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Poverty in the Philippines 
Abstract
Poverty remains as a formidable challenge for the Philippine 
Government. Despite the Government's various development plans, 
policies and programs from 1962 through to 1997 that addressed 
poverty, the number of Filipinos living below the poverty line is still 
substantial.
In the attempt to gain a deeper understanding of this policy 
problem this thesis is concerned with considering various aspects - but 
only aspects - of poverty in the Philippines. This is done by considering 
a range of pertinent issues that provide results that add to our 
understanding of poverty in the Philippines.
The thesis is broken up into three parts. In Part I the discussion is 
concerned with determining if the alleviation of poverty is seen as being 
an issue of major social importance in the Filipino community. This issue 
is explored by determining if diverse groups of Filipinos could arrive at a 
consensus in the selection of a principle of distributive justice under 
conditions of economic uncertainty. The experimental results presented 
indicate the remarkable result that a representative sample, drawn from 
the Filipino community, can agree unanimously on a single system of 
justice in distribution - a system that sets as a priority the elimination of 
poverty. These results have implications for political philosophy, social 
choice theory and policy implementation in the Philippines.
In Part II some of the possible causes of poverty in rural 
Philippines are considered. Chapter 3 is concerned with the analysis of 
provincial data to determine what factors cause the levels of household 
income per capita and poverty to vary across provinces in the 
Philippines. In contrast, the contents of Chapter 4 provide an analysis of 
information provided by detailed surveys carried out in two diverse 
villages. These two chapters provide new results and confirm other 
results scattered throughout an extensive relevant literature. Broadly 
these results suggest that the alleviation of poverty will require that
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appropriate policy action needs to be mounted simultaneously on a 
number of relevant fronts.
Part III is concerned with determining some of the possible 
consequences that flow from poverty in the Philippines. In Chapter 5 use 
is made of provincial data. There it is indicated, for instance, that the 
reduction of poverty probably needs to be part of any program that 
attempts to reduce infant and child mortality rate, and the total fertility 
rate. In Chapter 6 attention turns to consider the influence of poverty, 
after allowing for other relevant factors, on the age-adjusted height for 
age of young children - a variable which is a sensitive indicator of the 
level of well-being for a community. Micro data is employed. It is shown 
that poverty, widely redefined (to include not just household income 
measures but also the level of education in the family and a range of 
other considerations), has a clear influence on the age-adjusted height 
for age of young children.
In the concluding chapter, Chapter 7, the major findings are 
presented and policy implications are drawn from these findings.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A Brief Overview of the Poverty Situation in the 
Philippine Context
Poverty poses a formidable challenge to the Philippine 
Government. In a span of almost four decades (1962-1997) despite the 
government's various development plans, policy measures and public 
investment programs to alleviate poverty the number of people in the 
Philippines living below the poverty line remains substantial.1 The latest 
official statistics show that in absolute terms the size of the population 
that received incomes at or below the poverty line increased from 26.2 
million in 1985 to 27.2 million in 1997 (NSCB 1996: 21 and the NSCB 
Technical Working Group on Income Statistics 1997: 14). The former 
figure represents 49.3 and the latter 40.6 per cent of the total population 
of the country, respectively. A higher level of poverty (though less 
recent) was cited by the World Bank. The proportion of the population
1 The poverty line is the minimum income per annum (or month) which would 
enable a family to finance their essential food and non-food requirements. Computation 
of the food line is based on a nutritional requirement of 100 per cent of the per capita 
recommended dietary allowances (RDA) for protein and energy and 80 per cent of the 
per capita RDA for vitamins, minerals, and other nutrients as recommended by the 
Philippines' National Nutrition Council (Marquez and Virola 1994: 7). Non-food needs, on 
the other hand, are based on the ratio of the basic non-food expenditures to total 
expenditures taken from the Family Income and Expenditures Survey performed by the 
National Statistical Office (Marquez and Virola 1994: 9). Basic non-food expenditures 
include fuel, light and water, transportation and communication, household operations, 
personal care and effects, clothing, footwear and other wear, education, medical care, 
non-durable furnishings, rent and rental value of occupied dwelling unit, house 
maintenance and minor repairs, and taxes paid (NSO 1994 and 1996).
1
living below the poverty line was 52 per cent in 1985 and 54 per cent in 
1991 (World Bank 1998: 197).
That said, one factor that has contributed to the apparently slow 
decline in this percentage is that the Philippine economy suffered a 
slump in 1985 arising mainly from political instability. However, from 
1993 through to the late 1997, when the Asian economic crisis struck, 
the economy showed signs of recovery (NEDA 1986 and NSCB 1998).
Within this context the alleviation of poverty has been a major 
concern of the Philippine Government. One reason why this is so is 
because, as indicated below, leaders in the Government recognise that 
the comparative high level, and any increase in this level of poverty in 
the community, may be a potential cause of political unrest and social 
instability. As the poor increasingly lose confidence in their government 
to improve their plight they may weli begin to support groups opposed to 
the governing administration. In fact, to some extent this occurred in the 
1970s and the 1980s in that the insurgency movement in the Philippines 
grew and gained the support of the poor - especially the rural 
peasantry.2 In response to this growth in the insurgency movement, in 
the 1990s various groups - such as the Catholic Church, opposition 
parties, media, academics and the environmentalists - lobbied the 
Philippine Government to assist the poor.3 It is possible, they argued,
2 For a discussion on the rural poor and the insurgency movement see, for 
instance, Santos and Lee (1989), Burton (1989), Putzel (1992), Bulatao (1992) and 
Kerkvliet (1995).
3 These groups argue that it is the government's responsibility to provide, amongst 
other things, programs that create jobs, basic education, adequate nutrition and health 
care, and low-cost housing (for example, Profile Jaime Ongpin: not Running, Now or Ever 
1984: 9, Profile Salvador Laurel: no Plans, he says, for ‘87 1984: 6, Diokno 1987: 78-80, 
and Villegas 1993: 59). Apart from the government, the complementary role of private 
volunteer associations in the provision of health, nutrition, and educational programs also 
has been emphasised by Villegas (1992: 90 and 1993: 60).
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that if poverty is not addressed by the Government a rebellion may erupt 
resulting in a radical shift in the political system4. This view was given 
added credence when President Ramos, on the occasion of the tenth 
anniversary of the People's Power Revolution (of 1986), stated that if the 
mitigation of poverty was not addressed, then this prevalence of poverty 
may be the central cause of the next revolution in the Philippines 
(Ramos: Poverty Will Spark New Revolution 1996: 1).
That various sections of Philippine society believe that this is the 
central reason why poverty should be alleviated - which is that its 
alleviation will reduce the risk of social and political instability - is a view 
also reflected in parts of the study reported in Chapter 2 in Part I of this 
thesis. Of more importance, however, this study sets out to determine if, 
indeed, the alleviation of poverty is a priority amongst members of the 
Philippine community. Determining if this is the situation is of importance 
from the perspective of the successful implementation of poverty 
alleviation policies. Specifically, if the alleviation of poverty does receive 
wide support, then this should increase the success of poverty alleviation 
policies compared to the instance where this level of support is absent.
As for the empirical results of the study reported in Chapter 2, they 
indicate that the elimination of destitution and poverty is a priority for a 
community that is faced with considerable economic uncertainty and the 
potential for social and political chaos. As argued later, these general 
circumstances facing a representative community are not dissimilar to
4 This view was also articulated by an old man in a fishing village in Lake Taal in 
Laguna, Philippines (Pye-Smith 1997: 27) who suggested: 'What we need is a
revolution. We need a new system. The whole country depends on peasants and 
fishers for food.' Villegas (1992: 218) states that some critics of the Aquino administration 
claimed that democracy in the Philippines was 'in deep trouble' because of worsening 
mass poverty and increased unemployment.
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those that are pervasive in the Philippines. In addition, the findings 
reported in Part I and as pointed out there have some important 
implications that go well beyond just understanding the economic, social 
and political environment to be found in the Philippines.
Another reason why the Government is concerned about the level 
of poverty in the Philippines is that its prevalence may hinder further 
economic development.5 Thus, and related to the previous remarks, the 
maintenance of political and social stability presumably would contribute 
towards increasing the rate of economic development. (Empirical 
evidence, based on cross-country data, supporting the assertion that has 
just been made is to be found in Perotti (1996).) This is not the only 
reason, however, why the prevalence of poverty may hinder economic 
development. Since poor households generally have few or no assets, 
little or no education, inadequate nutrition, poor health and a relatively 
iarge number of children, they therefore have comparatively little 
capacity to contribute to the economic and social development of the 
community as a whole. Thus, without the capability of these households 
being raised such that they can take greater advantage of economic 
opportunities that are available, the rate of economic and social 
development of the community will tend to be impaired.6,7 (This line of
5 Economic development refers not only to the growth of per capita income but 
also to improvements in the use and actual performance of the factors of production 
(such as land, labour, capital, and technology). See, for instance, Gillis et al. (1992: 8-9) 
and Ray (1998: Chapter 2) on this point.
6 On the capability approach to economic development see Sen (1986 and 1987). 
Also see the various essays in Nussbaum and Sen (1993).
7 It is possible that because they are mostly uneducated, unskilled and unhealthy, 
poor people tend to reside in agricultural areas or work in industries that require minimal 
skills and capital requirements and with low labour productivity (Balisacan 1996: 457). 
Another reason why the poorest of the poor cannot take advantage of the market is their 
lack of access to technology or credit (Villegas 1993: 178). This argument arises 
indirectly in Chapter 4 in the main text.
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argument also receives support from some of the empirical evidence to 
be found in Perotti (1996).) The question, however, is the following: how 
is the capacity of poor households to be raised?
Attempting to answer this sort of question is what motivates the 
analysis presented in Part II of this thesis. Specifically, the discussion in 
Part II is concerned with attempting to determine, in some detail, what 
factors contribute to causing well-being poverty - more will be said on 
this term soon - in the Philippines and in rural Philippines in particular. 
The reason for addressing this issue is that to determine how to design 
poverty alleviation programs that are reasonably effective it is essential 
to possess a reasonably deep understanding of the causes of poverty. 
That said, while I do not claim that the analysis provided in Part II has 
reached the depth of understanding of poverty in the Philippines that 
may be regarded as completely satisfactory, nevertheless it is suggested 
that the line of research adopted is going in the right direction.
As for the term well-being poverty, it is defined as the measure of 
poverty that takes into account not only the real incomes received by 
households but also the life expectancy attained and the level of 
education received by less well off members of the community. It is, 
above all, a measure of poverty that implicitly takes into account the 
capability of individuals to function effectively in the community and take 
advantage of the economic and other opportunities available in the 
community.
This well-being view of poverty in the Philippines is encountered 
throughout this thesis. For the present it is noted that the level of well­
being poverty will rise even further (if nothing is done to mitigate it) since
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well-being poor people tend to experience higher rates of malnutrition 
and infant and child mortality. (Relatively high rates of incidence of 
malnutrition and infant mortality rates have been observed in the less 
developed regions of the Philippines (Balisacan 1996: 521-3).) If this is 
so then this will impede a poor household in its attempt to maintain, let 
alone increase, its level of well-being. In addition, poor households also 
tend to degrade the environment in their attempt to maintain their levels 
of subsistence. Premature cutting of trees and over-cultivation of land by 
poor people often occur (Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources, 1990: 164-8). (Within the general theory of economic 
development, this theme is developed in some detail in Dasgupta (1993 
and 1995) and Dasgupta and Mäler (1995).) Thus again the prevalence 
of well-being poverty tends to impede economic development.
The issues raised in the previous paragraph provide the 
motivation for the discussion in Part III of this thesis. In that discussion 
the main emphasis is on determining in what ways a reduction in the 
amount of resources available to members of a community influences 
the capacities of these individuals in this community to function 
effectively. Thus, for instance, I consider what factors influence the 
height for age of young children and how changes in the level of well­
being poverty influence infant and child mortality rates. The discussion 
in this part of the thesis indicates that the high level of well-being poverty 
in the Philippines has the consequence of stunting the lives of poor 
individuals, if not bringing these lives to a premature end. This stunting 
of the physical capabilities of these people no doubt also makes it that 
more difficult for these individuals to develop their capabilities to a higher 
level and, thereby, achieve a higher level of well-being.
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To conclude these introductory remarks, attention returns to the 
matter of the definition of poverty. To begin with it is noted that the very 
definition and measures of poverty employed by the public authorities 
are likely to influence the very type and form of poverty-alleviation 
policies adopted. To explain, let a government adopt - as past 
governments of the Philippines have done - an income-only measure of 
poverty that implies that an individual is considered as being poor only if 
their annual incomes or expenditures fall below a certain income level - 
the poverty line - set by the government.8 The use of this definition 
almost certainly caused past Philippine Governments (prior to the Ramos 
Administration), in their attempt to reduce the level of poverty, to 
concentrate on increasing the incomes of the rural poor. This narrow 
income-only approach to poverty alleviation, however, may well achieve 
comparatively limited results if no allowance is made for the possibly 
wide range of factors that cause households to be poor.
This potential policy mistake is less likely to occur, however, if a 
much more inclusive well-being measure of poverty is used - a measure 
that includes variables that attempt to reflect the capacity of individuals to 
be able to participate more effectively in the institutions and operation of 
the community. Part of the reason for doing so is that, as the previous 
discussion indicated and as the subsequent discussion will indicate in 
far more detail, raising the capacities of individuals is essential if at least 
the incomes for these individuals are to be raised and if the adverse 
consequences of poverty are to be avoided - adverse consequences that 
make it more difficult to mitigate poverty. That being the case, it follows
8 There are various studies on the measurement of poverty lines in the Philippines 
from 1965 through to 1985 using various methodologies and definitions. See Balisacan 
(1994: 447). On the methodological issues in estimating poverty, see for instance 
Mangahas (1986 and 1993), Martina (1998a) and the references cited there.
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that a well-being measure of poverty will signal to the authorities that to 
alleviate poverty in the community the attack has to be mounted on a 
number of fronts simultaneously - not only on the front directed at raising 
the level of incomes for less well off households.9,10
Expressing this line of argument slightly differently, it should be 
recognised that the task of alleviating poverty is a complex issue. This 
complexity should be reflected in the design of poverty alleviation 
policies and how they are implemented.* 11 To assess these policies will 
require a well-being measure of poverty of the form indicated earlier. 
This general perception of how poverty should be measured and how 
poverty-alleviation policies should be conceived is very much influenced 
by the arguments developed in the various chapters that make up Parts II 
and III of this thesis.
1.2 Objectives of the Study Set Out in More Detail
As just indicated, the topic of poverty in the Philippines is a 
complex issue. It is not possible, therefore, to discuss all facets of 
poverty in the Philippines in a thesis. Consequently this thesis will 
concentrate on a range of major issues, or themes, that will allow a 
contribution to be made to our understanding of this broad topic. This 
remark implies that there is no central hypothesis to be tested throughout
9 Various measures of the level, and changes in the level of well-being poverty are 
discussed, for instance, in Martina (1996) and Qizilbash (1997).
10 Part of the discussion in Chapter 4 deals with the matter, within a particular 
context, of the measurement of community well-being. Various relevant references are 
cited there.
11 This theme is developed in great detail in Martina (1998b and 1998c).
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this thesis. Rather this study addresses a range of pertinent issues, or 
themes, that provide results that add to the existing literature dealing with 
poverty in the Philippines, and poverty in developing countries in 
general. These themes are reflected in the following more detailed 
statement of the structure of this thesis.
Part I of the thesis focuses on:
(i) determining how Filipinos perceive the broad issue of 
economic justice, what system of justice pluralistic groups of Filipinos 
would agree to under conditions of uncertainty, and of more importance, 
whether these diverse groups can agree, widely, on a system of justice 
in the distribution of incomes and endowments within the community. 
The results derived from this study provide considerable insights into the 
matter of under what circumstances a community is likely to reach, or not 
reach, wide agreement on issues of social importance. Above all it 
indicates that, in certain reasonably realistic circumstances, diverse 
groups of individuals in the Philippines can agree unanimously (or 
nearly so) that the elimination of poverty is a social objective, and that 
this objective should receive priority. As indicated earlier, the 
importance of this result, with respect to the implementation of poverty- 
alleviation policies in the Philippines, is that these policies will receive 
wide support in the community. Without this level of support effective 
implementation of such policies would be that more difficult.
In Part II of the thesis attention turns to the matters of:
9
(ii) analysing the causes of variations in the level of the incidence 
of poverty, household incomes and per capita income across the 
provinces in the Philippines, and
(iii) examining some of the characteristics of rural poverty in the 
Philippines and identifying some of the possible links between formal 
education, credit and the use of forest resources on the level of well­
being of the rural poor.
The final part, Part III of the thesis, is directed at:
(iv) assessing some of the demographic consequences 
associated with varying the level of poverty - more specifically, the 
possible effects of poverty on the rates of infant mortality, child mortality, 
fertility, morbidity and net migration, and
(v) identifying some of the possible factors that may influence the 
health status of young children in two Filipino villages.
Each one of these themes in Parts II and III is concerned in 
particular with considering the implications of the research findings for 
the design of more effective relevant policies that improve the well-being 
of poor people. It is also indicated at various stages in this thesis where 
there seems to be scope for further research.
1.3 Scope and Limitations of the Study
In view of time, financial and logistic constraints, the scope of the 
field work that generated the relevant information made use of in this
10
study was limited in emphasis, range and period of coverage. Since 
poverty in the Philippines has always been predominantly rural,12 the 
emphasis of the study was on rural poverty.
While most of the data that were used in the study were from the 
period 1991 to 1997, the chapters also looked at major government 
policies, plans and programs from 1962 through to 1998 that may have 
affected the rural poor.13 The author would have liked to have made use 
of time-series data to capture the dynamics of poverty across time. 
Unfortunately, however, statistical data on the economic and social 
variables required for analysis using the same sample of households 
were not available, or if these variables were available, they were not in 
sufficient detail. Thus, the absence of time-series data on the economic 
and social variables that were studied may be considered a limitation of 
this research. Generating relevant time series data sets therefore is a 
potential area for future research.
12 In 1961, rural households made up about 66 per cent of all poor households 
(Balisacan 1992). Nearly three decades later, this figure declined marginally to 62 per 
cent (Balisacan 1992). For a discussion of the extent and magnitude of rural poverty in 
the Philippines, see for instance, Quisumbing and Cruz (1986), Sajor (1993), de Dios 
(1993) and Balisacan (1996).
13 Between mid-1962 to mid-1998, the Philippine Government was under four 
administrations, namely: Macapagal (1962-1965); Marcos (1966-1986); Aquino (1986- 
1992); and Ramos (1992-1998). The first medium-term (Fiscal Years 1963-1967) 
integrated socio-economic plan for the country was approved only in 1963 by the 
Philippine Congress under the Macapagal administration. Prior to 1963 the Government's 
annual development plans were not submitted by the executive branch of government 
for congressional approval and thus gained very little political support. The year 1998 was 
chosen as the end-point of the study because this was the last year of the Ramos 
Government, under whose administration several major poverty alleviation programs were 
launched. This was also the year that a new President (Estrada), who ran under a pro­
poor platform, was elected.
11
1.4 Methodology Used In the Study
The data used in the chapters were derived from primary and 
secondary sources. Primary data were generated from the results of 
game-theoretic experiments, focus group discussions and informal 
interviews carried out while I was performing fieldwork in the Philippines 
for one year, from late November 1996 to late November 1997. 
Secondary data sources include development plans, policies, programs 
and statistical publications of the Philippine government as well as 
books, journals and thesis.
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used in analysing 
poverty in the Philippines. Quantitative methods included the 
formulation of regression models, the estimation of these models and the 
application of various statistical tests such as t-tests and F-tests. Without 
time-series data, available cross-section data sets were used to estimate 
these models.
Focus-group discussions were the main source for the use of 
qualitative methods. Another qualitative technique used was to conduct 
interviews with key informants to cross-check the information gathered 
from official reports concerning two villages that were studied in detail. 
Detailed discussions of the relevant methods employed to provide 
relevant data sets are contained in the relevant chapters.
As mentioned earlier, since the chapters looked at different 
aspects of poverty, a wide range of academic disciplines was drawn 
upon to provide insights to assist the development of the various
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analyses developed throughout the thesis - that is a multi-disciplinary 
approach was applied through this thesis. The disciplines drawn upon 
to varying degrees were: anthropology, demography, development 
administration, economics, economic history, econometrics, 
epidemiology, environmental management, game theory, geography, 
political philosophy, public health and political science.
1.5 A Synopsis of Each Chapter
The core of the thesis is made of five chapters. Chapter 2 is found 
in Part I, Chapters 3 and 4 make up Part II and Part III is composed of 
Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 7 is set out the conclusions and policy 
implications derived from the main findings presented in the thesis. Here 
I will provide a synopsis of each of the core chapters.
The discussion in Chapter 2 in Part I is concerned with answering 
the following question: Can wide, if not unanimous, agreement be 
reached by members of a diverse community on a system of justice in 
distribution used to guide the redistribution of endowments within this 
community? The answer to this question is important within the context 
of Philippine society since it should provide some insight into how 
effectively this community may be able to go about mounting an effective 
poverty-alleviation program. Clearly if there was wide agreement about 
this matter then strong political support is likely to be given to any 
reasonable poverty-alleviation program. The opposite would be the 
case if this level of agreement was absent. That said, Arrow's 
impossibility result suggests that the question that has just been posed 
will receive a negative answer if certain constraints are imposed on the 
procedures that a community employs in the attempt to make important
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community decisions. These conditions are criticised for not allowing for 
various types of uncertainty that face members of communities - 
especially communities in developing countries such as the Philippines. 
Two types of uncertainty are allowed for. The first type refers to the 
situation where individuals are faced with considerable economic 
uncertainty that cannot be adequately insured against in private markets. 
The other type of uncertainty arises within the context that if wide 
agreement cannot be reached over what system of justice in distribution 
should be applied in the community concerned, then a consequence 
may be that this community is faced with political and social chaos. 
These two classes of uncertainty are allowed for in the design of various 
game-theoretic experiments to determine if groups of individuals can 
come to agree, broadly, on a single system of justice in distribution. 
(These experiments are based on those devised by Fröhlich, 
Oppenheimer and Eavey (1987a and 1987b) and Fröhlich and 
Oppenheimer (1990 and 1992).) The individuals from the Philippines 
who participated in these experiments were asked to choose one out of 
four alternative systems of justice. One principle is interpreted as being 
a version of Rawls' first principle of justice and the priority rule - a 
principle that is related to Popper's principle of minimising avoidable 
suffering. It was this system of justice which was unanimously decided 
upon.
As indicated earlier, Part II is made up of Chapters 3 and 4 - 
chapters that are concerned with determining some of the factors that 
cause poverty in the Philippines. In Chapter 3 use is made of macro 
data from 1990 - 1991 for each of the seventy-three (73) provinces in the 
Philippines. The argument begins by citing studies that use econometric 
regression models to analyse variations in poverty incidence and
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household income in Bengal and Bangladesh. The insights derived 
from these studies are modified and adapted to the Philippine situation. 
The presence of multicollinearity in the independent variables used in 
the initial models creates considerable difficulties, however. In the 
attempt to mitigate this problem to some degree and still gain some 
insights into which independent variables influence the level of poverty 
and household incomes in the Philippines, use is made of a two-stage 
least squares estimation procedure.
In contrast the argument in Chapter 4 makes use of micro data to 
determine the possible links between and among education, credit, 
deforestation and well-being poverty at the village level. In this chapter 
two diverse Filipino village communities were intensively surveyed and 
then focus-group discussions were held.
As also indicated earlier, Part III is made up of Chapters 5 and 6. 
The argument in Chapter 5 is directed at considering the demographic 
and health consequences of poverty. In this chapter use is made of 
relevant macro data sets at the provincial level from 1990 and 1991. By 
way of making use of these data sets, econometric analysis is used to 
assess the demographic and health consequences that flow from the 
level of poverty in the Philippine community. In particular, the 
demographic variables that are of interest are infant mortality rates, child 
mortality rates, fertility rates, morbidity rates (resulting from water-borne 
diseases) and net migration. To determine the influence of rural poverty 
on selected demographic and health variables, five econometric 
regression models are constructed. As in Chapter 3, multicollinearity is a 
serious problem in carrying out the analysis. Consequently, again two- 
stage least squares is used to estimate relevant regression equations.
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Chapter 6, on the other hand, studies the possible consequences 
of poverty at the micro level. More specifically, in this chapter a multi­
variate regression analysis is performed to determine what factors are 
likely to influence the normalised height for age of children in early 
childhood in rural communities in developing countries. The height for 
age in early childhood in developing countries has been used widely as 
a measure of the health status of children in these countries. What is not 
so widely recognised is that this variable provides, for a range of 
reasons, an important sensitive indicator of the short- and longer-term 
levels of well-being of individuals in developing countries.
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Part I
Poverty Alleviation as Part of the System of 
Justice in the Philippines
17
Chapter 2
Diverse Groups of Filipinos Attempting to 
Decide on a System of Economic Justice
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Voices from the Philippines
Fundamental to the success of any concerted attempt to achieve 
the social objective of alleviating poverty in the Philippines is that there is 
widespread support within the Filipino community for the setting of this 
social objective. If there is no such support it seems reasonable to assert 
that any attempted poverty alleviation program in the Philippines will 
meet with little success. These observations provide the initial 
motivation for the argument developed in this chapter. That said, it is not 
straightforward to generate satisfactory empirical information to 
determine if there is widespread support in the Filipino community for the 
social objective of the alleviation of poverty in the Philippines.
To explain, suppose the simple approach is adopted and 
individual Filipinos are asked, directly, their views on the matter of the 
alleviation of poverty in the Philippines. The weakness with this 
approach, however, is that the respondents are not faced with the 
consequences that may flow from their replies. For instance, if a 
concerted poverty alleviation program was implemented, the 
respondents may have increased levels of taxation imposed upon them
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as part of the attempt to generate the revenue required to finance the 
implementation of this program. If the respondents were aware of this 
consequence, they may provide a different answer to the question posed 
- compared to the situation where they were not faced with this 
consequence.
It follows that a quite different approach has to be adopted in the 
attempt to generate reliable relevant information. This I do by carrying 
out appropriate game-theoretic experiments in which diverse groups of 
Filipinos are faced with a range of alternative systems of justice. These 
groups are then expected to agree, unanimously, on a single system of 
justice. In making their choices, the groups of respondents are always 
faced with the consequences of their choices. In addition, the 
respondents are faced with economic uncertainty of the type prevalent in 
the Philippines. Given this realistic context, and if such groups can 
agree unanimously on a system of justice that incorporates the principle 
of the elimination of poverty in the community, then it seems reasonable 
to assert that reliable and useful information has been generated that 
policy-makers in the Philippines can make use of.
To provide a little more detail concerning these game-theoretic 
experiments, sixty-two (62) groups, each made up of four or five Filipino 
students or of government employees were asked to deliberate carefully 
over what system of justice in distribution they would prefer to see 
applied to guide the distribution of a given endowment between the 
members of each group. Each group was then asked to decide 
unanimously upon some system of justice in distribution. The context 
within which these decisions were to be made is that the members of 
each group were faced with various types of uncertainty.
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The flavour of these discussions that led up to the decisions that 
were made in these experiments is indicated by the following selection 
of comments taken from the transcripts:
Voice 1: When you maximise the average income with a floor constraint, 
[that is, all members of the group are to receive a basic amount of income] 
you are considering the income of the poorest of the poor. That is, I think, 
the essence of justice. The poor, regardless of whatever income the 
highest or the middle class receive, at least the lowest level could be 
helped. At least they feel secure. ... What makes a floor constraint 
necessary is to make people feel secure.
Voice 2: If you don't have [a] feeling of [economic] security what
happens? You panic! [When you don't have money you] will resort to 
borrowing and everything. For me, it is better to be sure that you can get 
some money somewhere when you need it.
Voice 3: [A minimum income needs to be provided to all in the community to 
prevent] the danger of poverty... .
Voice 4: ...[and] political instability. If society is not stable, then ... .
Voice 5: ... the people in the low income level might resort to other things 
that may not be good for society.
Voice 6: Such as?
Voice 7: Crime.
Voice 8: The problem with [providing a floor income to all in the community] 
is that [the least well-off] will be discouraged from working...
Voice 9: In maximising the average [income subject to a floor constraint] 
there would be an incentive for people to attain a higher level of income. 
The poor will work harder at the same time [as] they feel safe that their 
incomes will not fall below the floor level.
Part of the reason for citing these comments (which are discussed 
further in some detail in section 2.5) is that they are reminiscent of parts 
of relevant arguments put forward to justify, or in criticism  of certain
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systems of justice in distribution - arguments to be found in various 
writings in modern political philosophy. This observation and the earlier 
brief comments (on why game-theoretic experiments are performed in 
order to generate acceptable information) implies that the game- 
theoretic experiments of interest here have implications which go 
beyond just identifying relevant community views in the Philippines. In 
particular, it has implications for determining what factors may influence 
any community (not just any Filipino community) in attempting to come to 
agree on a system of justice. This is a matter of some intellectual and 
social importance and, therefore, needs to be discussed carefully.
This general observation becomes that more important in the 
present study since the diverse groups of Filipinos who participated in 
the game-theoretic experiments described later agreed unanimously 
that the elimination of poverty and destitution in the Philippines should 
be a priority. This is a remarkable experimental result. This is so since 
some important theoretical social choice literature (concerned with 
determining how a community may come to agree on matters of social 
importance) suggests that reaching such a level of agreement is highly 
unlikely if certain conditions are applied to the community's decision 
processes. But not only does the experimental evidence reported here 
provide contrary results, the designs of the game-theoretic experiments 
also indicate what general conditions probably need to apply in order to 
ensure that a community is capable of coming to agree, unanimously, 
on a system of justice that sets as a priority the elimination of poverty and 
destitution. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that this result is 
of considerable general intellectual interest which bears on a wide 
literature which is concerned with how communities attempt to come to 
agreements on matters of justice in distribution.
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For these reasons, some care is taken in this chapter in setting out 
and explaining the broad context within which the game-theoretic 
experimental results reported later should be interpreted. This 
explanation of the context within which the relevant game-theoretic 
experiments take place is provided in the rest of this introduction and in 
various sections in the rest of this chapter.
2.1.2 Introductory comments on the Arrow Impossibility 
Theorem
The groups of Filipinos were drawn, explicitly, from comparatively 
diverse groups from within the Philippine society in the attempt to ensure 
that these groups, when taken as a whole, held diverse and opposing 
views concerning a range of issues of social importance. As indicated in 
section 2.4, these groups did hold diverse opinions on some relevant 
important social issues - in short, these groups of participants were 
pluralistic. That being the case, and given the important social issue the 
groups of Filipino participants were asked to decide upon unanimously, 
the issue that immediately springs to mind is the following:
Question 1: Can groups of individuals who hold differing views on a 
range of social issues, come to agree unanimously (or nearly so), on a 
single system (out of at least three systems) of prudential justice in 
distribution - a system that will be used to guide the distribution of the 
total community endowment between members of this community?
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In commenting on this question, first it is noted that the term 
'prudential justice' alludes to the presumption that the community is 
asked to agree on a system of justice that will make the lives of 
individuals in the community better in relevant respects. And while this 
agreement will bring these improvements, individual lives almost 
certainly do not reach some sort of perfection - even after allowing for all 
relevant considerations. In addition, within the context of considering 
prudential justice, metaphysical moral issues are not the only issues that 
are likely to be considered when deciding upon some system of 
justice.14
As for the answer that is likely to be given to question 1, that will 
depend upon the procedures, or rules the community applies to govern 
the conversion of individual orderings of alternative relevant systems of 
justice into an aggregated social ordering of community preferences. 
For instance, if the procedures employed in the community concerned 
just satisfy the conditions required to derive Arrow's (1951 and 1963) 
impossibility theorem, then that theorem suggests that question 1 will 
receive a negative answer. Moreover, this negative answer is meant to 
apply to all societies for any period in history.
This insight, suggested by Arrow’s impossibility result, has served 
the purpose of inducing many to think about what reasonable alternative 
conditions, to those proposed by Arrow, could be used to produce 
possibility results. Certainly a casual perusal of the relevant history for 
some (but not all) societies suggests to us that acceptable and realistic 
possibility results are likely to exist. Specifically, certain societies made
14 See Griffin (1996: 19-31) for a discussion of prudential systems of justice and 
how members of a community may go about making their lives better.
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up of diverse groups have moved towards arriving at a broad pluralistic 
consensus over what constitutes an acceptable system of justice in 
distribution that is used to reduce conflicts between individuals and 
social groups, over issues of social importance, to acceptable levels.
Reaching this broad agreement is not surprising, however, if the 
community concerned wishes to become reasonably liberal, stable and 
well organised. This is so since if this broad consensus is not reached, 
and the distribution of a community's total endowment remains 
comparatively unevenly distributed between members of the community, 
then this community is likely to be plagued by bouts of political, social 
and economic instability.15 Eventually, however, generations of 
individuals come to learn from the relevant experiences and mistakes of 
their forebears and of their own generation and, thereby, recognise the 
need to compromise over the system of justice that each individual may 
wish to see implemented. In so doing each individual realises that each 
will benefit from the reasonable level of political, social and economic 
stability that eventually results from reaching a consensus over the 
system of justice in distribution that comes to be applied in this 
community. Finally, but not least, history suggests that an indefinite and 
unpredictable amount of time is required to reach the required level of 
agreement.
15 There is some indirect empirical evidence, based on recent historical experience, 
that provides some support for the argument just presented in the main text. Specifically, 
in an econometric study that draws on cross-country data sets covering the period 1960 
through to the mid-1980s, Perotti (1996) has shown that, after allowing for other relevant 
factors, there is a statistically significant positive relationship between a measure of 
personal income inequality within a country and a measure of political instability in this 
community. Thus, on average, an increase in the level of personal income inequality 
induces a greater level of political instability (as defined).
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For the reasons indicated at the beginning of this introduction, this 
line of argument needs to be tested to determine if it applies, or will come 
to apply in the Philippines. This is done by ways other than the casual 
perusal of relevant history. Specifically, I carry out game-theoretic 
experiments that are designed to represent relevant important types of 
uncertainty that face a community attempting to decide on a single 
system of justice. The design of these experiments is discussed in the 
next sub-section and in section 2.4. The experimental results obtained 
and presented in section 2.5 indicate that numerous and diverse groups 
of individuals are able to reach a unanimous agreement over the same 
single system of justice that is used, subsequently, to guide the 
distribution of an endowment between members of each group. In other 
words, the participants in the experiments bear the consequences of 
their decisions. What is more, some evidence is provided in section 2.5 
that indicates that individuals, once the relevant system of justice is 
unanimously agreed upon, did not attempt to take advantage, at the 
expense of others, of the application of the distributional rules embodied 
in the system of justice unanimously decided upon. Rather, individuals 
appeared to behave cooperatively by contributing to the best of their 
ability to the functioning of the community. Why this is so is a matter 
which is left to be considered at the end of section 2.5.
The various observations made over the previous few paragraphs 
suggest the following supplement to question T.
Question 2: What non-trivial alternative conditions to the Arrovian 
conditions imposed on the decision procedure used to decide on a 
prudential system of justice in distribution, that reflect important aspects
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of the uncertain circumstances that individuals face in the world as it is, 
would ensure that Question 1 is provided with a positive answer?
Finding an acceptable answer to this question forms a central part 
of the discussion presented in this chapter.16 To begin such an answer 
first the Arrovian conditions are discussed in section 2.2 and certain 
alternative conditions are suggested. These alternative (albeit loosely- 
defined) conditions are then put to the test by performing appropriately 
designed game-theoretic experiments that appeal to the moral intuition 
of the participants. The clear-cut results that emerge by performing these 
experiments indicate that indeed some of the original Arrovian 
conditions need to be replaced with conditions that reflect more closely 
the world that exists at least in Philippine society. After taking into 
account the results derived from these experiments, the precise form of 
the recommended alternative conditions is set out in section 2.6.
Finally, it is emphasised here that had the experimental results 
indicated that groups of individuals did not reach consensus, or near 
unanimous agreement on a system of justice in distribution, then clearly 
this would require that no modification of the Arrovian conditions was 
required.17 Since this was not the case, these experimental results do 
suggest that some of the Arrovian conditions do need to be replaced with 
acceptable alternative conditions.
16 Other attempts have been made to answer questions similar to that set out in 
question 2 in the main text. See, for example, Sen (1977) and the references cited 
there, Hylland (1991) and Roemer (1996: 37 - 48).
17 See Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) on the methodology of appealing to the moral 
intuition of pluralistic groups of individuals to test the acceptability of various systems of 
justice in distribution.
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2.1.3 Introductory comments on the game-theoretic 
experiments and the Rawlsian system of justice
The design of the game-theoretic experiments is based upon the 
various experiments described in Fröhlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey 
(1987a and 1987b) and Fröhlich and Oppenheimer (1990, 1992 and 
1996). These experiments were designed specifically to test if a 
sizeable proportion of the members of a community, when faced with 
certain types of uncertainty, would decide to adopt Rawls' (1971 and 
1993) second principle of justice in distribution, or some other principle. 
It turns out, however, that these experiments also provide an opportunity 
(as indicated in the previous sub-section) to determine what reasonable 
conditions, if any, imposed on a community decision procedure, may 
induce members of a community to come to agree, unanimously or 
nearly so, on what single system of justice in distribution should be 
applied in this community.
As for the interpretation of the design of these experiments, one 
possible interpretation is that made by Fröhlich, Oppenheimer and 
Eavey. Their interpretation is that they all incorporate some 
representation of the Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance' behind which all 
members of the community are completely ignorant as to their future life 
prospects.18 From behind this veil of ignorance in the initial situation 
individuals now are expected to come to a unanimous agreement over 
what system of justice in distribution is to be applied in this community. If
18 In more detail, the 'veil of ignorance' refers to a situation where individuals, when 
deciding on a system of justice, are not supposed to know their future talents, skill, 
tastes, or status in the society (Rawls 1971 and 1993). Rawls stressed that the 
importance of applying the concept of a 'veil of ignorance' lies in its implications; namely, 
that individuals now are stripped of their family antecedents and, as a consequence, 
have no bargaining advantage in the deliberations over deciding on a system of justice 
(Rawls 1993: 22-8).
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no such agreement can be reached, then the uncertainty associated with 
the veil of ignorance persists. That said, and as recognised by Fröhlich 
and Oppenheimer (1996) for instance, in reality it is not possible to 
replicate Rawls' veil of ignorance in game-theoretic experiments.
A less demanding interpretation and the one which is favoured in 
this chapter, is that the design of these game-theoretic experiments 
represents important aspects of the circumstances that currently are to 
be found in economically developing communities where some eighty 
(80) per cent of the world's population live.19 Specifically, a relatively 
large proportion of the members of these communities is faced with 
considerable economic uncertainty as a result, in part, of these 
individuals having little or no access to complete formal, or informal risk 
markets or credit markets. This is a theme which is expanded upon in 
Chapter 4, but for the present it is noted that the use of these markets for 
mitigating risk would ailow the mitigation, if not the elimination, of various 
types of uncertainties.20 Faced with these economic uncertainties, as 
before, individuals now are expected to reach wide agreement over what 
system of justice in distribution should come to be applied in this 
community. Should this level of agreement not be reached, then the 
community now may be faced with the added uncertainty of possible 
socio-political instability.
19 The countries classed as developing are those that attained a per capita income 
in 1995, measured at international prices, of US$11,450 or less (World Bank 1997: 214).
20 More detailed discussions of this matter are surveyed in Besley (1995), Martina 
(1998b) and Ray (1998: Chapters 14 and 15).
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Given this last interpretation of the design of the game-theoretic 
experiments to be employed here, it would seem entirely appropriate 
that these experiments be carried out in the community of an 
economically developing, instead of a developed, country. This so 
since in such a community the participants, presumably, would be more 
aware than those from an economically developed country of the 
difficulties associated with contending with the general class of 
economic uncertainties alluded to in the previous paragraph. This is 
precisely what was done by way of carrying out these experiments in the 
Philippines in 1997, a country with a per capita income, in 1995 and in 
international prices, of US$2,850 (World Bank 1997: 214).
The experimental design contrasts with that employed in the 
Fröhlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey, the Fröhlich and Oppenheimer 
papers (and book) and in papers by others who have employed the 
Frohlich-Oppenheimer-Eavey experiment, in these experiments the 
participants were students drawn from communities - North American,21 
Polish22 and Australian23 - in which, it seems reasonable to assert, is not 
to be found the types and level of economic uncertainty prevalent in the 
Philippines (in 1997). I conjecture, therefore that these participants are 
likely to be less sensitive than the Filipino participants to the need to 
reach wide agreement on the adoption of a system of justice that would 
allow members of a community to cope reasonably successfully with the 
types of economic uncertainty that are pervasive in developing
21 The universities were the University of Maryland, University of Manitoba, and the 
Florida State University.
22 See Lissowski, Tyszka and Okrasa (1991). This study is flawed, however, since 
only five minutes were allowed for relevant decisions to be made. This matter is touched 
upon in section 4.
23 See Jackson and Hill (1995).
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countries.24 This conjecture tends to be supported by the experimental 
results reported in section 2.5, and those reported in, for example, 
Fröhlich and Oppenheimer (1992) and elsewhere. Specifically, and as 
indicated earlier, all sixty-two (62) groups of participants in the game- 
theoretic experiments carried out in the Philippines agreed unanimously 
on a particular system of justice in distribution - a system of justice that 
would allow individuals to cope with the economic uncertainty they 
faced. In contrast, in the other studies cited earlier a much lower level of 
agreement was reached on the same system of justice. (The level of 
agreement reached was about eighty (80) per cent of all groups in 
Fröhlich and Oppenheimer (1992) and around seventy (70) percent in 
the Polish and Australian studies.)
An apparent implication that can be derived from these limited 
comparative experimental results is that the culture and the relevant 
long-term circumstances to be found in the community of which an 
individual is a member influences this person’s impartial judgment of 
what system of justice in distribution s/he finds acceptable. Thus an 
individual is not necessarily an autonomous self whose judgments of 
issues of social importance are uninfluenced by the traditions of the 
community of which this person is a member.25 This line of argument, 
which is never taken into account by Rawls (1971 and 1993) in the 
process of devising his system of justice, is returned to briefly in section 
2 .6 .
24 In the case of the participants from Poland, while the average Polish is not 
considered wealthy compared to an average person living in a developed country, still the 
Polish participants are faced with less economic uncertainty than the Filipino participants 
since their basic needs are provided by the Polish Government.
25 The empirical results cited in the main text also tend to support Sandel (1982: 
179) and (MacIntyre (1988: 353) who argue that the community of which an individual is a 
member shapes his or her judgments on matters of social importance.
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As for the system of justice decided upon, it is that all in the 
community are provided with a floor level of income, after which this 
community is left free to maximise the average level of income for the 
community. Expressed differently, the community sets out to maximise 
the average level of community income subject to the constraint of 
providing a floor level of individual income for all in the community. 
Clearly such a system of justice, if implemented, removes one of the 
major uncertainties facing members of the community; namely, the risk of 
falling into destitution.
It is also pointed out in sub-section 2.3.1 that this system of justice 
in distribution is a simplified version of Rawls' first principle of justice and 
the priority rule. What is more, as argued in sub-section 2.3.2, this 
version of the Rawlsian system of justice is similar to the principle of 
minimising the level of avoidable suffering in a community - a principle 
that was recommended much earlier by Karl Popper (1945). Despite this 
similarity, it is also indicated in that sub-section that the arguments 
employed by Popper and Rawls, to justify their respective systems of 
justice, are quite different.
Finally, it is readily acceded that the simplified Rawlsian system of 
justice does not provide a detailed set of criteria for assessing and 
comparing various relevant social states. Nevertheless, this system 
does serve the useful social purpose of indicating what system of justice 
is likely to receive wide acceptance within certain types of communities. 
If this system of justice is agreed to, its application will assist this 
community to attain the social objective of a more stable, well-ordered 
and liberal society. What is more, the simplified Rawlsian system of
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justice does not allow certain types of changes in social states to be 
compared and ranked in ways that make comparatively limited demands 
on information. This matter is returned to at the end of section 2.6, while 
concluding comments are made in section 2.7.
The next two sections will provide some information on the 
literature being referred to in this chapter; namely, that relating to Arrow's 
impossibility theorem and Rawls' principles of distributive justice.
2.2 Possible alternatives to the Arrovian conditions
Kenneth Arrow (1951 and 1963) set out to determine if a system 
(the social welfare function) existed that, while it satisfied what seems to 
be a list of reasonable conditions, could be used to convert information 
on individual orderings of social alternatives into a single social 
ordering. Such a list of conditions is the following:
P (Weak Pareto Principle): For any alternatives x and y, if all individuals 
prefer x to y, then the society prefers x to y (xPy).
D (Non-Dictatorship): There is no individual such that, for any set of 
individual orderings, for any alternatives x and y, if this individual prefers x 
to y then society prefers x to y regardless of the preferences of all others 
in the community.
U (Unrestricted Domain): For any set of alternatives and any set of 
individuals, the domain of the information considered in the social welfare 
function includes all orderings of alternatives by all individuals.
I (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives): How a community orders any 
alternatives x and y depends only on how individuals order x and y and 
no other information matters.
CR (Collective Rationality): The social welfare function should result in 
orderings of alternatives that are complete (that is, x is at least as good as 
y (xPy), or y is at least as good as x (yPx), or both) and transitive (that 
is, if xPy, and yPz, then xPz).
It turns out, however, that no social welfare function satisfies these 
five conditions when taken together and if there are at least three
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alternatives to be rank ordered (Mueller 1979: Chapter 10). The 
conditions that do most to precipitate this impossibility result are 
conditions U, I and CR.
To begin with condition U implies that a great deal of information 
may need to be taken into account when attempting to rank social states. 
As for attempting to decide on this matter, this task is not assisted by 
imposing condition I since it requires that only a comparatively limited 
range of information can be used to organise and interpret all the 
alternatives generated by imposing condition U. In particular, the 
imposition of condition I implies that, during the attempt to rank the 
alternatives x and y, it is not permitted to take into account information on 
the intensity of individual preferences, or information concerning the 
context within which such an ordering is to be attempted, or any other 
information about other alternatives that individuals may wish to make 
use of. Finally, CR imposes a requirement that the ordering of the 
alternatives (of which there must be at least three) needs to satisfy 
certain requirements that may be seen to be excessive.
As others have done it seems reasonable to argue, however, that 
a pluralistic community, when attempting to rank alternative social states, 
reasonably could take into account a different range of information than 
that required by the imposition of conditions U, I and C R .26 For 
instance, a community could take less information in account than that 
required by condition U in arriving at acceptable social orderings.27 In
26 See for example, Sen (1970), Hurley (1989: 234-5, 237-8), Roemer (1994: 
Chapter 9), Hausman and McPherson (1996: Chapter 12), Roemer (1996: 37-8), 
Qizilbash (1997: 2012-3) and Barry (1998: 194).
27 This point was recognised by Hurley (1989: 235) who observed: ‘We expect a 
scientific theory to tell us what to believe given the data we have about the way the world 
is; but we do not also expect it to tell us what we ought to have believed if the world had
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the present study individual choices between relevant alternatives is 
limited to representing the reasonable presumption that most individuals 
living in developing countries (at least) face income streams that are 
completely variable, and these individuals are under-insured (and often 
hardly, implicitly or explicitly, insured) against this income variability. It is 
assumed in section 2.4 that this uncertain situation applies in the initial 
situation - and this is so even if the political system is stable and well- 
ordered.
As for the imposition of condition I, this prevents the use of 
relevant information that individuals may wish to take into account when 
attempting to decide on a social ordering of relevant alternatives x and y. 
In this regard, what is emphasised here is that individuals may wish to 
make use of information concerning the context within which a 
community attempts to reach agreement over a social ordering. To 
explain, suppose (drawing on Rawls (1993)) that a community is 
attempting to make an acceptable social ordering of relevant 
alternatives within the following context : If wide agreement is reached 
concerning a particular ordering of relevant alternatives, then desirable 
social consequences will flow from this decision (such as social and 
political stability). Should no such agreement be reached, then highly 
undesirable social consequences (such as political and social chaos) 
will result from this disagreement. Within this general context it seems 
reasonable to suggest that individuals are likely to make (eventually at 
least) compromises, if required, over the orderings they make in the 
attempt to reach wide agreement over the ranking of relevant
been different in certain significant respects.’ Similar sentiments were expressed by 
Barry (1998: 194 fn 25) who noted that condition U requires that: '[W]e must be able to 
produce a single ranking of all possible states of the world - a task that no person or 
institution ever faces or has any reason for facing.1
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alternatives. In particular, an individual may be willing to agree to the 
imposition of a reasonably fair system of justice even though this system 
is not this person's first choice. (If the proposed system of justice is not 
seen to be fair by some individuals, they may not agree to this system of 
justice even though social chaos may result from this failure to 
compromise. This possibility is returned to in sub-sections 2.5.3 and 
2.5.4.)
The contrasting context is that where no severe consequences 
flow from members of a community not being able to reach wide 
agreement on some ordering of the same set of relevant alternatives. 
Within the alternative context it seems reasonable to assert that some 
individuals, at least, will not compromise over their individual orderings 
of relevant alternatives. Consequently, no broad agreement can be 
reached over some single relevant ordering.
It follows that the presence, or absence, of severe social 
consequences flowing from members of a community not being able to 
reach a widely-agreed ordering of relevant alternatives may well be 
information individuals take into account when attempting to reach wide 
agreement on a system of justice. Nevertheless, the imposition of 
condition I implies the discarding of all relevant information concerning 
the context within which these individual orderings are to be made. It 
seems reasonable to argue, however, that this condition should be 
replaced with one that does take this information into account.28 The
28 It has also been argued by Roemer (1996: 215-7) that the use of bargaining 
theory, to decide matters of distributive justice, is not convincing when no allowance is 
made for the context within which the bargaining takes place.
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point is reflected in the design of the game-theoretic experiments 
discussed in section 2.4.
To summarise the argument in the last few paragraphs, there are 
two types of uncertainty that need to be allowed for when considering the 
mechanism a community might employ to convert individual orderings of 
alternative systems of justice in distribution into a social ordering of these 
alternatives. The one type of uncertainty reflects the under-insured 
variable income streams that are assumed to face each individual in the 
community concerned. All individuals face this economic uncertainty 
before any community decisions are made concerning the ordering of 
alternative systems of justice in distribution. The second type of 
uncertainty relates to that which may face the community, taken as a 
whole, after a community decision has been made (or not made) 
concerning the ordering of systems of justice. Specifically, this 
uncertainty arises from the assumption that if the community cannot 
reach wide agreement on what single system of justice in distribution 
should be applied, then adverse social consequences may well flow 
from this indecision. This latter class of uncertainty sets the general 
context within which relevant social decisions are to be made.
Turning to the condition CR, it imposes a restriction which, if 
satisfied, produces information that is in excess of what is required if all 
the community needs to know is what system of justice in distribution is 
preferred to all the other alternative systems that are to be considered. 
Suppose, for instance, that there are at least four (4) alternative systems, 
and the community has agreed, unanimously, on which system of justice 
is socially preferred to the other three alternatives. This observation also
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is taken into account in the interpretation of the results derived from the 
running of the game-theoretic experiments described later.
If these proposed alterations to the relevant Arrovian conditions 
are applied, then it is conjectured that members of a community will be 
able to reach broad, if not unanimous, agreement on what system of 
justice in distribution should be applied in this community. This 
conjecture needs to be tested experimentally. This matter will be 
addressed in sections 2.4 and 2.5. Before doing so, however, it is useful 
to discuss briefly the more recent writings of John Rawls and much 
earlier relevant writings of Karl Popper since they shed additional light 
on the matters raised in this section.
2.3 Brief comments on Rawls' system of justice
2.3.1 Rawis! and some other systems of justice
The core assumption that led John Rawls to derive the system of 
distributive justice set out in Political Liberalism (1993, especially 
Lectures I, V and VIII)29 is that members of any community are faced with 
considerable uncertainty. This core assumption was also applied by 
Harsanyi (1953 and 1955). These two authors arrived at quite different 
conclusions, however, as to what system of justice a community would 
wish to adopt in these circumstances.
Harsanyi conjectures that when faced with this uncertainty ‘a 
group of rational self-interested individuals’ would select a principle
29 As indicated in the main text, this system of justice set out in Political Liberalism 
(1993) has a different emphasis to that set out in Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971).
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which would maximise the level of total utility for the community. Such a 
principle, according to Harsanyi, would result in the social welfare 
function taking the form of the sum (or mean) of all individual utility levels 
in the community. The cruder version of this principle adopted here is 
that the social welfare function taking the form of the sum of all individual 
income levels in the community.
In contrast, Rawls in Political Liberalism (1993) deduced that 
when members of a community are faced with considerable uncertainty, 
they would adopt, in their own self-interest, a system of justice that 
allowed this community to be stable and well-ordered.30 This system of 
justice, therefore, needed to be perceived by all members of the 
community as being just and fair to the extent that this system induces 
these individuals to accept, of their own volition, the workings of this 
community's basic institutions (Rawls 1993: 35). The only system of 
justice, Rawls argued, that would aliow this end to be achieved and 
thereby would ensure a stable and well-ordered society is that which 
contains as first principle the following: 'each person has an equal claim 
to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties' with this 
scheme being the same for all. Simultaneously, the priority rule also is 
meant to apply which requires that the first principle is satisfied as a 
priority, before attempting to apply any other principles of justice, 
whatever they may be (Rawls 1993: 5-6).
Rawls (1993: 6-7) also explained that to ensure that the first 
principle is indeed satisfied all citizens in the community should be
3U The idea of the need for a community to adopt a system of justice that will allow 
this community to be well-ordered and stable is also to be found in Barry (1995: 72). 
Specifically, he states: 'I define [the rules of justice] as the kind of rules that every society 
needs if it is to avoid conflict - on any scale from mutual frustration to civil war.'
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provided with the level of all-purpose income just adequate to ensure 
that all citizens are now placed in a position where they are able to learn 
about, and take effective advantage of, the basic rights and liberties the 
community has guaranteed them. In other words, all citizens are to be 
provided with a floor, or basic level of all-purpose income that is required 
to finance the meeting of an individual's basic needs. These needs have 
to be met if an individual is to be able to take advantage of Rawls' first 
principle.31 Once this floor income has been provided to all members of 
the community, it remains for this community to decide upon any 
additional principles of justice in distribution it may wish to apply.32 This 
may be referred to as the simplified Rawlsian principle of justice in 
distribution and the priority rule.
This system of justice has some links to a system of justice 
recommended many years earlier by Popper (1945: Chapter 9) as an 
alternative to the utilitarian principle of 'maximising the greatest amount 
of happiness for the greatest number'. However, the argument Popper 
employed to arrive at his recommendation is quite different from, and 
quite meagre compared to that developed by Rawls in Polit ical 
Liberalism to derive his system of justice. This matter is discussed 
briefly in the next sub-section.
31 In a community where private markets fail (as they most likely will) to supply public 
goods, an individual will also need to be provided with a basic supply of some appropriate 
public goods. The supply of these goods (such as basic education and preventive public 
health) is required, as well as a basic floor income, to allow this individual to take full 
advantage of the basic rights and liberties available in the community. However, to keep 
the argument in the main text simple, this complication is not allowed for here.
32 Similar systems of justice have been proposed by others - such as Barry (1973: 
77), Frankfurt (1987), Pogge (1989), and Peffer (1990: particularly 384-5 and 404). It is 
also pointed out that Diokno (1987: 30), a noted Filipino nationalist, proposed that the 
basic material needs of all be met first and then the improvement of the standard of living 
of all, but with special emphasis on the lower-income groups. The latter is similar to Rawls' 
second principle of distributive justice.
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In A Theory of Justice, Rawls also had extended his system of 
justice to include the well-known second principle that required, after the 
first principle had been satisfied, maximising access for the worst-off 
individuals in the community to a stock of basic, or primary goods. 
Presumably, to ensure this access the worst off in the community are 
provided with the all-purpose income to allow them to acquire access to 
these primary goods. In Political Liberalism, however, Rawls gives little 
emphasis to this second principle of justice.33 Nevertheless, this second 
principle of justice which is sometimes called the 'difference principle' 
may still be a principle that a community, faced with considerable 
economic uncertainty, would wish to adopt instead of the first principle. 
The simplified version of this principle referred to here requires that the 
all-purpose level of income received by the least well-off in the 
community is maximised.
These brief comments in the previous few paragraphs indicate 
that there are at least three alternative systems of justice that a 
community may wish to choose from under conditions of considerable 
uncertainty: (a) maximise the level of total income for the community; (b) 
the simplified Rawlsian first principle of justice and the priority rule; and 
(c) the Rawlsian second principle of justice. This list of alternative 
systems of justice can be increased to include an extension of Rawls' 
first principle of justice; namely: (d) all members of the community are to 
receive at least the floor level of all-purpose income and none are to 
receive a level of income above some agreed upper bound level of 
individual income.
33 Others also have noted that Rawls, in his more recent writings, has little to say 
about his second principle. See Laden (1991: particularly 215-7) and Pogge (1989: 
161).
40
Individuals within a community now are assumed to be faced with 
the task of choosing a single system of justice from these four alternative 
systems of justice. If the community can agree on such a system, then 
this system will be used to guide the distribution of the community's 
endowment among members of this group. To conform with reality, 
however, this choice has to be made under conditions of relevant types 
of uncertainty discussed in the previous section. The pertinent issue 
now becomes a variation of question 1 as set out in sub-section 2.1.2: 
Within this particular context can pluralistic groups of individuals come to 
agree unanimously (or nearly so) to the adoption of one of these 
alternative prudential systems of justice in preference to any other?
It is this question that Fröhlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey (1987a 
and 1987b) and Fröhlich and Oppenheimer (1990, 1992 and 1996) 
implicitly set out to answer by way of attempting to generate relevant 
empirical information that allowed an answer to the question posed. 
This the authors did by carrying out various game-theoretic experiments 
in which groups of participants were faced with relevant uncertain 
circumstances. The design of these experiments will be discussed in 
section 2.4.
It is noted that Fröhlich et al. (1987a, 1987b, 1990 and 1992) did 
not refer, explicitly, to Rawls’ first principle of justice and the priority rule. 
Rather they set the condition of the community being free to maximise 
the level of total community income subject to the constraint that all in the 
community are to be provided with a floor level of income. In other 
words, as a priority, all in the community are to be provided with a floor 
level of income. Once this condition, or constraint has been satisfied the 
community is left free to maximise the level of community income. This
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system of justice considered by Fröhlich et al. (1987a, 1987b, 1990 and 
1992) can be interpreted as a being a more particular version of Rawls’ 
first principle of justice and the priority rule. And it was this latter system 
of justice in distribution that, as noted earlier, Rawls subsequently came 
to emphasise in his Political Liberalism published in 1993.
2.3.2 Rawls' and Popper's principles of justice compared
As noted in the previous sub-section, there are some similarities 
between Rawls' first principle of justice and the priority rule, and the 
principle of justice recommended by Popper. Popper recommended that 
a community sets the social objective of minimising the level of 
avoidable suffering (Popper 1966: 158, 235 fn 6 and 285-6 fn 2).34 
While Popper does not explain what precisely he means by this 
principle, it seems reasonable to argue that this principle requires that, 
as a priority, all in the community are provided with access to a basic set 
of rights and liberties. What is more, in order to attain this social 
objective, as a priority all in the community are provided with, at least, a 
basic amount of all-purpose income that allows each individual to take 
advantage of the rights and liberties available to members of this 
community.35
This interpretation of the principle of minimising avoidable 
suffering is given some support by comments made later by Popper 
(1958) where he endorses the principle that a (Western) community
34 Use is being made here of the fifth edition of Popper (1945).
35 As before, difficulties posed by private markets failing to provide public goods, 
are ignored in the main text.
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should recognise that 'the struggle against poverty must not be left to 
chance' (Popper 1958: 216). By a society adopting this principle, and it 
being willing to make a concerted effort to fight poverty, 'testifies to the 
sincerity of its conviction' and, therefore, '[this society] has the right to put 
its ideas into practice' (Popper 1958: 217). Again, to achieve this 
objective, presumably, as a first priority all in the community should be 
given access to a basic amount of all-purpose income; that is access to 
enough income (or means to income) to ensure the elimination of 
(income-only) poverty.
There also are other similarities between the respective 
principles of justice in distribution recommended by Popper (1945) and 
later by Rawls (1993). Specifically, both saw the need to devise a 
system of justice that could be presented as a credible alternative to the 
utilitarian principle of maximising the level of community well-being - a 
principle of justice that both Rawls (1971) and Popper (1966) found 
suffering from serious defects. That said, the argument employed by 
Popper to justify his recommended principle of justice was quite different 
from that provided by Rawls (1971 and particularly 1993).
To explain, the comparatively limited relevant argument provided 
by Popper (1966: 158-9 and 1960: 84-5) is based upon pragmatic 
considerations; namely, the sole criterion for determining which principle 
of justice should be applied is that which can be most easily and 
effectively implemented. The principle of minimising avoidable suffering, 
Popper argued, would be comparatively easy to implement effectively 
compared to the considerable practical difficulties associated with 
implementing some more complicated and grandiose principle of justice 
such as maximising the level of community well-being. Also, if any
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mistakes are made in implementing this principle, then these mistakes 
are comparatively easy to correct.
It follows that Popper was concerned with the relative size of the 
relevant risks and uncertainties that arise after any particular principle of 
justice has been decided upon. In contrast, however, Rawls was very 
much (but not only) concerned with relevant risks and uncertainties that 
are present before any principle of justice has been decided upon.
Turning to Rawls, as is well known he assumes that a 
representative community is faced with a 'veil of ignorance' in the 
original position in which members of this community are negotiating 
over what system of justice to adopt.36,37 In other words, individuals are 
confronted with complete uncertainty as to the likelihood of future 
relevant events such that the probabilities attached to the occurrence of 
major contingent events cannot be determined. Thus it is quite possible 
that any individual may receive an income less than the floor level of 
individual income. If this does occur for the individual concerned, this 
person will be faced with disaster and destitution. In these 
circumstances this person is likely to be strongly risk averse. Thus any 
income this person receives which is below the floor level will be given a 
comparatively high value by this person. In contrast, in these
3b The present discussion draws on Rawls (1993: Lectures I and VIII), Laden (1991: 
216) and Martina (1998a: 74-5).
37 Rawls (1993: 22-8) stressed that the reason for imposing the assumption of the 
'veil of ignorance' is so that all individuals now were stripped of their family antecedents. 
As a consequence individuals have no bargaining advantage in the deliberations over a 
system of justice and, hence, no particular individuals or groups are able to impose their 
particular views and values on others in the bargaining process. It follows that any system 
of justice that is decided upon in this situation is likely to be seen to be fair by members of 
the community. Hence this system receives wide support - at least compared to that 
given to any system of justice that is the consequence of certain groups being able to 
apply their bargaining strength during negotiations over a system of justice.
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circumstances any additional income this person receives which places 
this person above the floor level is likely to be given a comparatively low 
value. Finally, and not least, it is assumed that all individuals will not be 
able to insure in private insurance markets against the uncertainties they 
face in the original position. (As noted in section 2.1.3, this is the 
situation that tends to apply in developing countries.) The reason is that 
the values of the probabilities attached to contingent events cannot be 
determined and, hence, no private insurer would be willing to provide 
insurance in these circumstances.
It follows that in this set of circumstances those individuals who 
are faced with the threat of devastating economic situations are likely 
(eventually at least) to see advantage for themselves by operating 
outside the structures created by current social, political and economic 
institutions. Faced with this threat of potential social and political 
instability, it seems reasonable, therefore, for prudent risk-averse 
members of a diverse community to regard it as being in their mutual 
interest to ensure that this system of justice in distribution is unanimously 
agreed upon (or nearly so).38 Once this system of justice is agreed to it 
is implemented and maintained indefinitely into the future. In contrast, if 
this agreement is not reached, then there is always the presence of the 
relatively high risk that social, political and economic instability will be 
prevalent in this community.
At this point it is noted that the two types of uncertainty referred to 
in the previous section are present in the Rawlsian thought experiment. 
Is the presence of these two types of uncertainty enough to induce the
See Rawls (1993: 27) on this point.
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overlapping consensus that the community should adopt Rawls’ first 
principle and the priority rule? Rawls (1993) implicitly reasoned that it 
was. The way in which this question is answered here is to carry out 
relevant game-theoretic experiments. These experiments will also 
provide a test to determine whether a community, when faced with 
relevant types of uncertainty, would adopt unanimously a simplified 
version of Popper’s principle of minimising avoidable suffering.
To conclude this section, more needs to be said about the 
motives individuals may have for adopting the Rawlsian first principle of 
justice and the priority rule. Only two types of motives have been 
considered up to now - the pragmatic motive alluded to by Popper and 
the motive of prudential self-interest emphasised by Rawls. There is 
likely, however, to be another motive which was not discussed by 
Popper or Rawls. Specifically, and bearing in mind that all individuals 
are faced with considerable uncertainty, each person may develop an 
empathy, and thereby a compassion for those, but yet unknown, unlucky 
individuals who will be faced with destitution (if nothing is done to 
prevent this situation occurring) once the veil of ignorance is lifted. And 
once the veil of ignorance has been lifted, those individuals who are 
lucky enough to be comparatively well off may continue to feel sympathy 
and compassion for those who, through no fault of their own, are faced 
with destitution, that is, before anything is done to prevent its occurrence. 
These motives, if continuously held, also contribute (along with any other 
relevant motives) towards inducing individuals to agreeing to the 
implementation of Rawls' first principle of justice and the priority rule over 
an extended period of time.39
39 It could be argued that by individuals adopting the motives of sympathy and 
compassion for others less well off than themselves this creates, what Cohen (1997: 10)
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It probably would be impossible to determine the relative 
importance of each one of the motives, listed in the previous paragraph, 
that results in a community agreeing to the implementation of the 
Rawlsian system of justice of interest here. For instance, an individual 
may adopt a number of motives simultaneously. What can be said here, 
however, is that the game-theoretic experimental results suggest that 
there were a number of motives, and not just one, that contributed 
towards the respondents in these experiments choosing the system(s) of 
justice that they did. This matter is discussed in sub-section 2.5.3.
2.4 The design of the game-theoretic experiments
2.4.1 Introduction
As indicated in sub-section 2.1.3, the game-theoretic experiments 
that were conducted in the Philippines were based upon those devised 
by Fröhlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey (1987a and 1987b) and Fröhlich 
and Oppenheimer (1990, 1992 and 1996). The basic experimental 
design consisted of three steps, namely:
• Groups of participants were given a brief introduction to various 
systems of economic justice relating to the matter of distribution of 
personal incomes under conditions of uncertainty. Each participant was 
then asked to make an initial ranking of the four systems of justice listed 
in sub-section 2.3.1.
• Next the groups of participants were given unlimited time to discuss 
these systems.40 After these deliberations each group was asked to
calls, the 'ethos of justice' in a community. This ethos then contributes towards inducing 
individuals to choose and implement some egalitarian system of justice. The egalitarian 
system of justice that Cohen had in mind, however, was the second Rawlsian principle - 
not the first principle of justice and the priority rule.
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reach a unanimous agreement on which of the four alternative systems 
of justice they wished to have applied to determine the distribution of a 
given endowment allocated to each group. Each group also was told 
that the system chosen (or imposed) subsequently would be used to 
guide the redistribution of unknown amounts of personal income that 
each member of the group would receive. If a unanimous agreement 
could not be reached, however, then a system of justice would be 
imposed upon the group by the moderator conducting the experiment.
• There was a de-briefing in which each participant was asked again to 
provide a final ranking of the four alternative systems of justice in 
distribution.
It follows from this brief description of the design of these 
experiments that the participants were faced with two forms of 
uncertainty. These forms of uncertainty represent the two types of 
uncertainty emphasised in the argument developed in section 2.2. The 
first was that a given amount of income allocated to each group of 
participants was to be randomly distributed among the members of the 
group. Thus the participants did not know the level of the personal 
incomes that they are to receive in the future, and before any attempt 
was made to redistribute personal incomes between the participants 
according to some relevant system of justice in distribution. Thus the 
domain of the alternative systems of justice to be considered was 
restricted to the situation where individuals were faced with uncertain 
income streams.
40 In the study by Lissowski, Tyszka and Okrasa (1991) only five minutes were 
allowed for these discussions.
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The other form of uncertainty arises from the requirement that if the 
participants of any group do not agree unanimously on a system of 
justice that is to be applied amongst members of the group, then the 
group(s) concerned will have an unknown system of justice imposed 
upon it by the moderator. This potential threat is meant to represent, as 
conjectured by Rawls, that dire consequences may flow from a 
community not reaching wide agreement on the social ordering of 
matters of import to this community. This was pointed out in the earlier 
discussions of Rawls' conjecture in sub-section 2.3.2. This potential 
threat is also meant to represent the context that relevant decisions are 
made. This point was discussed in section 2.2 within the context of the 
Arrovian condition I.
While the first type of uncertainty is only a weak representation of 
the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, it more closely represents, as indicated in 
sub-section 2.1.3, the uncertain economic circumstances to be found in 
developing countries, where insurance and credit markets are 
incomplete. Thus it seems appropriate that those who participate in 
these game-theoretic experiments are familiar with these circumstances. 
To achieve this end the participants in the experiments reported here 
were citizens of the Philippines. In addition, and remembering that 
Rawls' system of justice is meant to be adopted by a society whose 
members may hold diverse opinions on a range of social issues, the 
participants were drawn from: both genders and various age groups; 
both rural and urban backgrounds; a range of income groups; and 
populations of university students and government employees.
To test if the participants did hold a diversity of opinions on a 
range of social issues, they were asked questions on their general
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attitudes towards income redistribution and political parties. Students 
were asked their motivation for participating in the experiments, while 
government employees were asked their views on different political 
parties and attitudes towards risks. The differences in the responses 
were statistically significant as between participants from MetroManila 
and those outside of this region. The responses to questions regarding 
attitudes to income redistribution by the students were found statistically 
significant at the .001 level and for government employees at the .003 
level. Hence, the participants were not too homogeneous in their value 
systems. That said, for the other questions - on motivation for 
participation, attitudes towards life and minority groups and economic 
aspirations and future career plans and aspirations - the responses by 
location were not found significantly different from each other.
Finally, the group discussions were recorded electronically. 
Transcripts were made of these recorded discussions.41 A sample from 
the transcripts is labelled as Annex 1.
2.4.2 More detail on the structure of the experiments
Three types of game-theoretic experimental designs were 
conducted in the Philippines to capture various types of relevant 
circumstances. One type of experiment consisted of the terms ‘justice’ 
and ‘principles of distributive justice’ being mentioned explicitly in the 
handbook provided to the participants in the game-theoretic
41 There are 83 pages of transcript. For a fee to cover the cost of reproducing them, 
these transcripts are available upon request. Words or phrases used by the participants 
in the vernacular were carefully translated into their English equivalent.
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experiments. To determine if the choice of principle would change if 
there was no reference to the words 'justice' and 'principles for 
distributive justice', in the second type of experiment these words were 
replaced with the terms ‘income distribution’ and ‘rules for distributing 
monetary gains and losses’. 42
These two types of experiments consisted of three parts. The first 
part was where the individual participants in each group were asked to 
rank order the four alternative principles of justice listed earlier. 
Participants were told that this principle would be applied later in the 
process of redistributing the initial individual incomes that would be 
randomly allocated to each participant. The participants had to rank 
order these alternative principles on three occasions. The first occasion 
was when the participants were introduced to the four principles. The 
second occasion was when the participants were asked to determine if 
they had understood the concepts which were being used in the 
experiment. The final occasion was when the participants were asked to 
discuss, for an unlimited period of time, the alternative systems of justice 
and then were expected to agree unanimously on one of the systems. It 
was suggested that the participants were to assume that they were policy 
makers in the Philippine Government, or members of a committee that 
would decide on rules for distributing incomes among its constituents. A 
lengthy and open discussion of the principles was permitted. If no such 
agreement was reached then some system was imposed by the
42 Other variants to the basic research design were introduced by Fröhlich, 
Oppenheimer, and Eavey (1987a and 1987b). One such variant made the risks seem 
higher for the participants. This was done by lowering the floor income and raising the 
ceiling income level compared to the basic experiment. This resulted in an increase in the 
difference in the pay-offs received by the participants prior to any redistribution of income 
based on the chosen principle of justice.
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moderator. After this, the participants were asked to provide 
demographic, sociological and psychological data about themselves.
The third type of experimental design was more complex. The 
main difference is that each participant was expected to perform an 
unspecified task for which s/he would be paid a fee. The amount of 
before-tax-cum-transfer income a participant received was totally 
dependent on how well the participant performed this task. Since the 
participant did not know if s/he possessed the inherent skills required to 
perform, effectively, the unspecified task, essentially s/he was faced with 
complete uncertainty, in the initial situation, as to how much before-tax- 
cum-transfer income s/he would receive. Faced with this uncertain 
situation, as before the participants in each group discussed and then 
were expected to agree unanimously on one of the alternative systems 
of justice. If no such agreement was reached then a system was 
imposed by the moderator.
The task the participants subsequently were asked to perform, 
after the system of justice was decided upon (or imposed if need be), 
was to correct the spelling mistakes within a given text. The more 
spelling errors identified by a participant, the larger was the before-tax- 
cum-transfer income that this individual received. Subsequently, and to 
ensure that the conditions of the agreed system of justice were satisfied, 
the incomes of some individuals were taxed at a certain rate and the 
revenue raised was used to finance income transfers to others.
The next element in the design of this experiment was aimed at 
eliciting information on how stable individual and group preferences are, 
with respect to a particular system of justice, once individuals have borne
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the consequences of the application of the group's initial choice of a 
particular principle of justice. It is possible that some may change their 
preference once they experience the consequence of their previous 
behaviour. In the attempt to generate relevant information each 
participant was asked after the initial task had been performed and the 
redistribution of personal incomes had taken place, if s/he wished to 
change her/his mind as to which system of justice should be applied. 
The participants were asked four questions, as follows:
• How do you feel about the principle you chose?;
• How do you rank the principle now?;
• How sure are you in your choice of principle?, and
• How satisfied are you with the principle you chose?
After the participants had indicated their responses to these 
questions in the end-of-production document, they were then required to 
correct spelling mistakes in a different passage of prose. The personal 
incomes received for performing the task were redistributed again 
according to the agreed system of justice. Finally, the participants were 
asked to perform this last sequence of steps once more.
With the information gathered on how well each participant 
performed the task assigned at each stage of these experiments, it was 
possible to identify the influence that the implicitly agreed tax-cum- 
transfer system had on labour productivity. In addition, it was possible to 
observe how stable were individual preferences for a particular principle 
of distributive justice, when the individuals concerned bore the 
consequences of the application of the group's choice of a particular 
principle of justice.
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The final component in the design of this extended production 
experiment was that the form of this experiment was varied in order to 
determine the influence of democratic participation, in the process of 
deciding on a system of justice, on the level of labour productivity. While 
most groups were expected to make a unanimous decision concerning 
some relevant system of justice, one variation of this experimental 
design was that a group was allowed to make a decision by using a 
simple majority rule. Another variation was that the moderator imposed 
the floor-constraint principle of justice on the groups concerned.
Details on the features of and procedures for each of the three 
variants described in the previous paragraphs are contained in 
Handbooks A (with reference to justice), B (without any reference to 
justice) and C (production experiments with reference to justice). These 
handbooks are labelled as Annexes 2 to 4, respectively.
2.4.3 Information on the participants in the experiments
Table 1 sets out the number of participants in the experiments 
according to the conditions and the location of the experiment (that is 
whether it was held in MetroManila or outside MetroManila). Of the 320 
participants, 110 individuals were given handbooks with reference to 
justice, another 110 persons were given handbooks without reference to 
justice, and the rest undertook the production experiments. There were 
2243 groups in which the participants went through three rounds of work, 
pay and redistribution. Of these latter groups, 12 groups were expected
43 As indicated earlier in the text there should be five participants per group. 
However, in the case of the student participants, sometimes not all of the five individuals 
showed up. Thus about a third of the total number of groups (25 out of 67) had between 
two to four participants per cluster.
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to choose some system of justice unanimously. An additional five 
groups used the majority rule to decide this issue. The other five groups 
had the floor-income constraint principle of justice imposed upon them.
Table 1. Number of Participants and Groups Based on Different 
Experimental Conditions and Location_______________________
Condition
S tudents G overnm ent Em ployees Total
Metro-
Manila
O utside
MetroManila
M etroManila O uts ide
M etroManila
Indi­
vidual
G rps. Indi­
vidual
Grps. Indi­
vidual
Grps. Ind i­
vidual
G rps. Indi­
vidual
G rps.
Experim ents 
w ithout 
p roduction  
(i) W ith 
reference to 
jus tice
25 7 25 6 30 6 30 6 110 25
(ii) W ith no 
reference to 
ju s tice
25 5 25 8 30 6 30 6 110 25
Experim ents
with
production  
and with 
re ference 
to Justice 
(i) Unanim ity 28 6 25 6 0 0 0 0 53 12
(ii) M ajority 
Rule
14 3 10 2 0 0 0 0 24 5
(iii) Im posed 8 2 15 3 0 0 0 0 23 5
Total 100 23 100 25 60 12 60 12 320 72
While all those who participated in the Frohlich-Oppenheimer- 
Eavey experiments were all undergraduate students, the experiments 
that were conducted in the Philippines had participants who were both 
undergraduate students and government employees. Students were 
chosen as participants in the experiments since they were expected to 
be the future administrators of governmental as well as non­
governmental programs concerned with the distribution of the nation’s 
resources (that is, land, labour, capital and technology). On the other 
hand, government employees were selected because they are the 
current administrators of public sector programs concerned with
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agriculture and agrarian reform and providing infrastructure, budgets 
and social services such as health and community welfare - programs 
which, at least in part, are concerned with distributional issues.
The experiments in which university students were participants 
were run in two universities in the Philippines. One university was 
located within MetroManila and the other outside of MetroManila. A total 
of 200 undergraduate students participated in the experiments (see 
Table 1). Of the total, 50 per cent (or one hundred participants) came 
from the University of the Philippines in Diliman (U.P. Diliman), Quezon 
City and the other half from the University of the Philippines in Baguio 
City (U.P. Baguio). Students in U.P. Diliman came from different regions 
of the country, while most of the U.P. Baguio students originated from 
Northern Luzon, particularly the Cordillera Administrative Region, the 
llocos Region and the Cagayan Valley Region. The participants were 
selected by stratified random sampling44 from a list of undergraduate 
students who were in the junior (third year) and senior (fourth, fifth, sixth 
or seventh year) levels. Students from U.P. Diliman who participated in 
the experiment were specialising in economics, engineering (civil, 
chemical and industrial), social work and community development, 
linguistics and mass communication. Participants from U.P. Baguio, on 
the other hand, were majoring in economics, political science, 
mathematics, biology and mass communication.
44 Stratified random sampling is 'a method wherein a universe is divided into sub­
universes such that the units within each sub-universe are more alike than are the units in 
the universe as a whole, and a random sample is taken in each sub-universe.' (Onate and 
Bader 1990: 16). It is worth-mentioning that selection of participants in the Philippine 
experiments was somewhat different from the Frohlich-Oppenheimer-Eavey 
experiments. In the Philippine case, students and government employees were selected 
by stratified random sampling from a list provided by the schools and the government 
offices, while in the Frohlich-Oppenheimer-Eavey study, the undergraduate students 
were recruited through classroom announcements and were invited to participate in the 
experiments on a voluntary basis.
56
Apart from the universities, the experiments also were conducted 
in government offices in MetroManila and outside MetroManila. There 
were 120 employees from six45 government agencies who participated 
in the experiments. These agencies are the Departments of Agriculture, 
Agrarian Reform, Public Works and Highways, Health, Social Welfare 
and Development and Budget and Management. These six departments 
are among several 'front line' government agencies that deal directly 
with the public on matters concerning the formulation and 
implementation of plans, policies, programs and the distribution of funds 
for their respective sectors. These departments also have several 
bureaus under their jurisdiction or attached to them. Of the 100 public 
sector employees who participated in the experiments, half were from 
the National Capital Region and the rest were from the Cordillera 
Administrative Region. The employees also were selected by stratified 
random sampling from a list of technical staff provided by the personnel 
section in each relevant department.
2.5. The results of the game-theoretic experiments
2.5.1 On unanimity and choice of a principle of justice
Table 2 sets out the number of groups choosing a particular 
system of justice, subject to the conditions imposed on a particular 
experiment. As indicated in the table, of those sixty-two (62) groups that 
were free to choose any one of the four alternative systems of justice all 
these groups agreed unanimously on some principle of justice - 
although the choice made by each group was subject to the constraint 
that if a unanimous agreement was not reached by a group then some
45 Due to time and budget constraints, the number of government agencies was 
limited to six.
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arbitrary system would be imposed upon this group. What is more, 100 
per cent of these groups unanimously agreed on the principle of justice: 
all in the group are to be provided with a floor level of income after which 
this group would be left free to maximise its average level of income. 
This is the floor-income constraint principle of justice. This was so in the 
instance of both the non-production and production experiments. The 
same principle of justice also was chosen by the five groups for which 
the majority rule was used to decide on what system of justice should be 
applied by the group concerned. These results imply, therefore, that 
these groups all agreed unanimously on a system of justice that is, as 
argued in section 2.3, a simplified version of Rawls' first principle of 
justice in distribution and the priority rule. This principle is, in turn, 
similar to a simplified version of Popper's principle of minimising 
avoidable suffering. These experimental results alone are remarkable 
and will be commented upon later.
Table 2. Number of Groups Based on Different Experimental Conditions 
and their Choice of Principles of Justice or Rules for Income Distribution
C o n d itio n
C hosen Princip le  of Justice  or Rule fo r Incom e D istribution
M ax im is ing  F loor 
Incom e
M axim ising 
A verage  Incom e
M axim ising 
A ve rag e  Incom e 
w ith  a F lo o r  
C onstra in t
M axim ising 
A ve ra g e  Incom e  
w ith  a R a n g e  
C on s tra in t
E xp e rim e n ts  
w ith o u t 
p ro d u c tio n  
(i) w ith 
re fe rence  to 
jus tice
0 0 2 5 0
(ii) no
re fe rence  to 
jus tice
0 0 2 5 0
E xp e rim e n ts
w ith
p ro d u c tio n  
and w ith 
re fe rence  to 
jus tice
(i) Unanim ity 0 0 12 0
(ii) Majority 
R ule
0 0 5 0
(iii) Im posed 0 0 5 0
Tota l 0 0 7 2 0
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It follows from these basic experimental results that it did not 
matter what the characteristics were for each of the participants in each 
group since all groups agreed on the floor-income constraint principle of 
justice. This observation is confirmed by the information set out in table 
3 where the broad characteristics of the groups of participants are 
indicated. Thus the experimental results do not contradict the view that 
unanimous agreement on a single system of justice in distribution can be 
achieved in a community whose members may hold diverse views on a 
range of social issues.
Table 3. Number of Groups Based on Type of Participant and Location 
and their Choice of Principles of Justice or Rules for Income Distribution
Type of
Participant
and
Location
Principle of Justice or Rule for Income Distribution
Maximising Floor 
Income
Maximising 
Average Income
Maximising 
Average Income 
with a Floor 
Constraint
Maximising 
Average Income 
with a Range 
Constraint
Students 
(i) from 
Metro- 
Manila
0 0 23* 0
(ii) from 
outside of 
Metro- 
Manila
0 0 25* 0
Government 
Employees 
(i) from 
Metro- 
Manila
0 0 12 0
(ii) from 
outside of 
Metro- 
Manila
0 0 12 0
Total 0 0 72 0
* Includes data for game-theoretic experiments where the re-distributive principle was 
imposed.
In reaching these unanimous agreements all groups were left free 
to discuss at length the merits and weaknesses of the four alternative
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systems of justice in the light of the two types of uncertainty each 
participant was faced with. The two types of uncertainty were discussed 
in the previous section and will be discussed further later in this section. 
Above all, it is emphasised that these discussions were not guided in 
any way. Rather, each participant was free to make her/his own choice 
from the menu of alternative systems of justice, although subject to the 
constraints created by the two types of uncertainty each participant was 
faced with. As for the group discussions that went into making these 
constrained choices, they indicate that the participants took this activity 
seriously in that most groups discussed the relevant issues at stake at 
some length. Seventy per cent (47 of the 67) of the experimental groups 
discussed a range of relevant issues. The remaining groups adopted 
the floor-income constraint principle more or less immediately once it 
had become obvious to the participants that they all had made the same 
choice of a system of justice and therefore there was no need for a 
discussion of the relevant issues at stake. The average length of the 
discussions for the various groups is indicated by the information set out 
in table 4. The average length of the group discussions was about 48 
minutes.
Table 4. Number of Groups Based on Length of Group Discussion and 
Location
S tu d e n ts G o ve rnm e n t E m p loyees Tota l
L eng th  of
G roup
D iscuss ion
M etroM anila O u ts id e
M etroM anila
M etroM anila O u ts id e
M etroM anila
1. E x tens ive  
D iscuss ion  
(m ore  than 
1/2 page  of 
transcrip t)
10 19 7 11 4 7
2. B rie f 
D iscuss ion  
(1/2 page or 
less of 
transcrip t)
11 3 5 1 20
S u b -to ta l 21 22 12 12 6 7
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Most important of all the participants also explained why they 
adopted the principle of justice agreed upon - a matter returned to in 
sub-section 2.5.3.
2.5.2 The level of the floor-income constraint
While there was unanimous agreement within and between all 
groups on what system of justice should be applied, there was some 
disagreement among participants over where to set the level for the 
floor-income for the representative household. The floor-income level 
chosen by government employees was higher than that set by the 
university students (see Table 5). This difference probably can be 
explained by the fact that the government employees were more 
experienced in the matter of costs associated with raising a family. The 
mean levels of the floor income set by the students from MetroManila 
and those from outside MetroManila were also found to be significantly 
different from each other (p  = .003). This was not so, however, in the 
case of the government employees since the mean levels set by the two 
regional groups were not statistically different from one another (p  = 
0.41). That said, the level of the floor income set by the two groups 
(students and government employees) were both substantially higher 
than the annual poverty line set by the Philippine Government in 199746 
and the basic income tax exemption of 60,000 pesos for employees.
46 The 1997 annual per capita poverty threshold was 11,388 pesos (NSCB 
Technical Working Group on Income Statistics 1997). An annual poverty threshold figure 
of 56,940 pesos per household was derived by multiplying the per capita poverty 
threshold by five, which is the average household size in the Philippines.
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Table 5. Level of Annual Household Floor Constraints Set by the 
Experimental Groups in MetroManila and Outside of MetroManila by Type 
of Participant_______________________________________________________
Students Government
employees
MetroManila Outside Metro­
Manila
MetroManila Outside Metro­
Manila
Number of 
groups 21 22 12 12
Mean 
(in pesos) 
(in US 
dollars)*
299,000
7,475
279,205
6,980
347,750
8,694
344,500
8,612
Median 
(in pesos) 
(in US 
dollars)*
273,000
6,825
273,000
6,825
390,000
9,750
292,500
7,312
Standard 
deviation 
(in pesos) 
(in US 
dollars)*
131,294
3,282
67,385
1,685
144,456
3,611
137,790
3,445
F-statistic 3.70 1.16
P = 0.003 0.41
‘ Conversion rate used: 1 US dollar = 40 Philippine Pesos.
It might be argued that the empirical result indicating that no 
agreement could be reached within reasonably narrow bounds as to 
where the floor income constraint should be set, suggests that the floor- 
income constraint principle of justice is of little practical worth. This 
argument is returned to at the end of section 2.6 where it is suggested 
that, even with this lack of agreement, it still may be possible to say 
something useful about how social states may be compared and ranked.
2.5.3 Reasons for the choice of principle
At this point the discussion returns to consider the sort of issues 
raised by the remarks, set out in sub-section 2.1.1, made by the 
participants in the experiments. These remarks also indicate the motives
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the participants had for adopting a particular system of justice which was 
an issue touched upon in sub-section 2.3.2.
As noted within the context of table 4, by far the majority of the 
experimental groups discussed the issue of distributive justice at some 
length. Many groups of participants came to reasoned conclusions that 
took into account realistic situations that are likely to apply in the 
Philippines. In particular, the participants concerned were well aware of 
the economic uncertainty that filled the lives of members of the Filipino 
community. Some of these participants also articulated the important 
implication that flows from this observation; namely, for the community 
not to mitigate this economic uncertainty to a reasonable degree would 
contribute, in an important way, towards precipitating political and social 
instability. What is more, some participants expressed sympathy for the 
severe economic situation that faced the less well-off in this community. 
That said, some participants believed, however, that there were costs 
attached to policies directed at mitigating economic uncertainty. In 
particular, some of the participants were acutely aware of the need to 
take into account the possibility that the application of a redistributive tax- 
cum-transfer system could induce individuals to behave deceptively in 
an attempt to take advantage of this system at the expense of others. As 
will be indicated later, the relevant experimental results indicate that the 
level of these costs is not great, if not non-existent. For the present, 
however, more of the sort of comments which were cited in sub-section 
2.1.1 will be set out here. These comments are organised by issue 
raised by the participants.
(i) Providing a minimum level of income will provide a system of 
insurance that will enable persons to meet their basic consumption
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needs, increase the ir chances of surviva l and m itigate econom ic 
insecurity.
Voice 1: In maximising the average with a floor constraint there would be a 
buffer so that no one would fall below poverty. (Transcripts: 5)
Voice 2: Also here within the Philippines if there is a minimum income per 
person he will be able to survive. He doesn't need to go to another 
country. We do not need to be slaves of foreigners for us to earn [enough]. 
If there is work here, why don't we just work in our country ? (Transcripts: 
35)
Voice 3: At least if you have a floor constraint, then there is a sure income 
for every month and the person will feel more stable. For Filipinos, security 
of tenure is very important and security in itself...If you don't have this 
feeling of security, what happens? Panic? You will panic! Isn't it that 
when you do not have any money, you have a big problem?... So that is 
what happens to them. They will resort to borrowing and everything. 
(Transcripts: 13)
Voice 4: Basic needs and security. I think it is hard to say basic needs 
without security. It would mean you cannot sustain your basic needs. 
Health and education, you need that later. Basic is just food, clothing and 
shelter. With security at least their options would be maximised. 
(Transcripts: 19)
These reported comments suggest that the dominant but possibly 
not the only motive expressed by these participants is that of self-interest, 
such that implementing the floor constraint system of justice will insure 
each participant against the risk of facing destitution.
(ii) Providing this basic income will raise the capability of individuals to 
work more productively and, hence, be capable of raising the level of 
income they receive.
Voice 1: If you don't manage the floor, there is a possibility for some 
people to receive zero incomes. You would be a burden to society. You 
are not productive. (Transcripts: 68)
Voice 2: If that is set, there won't be so many poor. No one would fall 
below the poverty line. I think that is just because those in the higher 
income levels may earn as much as they want. There is no limit. But at the 
lower levels, there is at least a minimum income that is just to satisfy their
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needs... For survival and of course to be physically and mentally healthy 
in order to be productive. (Transcripts: 32 and 33)
This last set of comments also indicates that individuals need 
access to a basic, floor level of all-purpose income to allow an individual 
to acquire a range of goods and services required for this person to 
function reasonably effectively - an idea to be found, as noted earlier, in 
Barry (1973: 77), Frankfurt (1987), Sen (1985 and 1993), Pogge (1989), 
Peffer (1990: 384-5 and 404) and Rawls (1993: 6-7).
(iii) Social instability comes from gross income inequality.
Voice 1: [A floor income needs to be provided] because you have to 
consider the stability of income...and the stability of society as well. 
(Transcripts: 29)
Voice 2: Now, if you have the exact amount for you to survive, you don't 
need to find ways and means to survive. If you know that you will be 
below the poverty line, what shall you do? You will do all means for you 
to survive. Hold-up, kidnap, something like that. (Transcripts: 35)
Voice 3: What is happening now is that basic needs are not met. Hence, 
crime incidence is high. Maybe when they [basic needs] are met, the crime 
rate will go down. (Transcripts: 46)
Voice 4: [A minimum income needs to be provided to all in the community to 
prevent] the danger of poverty. (Transcripts: 20)
Voice 5: [And] political instability. If society is not stable, then... 
(Transcripts: 20)
These participants clearly would have a good idea, based on 
personal experience, of what Rawls was talking about in Lectures I and 
VIII in Political Liberalism. Their arguments were based on the need to 
satisfy prudential considerations (of the sort to be found in Political 
Liberalism ) which will allow the lives of the less well-off in the 
community to become better.
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(iv) In contrast, some participants chose the floor constraint principle, in 
part at least, since they were concerned about the severely deprived 
circumstances that the less well-off in the Filipino community found 
themselves in, and the personal shame attached to this situation.
Voice 1: That is why we go for [maximising the average income with a floor 
constraint]... since everybody has a need so everyone has [to have] 
something to sustain that need. In our society, the powerful overcomes the 
weak. So the more powerful you are, you can overcome the weak 
because of the inequalities and deficiencies of the weak. So the 
government should at least provide the person with protection so that a 
person could live decently. Because in any society, if you are the most 
educated and most trained, you will achieve a status, you will be more 
powerful. So the powerful can defeat the weaker ones and this is the 
example in the Philippine context. So the rich become richer and the poor 
loses more because there is no [income] redistribution. So, all individuals 
should receive an income for a person to live decently. (Transcripts: 66)
Voice 2: [A basic income should be provided to all] because in our society 
when you are a low-income earner, people look down on you.(Transcripts: 
40)
This last reported comment indicates some sympathy for the 
situation poor people in the Philippines find themselves in, in particular 
the lack of community respect that poor people experience. This matter 
of community respect for people raises an issue that has been stressed 
by Wolff (1998). Specifically, he argues that improving and maintaining 
the level of community respect for all poor individuals should be an 
important objective of any poverty alleviation program. Essentially this 
sort of idea was recognised, implicitly, in the previously-recorded 
comment.
(v) Finally, the participants, and in particular the government employees, 
were very concerned about balancing idealism with reality in any attempt 
to implement the floor-income constraint principle of justice. Some 
participants stated that for it to be possible to implement the unanimously 
agreed principle of justice, the level of the floor income should be set by
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the government subject to its ability to generate tax revenue. The 
participants also pointed out that the floor constraint should be set at a 
level that did not, for various reasons, severely undermine the incentive 
to work.
Voice 1: The problem with [the floor-income constraint principle] is that 
[individuals] will be discouraged to work...[Those paying taxes] will only 
work to a certain level because beyond that the government will get [most 
of their income]. So there will not be anyone to finance the additional 
income needed [to finance the floor-income constraint principle]. 
(Transcripts: 15).
2.5.4 A possible relationship between background or 
attitudinal variables and ranking of principles
Are the participants in the experiments too homogeneous in their 
value systems? The results that were derived from the answers of the 
participants to attitudinal and background questions were mixed. 
Responses to questions on their general attitude to income redistribution 
and political parties (for students and government employees), 
motivation for participation (for students only) and ideological preference 
and risks (for government employees only) revealed that the differences 
between the participants in MetroManila and outside of MetroManila 
were significant. The responses on questions regarding attitudes to 
income redistribution by the students were found statistically different at 
the .001 level and for government employees at the .003 level. Hence, 
the participants were not too homogeneous in their value systems. That 
said, for the other questions on motivation for participation (particularly 
earning money), attitudes towards life and minority groups and economic 
aspirations (in the form of level of salaries found satisfactory) and future 
career plans and aspirations, the responses by location were not found 
significantly different from each other.
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Can the background of the participants explain the choice of 
principle by the group? As indicated in sub-section 2.4.3, the students 
came from different regions of the country and were specialising in 
different undergraduate courses. The government employees, on the 
other hand, were working with different agencies and had varied areas 
of specialisation. Government employees working outside of 
MetroManila were found to have had a higher proportion of their college 
expense financed by scholarships and loans compared to state 
employees working in MetroManila. This may be attributed to the 
relatively higher average income levels received by households in 
MetroManila than those outside of MetroManila47. The U.P. students and 
government employees were from different age groups, with public 
sector employees a lot older than the students. Despite the afore­
mentioned differences in backgrounds, there was no variance in group 
choices of a principle of justice.
To determine further the possible relationship between 
background factors and support for the four principles of distributive 
justice, the correlations between the variables at the start of the 
experiment were calculated. The results showed a low correlation 
between background or attitudinal variables48 used in the study and the
47 The Family Income and Expenditures Surveys in the Philippines show that 
households in the National Capital Region (which is the same as MetroManila) had the 
highest average income among all the regions of the Philippines in 1985, 1988, 1991 
and 1994 (NSO 1994 and 1996). Using constant 1988 prices, the average income levels 
of households in MetroManila were more than twice that of households in the Cordillera 
Administrative Region in 1988, 1991 and 1994 (NSO 1994 and 1996).
48 The background or attitudinal variables were adopted from Fröhlich and 
Oppenheimer (1992: 207-9). However, variables concerning ideological preferences 
were modified to consider the Philippine context. Apart from Fröhlich et al. (1987a and 
1987b), I am not aware of any existing literature that studied the statistical correlation 
between background or attitudinal variables and the preference for particular principles of 
justice or rules to distribute incomes.
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individual participants' preference for any of the four principles (see 
Table 6). The computed Pearson’s correlation coefficient49 ranged from 
negative 0.13 to positive 0.20.
Table 6. Correlations Between Background Factors and Initial Support 
for Four Principles
Principle
Variable Floor Maximum Floor Ranee
Income Averaae
Income
Constraint Constraint
Pearson's Pearson's Pearson's Pearson's
R R R R
Income redistribution attitudes 0.00 -0.04 -0.11 0.11
Money enough to affect choice 0.06 0.13 -0.13 -0.10
Joined for the money -0.04 0.09 0.03 -0.05
Joined out of interest -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.04
Income is Luck 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
One's action is for other people's 
pleasure
0.00 0.05 -0.03 -0.03
Accomplishment through individual 
efforts
0.04 0.07 -0.07 -0.02
Some groups are inferior 0.01 0.08 -0.11 -0.02
Percentage of college expenses 
met through parents' help 0.00 -0.04 0.09 -0.06
Percentage of college expenses 
earned bv student 0.10 0.05 -0.08 -0.09
Percentage of college expenses 
through trust monies -0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.02
Percentage of college expenses 
through scholarships -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.02
Percentage of college expenses 
through loans 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.03
Percentage of college expenses 
through other sources -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Minimum salary after graduation 0.05 -0.07 0.02 0.04
Minimum salary at age 35 -0.02 -0.13 0.10 0.07
Minimum salary at age 50 -0.06 -0.11 0.03 0.12
Ideology (+ = Liberal) -0.04 -0.13 0.04 0.15
Years father was employed 0.02 -0.08 0.06 -0.02
Years mother was employed -0.08 -0.02 0.09 0.02
With conservative ideas -0.02 0.18 -0.07 -0.06
Some must fail 0.02 0.20 -0.06 -0.15
Plans a public service career -0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.09
Plans a political career -0.07 -0.02 0.08 0.03
Plans private business -0.14 -0.13 0.18 0.08
Plans a private professional career -0.08 -0.01 0.06 -0.01
49 The coefficient of correlation p  (rho) measures the degree of linear association 
between two variables; it ranges from -1.0 to +1.0 inclusive with -1 reflecting a perfect 
negative association and +1 to a perfect positive relationship (Gujarati 1995: 767).
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Regression models were likewise constructed to determine the 
combined effect of attitudinal and background variables on the choice of 
principle by individual participants and on income redistribution in 
general (see tables 7a to 7e). Only four per cent of the variance in the 
floor constraint principle and at most nine per cent of the maximum 
income was explained by the regression models. In addition, only three 
per cent of the variance in the support for income redistribution was 
explained by the regression model. Moreover, only between two to five 
variables were found to be significantly related to the individual 
participants' choice of principles and income redistribution.50 The 
foregoing results show the difficulty in explaining the choice of principle 
for income redistribution as well as income redistribution per se using 
background or attitudinal factors.51
Table 7a. Regression Model of Background Variables Explaining Support 
for the Floor Constraint Principle
Dependent Variable = Initial Support tor Maximising the Average Income with a Floor 
Constraint
Model: Initial support for the Floor Constraint Principle = 25.95 - 0.35 (Attitude towards 
income redistribution) - 0.82 (Money is sufficient to affect choice) + 4.15 (Plans to 
be a private professional)
Number of participants : 273
r2 : 0.054
Adjusted r2 0.043
50 Most of the attitudinal and background variables were not found statistically 
significantly related to the participants' preference for any of the four principles, even at a 
ten per cent level of significance.
51 Admittedly, other background or attitudinal variables may be used to explain the 
preference for a principle of justice. This study used the Frohlich-Oppenheimer-Eavey 
background and attitudinal variables, although they were modified to reflect the 
Philippine setting.
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Variable Coefficient Standard T-statistic p (2-tailedl
Error
Constant
Attitude
25.95 4.40 5.90 0.000
towards income 
redistribution -0.35 0.24 -1.49 0.138
Money is 
sufficient to 
affect choice 
Plans to be a
-0.82 0.43 -1.92 0.056
private
professional 4.15 1.47 2.82 -0.005
Analysis of Variance
Source Sum of Dearees of Mean F-Ratio p
Sauares Freedom Sauare
Regression 1303.24 3 434.41 5.09 .002
Residual 22967.82 269 85.38
Table 7b. Regression Model of Background Variables Explaining 
Support for Maximising the Average Income Principle
Dependent Variable = Initial Support for Maximising the Average Income
Model: Initial support for Maximising the Average Income = 18.99 + 0.74 (Joined for the 
money) - 2.38 (Ideological preference) - 0.5 (Years father was employed before 
the age of seven) + 2.14 (Attitudes to political parties) + 3.72 (For some people to 
succeed, others must fail)
Number of participants : 273
r2 : 0.108
Adjusted r2 : 0.091
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic d (2-tailedl
Constant 
Joined for
18.99 3.86 4.91 0.000
the money 
Ideological
0.74 0.48 1.56 0.120
preference 
Years father 
was
employed 
before the
-2.38 0.91 -2.61 0.010
age of seven 
Attitudes to 
political
-0.50 0.32 -1.57 0.116
parties 
For some 
people to 
succeed, 
others must
2.14 0.62 3.45 0.000
fail 3.72 1.22 3.04 0.003
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Analysis of Variance
Source Sum of 
Sauares
Dearees of 
Freedom
Mean
Sauare
F-Ratio
Regression 3116 5 623.1 6.475
Residual 25694 267 96.232
Table 7c. Regression Model of Background Variables Explaining Support 
for Maximising the Average With a Range Constraint Principle
Dependent Variable = Initial Support for Maximising the Average Income with a Range 
Constraint
Model: Initial support for the Range Constraint Principle = 9.38 - 0.79 (Money is sufficient 
to affect choice) + 0.002 (Minimum salary at the age of 50) + 2.28 (Ideological 
preference) - 2.58 (For some people to succeed, others must fail)
Number of participants : 273
r2 : 0.062
Adjusted r2 : 0.048
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic p (2-tailedf
Constant 9.38 3.83 2.45 0.015
Money is 
sufficient to 
affect choice 
Minimum
-0.79 0.51 -1.53 0.127
salary at the 
age of 50 0.002 0.001 2.04 0.043
Ideological 
preference 
For some
2.28 0.99 2.29 0.023
people to 
succeed, 
others must 
fail -2.58 1.38 -1.88 -0.062
Analysis of Variance
Source Sum of Dearees of Mean F-Ratio u
Sauares Freedom Sauare
Regression 2118.34 4 529.58 4.41 0.002
Residual 32167.38 268 120.03
Table 7d. Regression Model of Background Variables Explaining 
Support for Maximising the Floor Income Principle
Dependent Variable = Initial Support for Maximising the Floor Income Principle
Model: Initial support for the Floor Income = 13.41 + 0.06 (Percentage of College 
Expenses Earned By the Student) - 3.82 (Plans private business)
Number of participants : 273
r2 : 0.028
Adjusted r2 : 0.02
72
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic d  (2-tailed)
Constant 13.41 1.59 8.42 0.00
Percentage 
of college 
expenses 
earned by 
the student 0.06 0.04 1.50 0.13
Plans private 
business -3.82 1.71 -2.24 0.03
Analysis of Variance
Source Sum of Dearees of Mean F-Ratio &
Sauares Freedom Sauare
Regression 879.56 2 439.78 3.82 .02
Residual 31088.21 270 115.14
Table 7e. Regression Model of Background Variables Explaining Support 
for Income Redistribution
Dependent Variable = Index of support for Income Redistribution
Model: Index of Support for Income Redistribution = 14.83 - 0.18 (Joined for the money) 
+ 0.33 (Joined out of interest) + 0.24 (Attitude to Political Parties) + 0.74 (Plans a 
Private Professional Career)
Number of participants : 273
r2 : 0.048
Adjusted r2 : 0.033
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic d  (2 - ta ile d )
Constant 
Joined for
14.83 0.79 18.70 0.000
the money -0.18 0.11 -1.60 0.111
Joined out 
of interest 0.33 0.15 2.20 0.028
Attitude to 
political 
parties 
Plans a
0.24 0.14 1.67 0.096
private
professional
career 0.74 0.38 1.97 0.050
Analysis of Variance
Source Sum of Dearees of Mean F-Ratio a
Sauares Freedom Sauare
Regression 73.44 4 18.36 3.34 0.01
Residual 1470.65 268 5.49
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Are group choices of principles related to individual preferences or 
were they arrived at because of the way the experiments were 
structured? Data from the experiments revealed that at the start of the 
experiment and prior to the group discussion, the floor constraint 
principle already had the highest average mean support among the floor 
principles (see Table 8). This suggests that group choices were related 
to the preferences of individual participants.
Table 8. Mean Score* of Individual Preferences at Various Stages of the
Experiments on Distributive Justice (n=320)
Staae of the Maximum Floor Maximum Floor Ranqe
ExDeriment 
Start of the 
experiment
Income Constraint Constraint
Mean
Standard
10.44 14.88 21.25 14.41
deviation 
Prior to Group 
Discussion
(10.73) (10.26) (9.39) (11.18)
Mean
Standard
11.28 14.56 21.72 13.22
deviation 
After the Group 
Discussion
(10.35) (10.26) (9.39) (11.18)
Mean
Standard
9.66 12.34 26.50 11.64
deviation 
F-statistic 
(between the 
start and after 
group
(9.21) (9.09) (7.36) (10.03)
discussion) 1.36 1.28 0.63 1.24
P =
F-statistic 
(between prior 
and after group
0.003 0.015 0.000 0.026
discussion) 1.26 1.44 1.58 1.22
P = 0.019 0.001 0.000 0.037
* The scores represent the position of the four main principles in the preference ranking 
of the individual participants: first place receives a score of 30, second place gets 20, 
third place gets 10 and last place gets zero (adapted from Fröhlich and Oppenheimer 
1992: 78, footnote 13).
Individual preferences, however, shifted over the course of the 
experiment (see Table 9). At the start of the experiment, the floor 
constraint principle already had the most support among the four 
principles, followed by maximising the average income. About 45 per
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cent (130 of 290 participants) ranked the floor constraint principle as 
their first choice compared with 22 per cent (63 of 290) of the total 
participants who chose maximising the average income principle. After 
passing the test (and choices with payoffs for those who did not undergo 
production experiments), the floor constraint principle continued to have 
the most support from the participants at 46 per cent (134 of 290) of the 
participants. In both stages of the experiment, Rawls' second principle, 
maximising the floor income, received the least support.
Table 9. Shifts in Individuals' First Place Rankings of Principles Prior to 
Group Discussion___________________________________________________
1. S tart o f the
M axim um
Floor
M aximum
Incom e
Floor
C onstra in t
R anae
C onstra in t
Tota l
E xp e rim e n t 
2. P rio r to
41 6 3 130 56 2 9 0
D iscuss ion  
3. N et
3 7 71 134 48 2 9 0
C h a n g e s  
4. G ross
- 4 8 4 -8 0
Gains 
5. G ross
17 39 46 28 130
L o sse s  
6. D ese rtion  
R ate (L ine  5/
-21 -31 ■42 -36 -130
L ine  1) 0.51 0 .4 9 0 .3 2 0 .6 4 0 .4 5
The participants were also asked to indicate their level of
confidence in ranking the principles on a scale of 1 (very unsure) to 5 
(very sure). The data showed that 54 per cent (157 of 290) of the 
participants were either sure or very sure about their ranking at the start 
of the experiment (Table 10). Of those who changed their ranking, there 
were more participants who gained confidence in their answers as the 
experiments continued. The increase in the level of confidence may be 
attributed to their reading the rest of the handbook, passing the test and 
going through the choices with payoffs part of the production 
experiments.
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Table 10. Changes in Participants' Confidence in Rankings Prior to 
Group Discussion
N um ber of partic ipants
M ean score  fo r degree of confidence:
2 9 0
S tart o f Experim ent 3 .3 5 F-statistic 1 .25
Prior to  D iscussion 3 .7 7 p  (one-tail) 0 .0 3
Losses in D earees of No Gains in Dearees of Net
C o n fid e n ce C hanae C on fidence C ha na es
C o n fid e n ce  Level 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4
V e ry  U nsure 0 3 0 2 1 6
U nsu re -2 25 6 4 4 4 52
No op in ion 0 -2 4 14 0 12
S u re -2 -8 -6 130 2 6 10
V e ry  Sure 0 -1 0 -4 6 -5
Tota i 0 -3 -8 -14 165 4 9 4 4 6 1 75
P e rcen t o f 290 1 3 5 5 7 17 15 2 0 26
After the group discussion, the third principle continued to gain the 
support of the participants (see Table 11). One hundred and one 
participants decided to change their first place ranking from the three 
other principles to the floor constraint principle. Moreover, all of those 
who chose the third principle prior to the group discussion retained their 
preference (a gross loss of zero). However, while the unanimous choice 
of all the groups was the floor constraint principle, nevertheless, even 
after the discussion of the issues at stake, some 19 per cent (55 of 290) 
of all participants (see Table 11) individually still preferred some other 
system of justice than the floor-income constraint. In order to achieve 
unanimity, however, these dissenting participants saw the need to 
compromise on the system of justice they preferred to have applied, and 
consequently came to agree to some acceptable alternative. By 
compromising in this way each group of participants avoided the threat 
of having some unsatisfactory system of justice arbitrarily imposed upon 
it.
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Table 11. Shifts in Individuals' First Place Rankings Over the Time of 
Decision
Maximum Maximum Floor Ranae Total
Floor Income Constraint Constraint
1. Prior to Discussion 37 71 134 48 290
2. After Discussion 17 19 235 19 290
3. Net Changes -20 -52 101 -29 0
4. Gross Gains 0 1 101 2 104
5. Gross Losses -20 -53 0 -31 -104
6. Desertion Rate (Line 
5/ Line 1) 0.54 0.75 0 0.64 0.36
This willingness to compromise by the dissenting minority is by no 
means an obvious and certain pattern of behaviour. If the system of 
justice that the majority of the participants ranked first was seen by the 
minority as being unfair and unjust, then this group may well have 
preferred to have an unknown system of justice arbitrarily imposed. This 
action is taken here to represent some unknown level of political and 
social chaos. For the minority, this alternative could not be worse than 
the system of justice the majority wished to have applied. Thus the 
legitimate and reasonable interests of the minority should not and cannot 
be ignored when a community decides on a system of justice. These 
interests are viewed as those that no informed and impartial person 
could object to .52 Thus any system of justice that eventually is 
unanimously agreed upon must be seen to be the fairest system of 
justice that can be hoped for in the circumstances by all sections of the 
community. This would seem to be the position adopted, at least 
implicitly, by the participants in the experiments where unanimous 
agreement was required.
b 2 - The sort of issues just raised in the main text have been emphasised by Barry 
(1995: 160 -1,211 -2). Also see Barry (1998).
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The previously reported results also indicate that each of the two 
types of uncertainty that the participants were faced with made a 
contribution towards each group reaching the unanimous agreement 
that the floor-income constraint system of justice should be applied. To 
begin with, the uncertainty, created by the threat that an unknown system 
of justice arbitrarily will be imposed on a group if unanimous agreement 
on a system of justice can not be reached within this group no doubt 
encouraged individuals within each group to compromise, subject to the 
qualification set out in the previous paragraph in order to reach this 
unanimous agreement. Nevertheless, the system of justice unanimously 
agreed to need not have been the same for all the groups. However, to 
induce all groups to adopt the same system the second type of 
uncertainty is required - which is that all the participants are faced with 
an uncertain income stream in the initial situation. This type of 
uncertainty encouraged, after some group discussions, the great majority 
of participants to adopt as their first preference a system of justice that 
ensured that no individual would receive a level of income below some 
basic floor level (see Table 11). This level of first preference for this 
system of justice contributed to the same single system of justice being 
adopted across all groups, that is, after a minority of participants had 
compromised on the system of justice they preferred to see adopted.
Of the four principles of justice, the principle maximising the 
average income was observed to have the highest desertion rate (75 per 
cent of the total number of desertions). This may be attributed to the 
comment of most participants that since the third and fourth principle also 
maximises the average income (although the incomes are subjected to a 
floor or a range constraint) they chose the floor constraint principle 
because a minimum income is provided for. However, despite the
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changes in individual preferences throughout the experiment, the groups 
chose a common principle during the voting phase. Based on the 
transcripts of the group discussion, it may be surmised that the choice of 
principle may be the result of a bargaining process among the members 
of the group.
As expected, the level of confidence of the majority of the 
participants improved after the group discussion (see Table 12). Twenty- 
one per cent (60 out of 290) of the participants indicated a change in 
their level of confidence. The net change in confidence was found to be 
highly statistically significant at the .001 level.
Table 12. Changes in Participants' Confidence in Rankings Over The 
Time of Decision
Number of participants 290
Mean score for degree of confidence:
Prior to Discussion 3.77 F-statistic 2.06
After Discussion 4.09 p (one-tail) 0.001
Losses in Degrees of No Gains in Degrees of Net 
Confidence Change Confidence Changes
Confidence Level 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4
Very Unsure 0 0 1 0 2 1 4
Unsure 0 11 1 23 4 28
No opinion 0 0 3 11 0 1 1
Sure 0 -1 -1 177 15 13
Very Sure 0 0 0 0 39 0
Total 0 0 -1 -1 230 28 23 6 1 56
Percent of 290 .03 .03 79 10 8 2 .03 19
Figure 1 shows the participants' first place rankings in the three 
phases of the experiment: at the start (series 1); after the tests and before 
discussion (series 2); and after the choice has been made (series 3). 
The figure shows that the floor constraint principle (or the third principle) 
has consistently been chosen as the participants' first choice among the
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four principles over the course of the experiment. The floor constraint 
principle also had the lowest desertion rate between the first two phases 
of the experiment (series 1) and between the last two phases (series 2) 
as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1. First-Place Rankings at Three Successive 
Points in the Experiment
250 
200
Number of 
First-Place 
Rankings 100
50
0
1 2  3 4
□  Seriesl 
Ü  Series2 
I  Series3
Principles
Figure 2. Rates of Desertion from principles over the 
Course of the Experiment
Principles
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As expected, changes in first-place rankings and level of 
confidence were observed to be minimal in experiments where the 
participants were not allowed to discuss and choose a principle as a 
group. Table 13 shows that after the author imposed the floor 
constraint principle on the group at a level of 6,000 pesos per individual 
per month, the total desertion rate was a low 23 per cent. The range 
constraint principle had no desertions, followed by the floor constraint 
and maximising the average income principles, both at 33 per cent. 
Since there was more shifting of first-place rankings when the group was 
given a chance to discuss and choose a principle rather than when the 
principle was imposed, it is plausible that going through the discussion 
phase may have resulted in a compromise among the group members. 
When the principle was imposed on the group, net changes in the 
participants' level of confidence was zero and statistically insignificant 
(see Table 14). Hence, discussion of principles as a group may have a 
positive effect on the participants' level of confidence in their rankings.
Table 13. Shifts in Individuals' First Place Rankings of Principles Over 
the Time of Imposition of Principle___________________________________
1. P rio r to  Im position
M axim um
F loor
2
Maximum
Incom e
3
F loor
C onstra in t
9
R anae
C ons tra in t
8
Tota l
22
2. A fte r Im position 2 4 7 9 22
3. N et C hanges 0 1 -2 1 0
4. G ross Gains 2 1 1 1 5
5. G ross Losses -1 -1 -3 0 -5
6. D esertion  R ate (Line 
5 / L ine 1) 0 .5 0 0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 0 .2 3
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Table 14. Changes in Participants1 Confidence in Rankings Over The 
Time of Imposition of Principle
Number of participants 22*
Mean score for degree of confidence:
Prior to Imposition 3.73 F-statistic 1.03
After Imposition 3.64 p (one-tail) 0.47
Losses in Degrees of No Gains in Degrees of Net
Confidence Change Confidence Changes
Confidence Level 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4
Very Unsure 0 0 0 0
Unsure 0 3 1 1 2
No opinion 0 0 0 0
Sure 0 1 1 9 2 0
Very Sure 0 1 0 1 2 0 -2
Total 0 1 1 2 14 3 1 0
Percent of 22 4 4 9 64 14 4 0
* Excludes tied rankings for first place.
The effect of choice of the re-distributive principle on productivity 
is now considered in more detail.
2.5.5 The stability of social preferences and incentives
The experiments that attempted to generate the greatest amount 
of information were those requiring that a task be performed by the 
participants. As mentioned in section 2.3, the nature of the task was 
unknown at the time of initially deciding on a system of justice in 
distribution. In these experiments those groups that were free to choose 
a principle of justice unanimously agreed on the floor-income constraint 
principle (see Table 2). The results of these production experiments 
likewise revealed that prior to the performance of the first task the floor- 
income constraint principle was adopted as the first choice by 97 per 
cent (75 of 77) of the individual participants (see Tables 15 and 15a). 
This excludes the 23 participants who had the floor constraint imposed.
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Over the course of the repeated production and redistribution part of the 
experiment, those who ranked this principle first settled at 95 per cent 
(73 of 77).
This stability of these private preferences is of interest for it 
indicates that after individuals had experienced the consequence of 
imposing the tax-cum-transfer system implied by the application of the 
chosen principle of justice, individuals hardly changed their preference 
for the floor-income constraint principle. What marginal changes in mind 
that did take place indicate (see Table 15) that individuals now tended to 
adopt a more egalitarian principle than the floor income constraint 
principle as their first preference; namely, the principle of maximising the 
income for the least well-off in the community (that is a version of Rawls' 
second principle of justice).
Confidence in the participants' first-place rankings was also noted 
to increase over time. Table 16 shows the improvement in the level of 
subjects' confidence in their rankings after production and redistribution 
for all types of experiments. However, the changes in the confidence 
level were not found statistically significant when the principle was 
imposed on the group.
T a b le  15. 
P ro d u c t io n
In d iv id u a l 's
(N = 1 0 0 )
F irs t P lace R an k in g s  O v e r  th e C o u rs e  of
P rinc ip le First P lace R ankings after:
C ho ice  or P ro d u c tio n
Im position
C hanges in F irst-P lace 
R ankings
+
N et
C ha ng es
F loo r
C o n s tra in t 83 80 -3 0 -3
R ange
C o n s tra in t 10 10 -1 1 0
M axim um
Incom e 3 3 -2 2 0
M axim ising  
the  F loor 4 7 0 3 3
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Table 15a. Individual Participants' First Place Rankings Over The Course 
of Production by Type of Experiment
Principle First-Place First-Place Changes in First-
(Type of Rankings after Rankings After Place Rankings
Experiment) Group Choice or 
Imposition
Production (Third 
Task)
Floor Constraint 83 80 -3
Unanimity (53) (52) (-1)
Majority Rule (22) (21) (-1)
Imposed ( 8) ( 7) H )
Range Constraint 10 10 0
Unanimity (0) (0) (0)
Majority Rule (1) (2) (+1)
Imposed 0 ) (8) (-1)
Maximum Income 3 3 0
Unanimity (0) (1) (+1)
Majority Rule (0) (0) (0)
Imposed (3) (2) (-1)
Maximising the 
Floor
4 7 +3
Unanimity (0) (0) (0)
Majority Rule (1) (1) (0)
Imposed (3) (6) (+3)
Table 16. Impact of Production and Redistribution on Subjects' 
Confidence in Rankings
ALL EXPERIMENTS
Before Tasks After Tasks Differences F-statistic p(one-tail)
Number of 
Participants 100 100
Mean
Standard
3.70 4.15 0.45 1.52 .02
deviation 0.92 0.74
UNANIMITY EXPERIMENTS
Before Tasks After Tasks Differences F-statistic p (one-tail)
Number of 
Participants 53 53
Mean
Standard
3.64 4.13 0.49 1.47 .08
deviation 0.92 0.76
MAJORITY-RULE EXPERIMENTS
Before Tasks After Tasks Differences F-statistic p (one-tail)
Number of 
Participants 24 24
Mean
Standard
3.71 4.33 0.62 2.18 .03
deviation 0.85 0.56
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IMPOSED-PRINCIPLE EXPERIMENTS
Before Tasks After Tasks Differences F-statistic p (one-tail)
Number of
Participants 23 23
Mean 3.74 4.00
Standard
deviation 1.01 0.85
0.35 1.40
As for the matter of why individuals continued to select the floor- 
income constraint principle during the repeated production and re­
distribution process is something that needs some explanation. This is 
especially so since in the second and third rounds of the production 
experiments, essentially the 'veil of ignorance' had been lifted; that is 
individuals now had a good idea of their abilities to perform the 
previously-unknown assigned task. Those who were fortunate enough 
to have the abilities to perform the required task effectively apparently 
now had the incentive to set as their first choice the principle of 
maximising the average income in the community. In contrast, those 
who were not capable of performing the required task effectively had the 
incentive to set as their first preference a more egalitarian principle than 
if the floor-constraint principle be applied. Nevertheless, as just 
indicated the proportion of the participants who nominated the floor- 
constraint system of justice as their first choice hardly altered over the 
repeated plays of the production game. This persistence of these 
preferences amongst the more fortunate possibly was due to these 
individuals developing some empathy with the less fortunate participants 
who, through no fault of their own, did not possess the skills required to 
allow them to generate an income above the agreed floor-income level. 
Consequently, for compassionate reasons the better-off participants 
continued to agree to select the floor-constraint principle of justice. As 
for the least fortunate participants, the persistence of their preferences
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may reflect a recognition of the view that the agreed system of justice 
was the best that could be hoped for in the circumstances.
The sympathy by the better-off participants for those less fortunate 
also seems to have been reflected in the work behaviour of the better off. 
This matter will be returned to towards the end of this section. For the 
present, however, it is noted that the data set out in table 17 indicates 
that there was a significant increase in the level of average productivity53 
over the sequence of production tasks. It is possible that part of the 
reason why the participants, on average, produced a greater level of 
output after each task is that they learned how to become more skilled at 
performing the assigned task.54 What does not appear to explain this 
improvement in labour productivity, however, is the use of democratic 
processes to decide on a system of justice. The conclusion was inferred 
from the data set out in Table 18 that indicates that the improvements in 
the levels of productivity, for both the choice and imposed experiments, 
were not statistically significantly different from one another.
T ab le  17. O verall Im pact of Production Experience on P roductiv ity
Type of 
Experiment
First-
Period
Mean
Last-
Period
Mean
F-statistic P N
All experiments 
Choice
8.01 10.06 2.33 .00 100
experiments
Imposed-rule
8.16 10.13 2.20 .00 77
experiments 7.52 9.83 2.87 .01 23
53 Labour productivity was measured by counting the spelling errors each 
participant took account of and accurately corrected.
54 A similar point was made by Fröhlich and Oppenheimer (1990: 469) within the 
context of the empirical results they obtained; namely, that labour productivity tends to 
improve with an increase in the number of similar tasks performed.
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Table 18. Overall Impact of Type of Experiment on Production: Choice 
Vs. Imposition________________________________________
Stage of 
Production
Choice
Experiment
Mean
Imposed
Experiment
Mean
F-statistic P N
First production 8.35 7.52 1.40 .22 23*
Last production 10.26 9.83 1.55 .16 23
* To be comparable with imposed experiments, the sample size of choice experiments 
was reduced from 77 to 23.
That said, when the participants were further differentiated into 
those who paid taxes and those who were recipients of income transfers, 
statistically significant differences in the increase in the level of average 
productivity do emerge (as indicated in Table 19)55. While the level of 
productivity increased significantly for both groups, the difference in the 
level of productivity between the first and the last task was greater for the 
recipients of income transfers than that for those who were taxpayers.
Table 19. Impact of Tax Status Changes on Productivity: All Experiments
Tax Status First-Period
Mean
Last-Period
Mean
F-statistic P N
Taxpayers'
production
10.62 11.88 1.84 .02 43
Recipients'
production
5.41 8.14 2.97 .00 44
When the tax-paying and the income-recipient participants were 
disaggregated, however, into those who participated in choice and those 
who participated in imposed experiments, the most statistically 
significant increase in the level of productivity was observed for 
recipients in the choice experiments (see Table 20). Nevertheless, the 
mean productivity rose for both the tax-payers and the income-recipient 
of participants when the principle of justice was imposed on the group. 
In these experiments, however, the increase in the level of productivity
55 Of the 100 participants in the production experiments, there were 13 students 
whose contribution to group output was equal to the average group output. They were 
excluded from the analysis.
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for tax-payers was found not to be statistically significant (see Table 20). 
It may be inferred, therefore, that for taxpayers the lack of freedom to 
choose a principle of justice may have served as a disincentive for this 
group of participants to increase their level of productivity. Not too much 
should be made of this point, however, since comparatively few (only 
five) experiments were carried out where the principle of justice was 
imposed.
Table 20. Impact of Experimental Treatment Tax Status Changes on 
Productivity: All Experiments
CHOICE EXPERIMENTS
Tax Status First-Period Last-Period F-statistic
Mean Mean
Taxpayers'
production
11.03 11.94 1.79
Recipients'
production
5.81 8.03 2.67
IMPOSED EXPERIMENTS
Tax Status First-Period
Mean
Last-Period
Mean
F-statistic P N
Taxpayers'
production
10.38 11.63 2.68 .11 8
Recipients'
production
4.60 8.20 3.20 .05 10
The experimental results reported in tables 15 to 20 suggest that 
deceptive behaviour, with respect to the operation of the tax-cum-transfer 
system, may be less severe than some may believe.56 Nevertheless, 
some may find it surprising that the average level of labour productivity, 
for at least those participants who paid income taxes, did not decrease. 
In fact it increased over the three runs of the experiment. There are a 
number of explanations that can be put forward to explain, at least in 
part, this behaviour. The first explanation (or partial explanation) is that,
56 A similar inference can be drawn from the relevant results reported in Fröhlich and 
Oppenheimer (1992).
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as is well known,57 the imposition of an income tax creates a negative 
compensated substitution effect which induces individuals to demand 
more leisure and a positive income effect which induces individuals to 
demand less leisure (more work) to offset for the loss of personal income 
resulting from having to pay taxes. This is assuming that leisure is a 
normal good. Thus it is possible that the positive income effect for 
leisure at least just offsets the negative compensated substitution effect. 
In these circumstances the average labour productivity for tax payers 
would not fall as a result of imposing the income tax. The same 
argument applies with respect to the income-transfer recipients.
The weakness with this argument is that it does not explain why 
the income effect takes the large positive (relative to the negative 
substitution effect) value that it does. To provide part of such an 
explanation it could be suggested, by drawing on an earlier argument, 
that the tax payers who are the better off in the community have 
sympathy and compassion for the less well-off who, through no fault of 
their own, do not possess the required skills to allow them to earn a pre­
transfer income that is above the agreed floor income level. 
Consequently, the better off are willing to work relatively diligently in an 
attempt to generate the personal incomes required to provide the tax 
revenue used to finance the income-transfers required to satisfy the 
floor-income constraint. In this way the members of the group concerned 
can maintain harmonious relations among themselves.
It may also be argued that the participants may have recognised 
that if deceptive behaviour became prevalent, then the system of justice
57 See, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Putterman, Roemer and 
Silvestre (1998: 876).
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initially unanimously agreed upon would come to be rejected by a 
sizeable proportion of any group. If this occurred in a community this 
would face this community with the possibility of political and economic 
chaos. The participants also may have realised that if this possibility 
became a reality then this would make the vast majority if not the whole 
group worse off. What more, it would not be known who (if anyone) 
would be made better off by this chaotic situation. Thus this group, in 
which deceptive behaviour is prevalent, is faced with a variation of the 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance. Whereas the Rawlsian veil of ignorance 
refers to the situation before an egalitarian system of justice has been 
decided upon, the situation referred to here (with its associated veil of 
ignorance) arises after such a system of justice has been decided upon. 
Faced with this threat, and given that the system of justice they initially 
agreed to is seen to be fair, these considerations induced the 
participants to recognise that it is to the advantage of each individual to 
behave honestly (or reasonably so) with respect to the implementation of 
the tax-cum-transfer system.
2.6 An alternative to Arrow s social choice framework
The experimental results reported in the previous section suggest 
that the design of the game-theoretic experiments underlying these 
results indicate how a reasonably detailed answer can be provided for 
question 2 (and hence, a positive answer can be given to question 1) in 
section 2.2.2. Specifically, the design of these experiments suggests 
that if some of the Arrovian conditions are replaced with appropriate 
alternative conditions, then this will ensure that in certain communities, at 
least, the resulting decision process employed will result in its members
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agreeing, unanimously, on a single system of prudential justice in 
distribution.
In setting out these alternative Arrovian conditions, first it is noted 
that it is clear from the group discussions and the group decision 
procedures employed in the experiments that the weak Pareto principle 
(P) was applied during the decision process. Specifically, if all 
individuals in any single group of participants - a group which is taken to 
represent the community - preferred some social objective, x, over 
another, y, then this group preferred x to y.
As for the range of relevant alternative conditions to the Arrovian 
conditions, to begin with condition U (unrestricted domain) it is replaced 
by two alternative conditions. Within the context of devising one of these 
alternative conditions, I readily concede that, and as was emphasised in 
sub-section 2.1.1, cultural factors and social circumstances probably 
contributed to the experimental results reported in the previous section. 
This statement is based upon the fact that: (i) each group of Filipino 
participants agreed, unanimously, on the floor-income constraint system 
of justice in distribution, whereas (ii) for the experiments, that used 
participants from universities in North America, Poland and Australia, 
respectively, only between 70 and 80 per cent of all groups agreed 
unanimously on this system of justice (See the discussion near the end 
of sub-section 2.1.1). This marked difference in the results obtained for 
these two sets of identical experiments probably can be explained to 
some degree, at least, by the different social cultures from which each 
set of participants was drawn.58
58 As for the relevant differences in cultural values, possibly this can be explained by 
the Filipino participants being more aware, than the participants in the comparable
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It follows that cultural factors appear to influence individual 
rankings of relevant alternatives. Thus any relevant ranking is likely not 
to be the same for any set of individuals. To allow for this reasonable 
possibility, the following condition is recommended:
CS (Cultural Similarities) The members of a diverse community who are to rank 
any alternatives, x and y, are from a society possessing cultural characteristics, at 
least with respect to perceptions concerning matters of economic uncertainty, that 
are the same as (or very similar to) that for the Filipino participants in the reported 
game-theoretic experiments.
The experimental results presented in the previous section 
suggest that one of the implications of imposing condition CS is that 
members of a community that satisfies this condition tend to be risk 
averse. That said, this condition does not rule out the possibility that the 
members of such a community have diverse views on a range of other 
issues of social importance such as religious matters, international 
affairs, legal systems and so on, and these alternative views are 
respected by members of the community. In other words, the community 
is pluralistic. In addition, while condition CS places limits on the sort of 
community that is being considered, this community, as alluded to earlier 
in section 2.1.3, is likely to be representative of a relatively large 
proportion of the world's communities (that will tend to be found in 
developing countries).
The other condition that leads towards replacing condition U 
(unrestricted domain) is one that allows for the uncertain economic 
circumstances that arise when risk and credit markets are incomplete or
experiments, of the difficulties associated with coping with relevant severe economic 
uncertainties of the kind represented in the game-theoretic experiments - uncertainties 
of the type prevalent in developing countries. (See the discussion near the end of sub­
section 1.1 in the main text.)
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absent in a community. In addition, the alternatives to be considered 
need to be restricted to the alternative systems of justice listed in section 
2.3.
R (Restricted Domain): For the set of the four alternative systems of justice in 
distribution, listed in section 2.3, to be considered by a diverse community, the 
domain of the social welfare function is restricted to orderings of alternatives that 
individuals make when faced with uncertainty of the form that each individual does 
not know, in the initial decision period (that is, the original position), what level of 
income s/he will receive in the future.
The experimental results also suggest (see Tables 11 and 15) that 
facing individuals with the uncertainty of the type reflected in condition R, 
th is was not enough, in itself, to induce unanimous agreement over a 
principle of justice - a minority (around 19 per cent) of the participants 
individually preferred a system of justice other than the floor-incom e 
constraint principle. And this was so even though condition CS applies. 
To achieve the desired unanimous agreement the experimental results 
indicate that the community needs to be placed in a threatening context 
where, if unanimous agreement is not reached on a single system of 
justice, dire consequence may result. That said (and as noted in the 
previous section), any system of justice that a community may agree 
upon will need to be seen as preferable to the threatened alternative. It 
is also recalled that the point was made in section 2.2 that condition I 
(Independence of Irrelevant A lternatives) does not take into account 
information concerning the context within which important community 
decis ions are made. Thus the fo llow ing a lternative  condition  is 
recommended:
TC (Threatening Context): Individuals in a diverse community have to order 
any alternatives x and y within the context that there is the threat that if a social 
ordering is not unanimously agreed to by members of this community then a 
randomly-selected alternative may be imposed upon the community. How 
individuals may order x and y within any other context is completely disregarded.
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Attention next turns to finding an alternative to condition CR. The 
reason for finding a replacement is because, as indicated in section 2.2, 
condition CR requires more information than is required for a community 
to make a decision on which of the relevant alternatives it prefers to all 
others. The condition that was employed, implicitly, in the previous 
game-theoretic experiments is the following:
WCR (Weak Collective Rationality): If the social welfare function provides 
orderings of alternatives that are such that x is socially preferred to yj, for all i, 
where i is no less than 3, (xPyj, i > 3), then x is socially preferred to all the other 
alternatives.
Satisfying this condition clearly is far less demanding than 
attempting to satisfy condition CR (which requires that the ordering of the 
alternatives be complete and transitive), or a weakened version of CR 
which allows quasi-transitivity or acyclic orderings.59 That said and as 
indicated in section 2.2 and implied by the results for the game-theoretic 
experiments, satisfying condition WCR may be all that is required for a 
community to reach an acceptable relevant decision.
Finally, the experimental results suggest that the non-dictatorship 
(D) condition can be replaced by a unanimity condition.
Un (Unanimity): For any set of alternatives, x and y, there must be unanimous (or 
nearly so) agreement by the members of the community (composed of at least 
two members) over the ordering of these alternatives such that if any individual 
prefers x to y then, without this person coercing anyone else to adopt this 
ordering, all (or nearly all) other individuals in the community accept this ordering.
59 Quasi-transitivity requires that xPyPz but not xlylz, where P denotes ‘preferred to’ 
and I denotes ‘indifference to’. Acyclic preferences requires xPyPz but not zPx (Mas- 
Colelletal. 1995:800).
94
Drawing these various comments together, along with bearing in 
mind the experimental results presented in the previous section, the 
following is stated:
Conjecture: If a community satisfies condition CS, and during the process of 
this community attempting to decide on the ordering of alternative systems of 
justice in distribution the conditions P, R, TC and WCR are imposed on the 
decision procedure, then Un will be satisfied, and the system of justice 
unanimously (or nearly so) agreed upon is a version of Rawls’ first principle of 
justice and the priority rule, or a version of Popper's principle of minimising 
avoidable suffering.
This conjecture is not contradicted by the experimental results 
presented in the previous section. That said, it is a possibility that other 
sets of participants cannot agree unanimously on the floor-income 
constraint system of justice. This may be so even though the participants 
are drawn from a population that satisfies condition CS and conditions 
P, R, TC, W CR and Un are imposed on the community decision 
procedures. Whether this is so, or not is a matter that needs to be tested 
at some future time.
To conclude this section it is noted that the floor-income constraint 
system of justice does not provide a precise set of criteria for ranking 
social states. In particular, this principle of justice does not say anything 
about where the floor level of income should be set. It is also recalled 
that in section 5 it was pointed out that the participants in the 
experiments did not agree on the level of the floor income. This does not 
mean, however, that social states cannot be ranked by way of making 
use of this system of justice. This is demonstrated in Martina (1998a) by 
way of drawing on Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) and Atkinson 
(1992). Specifically, even though the level of the floor well-being, or 
income level (or poverty line) is not known, specific use can be made of
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the Rawlsian system of justice in distribution and basic information on 
the characteristics of groups of households in the community, to provide 
a reasonably satisfactory ordering of relevant social states can be 
made.60 Such a comparison may be all that is required from the point of 
view of assessing social policy directed at improving the lives of 
members of a community.
2.7 Conclusions
The discussion in this chapter set out to determine if diverse 
groups of Filipinos could come to agree, unanimously (or nearly so), that 
the alleviation (if not the elimination) of poverty in the Philippines was a 
social priority. The reason for wishing to generate this information is that, 
as indicated at the beginning of sub-section 2.1.1, the authorities in the 
Philippines need to know the level of support that they will receive when 
making a concerted attempt to alleviate poverty in the Philippines. It was 
also indicated there that care is needed to be taken in the methods used 
to generate this information. If inappropriate methods are employed then 
misleading information is likely to be generated. It is important, 
therefore, and as indicated in sub-section 2.1.1, that individuals are 
faced with the consequences of their decisions. For this reason game- 
theoretic experiments were used to determine if relevant decisions could 
be made by diverse groups of Filipinos. In these experiments the 
participants are faced with comparatively severe forms of economic 
uncertainty and threats of uncertain social, political, and/or economic
60 Briefly, these techniques require that an appropriate range of income levels, or 
levels of well-being, is taken into account for each characteristic group of households 
when comparing social states. It is then determined if one social state dominates, in some 
appropriate way, another social state.
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consequences if certain decisions are not made. These circumstances 
seem to reflect relevant circumstances that the representative person in 
Philippine society is faced with.
The results reported in section 2.5 indicate that groups of 
participants from comparatively diverse sections of Philippine society 
can agree, unanimously, that the social objective of eliminating poverty 
is a social priority. The particular system of justice unanimously agreed 
upon is a simplified version of Rawls' first principle of justice and the 
priority rule and Popper's principle of minimising avoidable suffering. 
What is more, these participants expressed a range of motives for 
agreeing to this system of justice. These motives were expressed in 
language that hints at arguments to be found in a range of contemporary 
literature in political philosophy that deals with matters of justice in 
distribution. Most important of all, these motives were expressed in 
deeds as well as words. In the instance of the production experiments, 
in particular, participants were willing to accept the consequences of 
their agreements by contributing labour to the successful implementation 
of the system of justice initially unanimously agreed upon. For the 
reasons also indicated at the beginning of the introduction, these 
experimental results should be of some interest to policy-makers in the 
Philippines.
That said, and as indicated throughout this chapter, these 
experimental results have far wider implications than just determining if 
diverse groups in the Filipino community can agree unanimously on an 
egalitarian system of justice. Specifically, the reported experimental 
results indicate what conditions that underlie Arrow's impossibility result 
need to be replaced with alternative conditions that reflect important
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aspects of the world as it is (at least in a developing country such as the 
Philippines) in order to generate the possibility result that a community 
can agree unanimously on the floor-income system of justice. One 
general factor that contributes to this positive result is that of individuals 
being faced with relevant forms of uncertainty. The presence of this 
uncertainty alone does not seem to be enough, however, to generate the 
level of agreement required. As pointed out in the previous section, 
there is empirical experimental evidence to indicate that in certain 
communities unanimous agreement will not be reached even though 
these communities are faced with relevant types of uncertainty. The 
reason for these conflicting results seems to be that the culture, ethos 
and the life experiences of the members of the community concerned do 
seem to be factors of some importance for determining if a community is 
capable of reaching wide agreement, eventually, on a single system of 
justice in distribution. This speculative statement needs to be tested with 
further relevant empirical research.
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Causes of Poverty and Designing Poverty- 
Alleviation Programs
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Chapter 3
Possible Causes of Variation in the 
Incidence of Poverty and Household 
Incomes - A Study at the Macro Level
3.1 Introduction
What factors cause the ievei of poverty, household income and 
per capita income to differ across the rural areas of the Philippines? This 
is the central question that the analysis presented in this chapter 
attempts to answer. In the process of attempting to reach a deeper 
understanding of the causes of poverty in the Philippines it is hoped that 
worthwhile insights can be derived as to how to improve the design of 
poverty-alleviation policies in the Philippines - and in the rural 
Philippines in particular.
The causes of poverty are complex. To begin with it is difficult to 
attribute its causes to a single factor. In a review of the relevant literature 
dealing with poverty and related topics, Abad and Eviota (1985) grouped 
the explanations of the causes of poverty in the Philippines into four 
categories - although categories that are not all mutually exclusive. First, 
it arises from the anti-development values, attitudes and lifestyles of the 
poor; in others words the poor are to blame for their own plight. Second, 
poverty is the inevitable outcome of historical circumstances and the
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industrialisation process. Third, it is the result of power conflicts in which 
the poor do not have access to decision-making processes; and finally, 
poverty is the outgrowth of a political economy which has consistently 
concentrated the ownership of productive assets and resources in the 
hands of a few people.
As it stands, the notion that the poor are against development per 
se is not a convincing argument. Surely poor people would not oppose 
public action whose ultimate objective is to raise a person's level of well­
being. Nevertheless, it is possible that poor people, due to their 
circumstances, do come to believe that they cannot expect, or are not 
entitled to, any improvement. This does not mean, however, that no 
attempts should be made to improve their situation. Rather, by providing 
assistance to allow these persons to be more capable of taking 
advantage of their potential to gain access to goods and services 
required to improve their well-being, they will indeed be able to improve 
the quality of the lives they lead. What is more, they probably will come 
to develop higher expectations as to what they and their children can 
achieve.
The term 'anti-development' is most often equated with anti­
modernisation. It should be recognised, however, that poor people are 
often under-nourished, uneducated, landless, faced with poor 
infrastructure facilities and have little access to support services such as 
credit and marketing facilities. Thus the risks that poor people face 
within the context of economic change (such as that associated with the 
introduction of a new technology) are relatively high, compared to those 
experienced by people who are able to insure in various ways against 
this economic uncertainty. For instance, it could well be that there is not
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sufficient evidence to determine if the introduction of high-yielding 
varieties in the rice-producing areas of the Philippines will bring benefits 
to the less well-off farmers. Thus the under-insured risks that the 
income-poor farmers face as a result of the adoption of a new rice 
technology are higher than the risks for the better-off farmers - farmers 
who have access to assets that can be used as collateral to raise credit. 
And this credit can be drawn upon to finance the purchase of 
complementary farm inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, tractors 
and water. In addition, should the new technology be unprofitable, this 
credit can be used to smooth out household income streams.
It follows that since poor farming households have little or no 
access to these financial resources, they cannot afford to make mistakes 
concerning the allocation of resources they control. To do so would face 
them with destitution. To add to their difficulties, poor farmers are also 
likely to be illiterate, so that learning about modern farming techniques is 
relatively difficult. Thus, in this respect alone, poor households are 
constrained in their abilities to take advantage of development programs.
In short, poor people in the rural Philippines have a range of good 
reasons for not participating in development programs to the level that 
others may expect. The reason is that these programs, when viewed 
from the perspective of poor individuals, may be seen to be 
comparatively risky economic ventures.
The second explanation (mentioned earlier) as to why people are 
poor argues that in the pursuit of economic growth - whether through 
government policies or market mechanisms - certain segments of the 
population would unavoidably be marginalised. In the light of recent
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research, this argument is no longer tenable as it applies to developing 
countries. To be specific, empirical evidence based on cross country 
data is now available that indicate that policies directed toward reducing 
economic inequality are likely to increase (not decrease) the rate of 
growth of real gross national product per capita in a developing country. 
(See, in particular, Rodrick (1995) and Perotti (1996).)
Some (but not all) of the reasons why this is so are alluded to in 
some of the results to be presented later in Chapters 5 and 6. In those 
chapters various classes of empirical evidence are presented that 
indicate that the reduction in the level of poverty contributes towards the 
improvement in the health status of children and in a reduction in the 
level of the total fertility rate. These changes, it seems reasonable to 
assert, would contribute towards increasing the rate of growth of real 
gross national product per capita in the Philippines. So, for example, an 
improvement in the health status of children will contribute towards a 
reduction in the physical stunting and a reduced mental capacity of 
members of the labour force. And these reduced capacities of 
individuals will reduce the level (if not also the rate of growth) of labour 
productivity in the community. (Relevant references that consider this 
issue are surveyed in Chapter 6.) As for the total fertility rate, Perotti 
(1996) provides empirical evidence to indicate that a reduction in the 
level of this variable increases the rate of growth of real gross national 
product per capita in developing countries. This empirical evidence is of 
some importance for the Philippines where the total fertility rate in 1995 
stood at 3.7 - which is comparatively high relative to countries at a 
similar level of economic development. (The weighted average total 
fertility rate for lower middle income countries in 1995 was 3.0. (World 
Bank 1997)).
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As for the third and fourth explanations, which overlap with the 
previous supposed explanations for the level of poverty in the 
Philippines, they suggest that since the poor do not have the resources, 
required skills and are often unorganised, they cannot fully participate in 
the conceptualisation, design and implementation of government 
policies and programs. This situation persists because of the existence 
of an elite61 group in the society who own most of the land and capital, 
have the political connections and who exploit the resource which 
majority of the poor have in abundance - which is unskilled labour. Thus 
government programs aimed to reduce the inequitable distribution of 
resources - such as agrarian reform and the abolition of monopolies in 
coconut and sugar - have yet to make a positive impact on the poor in 
the Philippines.62
61 For an in-depth study of the role of the socio-economic elite in Philippine politics 
and government, see Simbulan (1965).
62 Sobhan (1983: 62-4 and 68) points out that in the economic circumstances faced 
by farmers where there is a decline in agricultural yield given fixed and variable production 
costs, and where farmers continue to rely on rainfed agriculture or have no access to land 
(such as hired labourers), it is not surprising that agrarian reform has had a limited impact 
on the circumstances on beneficiaries of Operation Land Transfer. Among the major 
criticisms against the agrarian reform programs of the Philippine government are: (i) its 
narrow coverage (which prior to the Aquino administration has been confined to certain 
types of agricultural lands such as rice and corn); (ii) high cost of annual land amortisation 
relative to the annual income of rural households; (iii) the lack of support services such as 
credit, rural infrastructure, marketing and budgetary support (Rodriguez 1987); and (iv) 
slow implementation due to delays in arriving at land valuation and compensation policy 
(Sobhan 1983).
Saulo-Adriano (1991), on the other hand, analyses the bottlenecks and loopholes of 
Republic Act 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) that was approved during 
the Aquino Administration. These include limited coverage (arising from exemptions), 
the use of variable versus the single retention limit and award ceiling, and the existence of 
provisions favouring agri-business corporations. See also the views of the Congress for 
A People's Agrarian Reform (1992). For a historical background on agrarian reform and/or 
agrarian conditions in the Philippines, see for instance Sobhan (1983), Narciso (1988), 
Hayami et al. (1990), Saulo-Adriano (1991) and Kerkvliet (1997).
In the case of the oil palm industry, it remained highly monopolistic after deregulation 
policies during the Aquino administration because the oil mills under the defunct Unicom 
controlled 75 per cent of the processing of coconuts (Sajor 1993: 34) Also, yields from 
sugar and coconut have declined in the late 1980s as compared to the early 1980s 
because of the lack of support infrastructure such as irrigation and drainage (among 
others) and aging trees, respectively (Sajor 1993: 29). In addition, due to the excess
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At this juncture, it is important to distinguish the root causes of 
poverty from the societal mechanisms that maintain it since these issues 
differ from one another (Abad and Eviota 1985). It may be surmised that 
there are preconditions for becoming poor such as insufficient income, 
non-ownership of land and capital and the lack of education and 
marketable skills. On the other hand, government intervention, in terms 
of policies and programs, or the lack of them, may perpetuate poverty. 
These preconditions and maintenance factors may be viewed as 
interlinked since current circumstances may have resulted from the 
failures in the government policies of previous and/or current political 
administrations. This point has a bearing within the context of a recent 
study by the Philippine Institute for Development Studies for the 
Presidential Commission to Fight Poverty (PCFP 1995) which listed six 
causes of poverty in the Philippines. These six causes can be classified 
into two categories. The first category lists the lack of employment and 
other opportunities to improve the livelihood of poor households, gross 
inequality in the distribution of wealth and access to resources, 
impediments to increased levels of productivity (such as low level of 
literacy and skills and the lack of complementary inputs to production), 
the abdication by the majority of the poor of their right to actively 
participate in the political process and having an inferior or degraded 
resource base. The second category is composed of factors such as the 
government's failure to provide alternative employment opportunities, 
adequate basic social services and a responsive service delivery system 
for the poor.
supply of labour and because the workers are unorganised and often indebted to their 
patrons, the sugar and coconut workers have to contend with wage rates lower than the 
legislated minimum wages (Sajor 1993: 25).
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It follows on from this last set of observations that a better 
understanding of the causes of poverty and how to address these 
concerns, require knowledge both of the existing circumstances that 
many of the poor are faced with as well as taking into account the form 
of government policies in the past and the present which may have 
influenced the extent of these existing circumstances. This perspective 
is taken into account in the empirical analysis of poverty in the 
Philippines in the 1980s and early 1990s. Before providing such an 
analysis, however, two comparable studies for other Asian countries are 
considered.
3.2 Recent studies on the causes of rural poverty
The recent studies of rural poverty in parts of Asia of interest are 
those conducted by Hossain and Sen (1992) and Gaiha (1988).
3.2.1 The Hossain and Sen study
Using cross-section data sets, Hossain and Sen analysed the 
determinants of household income and the level of poverty in rural 
Bangladesh in the 1980s. With household income as the dependent 
variable, the following independent variables were used in their model: 
land owned by a household; the proportion of cultivated land under 
tenancy and used to grow modern varieties of food grains; number of 
members in a household earning income; the proportion of female 
earning members and non-agricultural earners in a household; the 
household head with primary, secondary, and/or higher education; 
household receiving remittances and villages with access to electricity 
and/or good transport facilities. The econometric model was estimated,
106
using ordinary least squares, separately for farm and non-farm 
households as well as poor63 and non-poor households. Finally, the 
regression model was estimated by using the whole data set based on 
information for all households.
Among the major findings of Hossain and Sen were:
• The size of the land owned by the household is the most significant 
determinant of rural income. Rural incomes are expected to increase by
26 per cent if the size of the land owned of an average household is 
doubled.
• The contribution of labour income to household incomes is relatively 
high. A doubling in the number of income/wage earners would increase 
incomes by 46 per cent. The effect, however, is less for poor households 
and more for workers engaged in non-agricultural activities. The 
contribution of female workers to household incomes was also found to 
be 60 per cent lower than that for an average male worker.
• Higher levels of education (that are beyond the secondary level) are an 
important factor in increasing rural incomes and the effect is greater for 
households engaged in non-farm activities. The effect of primary 
education on the household head is significant for poor (at a 10 per cent 
level of significance) but not for non-poor households. Secondary 
education, however, has the opposite effect.
• Household income for a village that has access to electricity is nearly
27 per cent higher than for a village with no electricity. In addition, 
households in a village with efficient transport facilities have an income
63 Households were classified as poor if their average income was below the poverty 
line. The poverty line used by the authors was derived by getting the money value of the 
required per capita daily intake of 2,112 calories plus a 30 per cent allowance for non-food 
basic needs (Hossain and Sen 1992).
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level that is 11 per cent higher than those in villages with access to a 
less developed transport network.
• Adoption of new agricultural technology, particularly the use of modern 
variety seeds, raises the incomes received by both poor and non-poor 
households; but the effect on poor households is greater. This could be 
explained by the observation that those who owned more land (the 
richer households) have difficulty in supervising labour in order to derive 
the maximum profit to be obtained from the new farm technology.64
• Finally, overseas remittances were found to be insignificantly related to 
household income.
3.2.2 The Gaiha study
The study by Gaiha concentrated on determining the factors that 
influence the risk of becoming poor in rural India. To determine these 
factors use was made of a logit model65. Gaiha categorised the 
households selected through a multistage stratified sampling method 
into poor (if the per capita income of the household falls below a given 
cut-off point66) or non-poor (if the per capita income exceeds the cut-off 
point). His logit aggregative regression results indicated that there were 
specific variables, after allowing for other factors, which were 
significantly correlated with the probability of a household falling below
64 To achieve the optimum results from the use of high-yielding varieties of seeds 
for foodgrains requires the careful and precise application of water, fertilisers and the 
control of weeds. If this precision is not achieved, relevant crop yields can fall appreciably 
(relative to the optimum). See, for example, Lipton and Longhurst (1989) on this issue.
65 Under the logit model, the dependent and selected independent variables take 
the value of one (1) if a specified event occurs, and zero (0) if the specified event does 
not occur (Gaiha 1988: 221).
66 Two cut-off points were used by Gaiha. An upper bound which represents the 
minimum cost of a nutritionally adequate diet and a lower bound, which is assumed to be 
80 per cent of the minimum cost (Gaiha 1988: 227).
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the poverty line in rural India in the late 1960s. These factors included 
village-specific variables (particularly the existence of transport and 
medical facilities), technological variables (specifically the use of 
electricity for farming, high-yielding varieties of crops and agricultural 
extension programs) and the education variable (any household 
member with higher than primary education). The higher the level of 
these independent variables, the lower is the probability that a 
household will fall below the poverty threshold. On the other hand, the 
dependency burden, or the proportion of children (that is, household 
members who are iess than or equal to 14 years old) to the total number 
of persons in the household, was found to be positively related to the risk 
of poverty. The risk of falling under the poverty line, however, was found 
to vary across occupational groups - other things being held the same.
For a range of reasons the results provided by both studies are of 
interest for other developing economies. They indicate how poverty 
alleviation policies in other developing countries may be more effectively 
designed. These results also indicate how to go about the task of 
determining what factors may determine the level of poverty in another 
developing country - such as the Philippines. This matter is turned to 
next.
3.2.3 Applicability of the studies to the Philippines
The studies that have just been cited provide useful insights as to 
how a similar study may be constructed to allow an analysis of poverty 
in the Philippines. Nevertheless, there are particular circumstances and 
issues that apply in the Philippines that need to be allowed for. To begin 
the discussion of this matter first it is noted that in the Philippines land
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ownership - a significant variable in determining rural incomes in the 
Hossain-Sen study - remains highly skewed. While land reform may for 
the time being help in redistributing wealth and removing the worst 
examples of rural poverty, it is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for the elimination of poverty. To begin with, land reform needs to be 
combined with increased access to credit, improved agricultural 
technology and supporting extension services. In addition, ideally land 
reform needs to be combined with an effective industrial policy that 
provides alternative employment opportunities for the rural labour force. 
This alternative source of income for rural households will allow them to 
reduce the variance of income streams.
What is more, the introduction of new agricultural technology 
would need to be combined with support facilities that reduce the costs 
of access to markets for inputs and outputs. If not, then any new 
technology introduced into rural Philippines is likely to bring only limited 
increases in the incomes of poor households. For instance, the 
provision of electrical power and improved transport facilities were both 
cited in both the Hossain and Sen, and Gaiha studies as factors 
increasing the income level of a poor rural household. Areas with 
electricity would benefit from the infusion of new agricultural technology 
such as, for instance, the effort and time saved by making use of electric- 
powered threshers and water pumps. Good transport facilities, on the 
other hand, are essential for lowering the costs of transporting inputs 
(particularly fertiliser and pesticides) and outputs between the farm and 
various markets. (The inputs of fertiliser and pesticides are essentially 
for allowing the effective exploitation of the new seed technology.)
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As for access to medical facilities such as health centres, it 
probably is important for raising the health status of poor rural (and non- 
rural) households. And a healthy rural population is one factor which will 
tend to increase the capability of these households to exploit, effectively, 
the economic opportunities open to them. A similar remark can be made 
about the provision of higher levels of education. Yet, in the Philippines 
rural educational levels are lower than those found in urban areas. The 
latest education census shows that of the urban population aged 15 
years and over 42 per cent have reached, or have graduated from high 
school. In the rural areas, however, only 46 per cent of the residents 
aged 15 years and over have attained the lower level of education of 
elementary education (DECS and NSO 1996).
Foreign remittances were found to be insignificant in raising rural 
incomes in the Hossain and Sen study. However, these may be a 
significant factor, especially between 1985 and 1995, for augmenting 
household incomes in the Philippines. Foreign exchange remittances by 
overseas contract workers were US$3.98 billion in 1995, which is more 
than a 400 per cent increase over the level of remittances (a figure of 
US$687.20 million) in 1985 (NSO 1994c and 1995). (The primary 
market for Philippine labour is the Middle East (particularly Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) followed by Asian countries (such 
as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore) (NSO 1994c and 1995).)
On the dependency burden (which Gaiha found was positively 
related to the risk of becoming poor), it is possible that this also applies 
to the situation to be found in the Philippines - a community which has a 
relatively high dependency burden ratio. Based on the latest census 
data (NSO 1993), the dependency burden ratio in the Philippines was
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75.5 - which means that for every ten income earners, there are about 
eight others who rely on the working family members for their 
subsistence. This fact means that household members who are earning 
have to spread the incomes they receive amongst a relatively large 
number of dependents. However, a negative causation may not just go 
from the dependency ratio to the level of per capita real income. Low per 
capita real incomes (or poverty) may also induce couples to acquire 
more children and, thereby, raise the dependency burden ratio.67 There 
is, in other words, a simultaneous equation problem here.
These initial observations suggest that various factors may 
explain the variations in the level of household incomes and the level of 
the incidence of poverty across the regions and provinces in the 
Philippines. This matter has been considered in several studies of the 
differences in the level of the incidence in the level of poverty and the 
level of real average family incomes across the fourteen (14) regions of 
the Philippines (for example, Quisumbing and Cruz 1986; Bronger 1991; 
and Lamberte et al. 1993). The problem with these studies, however, is 
that they are all based on comparatively small data sets. It is possible, 
however, to expand the relevant data sets by gathering data for the 
seventy-six provinces of the country. This is what is done here.
As far as I am aware, this is the first time these data sets have 
been used for this purpose. This may be due to the lack of data on the 
incidence of poverty by province prior to 1991. Nevertheless, the sole
67 One reason why this may be so is that poor households need more hands to 
provide services such as fetching firewood and water for the household. In addition, 
since there is no social security system, parents may acquire children so that they will 
(they hope) assist their parents in their old age.
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use of regional data, instead of provincial data, means that useful 
information may be lost.
3.3 The Philippine minimum basic needs index68
Before turning to the matter of attempting to explain variations in 
the level of the incidence of poverty and household incomes across the 
provinces in the Philippines, it is useful to note, briefly, that these 
variables might not be the only ones whose variation may need to be 
explained. The other variable that may also be considered is the 
minimum basic needs (MBN) index by province. A measure of this index 
was published in 1995 by the Philippine Government.
This index contains eight variables by province; namely, (a) the 
number of families below the official poverty line; (b) the incidence of 
official poverty in the province; (c) the infant mortality rate; (d) the 
malnutrition rate; (e) the percentage of age cohort completing grade 4; (f) 
the adult illiteracy rate; (g) the proportion of households without access 
to safe water; and (h) the proportion of households without access to 
sanitary toilets. The first two indicators refer to income; the third and 
fourth to health status; the fifth and sixth pertain to education and literacy; 
and the last two to public health facilities. It follows that this index, if 
deemed as being generally acceptable, may be taken to measure the 
level of well-being by province.
The method used to construct the MBN index is similar to that 
used by the United Nations Development Program in deriving a human
68 The description of the index in the main text draws on PCFP (1995).
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development index. Each variable, k, for each province, p, is given an 
'index of achievement', or lPk, which measures how the province
compares with other provinces, as shown below (PCFP 1995: 22):
pn max x. - x  ^iP _ --------------k------- k
k “  max x^ - min x^
where:
xPk denotes the value of the variable k in province p, 
max xk is the highest value for variable k 
and min x^ denotes the minimum value for variable k.
Given the above formula, lPk takes a vaiue of zero (0) if its vaiue is
the highest among all the provinces, and one (1) if the lowest. For each 
province when the lPks for eight variables are summed up across all k
variables, the following identity is employed:
_ n
'P= I  ' pk-
k=1
Each lP or aggregate index for each province, is then compared and
ranked across provinces. As the aggregate index for a province tends to 
zero, the worse off the province has become in terms of well-being, as 
defined.
While the use of this method has the property that it allows us to 
rank provinces by using more than one indicator (PCFP 1995: 22), there 
are problems, however, with using such a composite index. Firstly, there 
is the matter of how each component in the aggregate index should be
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weighted. Specifically, each of the eight variables is given an arbitrary 
weighting; the weighting system is never explained. It is difficult, 
however, to reach a consensus on what weight to give each variable. 
Secondly, there is the matter of the selection of variables to be used in 
the index. The issue of what are the best indicators to use is, however, 
problematic.
These brief remarks - which are discussed in more detail in 
Dasgupta and Weale (1992), Qizilbash (1996) and Noorbaksh (1998) - 
suggest that the 'index of achievement' may give a misleading 
indication of why the level of poverty varies across the provinces in the 
Philippines. For these reasons, a different approach is employed here. 
(The matter of the methodology of the United Nations human 
development index is also discussed at various points in Chapter 4.)
3.4 The Data Set
Prior to discussing the regression models, a brief description of 
the data set used in this chapter is presented in this section. Table 1 
presents a summary of the data used in these models. A definition of the 
variables is contained in the appendix (see Annex 5).
Correlation between the independent variables may be detected 
using the correlation matrix (see Table 2 in Annex 6). For example, 
ELEC was found highly correlated with POT, SAN, NAGL, DEPR, URB, 
FLIT and ACADEG; NAGL with URB and ACADEG; and LANFO with 
ILLIT. (For instance, the variables electricity and sanitary toilet facilities 
are highly correlated - the unadjusted correlation coefficient between 
these two variables is 0.740. See Table 2 in Annex 6.) This information
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indicates that multicollinearity may be present when attempting to 
estimate the regression equations (3.1, 3.2 and 3.3) to be discussed in 
the following sections of the chapter. Hence, it is not possible to 
measure the separate influences of the correlated variables on the level 
of the incidence of poverty, or real average family income, or real per 
capita income in the province concerned. Thus, a two-stage estimation 
procedure was employed as a way of circumventing this problem to 
some degree. This procedure will be discussed in the next section.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
POVI 48.481 14.410 4 .900 74 .900
LogRAFI 10.320 0.309 9.760 11.059
LogRPCI 8.769 0.313 8 .157 9.567
ELEC 42 .842 20 .620 9.400 90 .900
POT 58.484 17.935 13.500 90 .300
SAN 50.258 19.798 8.700 93 .300
NAGL 43.714 14.017 12.000 77 .300
DEPR 80.422 6.739 66 .700 94 .700
HSIZ 5.349 0.227 4.800 6 .100
URB 35.190 17.612 9 .000 95 .200
LANFO 0.478 0.127 0 .216 0.831
IRRIG 0.483 0.268 0 .020 1.000
DIST 0.904 0.836 0 2
FLIT 71 .529 10.933 36 .300 90 .800
ILLIT 8.679 7.109 1.400 4 0 .200
ACADEG 10.099 3.194 3.100 20 .800
ROADEN 1.464 0.683 0.525 4.941
PAVRODEN 0.194 0.147 0.021 0 .640
D 6.836 3.659 1.000 13.000
3.5. Regression models
To determine which factors account for the variation in the 
incidence of poverty, real average family incomes, and real per capita 
incomes across the provinces of the Philippines, the statistical models 
shown below using household and/or provincial conditions as 
explanatory variables were considered. Note that these models are 
modified versions of those adopted by Hossain and Sen, and Gaiha.
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3.5.1 On the incidence of poverty
3.5.1.1 The model
The general form of the equation is:
Povi... = b + b'.. x... + li... , (3.1)jik o ji jik r j|k
where k denotes the cluster of data observations from a particular region. 
The term denotes a vector of independent and exogenous variables
for variable j, for province i which is in the region k. The term
denotes an error term whose value is assumed to be dependent upon
which cluster of data is used to estimate the relevant form of the 
regression equation. The vector of coefficients, bj, and the constant term,
bQ, are estimated using the Huber-White cluster method. This estimation
method is employed to mitigate the possible presence of (a) the cluster 
problem - which is likely to arise if the data collected from within a 
particular region is correlated69 - and (b) heteroscedasticity70.
The dependent variable in equation 3.1 is POVIj, which is defined 
as the proportion of the population in province i whose annual per capita 
income falls below the annual per capita poverty line, or threshold for 
this province. The poverty threshold, in turn, is defined as the annual per 
capita income required, or the amount to be spent to satisfy nutritional 
requirements of 2,000 calories per day and other basic needs (NSCB
69 For a discussion of the cluster problem see Deaton (1995: 1817-9 and 1997: 74 - 
8). The cluster problem causes the standard errors (or t-statistics) to be biased.
70 Heteroscedasticity causes the standard errors to be incorrect and the ordinary 
least square method of estimation to be inefficient. See White (1980) and Deaton (1997: 
78-80) on how the difficulties raised by the presence of heteroscedasticity may be 
overcome.
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1994: 2-22 fn 1). The previous discussion indicates a range of variables 
to explain the variation in the incidence of poverty across provinces. 
However, a major constraint on the choice of variables to employ in the 
analysis is the availability of data for specific variables for the same year 
(cross-section data) or for several years (time-series data). Variables 
such as the unemployment rate, source of credit, quality of transport 
facilities, access to medical facilities, and foreign exchange remittances 
were not included in the model since data were not available at the 
provincial level. Another variable that may be of interest, but not 
included in the regression model, is the extent of the adoption of the new 
agricultural technology in the various provinces. It may be that some 
provinces are in a better position to adopt high-yielding varieties. 
However, data on rice technology adoption at the provincial level were 
not available. Seventy-three out of seventy-five (75) provinces were 
covered in the study. (Data for two new provinces (that is Guimaras and 
Biliran) were not available in 1991.)
Potable water, sanitary toilet facilities, and electricity are 
considered to be basic needs. Potable water71 (POT) and sanitary toilet 
facilities (SAN) are essential for raising the level of health status in the 
community. Members of a household with adequate potable water and 
sanitary toilet facilities are more likely to be healthier than persons living 
in households without these basic facilities. If men and women are 
physically stronger and healthier, then clearly they are better able to 
generate more income. Electricity (ELEC), which is normally associated 
with modernisation, allows households to save on time and effort on
71 A potable source of water supply refers to water suitable for drinking from 
community water systems and tubed/piped deep well (NSO 1993: 2).
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household chores. Thus the members of the household have more time 
to engage in productive, or gainful, work. It also facilitates the 
establishment of small industry in rural areas. Hence, it is expected that 
the higher the proportion of households with electricity, potable water 
and sanitary toilet facilities, the lower is the incidence of poverty in the 
province.
While the Philippines is still basically agricultural, the labour force 
in the agricultural sector has been declining. Between 1987 and 1996, 
employment in this sector declined from 47.8 per cent to 41.7 per cent 
(NSCB 1997: 11-6). One of the possible reasons for the reduction in 
agricultural labour is the lower wages received by agricultural workers 
relative to non-agricultural workers. Non-agricultural workers also have 
been observed to be better educated and have better access to health 
facilities. Hence, the variable NAGL is expected to have a negative 
relationship with POVIj.
As for the dependency burden (DEPR), it is obvious that the more 
non-earning members there are in the household relative to those who 
are working, the fewer resources there are available to meet the basic 
needs for each member of the household - basic needs such as food, 
clothing and shelter. Thus the higher the dependency burden (DEPR) 
ratio, the higher is the expected incidence of poverty in the province. As 
indicated earlier, however, it is possible that there may be a 
simultaneous equation bias problem because POVIj and DEPR may 
influence each other. Hence the co-efficient estimate for DEPR may tend 
to be overstated, or biased upward.72
72 Suitable instrumental variables may be employed in the attempt to handle this 
problem. Because of other estimation problems, however - such as the presence of the 
cluster problem - this estimation technique is not employed here.
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As for the influence of average household size (HSIZ) on POVIj, 
the more (fewer) household members there are, the higher (lower) is the 
probability that the household will fall below the poverty threshold 
because there will be more (fewer) mouths to feed, clothe and shelter. 
The likelihood that this will occur will depend, however, on the number of 
non-earning members in the household.
Turning to consider the proportion of households living in an 
urbanised73 area (URB), it is not clear what influence this variable has on 
the incidence of the level of poverty. While urbanisation is associated 
with modernisation (which, in turn, means better infrastructure - for 
example, roads, bridges and school buildings), this variable may also be 
associated with higher levels of unemployment in urban areas.
Ownership of land74 is essential not only as a resource for 
generating income and ensuring a place to live, but also as a valuable 
asset to be sold in case of dire circumstances (for example, sickness in 
the family, or heavy indebtedness). Thus the proportion of owners fully 
owning and operating the area of arable land in the province (LANFO) is 
hypothesised to have a negative influence on the level of POVIj - other 
things being the same. In this regard it is also noted that while there are 
landless labourers in the Philippines, census figures show that about 15
A municipality and a city is classified as urbanised when it has a population 
density of at least 1,000 persons per square kilometre (NSO 1994b: 374). Poblaciones 
or central districts of municipalities and cities as well as in barangays (villages) are classified 
based on a set of guidelines (NSO 1994b: 374).
74 Full ownership of land is defined as 'land operated with a title of ownership in the 
name of the holder and consequently, the right to determine the nature and extent of the 
use of the land' (NSO 1994a: x).
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per cent of the total area of farms was tenanted, or leased in 1991 (NSO 
1994a: xxxiv).
Another variable which may influence the level of POVIj is the 
quality of land in a province. The quality of land would be reflected in the 
price of land. However, this variable was not included in the model since 
data on the price of an average piece of agricultural land by province 
were not available.
Irrigation, together with high yielding varieties and other support 
services to farming, aims to raise agricultural yield. This is done by way 
of enabling farmers to harvest their produce more than once a year. 
Thus, the proportion of irrigation facilities to arable land (IRRIG) is 
expected to have a negative influence on the level of POVIj - holding 
other things the same.
Most of the essential public services and infrastructure have long 
been concentrated in MetroManila and its surrounding provinces. 
Hence distance (DIST) may be an important variable in explaining 
variations in the incidence of poverty across provinces. This is 
particularly so since the road network in the Philippines is poor and 
communication facilities are inadequate (see World Bank 1996). As it is 
difficult to get estimated distances between the capital centre of a 
province and MetroManila, especially for the island provinces, dummy 
variables were used instead. All provinces which are officially classified 
as part of the Luzon island were given a value of zero (0). Exceptions 
were made for Mindoro and Palawan, two island provinces of Luzon 
which are relatively further away from MetroManila (compared with the 
other provinces within the Luzon island). Mindoro and Palawan were
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treated similarly to provinces in the Visayas, and were given a value of 
one (1). Provinces in Mindanao, on the other hand, that are even further 
away from Metropolitan Manila, were given a value of two (2). All things 
being equal, it is hypothesised that a province outside of Luzon has a 
higher incidence of poverty than one within the Luzon island.
Functional literacy (FLIT), or the ability to read, write and count 
(DECS and NSO 1996: xxiv) may help improve a person's socio­
economic condition. A person who is functionally literate, on the 
average, has a greater chance of receiving higher wages than the less 
functionally literate. A functionally literate person is also expected to be 
more exposed to information on improvements in science and 
technology and apply this to her/his daily life. Thus it is hypothesised 
that the higher (resp. lower) the functional literacy rate or FLIT for a 
province, the lower (resp. higher) is POVIj - other things being the same. 
Put differently, the higher (resp. lower) the illiteracy rate (or ILLIT) for a 
province, the higher (resp. lower) is POVIj - also other things being the 
same.
Another education variable used is ACADEG, or the proportion of 
those aged 25 years and over who have an academic degree. This 
variable, however, may be considered as an imperfect measure of the 
level of educational attainment in the province because it only covers a 
portion of the population, specifically those who are 25 years old and 
above. However, ACADEG gives us an idea of the level of educational 
attainment of a substantial portion of the labour force (with ages 15 years 
and above). Similar to FLIT, it is hypothesised that the higher ACADEG 
is, the lower is POVIj - holding other things the same. Alternative 
education variables which may be used in the model are gross
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enrolment rates and completion rates in the elementary and secondary 
school levels. School enrolment and completion rates, however, are 
also an imperfect measure of the level of educational attainment in a 
province since they cover a certain slice of the population only, 
particularly household members who are approximately between the 
ages of six and sixteen (16) years of age.
Roads are important in the rural areas primarily for transporting 
agricultural produce to the town or city market. Also, roads enable 
people to make use of facilities found in the town or city centres such as 
higher education and credit, which, in turn, allows them to improve their 
incomes. The better the quality of the roads, the easier it would be for 
farmers to raise their incomes. Thus, road density (ROADEN) and paved 
road density (PAVRODEN) are expected to have a negative influence on 
POVIj.
To take into account the cluster problem mentioned earlier, the 
data by province were clustered into the thirteen (13) regions (exclusive 
of the National Capital Region) of the country. Delineation by region (D) 
included the Cordillera Administrative Region, but excluded the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and the CARAGA region since 
the provinces within these two regions were still officially classified, in 
1991, as part of Regions 9 and 12, and 10 and 11 respectively.
As mentioned earlier, some of the independent variables are 
correlated with each other. When run together, the variables which are 
highly correlated may result in biased coefficients. The method most 
frequently used to remedy this situation is to drop the variables expected 
to cause the multicollinearity problem (Greene 1997: 423). This may,
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however, result in problems of mis-specification of the basic regression 
model (Greene 1997: 423). What is more, or of more importance, some 
valuable information may be lost, which otherwise would provide useful 
insights into how certain (independent variables) may influence the level 
of poverty in the Philippines. In the attempt to avoid this problem, and 
instead of dropping variables, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation procedure was employed.
To explain this estimation procedure in general terms, first it is 
specified that there is a dependent variable, Yj, that is to be regressed on
a set of relevant independent variables - the Xj's. This equation is
estimated using ordinary least squares based on the Huber-White
cluster estimation method. The estimated regression is then used to 
provide predicted values of Yj. These predicted values of Yj are then
used as an instrumental variable in the second stage in the estimation
process. Specifically, this second stage consists of specifying a 
dependent variable, yj, that is to be regressed on a set of relevant
independent variables - the Xj's. However, in the estimation of this
second regression equation, one of the independent variables is 
combined with the instrumental variable - the predicted values of Yj .
Besides that, this second equation is also estimated using ordinary least 
squares based on the Huber-White cluster estimation method (Deaton 
1997: 78 - 80 and Greene 1997: 741).
When it comes to the regression equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, NAGL 
was used as Yj in the first equation. The predicted value of Yj was then 
used as the instrumental variable in the estimation of the second 
equation. More specifically, in the first regression equation, NAGL was 
regressed on a range of independent variables (such as ELEC, URB and
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ILLIT). The Huber-White Cluster Method, discussed earlier, was used in 
this estimation of the regression equation. Next, the predicted value of 
NAGL was used as an instrumental variable, together with other 
independent variables, in a regression equation with POVIj as the 
dependent variable.
3.5.1.2 Regression results and analysis
After some experimentation with a range of relevant variables,75 
the regression equations which gave the most robust, stable and 
insightful results are those set out in Table 3. The regression equations 
as a whole were found significant based on the F-tests76. The coefficient 
of determination77 (denoted as R2) ranged between 0.26 and 0.29 for 
the POVIj model and 0.56 to 0.58 for the first-stage equation (with NAGL 
as the dependent variable). Except for the coefficient of one variable 
(PAVRODEN), all the coefficient estimates set out in that table are 
statistically significant at just above the five per cent level, or less. In 
addition, all coefficient estimates have the signs which intuition suggests 
they should have. This last assertion is explained by way of considering, 
in turn, each variable that is referred to in Table 3.
75 Other explanatory variables included in various regression equations - equations 
that are not reported in the main text - were: potable water, dependency burden, 
household size, irrigation, distance, functional literacy and road density. The relevant 
coefficient estimates for these variables were found not to be statistically significantly 
different from zero. Some of these variables are considered, briefly, later in the main text.
76 The F statistic is used to test the hypothesis that all the individual coefficients of 
the regression equation except the constant term are significantly different from zero 
(Greene 1997: 268).
77 The coefficient of determination measures the proportion of the total variation in 
the dependent variable that is accounted for by the variation in the regressors or in the 
independent variables (Greene 1997: 252).
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Table 3. Coefficient Estimates derived using the Huber-White 
cluster regression formula*: POVI model
Number of the regression equation
1 2 3 4 5 6
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
POVI NAGL POVI NAGL POVI NAGL
E s t i m a t i o n
m e t h o d
2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
constant 109.768
(7.78)
31.040
(6.17)
111.91
(8.74)
24.804
(4.467)
113.51
(11.03)
32.78
(7.88)
SAN - 0.300 
(-2.59)
-0.287
(-2.72)
-0.278
(-2.41)
LANFO -52.976
(-3.65)
-54.169
(-3.71)
-55.060
(-4.18)
NAGL -0.477
(-2.15)
-0.528
(-3.40)
-0.566
(-3.61)
ELEC 0.196
(2.18)
URB 0.255
(3.02)
0 .290 
(3.27)
0.346
(7.19)
ILLIT -0.541
(-2.92)
-0.527
(-2.58)
-0.588
(-4.20)
ACADEG 1.315
(2.11)
PAVRODEN 19.884
(1.97)
R2 0.288 0.563 0.274 0.583 0.261 0.560
F Statistic 8.01 71.32 9.92 89.10 14.04 58.37
no. of
observations
73 73 73 73 73 73
* All variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White method. See the appendix 
(Annex 5) for the definition of the variables and sources of data.
Columns 1, 3 and 5 show that SAN, LANFO and NAGL were 
found significantly related to POVIj based on their t-statistics78. Using a 
2SLS method as described earlier, other independent variables were, in 
turn, found significantly related to NAGL (see columns 2, 4 and 6). In
78 The t-statistic is used to test the hypothesis that the regression coefficient B|< is 
significantly different from zero (Greene 1997: 265).
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column 2, for instance, ELEC, URB and ILLIT were found significantly 
related to NAGL. Apart from URB and ILLIT, ACADEG and PAVRODEN 
were found to be significantly related to NAGL as shown in columns 4 
and 6, respectively. The results in Table 3 imply, therefore, that these 
other independent variables, that are statistically significant in 
influencing the level of NAGL, also at least indirectly influence the size 
of POVIj (that is, the level of poverty across provinces in the Philippines).
In passing, it is emphasised that because of the multicollinearity 
problem the independent variables, URB, ILLIT, ACADEG and 
PAVRODEN, were dropped from a single-equation model, with POVIj 
being set as the dependent variable. Thus, had a two-stage estimation 
procedure not been used, then a useful insight would have been lost; 
namely, and as has just been noted, these independent variables seem 
to have influenced, at least indirectly, the level of poverty across the 
provinces in the Philippines in the early 1990s. (This is not to say that 
we know the exact quantitative size of the full extent of the influence of 
these independent variables. This we cannot know, by drawing on 
relevant regression results, because of the multicollinearity problem. All 
we can say is that these variables at least have a statistically significant 
indirect effect on the level of poverty in the Philippines.)
Analogous to the Hossain and Sen study, LANFO and NAGL were 
observed to have a negative effect on the incidence of poverty. The 
results of the relevant regressions equations in Table 3 may be 
interpreted as follows. Owning land will tend to reduce the economic 
uncertainty that faces a rural household - economic uncertainty reflected 
in the variability of income streams. This reduced economic uncertainty, 
along with the fact that land can be used as collateral to underwrite
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loans, means that those households that own relatively large amounts of 
land will find it relatively easy (compared to households that own little or 
no land) to acquire credit. And this credit will assist in generating extra 
income for these households (that own relatively large amounts of land). 
In addition, the ownership of adequate amounts of land by a household 
will ensure that it has access to adequate amounts of food.
Turning to the issue of non-agricultural income earners, as 
pointed out in sub-section 3.5.1, this group receives comparatively 
higher wages and less volatile incomes than agricultural workers. The 
proportion of non-agricultural earners in the province may, in turn, be 
influenced by access to electricity, the level of urbanisation, the level of 
educational attainment of its labour force, and the availability of 
infrastructure facilities, such as roads. Electricity allows people in the 
rural areas to engage in alternative sources of income outside of 
agriculture. An increased level of urbanisation is associated with more 
employment opportunities in the manufacturing and service sectors. 
Having a basic level of literacy and an academic degree (for certain 
occupations) are also usually required for non-agricultural types of work. 
Paved roads facilitate also the creation and expansion of urban centres, 
which, in turn, provide opportunities for non-agricultural employment.
As for the negative effect of SAN on POVI, this indicates that the 
higher the proportion of households with access to sanitation facilities 
the lower the level of the incidence of poverty in the province concerned. 
It is possible that having access to sanitation facilities has a positive 
effect on the level of health status of rural households. Being healthy, in 
turn, allows more members of the household to earn more income.
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3.5.2 On variations in income
3.5.2.1 The regression models
In the present instance the following regression models are 
hypothesised:
LogRafi.jk = bQ + b'.x..  ^+ 1n.jk, (3.2)
LogRpci.-k = bQ + b'.x.-k + p..k, (3.3)
where again k denotes the cluster of data observations from a 
particular region. The term denotes a vector of independent and
exogenous variables for variable j, for province i which is in the region k. 
The term denotes an error term whose value is assumed to be
dependent on which cluster of data is used to estimate the relevant form 
of the regression equation. The vector of coefficients, bj, and the
constant term, bQ, are estimated using, as before, the Huber-White
cluster method. (The reasons why this estimation method was 
employed were indicated earlier just below equation 3.1.)
The dependent variables used in regression models set out in 
equations 3.2 and 3.3 were real average family income per province 
(RAFIj) and real per capita income per province (RPCIj) respectively. 
RAFIj was derived by dividing the estimated total real family income (in 
thousands of pesos) by the estimated total number of families per 
province. A family is defined as: '(a) a group of persons usually living 
together [in a household] and composed of the head and other persons 
related to the head [of the household] by blood, marriage or adoption; or 
(b) a single person living alone' (NSO 1994b: 367). RPCIj, on the other 
hand, was calculated by dividing the estimated total real income for a 
province (also in thousands of pesos) by the estimated total population 
in the province. To convert nominal incomes to real incomes, regional
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price indices were used. Similar to the Hossain and Sen study, the 
logarithmic form for real average family income per province (logRAFIj) 
and real per capita income per province (logRPCIj) were used in the 
models. Similar to the POVIj model set out in equation 3.1, a range of 
variables may explain the variation in the level of real average family 
income and real per capita income per province. However, the above 
models were limited to explanatory variables where data for relevant 
variables were available for 1990 and 1991 - the year for which income 
data were available.
The definitions of all the explanatory variables are similar to those 
in equation 3.1 - the POVIj model. However, for obvious reasons, the 
signs attached to the relevant regression coefficients are expected to be 
the opposite to those set out in Table 3. For example, while ELEC was 
expected to have a negative influence on the level of POVIj (where this 
variable is the dependent variable), the same independent variable is 
hypothesised to have a positive influence on the level of logRAFIj and 
logRPCIj.
That said, in the non-agricultural sector (NAGL) all the variables, 
electricity (ELEC), potable water (POT), sanitary toilet facilities (SAN), 
land (LANFO), irrigation (IRRIG), road density (ROADEN), paved road 
density (PAVRODEN), as well as functionally literacy, (FLIT) and having 
an academic degree (ACADEG) are all expected to increase real family 
income for households and real per capita income within the Luzon 
Island (Do). The dependency burden (DEPR) and illiteracy (ILLIT), on 
the other hand, are expected to decrease logRAFIj and logRPCIj. As for 
the influence of URB and HSIZ on logRAFIj and logRPCIj, they may go in 
both directions. The two stage least squares estimation procedure, as
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described in section 3.5.1.1, also was used in the estimation of relevant 
regression equations.
Finally it is noted that since the incidence of poverty depends on 
income levels, it seems reasonable to suppose that the higher the level 
of POVI, the lower should be the level of logRAFIj and logRPCIj. This 
relationship is not certain, however. If the distribution of total income in 
the community becomes more skewed against poor households, then a 
rise in the level of the headcount measure of poverty may be associated 
with the level of logRAFIj or logRPCIj remaining unchanged - or even 
rising if there is some economic growth in the economy and/or, in the 
case of logRPCIj, a decline in the rate of growth of population.
3.5.2.2 Regression results and analysis
After some experimentation with a range of relevant variables,79 
the regression equations which gave the most robust, stable and 
insightful results are those set out in Tables 4 and 5. The regression 
equations as a whole were found significant based on the F-tests80. The 
coefficient of determination (denoted as R2) which ranged between 0.53 
and 0.55 for both the logRAFIj model and the logRPCIj model were 
higher than the R2s for the POVIj model. With one exception 
(PAVRODEN), all the coefficient estimates set out in these tables are 
statistically significant at just above the 5 per cent level, or less. In
79 Other variables included in the various regression equations - equations that are 
not reported in the main text - were: potable water, dependency burden, household size, 
functional literacy and road density. The relevant coefficient estimates for these variables 
were found not to be statistically significantly different from zero. Some of these variables 
are considered, briefly, later in the main text.
80 See footnote 17 for a brief discussion of an F statistic.
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addition, all coefficient estimates have the signs which intuition suggests 
they should have. This last assertion is explained by way of considering, 
in turn, each variable that is referred to in Tables 4 and 5.
Columns 1, 3 and 5 in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that similar to the 
previous results for the POVIj regression model, SAN, LANFO and NAGL 
were found significantly related to logRAFIj and logRPCIj. However, 
there were two other independent variables that were found significantly 
related to real income per province but which were not found 
significantly related to POVIj; namely, IRRIG and DIST. As hypothesised, 
IRRIG was found positively related to logRAFIj and logRPCIj, while the 
influence of DIST on real income was as expected. Thus the 
relationship between DIST and real income (whether based on mean 
family income or per capita) means that if the province is located in 
Luzon, the real average family income for a household residing in the 
province, or the real per capita income for the province, tends to be 
higher compared to that (for either of these income measures) for a 
province located outside of Luzon Island - assuming that all others are 
equal.
Surprisingly, POT was not found to be significantly related to 
logRAFIj or logRPCIj. This may mean that, after allowing for other 
factors, increasing the level of access of households to potable water in 
a province does not necessarily mean a higher level of average 
household income or per capita income. This is not completely 
surprising. Suppose the authorities expend funds on increasing the 
availability of potable water. This change may take place quite 
independently of any (or no) alteration in the level of average household 
income.
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Table 4. Coefficient Estimates derived using the Huber-White 
cluster regression formula*:logRAFI model
Number of the regression equation
1 2 3 4 5 6
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
LogRAFI NAGL LogRAFI NAGL LogRAFI NAGL
E s t i m a t i o n
m e t h o d
2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
constant 8.862
(32.44)
31.040
(6.17)
8.926
(30.93)
24.804
(4.467)
8.857
(31.39)
32.78
(7.88)
SAN 0.007
(3.44)
0.008
(4.20)
0.007
(3.60)
LANFO 1.104
(4.93)
1.081
(4.78)
1.106
(4.77)
DIST -0.067
(-2.43)
-0.072
(-2.56)
-0.066
(-2.52)
IRRIG 0.273
(2.51)
0.270
(2.48)
0.273
(2.53)
NAGL 0.011
(3.14)
0.010
(2.79)
0.011
(3.17)
ELEC 0.196
(2.18)
URB 0.255
(3.02)
0.290
(3.27)
0.346
(7.19)
ILLIT -0.541
(-2.92)
-0.527
(-2.58)
-0.588
(-4.20)
ACADEG 1.315
(2.11)
PAVRODEN 19.884
(1.97)
R2 0.533 0.563 0.551 0.583 0.532 0.560
F Statistic 34.79 71.32 37.88 89.10 37.67 58.37
no. of
observations 72 73 72 73 72 73
*AII variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity 
using the Huber-White method. See the appendix (Annex 5) for a definition 
of the variables and sources of data.
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Table 5. Coefficient Estimates derived using the Huber-White 
cluster regression formula*: logRPCI model
Number of the regression equation
1 2 3 4 5 6
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
logRPCI NAGL logRPCI NAGL logRPCI NAGL
E s t i m a t i o n
m e t h o d
2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
constant
7.466
(28.24)
31.040 
(6.17)
7.559
(27.75)
24.804
(4.467)
7.484
(31.63)
32.78
(7.88)
SAN 0.006
(2.71)
0.006
(3.22)
0.006
(2.63)
LANFO 0.829
(3.73)
0.801
(3.69)
0.824
(3.89)
DIST -0.068
(-2.10)
-0.077
(-2.14)
-0.070
(-2.28)
IRRIG 0.0275
(2.99)
0.268
(2.81)
0.274
(2.97)
NAGL 0.012
(3.54)
0.010
(2.93)
0.012
(3.26)
ELEC 0.196
(2.18)
URB 0.255
(3.02)
0.290
(3.27)
0.346
(7.19)
ILLIT -0.541
(-2.92)
-0.527
(-2.58)
-0.588
(-4.20)
ACADEG 1.315
(2.11)
PAVRODEN 19.884
(1.97)
R2 0.527 0.563 0.548 0.583 0.532 0.560
F Statistic 35.01 71.32 36.41 89.10 35.18 58.37
no. of
observations 72 73 72 73 72 73
* All variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity using 
the Huber-White method. See Annex 5 for a definition of the variables and data sources.
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Turning to the regression results using NAGL as the dependent 
variable, variables such as ELEC, URB, ILLIT, ACADEG and 
PAVRODEN were found, in turn, to be significantly related to NAGL (see 
Columns 2, 4 and 6 in Tables 4 and 5). These results are identical to 
those contained in the even-numbered columns of Table 3. The 
predicted values of NAGL were then used as instrumental variables in 
the estimates of the regression equations in which logRAFIj or logRPCIj 
were dependent variables. (The results for these regression equations 
were discussed earlier.)
3.6 Conclusions
In conclusion, first it is emphasised that the results presented here 
need to be treated with some caution since the data used in the 
estimates of various regression equations are not ideal. However, if 
these results can be tested using improved data sets, and these results 
turn out to be robust, then they have implications for the design of 
poverty-alleviation programs in the rural areas of the Philippines.
It is also pointed out that it may not be inappropriate to compare 
the above results with those to be found in the studies by Hossain and 
Sen (nor that by Gaiha). This is due to the non-congruency of the 
models used (that is, some variables are missing in both models), as 
well as the different estimation techniques employed in these various 
studies. Nevertheless, there are some similarities between the Hossain- 
Sen study and the findings presented in the previous sections. For 
instance, in both studies the following list of variables was found to have 
a statistically significant influence on the level of poverty and real 
average household incomes: LANFO, NAGL, ELEC and some
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appropriate measure of the level of education. This implies that 
increasing the proportion of households who: own the land that they till; 
are working outside of agriculture; have access to electricity and receive 
a relatively large amount of basic education will raise the level of 
average real incomes for these households. What is more, the higher 
the level of average household incomes or per capita incomes in a 
province, the lower is the incidence of poverty in this province.
The regression results presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5 also 
strongly suggest that a reasonably sure way of reducing the level of 
poverty, and raising real incomes per capita at the provincial level in the 
Philippines is to improve the supply of a range of basic infrastructure. 
And this basic range of infrastructure refers to: (i) basic education 
directed at reducing functional illiteracy; (ii) electricity; (iii) irrigation; (iv) 
paved roads and (v) basic preventive health care, as represented by the 
provision of sanitation. This theme, of the provision of an improved 
supply of infrastructure in the Philippines, is one that is developed in 
parts of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Economic Links Between Formal Education, 
Credit, Deforestation and Well-Being 
Poverty in Rural Philippines -
A Study at the Micro Level
4.1 Introduction
There are a variety of ways of attempting to determine the links 
among the level of formal education, access to credit resources, use of 
forest resources and the level of weii-being in a community. The term 
‘well-being’ refers here to what is for the 'good' of a person (Dasgupta 
1993:8). What is for the 'good' of a person may, in turn, be defined within 
the context of the particular society of which this person is a member. In 
this chapter, the term ‘well-being’ is viewed in its broadest sense to 
include measures that are economic (in terms of per capita income) and 
social (education and public health) in nature. This approach is reflected 
in the construction by the United Nations Development Program (1997), 
of a Human Development Index. Also in this chapter, the term ‘well- 
being’ is interchangeably used with the phrase 'quality of life'.81
One general approach to the task of determining the possible links 
between the level of formal education and the level of well-being is to 
make use of apparently relevant sets of aggregate data across countries. 
Another general approach is to use the same data across regions within
81 For a review of the literature on the search for a definition and measurement of 
well-being see Sycip and Luna (1993) and Noorbaksh (1998).
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a country. Both of these general approaches, however, employ the 
methodology of drawing relevant, and often tenuous inferences from 
perceived measured statistical regularities between relevant economic 
and social variables.
A far more direct approach to deriving relevant information and 
insights is to select, carefully, villages within a community and hold 
focus-group discussions (FGDs) with groups of individuals living in these 
communities. A focus group refers to 'a small number of participants 
(usually six to twelve) from a target population who, under the guidance 
of a moderator, discuss topics of importance to the particular research 
study1 (Knodel et al. 1988: 42). Apart from having a focus or a particular 
topic of interest, the group focuses on the opinions of people who are 
relatively homogeneous or have certain things, or experiences, in 
common (Hawe et al. 1990: 174). The use of FGDs is a qualitative 
technique that aims to collect a range of information and with greater 
depth from a target group on, for instance, the reasons for people's 
attitudes and behaviour (Hawe et al. 1990: 174). FGDs are conducted 
until a 'clear pattern emerges and subsequent focus groups produce 
only repetitious information' (Hawe et al. 1990: 176). Focus group 
discussions differ from individual interviews because the participants are 
encouraged to give their opinions, elaborate on them, as well as react to 
the views of their co-participants (Knodel et al. 1988: 42).82
Through the process of asking a range of appropriate and relevant 
questions, discussions are stimulated on the general topic of the links 
that are thought to run among for instance, formal education, credit,
82 For the potential advantages and limitations of focus group research, see Knodel 
et al. (1988: 43-5) and Morgan (1997: 13-7).
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utilisation of forest resources and the level of well-being in this 
community. Naturally, for the FGDs to provide accurate and relevant 
information these discussions need to be carefully structured in order to 
minimise, if not eliminate, the risk of undesirable biases in the 
information generated. (This matter is briefly discussed in the next 
section.) Examples of the use of focus-group discussions employed to 
elicit relevant information, is to be found in Caldwell (1986) and Caldwell 
et al. (1988a and 1988b).
Assuming that this accurate information is created from the FGDs, 
then only comparatively limited, if any, inferences have to be made 
concerning what individuals consider to be the links and how these links 
are viewed among formal education, credit, the use of forest resources 
and their level of well-being. In addition, if appropriate questions are 
posed, useful information also can be generated relating to the possible 
links between, say, the level of formal education provided in a 
community and the degree of completeness of formal credit markets - 
two variables that, as Jacoby and Skoufias (1997: 330) have observed, 
are 'widely proposed as engines of economic growth' in developing 
countries.
Given this apparent comparative advantage of employing focus 
group discussions as a way of generating relevant information - a theme 
returned to in the concluding section 4.2 - this methodology was 
employed in two villages in the Philippines. To begin with, however, a 
detailed census survey was carried out in two carefully-selected 
villages.83 The one village is to be found in a comparatively poor area in
83 I would like to thank J. C. Caldwell for the advice he gave concerning the selection 
and design of the surveys used in the two Filipino villages concerned.
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rural Philippines. The other village is located in a comparatively well-off 
part of the country. The particular selection of these two villages was 
motivated by the desire to generate data sets that contained 
comparatively diverse sets of observations since it is essential to obtain 
this diversity if any insightful comparisons are to be made. Subsequently 
FGDs were held with groups of individuals in the two villages to 
determine their views on education, credit, forest resources, the quality of 
the lives they lead and what factors influence the quality of their lives - or 
what factors made their lives become better or worse. There were six 
homogeneous focus groups, composed of fathers, mothers, unmarried 
sons, unmarried daughters, younger children and grandparents.
Some of the inferences that were drawn from these discussions are 
mentioned, briefly, here. One inference is based upon the fact (indicated 
later in sub-section 3.2) that whereas the parents in the better-off groups 
gave highest priority to the education of their children, this was not the 
case for parents in less well-off groups. For these latter groups of 
parents the matter of the survival of their families was a far more pressing 
concern than investing in the education of their children - especially 
since these groups faced relatively large economic uncertainties with no 
access to formal insurance markets and only limited access to informal 
credit markets. That these Filipino parents had different perceptions 
concerning the relative benefits to be derived from investing in the 
education of children suggests that legitimate questions can be raised as 
to the acceptability of often cited formulations that have been used to 
measure the level of community well-being - measures such as the 
Human Development Index (HDI) devised by the United Nations 
Development Program and the Dasgupta-Weale measure of well-being. 
The Human Development Index includes two measures of educational
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attainment - the level of adult literacy and the combined level of 
enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education (UNDP 1997). 
The Dasgupta-Weale measure of well-being, on the other hand, includes 
a manipulated measure of adult literacy - along with per capita income, 
the infant mortality rate, life expectancy at birth and indices of political 
and civil rights (Dasgupta and Weale 1992 and Dasgupta 1993). 
Specifically, it might be argued that the structure of these measures of 
well-being attach too much weight, for certain communities, to the 
variable aggregate formal education (however measured) - at least after 
taking into account the actual preferences alluded to by representative 
groups to be found in the communities concerned. Exactly how much 
positive weight these various measures of community well-being place 
on the level of formal education is not immediately obvious. This is so 
because of the way that these measures are constructed. This matter is 
discussed, within the context of the Human Development Index, in 
Noorbaksh (1998). This issue will be returned to in subsections 3.2 and 
3.2.1.
Another insight that emerged from the FGDs is that the 
incompleteness of the credit system in parts of rural Philippines appears 
to contribute towards (but is not solely responsible for) discouraging 
parents in poor households from investing in the education of their 
children. The absence of a well-functioning credit system and the low 
levels of education and income, among others, may also contribute 
towards facilitating the depletion of forest resources. That said, this study 
also indicates that in the circumstances that poor, isolated communities 
are faced with in rural Philippines - that do not have access to a range of 
basic pieces of infrastructure (such as all-weather roads, electricity, a 
safe water supply and a preventive health system) - there apparently are
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few social, or private benefits to be derived from increased expenditures 
on subsidising the formal education and credit systems and investing in 
reforestation programs in such communities. The reason is that 
synergisms appear to operate, or a degree of complementarity exists 
between a number of elements that make up a basic system of 
infrastructure for such communities. Thus the increased provision of any 
individual element in this infrastructure system (such as expenditures on 
improved school facilities), without the other elements also being 
increased in size, probably contributes comparatively little to increasing 
the level of well-being for the community concerned.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reports on a 
baseline survey of the two selected villages in rural Philippines. This 
line of inquiry is extended in Section 3 by documenting the most 
revealing comments made in the FGDs held in these two villages to 
indicate what factors influence the quality of the lives of members of 
these communities. This information is also analysed and interpreted to 
infer how members of two villages in the Philippines perceived the 
benefits to be derived from credit, forest resources and education. These 
perceptions were used to determine the factors that appear to influence 
the level of household expenditures on the education of children. In the 
concluding section the information generated by the FGDs are drawn 
upon to gain some insights into how best to design more effective 
poverty-alleviation policies for rural Philippines. In this regard it is 
recognised that the inferences drawn from the FGDs are based upon a 
comparatively limited sample of information. Nevertheless, the qualified 
insights presented in this chapter are encouraging enough to suggest 
that there is scope for the further judicious use of FGDs in appropriate 
circumstances. Indeed, the limited use of this research tool has at least
142
as much to offer, in terms of generating relevant, useful and 
comparatively accurate information as that which can be gained from the 
use of some other more widely-employed research tools applied within 
the context that data sets are limited in range and content. This point of 
view is substantiated in the concluding sub-section (sub-section 4.2).
4.2. The initial surveys in two Filipino villages
Of the villages selected to be surveyed, one village is in the 
province of Masbate and the other village is in Benguet province. 
Masbate is an island province of the island of Luzon, while Benguet is 
found in the hinterland of Luzon island (see Figure 1). Masbate and 
Benguet have populations significantly different in terms of economic 
and social indicators as well as the availability of infrastructure facilities.
The province of Masbate, located south of Manila, was selected for 
study because the majority of its people are poor in well-being. Indeed, 
Masbate is the third poorest province in the country - based on per capita 
income and quality of life indicators of poverty. Based on 1991 data, 
Sulu and Maguindanao were the first and second poorest provinces in 
the Philippines using a minimum basic needs (MBN) index (PCFP 1995). 
As indicated in Chapter 3, the MBN index gives equal weight to eight 
indicators which are classified into four categories: income-based 
indicators - magnitude of families below the poverty line and incidence 
of poverty; education - cohort survival rate in education and population 
illiteracy rate; health and nutrition - infant mortality and malnutrition rates; 
and housing - water service coverage and percentage of households 
with no sanitary toilets. However, Sulu and Maguindanao were not
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selected as research sites because it was unsafe to conduct the 
fieldwork in these two provinces due to peace and order problems. It is 
worth noting that since people in Sulu and Maguindanao have relatively 
low incomes and these two provinces are also politically and socially 
unstable, this may mean that in these two provinces economic factors 
and social and political stability are inter-linked.
Since most of the people in Masbate have low incomes, the 
revenues generated by the provincial government are also minimal. In 
terms of internally-generated revenues, the province consists mostly of 
sixth-class municipalities. A municipality is considered sixth-class when 
it has an average annual income of less than one million pesos (NSO 
1994c: 1208 fn 6). Of its 21 municipalities, 76 per cent (or 16) are sixth- 
class municipalities. In addition, Masbate is located in a relatively poor 
region. Several studies have cited that Bicol is often one of the top five 
poorest regions based on poverty incidence; for example, see Rondinelli 
(1980: 8), Quisumbing and Cruz (1986: 16) and Balisacan (1993: 32 and 
1994: 452).
On the other hand, Benguet province is the fourth most well off 
province in the Philippines also using per capita income and quality of 
life indicators. Using a minimum basic needs index, Batanes, Bulacan 
and Cavite were the first, second and third richest provinces in the 
Philippines in 1991, respectively (PCFP 1995). However, these 
provinces were not chosen for the study because they were not 
comparable to Masbate in terms of population size. Based on the 1990 
census, Masbate has a population of about 600,000, Batanes island 
about 15,000, while Bulacan and Cavite have more than a million 
people. Also, Bulacan and Cavite are highly urbanised provinces with
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the number of people living in the urban areas estimated at 80 per cent 
and 76 per cent of total provincial population, respectively (NSO 1993).
Benguet is part of the Cordillera Administrative Region which 
consists mainly of upland provinces. La Trinidad, the capital of the 
province, is situated approximately 256 kilometres north of Manila. 
Southern Benguet, particularly Baguio City, is part of the Northwestern 
Luzon Growth Quadrangle, which is one of the priority areas for growth 
of the Philippine Government.
As for the villages selected for study, one was San Juan in 
Mandaon, Masbate while the other was Nangalisan in Tuba, Benguet. 
The two villages were selected based on the following criteria: (a) one of 
the villages is income poor (that is, more than two-thirds of the 
households live at or below the poverty line of the province) and has 
minimal infrastructure facilities, while the other village is comparatively 
well off in terms of the level of average income and infrastructure 
facilities; (b) there had not been, as yet, any education, health, or family 
programs, apart from the normal government program in one village, 
while there had been in the other village; and (c) the villages are located 
near the forests.
Households included in the FGDs were selected by way of the 
procedure of randomly selecting every second household in each of the 
chosen villages. A household is defined as a 'social unit consisting of a 
person living alone or a group of persons who: (a) sleep in the same 
housing unit; and (b) have a common arrangement in the preparation 
and consumption of food.' (NSO 1995: xii). This sampling technique was 
also adopted by Caldwell et al. (1988b: 10) in their study of village
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communities in South India. One hundred and three households in 
Barangay Nangalisan and 88 households in Barangay San Juan were 
randomly selected.84 The total number of sample households was pre­
set at 200 or 100 households for each village. The sample size was 
based on the funds for fieldwork and the time available for collection of 
field data and the number of observations required for statistical 
analysis. However, rather than taking a similar proportion of the total 
households in Barangay Nangalisan, the number of households 
surveyed in Barangay  San Juan was increased from 30 to 88 
households to make it comparable to that of Barangay Nangalisan.
A survey of the economic and social characteristics of these 
households was conducted at the early part of the fieldwork. Available 
relevant data sets were studied prior to the actual fieldwork. Secondary 
data were gathered from local libraries, archives and government 
publications or records. Such data were verified with key informants 
such as local leaders, primary school teachers and people who have 
resided in the villages for more than ten years.
A copy of the structured survey questionnaire is contained in the 
appendix (Annex 7). Pre-testing of the survey questionnaire and a 
preliminary visit to both sites were undertaken in December 1996. 
Follow-up visits to familiarise the author with the members of the 
community were made within two weeks prior to the full baseline survey. 
The full survey was conducted in Benguet by the author assisted by two 
local enumerators between March and April 1997 and in Masbate from 
July to August 1997 with the help of another two local enumerators. The
84 A barangay , consisting of a group of families, is the smallest political unit in the 
Philippines. The terms barangay and village are used interchangeably in this chapter.
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enumerators were thoroughly briefed on the purpose of the research and 
the contents of the survey instrument for half a day. The enumerators 
were either college graduates or graduating college students who knew 
the local dialect and who resided in the village or the province.
After the baseline survey was conducted, some members of each 
household were asked to participate in focus group discussions using a 
protocol guide (see Annex 8). For the sake of homogeneity, participants 
were grouped as follows: fathers; mothers; eldest (never married) sons; 
eldest (never married) daughters; younger children; and grandparents. 
To ensure greater control of the flow of discussion, the number of 
participants for each group was limited to six persons. Pre-testing of the 
protocol guide was likewise undertaken in both villages in December 
1996. Focus group discussions were facilitated by the author using 
Tagalog and the local dialect with the assistance of a local translator. 
The FGDs were conducted in Benguet between May and June 1997 and 
in Masbate between August and September 1997.
The discussions took an average of thirty minutes in the case of 
the groups of children and an hour and a half for the rest of the focus 
groups. Aside from taking notes, I recorded the discussions on tape and 
then transcribed them in full. An informal presentation to the local 
community of the preliminary results of the discussions was made after 
the last focus group discussion was held in each site.
In facilitating the discussions, I was careful not to express my 
opinions about the subject matter so as not to influence the views of the 
FGD participants. Naturally it is important that the FGDs are designed in 
such a way as to minimise, if not eliminate, any undesirable biases
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present in the information derived from the discussions. This is 
particularly so since it might be argued that, since the FGD participants 
come from a culture known to put emphasis on 'smooth interpersonal 
relations', these individuals may not reveal their true opinions and 
feelings regarding the topics discussed. Rather, they will only say what 
the researcher and other members of the group want to hear. In 
addition, for various reasons participants may hesitate to provide 
accurate information to a comparative stranger (the researcher) who they 
suspect of as being a government official. (For instance members of the 
community may believe that the information provided will be used by the 
authorities in such a way that it is to the detriment of this community.) In 
the attempt to avoid these potential impediments to gathering accurate 
information a number of strategies were applied. First, in order to gain 
the confidence of members of the local community, the researcher visited 
the villages to be surveyed some three to six months before the FGDs 
were held. Next, just prior to the FGDs the researcher emphasised to the 
participants in the initial discussions that they should provide honest 
answers to the questions to be posed and provide frank comments on 
any issues raised during the discussion. To encourage these responses 
it was pointed out that the researcher was not a government employee or 
from any private company and that the information generated by the 
FGDs was to be used for purely academic purposes. Certainly detailed 
personal information was not to be passed on to any government 
agency. In this regard it was pointed out that the group discussions were 
to be documented as a group response to the issues raised and, hence, 
the name of any single participant was not to be mentioned in the 
transcripts of the FGDs. Finally it was recognised that some participants 
may have reasoned that, as a way of gaining an increased level of 
reward for participating in the FGDs, they should provide answers that
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they believed the researcher wished to hear. To discourage this 
behaviour an appropriate incentive system was created. Specifically, it 
was announced, prior to the FGDs, that a community raffle was to be 
held as a token of appreciation for members of the community 
participating in the FGDs. Thus the level of any reward a participant may 
receive was made quite independent of any comments this person made 
during the FGDs.
4.2.1 The baseline surveys
Barangay San Juan in Mandaon, Masbate is situated 14 
kilometres south of the municipal capital. Its total land area is 1,390 
hectares. The latest census shows that the village has 498 people and 
97 households (NSO 1995). In contrast to other areas in Masbate, the 
village is not a coastal village nor is it rich in mineral resources. The 
village relies on rainfed farming and its major agricultural crops are rice 
and corn. The forests are about one and a half kilometres away from the 
village centre.
The infrastructure facilities for Barangay San Juan are near to 
non-existent and what exist are of low quality. Thus the village does not 
have its own postal service, telephone, or telegraph facilities. Mobility 
out of this barangay is limited. The few mini-buses or jeepneys that 
travel to and from the village, along poorly-maintained dirt roads, are 
overloaded with people, animals and products. The alternative means of 
transporting people and goods include water buffaloes, horses and 
bicycles. There is no village health station and the people have to go to 
the municipal or to the town capital in the attempt to meet their needs for 
health care. As for the water supply facilities, it consists solely of one
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deep well. In 1989, the local office of the Department of Health reported 
that about 47 per cent of Level 1 water supply systems (water from point 
source) - such as deep wells - did not provide a safe water supply 
(Provincial Government of Masbate 1991: 143).
There is one public primary school (for grade levels one to four) 
where multigrade teaching is used.85 Thus while one grade level is 
given set work, the students in the other grade level are asked to listen to 
the teachers lecture or recite in class. There is a 50 per cent drop-out 
rate of students attending this school.86 A day care for pre-school 
children was set up recently by the village council.
As for the contrasting village, Barangay Nangalisan in Tuba, 
Benguet, it has a population of 2,049 persons while there are 356 
households (NSO 1995). The estimated total land area is 1,048 
hectares. Similar to most of the villages in Benguet, its major products 
are vegetables and rice. The village is surrounded by forests. It is 
connected to Baguio City by a 16-kilometre all-weather road. (Its 
construction required the building of two tunnels.) The roads to 
Barangay Nangalisan are generally in a better state of repair than those 
for Barangay San Juan. Above all the presence of this superior piece of 
infrastructure, along with irrigation, contributes to allowing vegetable and 
rice farmers to harvest two or more crops a year and a sizeable
05 A World Bank report (1980: 40) pointed out that while there is evidence 
suggesting that multigrade teaching can be as academically effective as single-grade 
teaching, the success of this method will depend on the 'quality, dedication, and specific 
training' of the teachers. The World Bank did not cite specific studies supporting its 
assertion, however.
86 Based on a personal interview with a primary school teacher in the village it was 
established that for school year 1997-1998, there were 26 students in Grade 1, 23 
students in Grade 2, 19 students in Grade 3, and 13 students in Grade 4.
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proportion of these crops to be sold in the nearest city. The provision of 
electricity in most parts of the village also allows some families to 
engage in non-agricultural economic activities such as furniture-making 
and small metal industries. There are also three rice mills. There is a 
primary school, two elementary schools, a national high school, two day 
care centres, four parish churches and a village health station. Most of 
the households have water pipes connected to their houses. Spring 
water is the major source of water for drinking and washing.
Table 1 sets out some economic characteristics of the households 
in Barangays San Juan and Nangalisan based on an initial survey 
conducted in these two barangays. The household survey results show 
that, on average, households in Barangay Nangalisan are relatively 
better off than households in Barangay San Juan in terms of income 
and farm holdings. The reported average annual income87 received by 
a household in Barangay Nangalisan (Benguet) is about 1.6 times 
greater than that of a household in Barangay San Juan (Masbate). In 
addition, the data in Table 1 indicates that access to a range of facilities 
such as ease of access to potable water, sanitation and electricity and 
the quality of the structure of household housing is, on average, much 
lower in Barangay San Juan than that found in Barangay Nangalisan.
87 Household income was calculated by getting the sum of incomes derived from 
agricultural and non-agricultural sources in 1996. While the information on income was 
carefully surveyed, the data should be treated with caution because the figures were 
based on participant recall rather than on written records. However, the survey data were 
almost similar (although a little lower) to official figures on average annual income in the 
provinces of Masbate and Benguet in 1997. Questions on expenditures were not asked 
during the conduct of the household survey because it was observed during the pre­
testing of the questionnaire in December 1996 that participants encountered even more 
difficulties in remembering household expenditures incurred in 1996 as compared to 
incomes earned.
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TABLE 1. Selected Economic Indicators for two villages in the 
Philippines, 1997
INDICATOR :Barangay San Juan : Barangay Nangalisan
________________________________(Masbate)___________(Benguet)________
(Number of households) 88 103
Average annual nominal household 33,694 55,347
income (1996)
LABOR
In agriculture (%) 80.0 63.0
In non-agriculture (%) 20.0 37.0
AGRICULTURE
Average Farm Size (in has.) 3.3 0.4
Farm area: irrigated (%) 0 78.5
tenanted (%) 62.4 47.7
INFRASTRUCTURE
Ave. Length of Time to travel to
source of water and back (in mins.) 16.0 3.0
Proportion of households with:
electricity for home consumption (%) 0 65.0
electricity for home production (%) 0 16.0
potable water (%) 0 80.6
sanitary toilet facilities (%) 3.4 58.2
BASIC CONVENIENCES
Proportion of households with:
Eiectric stove or gas range 8.0 24.0
Refrigerator / freezer 0 38.8
Television 0 47.0
Radio 81.0 81.6
Motor Vehicle 1.0 4.0
Main material of household floor (%):
Cement 2.0 71.0
Palm bamboo 66.0 8.0
Wood Planks 20.0 16.0
Earth/Sand 11.0 4.0
Vinyl 1.0 0
Parquet or Polished Wood 0 1.0
Note: Apart from income, all the data contained in the table are 1997 figures. 
Source: Household survey conducted prior to focus group discussions
The data set out in Table 1 also indicate that the average 
household in Barangay Nangalisan, compared to that in Barangay San 
Juan, clearly has much greater access to a range of consumption goods. 
This fact also implies that the average household in Barangay  
Nangalisan has its basic food requirements satisfied - that is if this 
household is prudent and ensures that the demands for basic food are 
satisfied before other demands for consumption goods are met. The 
consumption patterns for the average household in Barangay San Juan
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suggest the opposite; namely, that basic food requirements are not 
satisfied for this household.
These consumption patterns also allude to another aspect of how 
much better off the average household in Barangay Nangalisan is likely 
to be (compared to that in Barangay San Juan); namely, this household 
is better placed to smooth out its consumption of food should there be 
sudden perturbations in the level of real household income. The 
importance of this matter for determining the relative level of well-being 
for the average household in these two barangays is a matter returned 
to in sub-section 3.1.2.
The data set out in table 1 also indicate that households in 
Barangay San Juan, on average, have homes further away from their 
source of water than do households in Barangay Nangalisan. The 
survey results indicate that it will take an average household in the 
village of San Juan a return time of 16 minutes to acquire water, as 
against three minutes in the village of Nangalisan. As for the structure of 
dwellings in San Juan, the majority (86 per cent of those interviewed) 
used either palm bamboo or wood planks for their house flooring. In 
contrast, most of the houses in the village of Nangalisan had cement 
floors.
Barangay San Juan also has a lower proportion of households 
with electricity, potable water, sanitary toilet facilities and household 
conveniences. However, about four out of every five households in both 
barangays had radios. In the absence of newspapers in the village, the 
farmers said they rely on the radio to update themselves on the latest 
information on agricultural technology.
153
4.2.2 Infrastructure and the health status of children
Set out in Table 2 are some social indicators for the two 
barangays based on the survey results. On the whole, the survey data 
showed that people living in Barangay Nangalisan are comparatively 
better off than those of Barangay San Juan in terms of the education 
level attained. Basic literacy rates (based on the ability to read and 
write) are higher in Barangay Nangalisan than in Barangay San Juan. 
The overall basic literacy rate for Barangay Nangalisan is almost the 
same as that of Benguet province in 1990. In contrast, the basic literacy 
figure for Barangay San Juan is similar to that of Masbate province 
almost 30 years ago (in 1970). This fact may imply that the pace of 
development in Barangay San Juan is slow relative to other barangays 
in the province of Masbate. Above all those data indicate that in 
Barangay Nangalisan the average years of schooling attained was 28 
per cent higher for males and 62 per cent higher for females compared 
to that for Barangay San Juan.
As for the measures of the health status (also set out in Table 2), 
they suggest that the children in Barangay Nangalisan are healthier 
than those in Barangay San Juan. Specifically, the proportion of 
children between one month and 60 months inclusive who were below 
95 per cent of the median height for age using Filipino standards is 
higher in Barangay San Juan. In addition, in Barangay San Juan a 
higher proportion of young children had diarrhoea episodes in the two 
week period just prior to the baseline survey being carried out.
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Table 2. Selected Social Indicators for two villages in the Philippines, 
1997
INDICATOR Barangay San Juan : Barangay Nangalisan
(Masbate)___________ :_____(Benguet)
(Number of households) 88 103
EDUCATION
Basic Literacy Rate (10 years old and 
over) Total 78.2 92.2
Male 73.5 92.6
Female 82.7 91.9
Average no. of years of education - 
fathers 6.75 8.67
Average number of years of 
education - mothers 5.72 9.24
Percentage of persons 25 years old 
and over with academic degree 3.9 14.8
Percentage of persons 15 years of 
age and over with no education: 
Male .02 .02
Female .04 .04
HEALTH
Percentage of children aged 1 to 60 
months below standard height: 
(based on P50 percentiie) 78.0 60.0
(based on P95 percentile) 98.0 87.0
Percentage of children < 5 yrs. old 
with diarrhoea episodes in the last 
two weeks prior to the interview 12.0 7.0
Duration of diarrhoea episode (no. of 
days) 1 to 15 1 to 10
Source: Household survey conducted prior to focus group discussions
As far as the treatment of diarrhoea is concerned, mothers in 
Barangay Nangalisan applied oral rehydration therapy to treat children 
suffering from diarrhoea, whereas mothers in Barangay San Juan said 
they gave antibiotic or herbal medicines to treat their children with 
diarrhoea. As is well-known the former treatment for diarrhoea is far 
more beneficial than the latter (which is near to useless if not harmful 
(Muhuri et al. 1996). Finally, the duration of each diarrhoea episode was 
found to be longer in Barangay San Juan as compared to Barangay 
Nangalisan (see Table 2). Both of these differences (in the treatment of, 
and in the length of episodes of diarrhoea) probably reflect the higher 
level of female education, better living conditions (in the form of better
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housing and nutrition) and the much better access to safe water88 and 
other preventive health care facilities in Nangalisan compared to those 
found in San Juan.
This general assertion was tested by applying econometric 
techniques to determine what factors influenced the health status of 
young children in the two Filipino villages. The measure of health status 
employed is the height for age of children under the age of five relative to 
a suitable norm. Since the full details and findings concerning this study 
are set out in Chapter 6, further discussion concerning this matter is 
omitted here.
4.2.3 On forest resources
Most of the people in Barangay San Juan rely more on forest 
resources for their subsistence than people in Barangay Nangalisan 
(see Table 3). Since most of the people in Barangay San Juan do not 
have sufficient money to purchase commercial forms of fuel, such as 
liquefied petroleum gas, they gather fuel wood from the forest. This is a 
labour intensive activity - especially as the size of the forest diminishes. 
Households in Barangay San Juan, with very limited access to 
adequate infrastructure such as electricity, find that they require more 
children than would otherwise be the case to assist with gathering fuel 
wood. These additional children almost certainly act as a drain on the 
community, if not the household concerned, by placing more strain on
00 For a survey of the literature on the link between childhood diseases and ease of 
access to safe water see Burger and Esrey (1995). In addition, Tonglet et al. (1992) 
provide an interesting study of the link between the incidence of diarrhoea in children 
and the time taken to walk to the nearest safe water supply.
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common property resources, such as public forests.89 In addition, the 
absence of electricity in the community means it is that more difficult to 
develop alternative, non-agricultural employment opportunities in the 
community.
TABLE 3. Selected Environmental Indicators for two villages in the 
Philippines, 1997
INDICATOR Barangay San Juan : Barangay Nangalisan
___________________ ;______(Masbate)_________ : (Benguet)________
(Number of households) 
Main Source of Energy (%):
88 103
Wood from Forests 76.0 31.0
Wood from backyard 23.0 3.0
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) 1.0 39.0
Combined wood from forests & LPG - 17.0
Combined wood from backyard & 
LPG
• 7.0
Others (e.g., electricity, etc.) - 3.0
Source: Household survey conducted prior to focus group discussions.
4.2.4 Concluding matters
Based on the data derived from the baseline survey, it is 
reasonable to conclude that households in Barangay San Juan may be 
considered to be relatively poorer in well-being compared to households 
in Barangay Nangalisan. This is so mainly because, on the average, 
household incomes are comparatively low and the people are less 
healthy. These outcomes are the consequence of the villagers in 
Barangay San Juan having less access, compared to those in Barangay 
Nangalisan, to basic infrastructure such as basic educational facilities, 
adequate roads, electricity, safe water, curative health care and irrigation 
- and, as will become clear when the focus group discussions are 
reported, near to no access to a formal credit market. There is also a 
relatively heavy dependence in Barangay San Juan on common 
property resources, such as the forests, for their daily subsistence. To
89 The matter just referred to in the main text is considered within the context of 
developing countries in general in Dasgupta (1995) and Dasgupta and Maler (1995).
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take advantage of these resources requires time be devoted to collecting 
forest timber for heating and building purposes. This tends to cause 
families in this barangay to be larger than would otherwise be the case.
4.3 Focus Group discussions on education, credit, 
forest resources and related issues in two Filipino 
villages
FGDs next were conducted to determine the perceptions that poor 
people have with respect to: (a) their economic and social 
circumstances, (b) their aspirations, (c) the matter of education and 
schooling, (d) access to credit and (e) the use of forest resources in the 
villages. More specifically, to begin with the participants in the FGDs 
were asked to define the term ‘poor’. Using their definition, the FGD 
participants were also asked to comment on whether they thought that 
people in their neighbourhood are 'poor' at present (1997), were poor 
five years ago (1992) and will be poor in five years time (2002). The 
FGD participants were also asked if they thought that their quality of life 
was improving or not in terms of: (i) the household incomes they receive; 
(ii) reliance on traditional patrons or landlords and (iii) dependence on 
resourceful people required for their sustenance. They were also asked 
to comment on, or discuss issues that influenced their lives such as: (iv) 
consumption patterns and practices; (v) housing conditions and 
acquisition of consumer durables; (vi) day-to-day living; (vii) participation 
in different organisations; and (viii) access to credit. Finally, the FGD 
groups were also invited to answer questions on how important 
education or schooling was to them and how good they thought their 
local schools were. What is reported here is a summary, and some 
analysis of the essence of the range of comments that were made in the 
discussions dealing with this list of issues. A matrix which contains the
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results of the FGDs by type of focus group and by village is found in 
Annex 9.
4.3.1 On poverty
4.3.1.1 Entrepreneurial ability
When asked to define the word poor, the FGD participants from 
Barangay Nangalisan responded differently from those in the village of 
San Juan. While several groups in both barangays mentioned the lack 
of job opportunities in their respective communities, nevertheless the 
groups from Barangay Nangalisan stated that, in addition, the poor are 
those who have not met their basic needs (which they defined as food, 
clothing and shelter) and educational requirements. In contrast, the 
groups from Barangay San Juan thought that the poor are those without 
adequate money income.
While the groups were not asked at this juncture if they thought 
that they were poor, some groups volunteered their opinion on the 
matter. The group composed of eldest never-married sons in 
Nangalisan believed that the people in their village were not poor 
because they do not possess the qualities of a poor person; namely, 
those, in their view, 'who do not work, are lazy, are uneducated, do not 
have many clothes and have no houses'. On the other hand, eldest 
never married sons and daughters in Barangay San Juan said that the 
people in their village were poor because they are unemployed and had 
no money or material assets.
Thus members of these two barangays had a rather different 
perception of poverty. Those in San Juan adopted the rather narrow
159
view that to reduce the level of poverty in a community, access to an 
adequate amount of money income was essential. In contrast, those in 
Nangalisan implicitly were concerned instead with placing households 
in a position where they were now capable of functioning more 
effectively - such as individuals possessing an adequate level of 
education and with access to facilities that assists with ensuring a 
reasonable health status (which implies having access to adequate 
shelter and clothing). Once these individuals were so equipped, they 
now also must be willing to work a socially acceptable number of hours 
(per week, for instance) to gain access to an adequate level of real 
income90. Thus those in Nangalisan were more concerned with well­
being poverty and the capability to generate income for themselves, 
while those in San Juan were only concerned with income-only poverty. 
(This latter assertion is qualified later when the matter of economic 
uncertainty is introduced into the discussion.) For this latter group, 
satisfying immediate needs to ensure survival was of more concern than 
expending income on other goods and services that brought private 
benefits some time into the future. Perhaps, as those living in Barangay 
San Juan came to have access to an increased level of real income, 
they too would come to realise the importance of the need to increase 
the capabilities.
When the focus groups were asked if they thought that most of the 
people who (in the case of the males) were working at the same job as 
they performed, were poor five years ago (in 1992), a majority in
90 Interestingly, the requirement implicitly stipulated by those participating in the 
FGDs in Barangay Nangalisan that the poor should work a socially acceptable number of 
hours, is a view that finds expression in Rawls (1993: 181 fn 9). Specifically he stated 
that: 'Those who surf all day off Malibu must find a way to support themselves and would 
not be entitled to public funds.' Rawls then qualifies his remarks by noting that his 
observations were 'not intended as endorsing any particular social policy'.
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Barangay Nangalisan said no. The same response was obtained to a 
similar question asked of females. In contrast, almost all of those in San 
Juan thought they were poor five years ago.
Within this context grandparents in Barangay  San Juan 
observed, however, that the farmers in the village had been given an 
opportunity to improve the quality of their lives five years earlier through 
the agrarian reform program, yet they had not taken full advantage of this 
government assistance. Instead, since the beneficiaries of agrarian 
reform in Barangay San Juan had not paid their annual dues, their 
lands had been re-possessed by the Development Bank of the 
Philippines, lands which, in turn, were sold to absentee cattle ranchers. 
Consequently, now most of the farmers do not own the lands that they till.
This sequence of events suggests, therefore, that there is a dearth 
of entrepreneurial ability in this community since, when faced with a 
potentially useful new economic opportunity, members of Barangay San 
Juan failed to take full advantage if it. As further evidence of this 
apparent situation, it is also noted that this community did not have any 
organisations that might further the interests of this community. In 
contrast, the FGD participants in Barangay Nangalisan reported that 
they participated in different kinds of organisations such as religious 
groups, school-based groups, women's groups, farmers' associations 
and the rural improvement club. Among the benefits that the members 
derive from participating in these organisations are seed capital for 
income-generating projects, training and making contacts for developing 
business opportunities. In the case of Barangay San Juan, it was 
observed that instead of engaging in income-generating projects several 
villagers spent their time drinking liquor and gambling in front of the local
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retail store. Also, as reported by the senior members of Barangay San 
Juan and as I observed during my fieldwork, these activities often led to 
neighbourhood quarrels and acts of violence.
Despite these observations, the conjecture that there is a relative 
dearth of entrepreneurial ability in Barangay San Juan cannot be tested 
directly. This is so since Barangays San Juan and Nangalisan are not 
equally endowed with natural resources and infrastructure. Indeed, 
since Barangay San Juan in contrast to Barangay Nangalisan does not 
have access to an all-weather road, and there is no forma! credit system 
provided in the village (a matter returned to later), there really is little or 
no scope for members of this barangay to engage in entrepreneurial 
activities. That said, in the opinion of the elder members of Barangay 
San Juan, due to the apparent lack of entrepreneurial ability in that 
barangay, its members had not taken advantage of a relatively important 
economic opportunity that became available in the early 1990s.
The reasons for emphasising the issue of the relative amounts of 
entrepreneurial ability to be found among rural communities are twofold. 
First, others also have observed that variation in this variable may assist 
in explaining the relative level of economic performance of comparable 
communities. Thus, for instance, Knight and Li (1997) suggest that 
variations in the amount of entrepreneurial ability to be found among 
members of comparable rural communities in the People's Republic of 
China appear to explain, at least in part, some of the sharp differences in 
the level of the economic achievements attained by the communities 
concerned. Second, and most important of all, this line of argument 
suggests that any effective poverty-alleviation program in a developing 
country may need to take into account of the variation in entrepreneurial
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ability that exists between communities. For those communities fortunate 
enough to have as its members individuals who possess relatively large 
amounts of entrepreneurial ability, the provision of a well-designed credit 
scheme, for instance, may assist appreciably in raising the level of well­
being in this community. In contrast, such a credit scheme is likely to 
achieve comparatively little if members of this community, through no 
fault of their own, are not blessed with adequate amounts of 
entrepreneurial talent. For this community, some alternative poverty- 
alleviation program (such as the provision of an assistance-for-work 
program directed at the building of basic infrastructure) may be a more 
effective way of raising the level of well-being in this community. Implicit 
in the comments just made is allusion to the view that variations in well­
being between communities in a country can be explained to some 
degree by the presence of luck, where part of this luck takes the form of 
random variations in the level of entrepreneurial talent to be found in 
different communities.
4.3.1.2 Future prospects, uncertainty and a risk-adjusted
measure of poverty
The FGD participants in Barangay Nangalisan were generally 
optimistic about their future socio-economic prospects. They thought that 
they would not be poor five years from now (year 2002) because of the 
following reasons: most of the people in Barangay Nangalisan work 
hard and help each other in the attempt to achieve common community 
objectives. In addition, wives help their husbands by also working as 
self-employed entrepreneurs, the government and non-governmental 
organisations are helping the poor by providing financial support for 
income-generating projects and most of the children are enrolled in
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school. In contrast, the FGD groups in Barangay San Juan were less 
optimistic about their future prospects since they thought that they would 
be poor in the future, although they said that their economic fortunes 
might improve if the following occur: people work hard to improve 
themselves and waste less time drinking liquor and gambling, farming 
becomes more productive and children finish their studies and find good 
jobs.
This set of comments suggests that members of these two 
barangays held quite different perceptions about their future life 
prospects. Other comments made during the FGDs suggest that these 
different perceptions could be derived from certain realities that 
influenced the abilities of these two communities to smooth out future 
income, and in particular, consumption streams. To explain further: to 
begin with, the majority of the mothers in Barangay Nangalisan stated 
that they possessed ready cash of 500 pesos or more at home to tide the 
household through the slack season. Seasonal out-migration of 
household members, as a way of stabilising household income, was not 
practised except by some who had received relatively high levels of 
education. These individuals migrated overseas, however. (Since 
employment opportunities in the Philippines are comparatively limited for 
those possessing relatively high levels of education, the best educated 
in the community see the need to migrate overseas in order to increase 
the economic return on their skills. )
Households in Barangay Nangalisan also took advantage of 
credit provided by the Land Bank of the Philippines. (The issue of credit 
will be referred to in detail in sub-section 4.3.3.) Thirty per cent of the 
fathers relied on such credit. Those fathers who could not obtain credit
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from the formal credit market stated that this was because they did not 
possess assets to offer as collateral to underwrite loans. In addition, they 
were afraid that they would not be able to repay any loans taken out 
because they did not have access to a stable income stream. These 
individuals borrowed, instead, from suppliers of inputs, landowners and 
from their relatives. Nevertheless, the strong impression gained from the 
FGD interviews in Barangay Nangalisan was that any instability in 
household income streams could be smoothed out by taking out a loan 
in the formal, or the comparatively well-organised informal credit market.
In contrast, members of the focus groups for Barangay San Juan 
stated that households in this barangay did not have access to a formal 
credit market, and only had a very limited informal market to offset the 
consequences of the unstable income streams that they faced - income 
streams made that more unstable by the fact that only rainfed agriculture 
was practised in this barangay. To mitigate this instability, by way of 
diversifying sources of household incomes91, the majority of the focus 
groups stated that their relatives go to Metropolitan Manila to work as 
domestic helpers or factory workers.
This need to migrate was made more pressing by the fact that 
most of the farmers in Barangay San Juan are sharecroppers on land 
owned by their patron. And since most of their patrons live in the town 
capital or in MetroManila that is relatively far from the village, these 
patrons are not in a position to be asked to provide loans (in cash or feed 
grains) to members of the focus group. As a result, most of the people in 
Barangay San Juan secured loans from the village captain, rich
Also, see Teitelbaum and Russell (1994: 234).
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neighbours, siblings and friends. In addition, it was not possible for most 
(that is, some 90 per cent) in this barangay to secure loans in the formal 
credit market due to the fact that few could secure such loans by 
providing land as collateral. Indeed the lack of credit in this barangay 
was so severe that no household could obtain credit from the local retail 
stores - all purchases were made in cash. This situation did not apply in 
Barangay Nangalisan.
Consistent with this comparatively limited range of facilities 
available to smooth out income and consumption instability in Barangay 
San Juan, access to savings was near to non-existent. Specifically, only 
ten per cent (two out of twenty) of the mothers who participated in the 
FGDs had access to 500 pesos or more savings during the slack season. 
This fact, and the dominant system of land ownership in this barangay, 
also implies that most households had no assets that could be traded in 
times of severe economic distress. This lack of assets available to 
households in Barangay San Juan contrasts sharply with that to be 
found in some other less well-off communities in developing countries. 
For instance, in certain communities in Zimbabwe, surveyed in the 1980s 
and up to the mid-1990s, Kinsey et al. (1998) report that the ownership of 
livestock essentially is a store of wealth which can be sold if necessary to 
smooth out consumption patterns. In particular, in times of a severe 
decline in food production in these communities, livestock are sold to 
finance the purchase of food. Interestingly, these sales also are used to 
finance educational expenses - and a range of other lesser 
expenditures. This sort of mechanism for smoothing out food 
consumption patterns and the payment of educational expenses is not 
available, however, to poor households living in Barangay San Juan -
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even though livestock are raised in this barangay by comparatively 
wealthy absentee landowners.
It was not surprising, therefore, to be told during the FGDs that the 
amount of rice produced by farming households in Barangay San Juan 
was just enough, after meeting their contractual obligations as 
sharecroppers, to meet their consumption needs. Hence, up to the next 
rainy season, there was minimal or no surplus at all for sale.
It follows from these various observations that households living in 
Barangay San Juan, compared to those living in Barangay Nangalisan 
are faced with far more economic uncertainty, which cannot be insured 
against in the formal, and only to a limited degree in the insurance 
market. If the members of Barangay San Juan and Barangay  
Nangalisan have access to formal credit, then it could be argued that 
these individuals have access to ex ante insurance if economic shocks 
are always anticipated. This is so since in this instance credit could be 
raised in this market, before any anticipated shock, to smooth out 
consumption. If, however, economic shocks are not anticipated, then 
clearly in this instance the credit market cannot provide ex ante 
insurance, it can only provide ex post insurance.92 Since, however, 
some 90 per cent of the members of Barangay San Juan have no 
access to the credit market this group, therefore, has no access to ex 
ante, or ex post insurance by way of the formal credit market. These 
groups also have access to only a very limited informal credit market. In 
contrast, some 30 per cent of the members of the Barangay Nangalisan 
community have access to at least ex post insurance through the formal
92 See Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) for a discussion of ex ante and ex post 
insurance provided by credit markets.
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credit market. Most of the rest of this community obtain at least some of 
this insurance through the informal credit market. It seems reasonable to 
presume, therefore, that these facts tend to lower the level of well-being 
for the average household in Barangay San Juan compared to that for 
the average household in Barangay Nangalisan - other relevant factors 
remaining the same such as that members of these two communities 
possess similar preferences and are risk-averse.
To explain these presumptions, first it is assumed that a 
representative household, h, possesses an expected well-being function 
of the following form:93
where E denotes the expectations operator, v(.) denotes the actual well- 
being function for household h, y denotes the actual current level of
income received by this household, m denotes the mean level for the
real income stream received by this household over some relevant 
period of time, and e denotes a random element in the actual current
h hlevel of real income received by household h. The levels of y and m
respectively also refer to the current situation after any formal, or informal 
credit has been provided, or any repayment of loans has been made.
Assuming that equation (1) is continuously differentiable, it can be 
manipulated (after applying Taylor's expansion and a few regularity 
assumptions) so that:
93 The discussion in the main text draws on Martina (1996) and the references cited 
there.
(1)
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E[v(yj] = v(rn) + \[S g  ]1v '']h (2 )
2 h h h
The term, [sQ ] denotes the variance of e , and the term [v"]
denotes the second derivative of the well-being function, v(y^ with 
h hrespect to m for household h. The term [v"] is assumed to take a
negative value for any h household - an assumption that implies that all 
households are risk averse or averse to variations in their income 
streams - other things remaining the same.
Consistent with the assumptions referred to in the paragraph just 
above equation (1), the assumption is applied to equation (2) that the 
function v(yh), for the average, or representative, household in Barangay 
Nangalisan is the same as that for the average household in Barangay 
San Juan. This implies that the representative households for the two 
communities possess identical preferences. (This assumption is 
imposed for the sake of simplicity. Relaxing this assumption in particular 
ways will not alter, however, the relevant conclusions arrived at. This is 
so if it is assumed, for instance that, at a given level of mean income, the 
average household in Barangay Nangalisan attains a higher level of 
well-being and is less risk-averse than the average household in 
Barangay San Juan. To demonstrate this assertion complicates the 
argument set out here and is therefore ignored.) This assumption 
implies, among other things, that the respective representative
households are risk averse to the same degree at any given common 
level of m . It is also assumed that the marginal utility of income is
positive. For the present it is also assumed that the representative 
households receive the same level of mean income, p.
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With these assumptions in place, and since it seems reasonable
to assert that the size of the variance in the partially insured94 
2 hincome stream, [se ], for the average household in Barangay San Juan
is greater than that for the average household in Barangay Nangalisan, 
it follows that the size of the expected level of well-being for this latter 
household is greater than that for the average household in Barangay 
San Juan. This conclusion would not be altered by relaxing some of the 
assumptions that have just been made to bring them more in line with 
the actual situation to be found in the two barangays.
In this regard first it is noted that the level of real income received 
by the average household in Barangay Nangalisan is greater than that
for the average household in Barangay San Juan. It follows, given the 
assumptions set out in the previous paragraph (that v(m*} is identical for
the two representative households and that the marginal utility of income 
is positive), that the average level of certain well-being - represented by 
the first term on the right-hand side of equation (2) - is larger for the 
average household in Barangay Nangalisan than that for the average 
household in Barangay San Juan. Second, and turning to consider the
second term on the right-hand side of equation (2), it is noted that the 
term, [v"] is likely to take a lower absolute value for the average
household in Barangay Nangalisan than that for the average household 
in Barangay San Juan. This is so since, to begin with, it is known that 
households tend to become less risk averse as the level of real income 
they receive increases in size. This assumption is based, in part, upon 
the empirical evidence to be found in Binswanger (1981) and Antle
94 This insurance may take the form of ex post insurance, which means that credit 
is used to offset any sudden declines, in the recent past, in household income.
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(1989). In addition, the earlier assumption needs to be applied so that 
the form of the function, v(m*], is the same for the average household in
both barangays. Finally, the observation is recalled that the level of real
income received by the average household in Barangay Nangalisan is
greater than that for the average household in Barangay San Juan.
This reasonable possibility, along with the fact as noted earlier that the 
2 hvalue of [se ] is smaller for the average household in Barangay
Nangalisan than that in Barangay San Juan, implies that the second 
term on the right-hand side of equation (2) must take a smaller negative 
value for the average household in Barangay Nangalisan than that for 
the average household in Barangay San Juan.
On piecing these various inferences together it seems not 
unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that the greater level of economic 
uncertainty faced by households in Barangay San Juan, along with the 
lower level of real income they received, probably caused them to 
experience a lower level of expected well-being than that experienced 
by households in Barangay Nangalisan - other things being kept the 
same. And this is so, in part, due to the greater uninsured variance in the 
income stream faced by households in Barangay San Juan. This is not 
to say that other factors should not be taken into account when 
attempting to rank the levels of well-being for these two barangays. The 
information provided in the previous section suggests, however, that 
allowing for other relevant factors - such as the level of health status, the 
level of education and access to a range of infrastructure - would not 
alter the general conclusion that has just been arrived at.
4.3.1.3 Consumption patterns
171
While I do not have information on the consumption patterns of the 
two barangays, I do have this information for the provinces of Masbate 
(in which Barangay San Juan is to be found) and Benguet (in which 
Barangay Nangalisan is to be found) for 1994.95 What is more this 
information is suggestive of the sort of consumption patterns to be found 
in the two barangays. For this reason this information is briefly 
assessed here.
In broad terms, consumption patterns in both provinces are 
similar, but not identical. There were two major points of difference. 
Whereas, on average, 58.4 per cent of total household income was 
expended on food, beverages and tobacco in Masbate, this percentage 
was 54.8 per cent in Benguet. The other major point of difference was 
the proportion of total income spent on education - the average 
proportion was 2.4 per cent in Masbate and 5.2 per cent in Benguet.
These differences are what one would expect - given what we 
already know about the two provinces. To begin with, it is well known 
that better off (compared to less well off) households tend to spend a 
smaller proportion of their income on food - assuming that the relative 
prices facing households are the same (at least approximately so).96 In 
addition, if one household has better access to credit, compared to 
another, and both households are of similar composition and have 
children, then one would expect the former household to spend a greater 
proportion of its income on the education of its children. Both of these
95 The data is taken from NSO (1996).
96 Evidence of this for a developing country (specifically India) is provided, for 
example, in Rao (1981).
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surmises are supported by the data set out in the previous paragraph.97 
That said, the matter of the expenditure on education is an issue 
considered later in more detail.
As for the types of expenditure made in the two barangays, 
however, some detail can be provided. The majority of the people in 
both villages occasionally consumed green vegetables, milk and milk 
products, sugar, as well as rice. While all the participants in Barangay 
Nangalisan had three meals a day during both the harvest and the slack 
season, some of the participants in Barangay San Juan said that 
sometimes they had two meals only during the slack season. Since 
household members are more mobile in Barangay Nangalisan, shoes 
are worn more regularly in that barangay  - especially when the 
household members travel to Baguio City. There have also been 
noticeable changes in eating and food preparation in Barangay  
Nangalisan such as the variety in the food that they eat and buying of 
canned goods and instant meals. The mothers in Barangay Nangalisan 
attributed these developments to the increase in the number of married 
women who are working outside their homes. These changes have not 
been experienced in Barangay San Juan.
4.3.2 Overall perceptions of the quality of life
When asked what they wanted most in life, the participants in the 
FGDs from Barangay Nangalisan mentioned education. Fathers and 
mothers wanted most to have their children finish their studies. Eldest
97 The observations that have just been made in the main text, concerning the 
influence that access to credit has on expenditures on education, tend to confirm the 
extended argument to be found in Jacoby and Skoufias (1997).
173
never married sons and daughters and younger children said they 
wanted to complete their studies and find a good job, or start their own 
business. In contrast, the participants from Barangay San Juan wanted 
most to improve their lives to a point where they could be sure that they 
would survive and meet their daily needs. The children, however, 
wanted most to finish their studies.
It follows that in the instance of the parents, at least, the levels of 
aspirations differ markedly between the two barangays. The primary 
concern of parents in Barangay San Juan is to take care of subsistence 
needs of their families. It follows immediately that these parents tend to 
give a comparatively low priority to allocating any of their limited budgets 
to the schooling of their children. This fact was reflected in the comments 
made by parents that they encountered difficulties in providing for the 
educational needs of their children. In addition, the preferences of these 
parents for meeting basic subsistence needs, instead of allocating more 
to the education of their children, are reflected in revealed behaviour. 
Specifically, as indicated earlier in sub-section 2.1 the schooling 
facilities in Barangay San Juan were markedly inferior to those to be 
found in Barangay Nangalisan. Indeed, in this latter barangay, where 
basic consumption needs are comparatively easily met, the education of 
the children is a priority concern for both fathers and mothers. And this 
concern could be met, to a reasonable degree, since households in this 
Barangay received comparatively large real incomes and at least 30 per 
cent of parents have reasonably good access to the formal credit market 
(see the discussion in the previous sub-section).
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4.3.2.1 Implications for the measurement of well-being
One of the possible implications that may be drawn from the 
observations made in the previous sub-section was touched upon in the 
introduction where it was suggested that widely-cited measures of 
community well-being (such as the Human Development Index and the 
Dasgupta-Weale measure of well-being), when applied to certain 
communities, result in too great a weight being attached to the level of 
aggregate formal education attained in the community concerned.
In extending those brief comments, first it is noted that the 
discussion in the previous sub-section indicates that parents in an 
extremely (absolutely and relatively) poor community are likely to place 
little or no value on formal education (compared to that found in a better- 
off community). One exception to the statement just made is that of the 
State of Kerala in India. In the late 1970s and early 1980s Kerala was 
ranked as one of the poorer states in India (with a headcount measure of 
poverty of 33.7 whereas that for all-India was 34.4) and yet, at that time, it 
had an adult literacy rate of 78 per cent which was well above that for all- 
India (which was 41 per cent). (These data are taken from Kakwani and 
Subbaroa (1993: table 18.10) and Dreze and Sen (1989: 223)). In 
addition, Caldwell (1986) provides a discussion of the importance given 
to the provision of basic education by the community in Kerala in the 
early 1980s and earlier. It is emphasised, however, that Kerala is a quite 
exceptional case - on this point also see Caldwell (1988b) and Sen 
(1981). This case, therefore, should not be taken to represent the 
average situation to be found in poor communities in developing 
countries.
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For the extremely poor community survival is paramount. Thus if 
the preferences of these parents are the only ones that are to count in 
devising the structure of some acceptable measure of well-being for this 
community, then this measure will give little or no weight to the measure 
of formal education attained in this community. It is acknowledged, 
however, that the relevant preferences of the parents in Barangay San 
Juan were in conflict with those of their children - children who, as noted 
in the previous sub-section, wished to complete their studies. However, 
implicitly it is being assumed that the parents are more informed than 
their children about the benefits to be derived from formal education. 
This is not an unreasonable assumption since the children interviewed 
were only in the age group 5 to 12 years. Consequently only the 
relevant preferences of the parents are to count in assessing the 
structure of some appropriate measure of community well-being.
In contrast, the observations in sub-section 3.2 also suggest that a 
better-off community would place a greater value on formal education. 
Consequently, and again if the preferences for this community are the 
only ones that are to count in the structure of the measure of well-being 
for this community, then this measure will give a greater positive weight 
to the measure of formal education attained by this community than that 
applied by the poor community.
It follows that, in the structure of the measure of community well­
being, the social weighting attached to formal education will tend to vary 
across communities to reflect the differing preferences that these 
communities possess for this good. That said, this system of weighting is 
in sharp contrast to the actual structure of any of the widely-cited 
measures of community well-being (mentioned earlier). In these latter
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measures the weighting of formal education (and any other variables 
utilised in these measures) is fixed across all communities. 98
To justify this latter system of weighting it might be argued that 
members of the poor community are inadequately informed about the 
relatively high level of private and social benefits to be derived from 
investing in basic education. Consequently, if this community was in 
possession of accurate information about these matters it would adopt a 
set of preferences that give far greater weight than it actually does to 
formal education. If this argument is accepted, then it would seem 
reasonable to over-ride the actual expressed (but ill-informed) 
preferences held by this community by imposing the system of social 
weighting reflected in the structure of some widely-cited measures of 
community well-being. In short, paternalistic preferences are being 
applied to determine the level of well-being of absolutely poor 
communities.
This line of argument is not completely convincing, however, 
bearing in mind the information reported in section 3.2. Since parents in 
the poorest community referred to there place a priority on survival, these 
parents would tend to discount, heavily, any 'accurate' information 
provided concerning the benefits from private investments in formal 
education. Members of this community, therefore, really are in 
possession of the only accurate information that matters as far as they 
are concerned for making informed judgments to determine the influence 
of formal education on the level of well-being for this community.
See Noorbaksh (1998) for more information on this point.
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That said, no doubt the 'paternalistic' structure of widely-cited 
measures of community well-being will continue to be applied 
extensively. For one thing these measures allow comparatively easy 
calculations of levels of 'well-being' for a community. Nevertheless, this 
paternalistic aspect of the structure of the measures of community well­
being is not above criticism for the reasons just indicated.
4.3.2.2 More on education
Expanding on the general theme of education, fathers and 
mothers in both barangays said that they observed that the costs of 
education together with food, clothing and shelter needs have been 
increasing. While the government provides free elementary and 
secondary education, parents said they still had to set aside funds for 
their children's daily allowance, school supplies, uniforms and projects. 
In Barangay Nangalisan the Plan International, a non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) provides income-poor families with uniforms and 
supplies worth 900 pesos per child enrolled in elementary school. Also, 
for mothers who volunteer as barangay health workers, one child is sent 
to college to study with the education fees being met by the government. 
In Barangay San Juan, however, there is no additional support to 
households, financial or otherwise, from the government, NGOs or the 
private sector, for the schooling of children.
While some fathers said they occasionally withdrew their children 
from school to help on the farm, all the mothers from both barangays 
said they never did, although they requested their children to come 
home immediately after school to perform various chores at home. 
Parents and grandparents from the two barangays commented that in
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their youth they themselves had been withdrawn from school by their 
own parents to work at home or on the farm. What also was agreed upon 
by most of the fathers and mothers in Barangay San Juan who 
participated in the FGDs was that a child in school means less labour for 
farming and performing household tasks.
Nevertheless, children were still expected by the parents in 
Barangay San Juan to assist with household chores. From the age of 
five children assist with cleaning the house and the backyard, cooking 
food, washing dishes and clothes, ironing clothes, minding their siblings, 
caring for livestock, leading animals to pasture, fetching water, gathering 
fuel wood and fodder and taking messages to other people. Mothers 
said that their children helped them between five minutes to two hours a 
day. The children, however, stated that they helped their parents 
between half an hour to half a day. Since parents probably wished to be 
seen by others as behaving as responsible parents, I suspect that the 
children were providing more accurate information on the hours they 
spent on carrying out household chores.
As a further indication that this is so, it is noted that one of the two 
teachers in Barangay San Juan observed that, because the children 
had to help with farm and household work after school, they have little 
time to do their homework. In addition, in the absence of electricity, the 
children use kerosene lamps to study in the evenings. These factors, 
along with the lack of interest and involvement by the parents in their 
children's studies, led this teacher to observe that children do not 
perform well in school. As further evidence of the poor quality of the 
education provided it is noted that, in an election recently held in the 
barangay (for the post of village captain), it was alleged that many
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voters (what proportion is not known) placed their candidates' names in 
the wrong places on their ballot forms.
Almost all of the groups of fathers, mothers and grandparents in 
both barangays think that the schools in their area are ‘good’ based on 
their observation of their children or grandchildren who learned how to 
read and write. The parents and grandparents said their schools are 
‘good’ because they think their teachers are of high quality. Some 
parents said they believed that the local schools are 'good' because 
their children who studied in the village were able to reach college.
The FGD participants also noted that their children and those of 
their neighbours who finished college did not return to the village 
because there were so few employment opportunities available in their 
locality. These communities, therefore, experienced a drain of 
educational talent out of the community. While this represented an 
economic cost for these communities, there also was a potential benefit; 
namely, if remittances were sent back to the parents then this provided a 
diversified source of income for the households concerned.
4.3.3 On credit"
99 Apart from asking participants of FGDs their experiences in availing themselves of 
loans from the formal and informal credit markets, detailed questions on credit-related 
issues such as market interlinkages, transaction costs, lending terms and procedures and 
repayment performance were not asked. Nor did the author conduct interviews with 
banking institutions and private moneylenders in Barangays Nangalisan and San Juan or 
in the town centres. This is because the research was not intended to be a study of credit 
per se but rather on the use of credit in relation to the level of formal education and the 
use of forest resources. While these may be considered as a limitation of the present 
study, these issues were studied in detail in previous research on credit. Discussions of 
various aspects of credit markets in the Philippines are to be found in studies such as 
Collado (1975), Matienzo (1978), The Presidential Committee on Agricultural Credit 
(1981), Corales and Cuevas (1987), Flora (1987), Tolentino (1987), Abiad et al. (1988), 
Tolentino (1988), Agabin et al. (1989), Russell (1989), Teh (1991), Llanto et al. (1993), 
Mask (1995) and the World Bank (1996).
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People in rural areas mainly rely on agricultural incomes which are 
highly unstable - especially if households were dependent on rainfed 
agricultural methods of production. The instability of agricultural 
incomes, in turn, may be traced to factors such as the effect of weather 
disturbances, pests and fluctuations in commodity prices. Since their 
incomes are unstable, most of the time rural folk have low liquidity 
positions (Besley 1995: 2127) unless they can build up reserves in a 
good season. Also, as discussed in sub-section 3.2.1, since their 
incomes are volatile, the rural poor are faced with economic uncertainty - 
a factor that lowers the level of well-being of risk averse poor 
households. To add to these difficulties is the fact that credit markets, 
among others, in developing countries such as the Philippines, are 
incomplete.
The formal sources of credit in the Philippines are government- 
owned banks, private banks and other credit institutions registered with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Formal sources of credit are 
often faced with risk and information-related problems such as adverse 
selection (lenders may not observe the relevant characteristics of 
borrowers prior to providing the loan) and moral hazard (lenders may 
find it too costly to observe the relevant actions that their borrowers take 
after securing the loan)100. In addition, government-supported rural 
credit programs were observed to suffer from deficiencies in design and 
implementation101. In the Philippines, for instance, two reasons why
1UU For a discussion of these two information-related problems confronting a credit 
market, see Besley (1995: 2131) and Hoff et al. (1993: 4-5).
101 To cite a few, a discussion of credit market experiences in various countries such 
as Northern Nigeria, China, Thailand and India are contained in Hoff et al. (1993) and in
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subsidised credit programs encountered high default rates were the lack 
of proper loan appraisal and loan supervision (Collado 1975: 231 and 
IFAD 1985: 67). Income-poor borrowers were also found to tend to have 
higher incidences of loan default than middle-income and rich borrowers 
(Floro 1987: 200-3) 102.
Informal sources of credit, on the other hand, include relatives, 
neighbours, friends, landowners, input-dealers and private 
moneylenders. They are easier to access because there are no forms to 
complete and collateral is not often required. However, loans of this type 
are usually based on ‘non-price considerations such as patron-client 
relationships and other forms of social relations binding the contracting 
parties’ (IFAD 1985: 11). In the rural areas, poor people are more likely 
to borrow from the informal credit market and rely less on formal financial 
resources because they 'tend to lack reliable forms of collateral, are less 
likely to be literate and numerate, may face higher transaction costs and 
lack the influence needed to gain subsidised loans’ (Besley 1995: 2125). 
Examples of studies on informal credit markets in the Philippines include 
the Presidential Committee on Agricultural Credit (1981), Floro (1987), 
Agabin et al. (1989) and Floro and Yotopoulos (1991). This experience 
is reflected to varying degrees in the two villages in the Philippines.
The results of the focus group discussions in B arangay  
Nangalisan and Barangay San Juan revealed that a majority of the 
people rely more on informal than formal sources of credit. As pointed 
out in sub-section 3.2.1, 30 per cent of the fathers in Barangay
the Philippines, see Matienzo (1978: 3-6), Corales and Cuevas (1987: 2-10), Tolentino 
(1987 and 1988: 19-22) and Abiad et al. (1988: 3-5).
102 Or that the higher the family net income, the higher is the rate of loan repayment 
(Matienzo 1978:151-2).
182
Nangalisan who participated in focus group discussions said they have 
availed themselves of agricultural loans from the Land Bank of the 
Philippines. A majority of those who availed themselves of these loans 
reported that they did not encounter any problems in borrowing from 
these sources. The FGD participants from Barangay Nangalisan who 
reported that they had difficulties in paying their loans attributed their 
difficulty to the increase in household expenditures, particularly their 
children's tuition fees. FGD participants who were unable to borrow from 
the Land Bank reported they did not avail themselves of government 
loans because they did not have any assets to offer as collateral103 and 
no stable sources of income. These participants said that they borrowed 
instead from informal sources, in particular, from suppliers of farm inputs, 
landowners, or from their relatives. In contrast, all of the fathers from 
Barangay San Juan said they have never secured a loan from the 
formal credit market because there were no such facilities in the village. 
Most of the banking institutions are located in the capital town of 
Masbate which is forty-five (45) kilometres away from the village.
In the case of mothers, half of the participants from Barangay 
Nangalisan have taken advantage of credit facilities such as the 
Government Service Insurance System and the Social Security System. 
The FGD participants said they did not encounter any difficulties with 
borrowing and paying their loans since payments were automatically 
deducted from their salaries. However, while they may have access to 
the credit facility of the Land Bank, they did not take advantage of the
103 The majority of Benguet farmers do not have titles to their lands. Under 
Presidential Decree No. 705, all lands with a slope of 18 degrees or more are considered 
as forest reserves and are excluded from titling since these are considered public lands. 
Since Benguet farmers do not have land titles, they are not eligible to avail themselves of 
formal sources of credit (Bantly n.d.: 12). It was learned from the FGD participants that 
those who were able to secure loans from the Land Bank have titles to lands in the 
lowlands and are members of the local farmers' association.
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bank's loans because they found the interest rates high and they lacked 
information on the requirements for collateral. Instead some of them 
borrowed from persons rather than institutions. About ten per cent of the 
FGD participants were able to borrow from the local Catholic Church. 
The church had received grants from overseas and distributed loans to 
women in the village (regardless of religious denomination) using the 
Grameen Banking approach104. In contrast, 95 per cent of the mothers in 
Barangay San Juan reported that they did not secure loans from formal 
credit sources because, as their husbands said, these facilities were 
non-existent in the barangay. Hence, they relied on themselves and 
their neighbours. A group of mothers said that Barangay San Juan 
used to have a credit cooperative six years ago (1991). They found the 
cooperative important to them because they were able to borrow 
consumer goods from the co-op store and pay the cost of goods in the 
succeeding month. However, the officers decided to close the 
cooperative when most of the members decided to withdraw their 
contributions of 100 pesos each (about 2.5 US dollars using a US$1 = 
Philippine 40 pesos exchange rate) due to lack of money for daily needs.
A similar picture was depicted by the elders in these two 
communities. Grandparents in Barangay Nangalisan reported that they 
were able to borrow from neighbours and the local savings and loan 
association. In contrast to that of Barangay Nangalisan, but similar to 
what their children (and daughters-in-law or sons-in-law) reported, 
grandparents in Barangay San Juan said they were unable to avail
104 The Grameen Banking approach, a popular credit scheme for the poor which 
originated in Bangladesh and which is known to have repayment rates as high as 97 per 
cent, was first adopted in the Philippines in 1989 in Laguna (South of Manila) as a 
research-cum-action program. Since 1989, the credit scheme has been replicated by the 
government and by non-governmental organisations in some parts of the country. For a 
brief discussion of the replication of the scheme in the Philippines, see Llanto et al. 
(1993) and Mask (1995). See also footnote 110.
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themselves of formal credit. The majority reported that instead they 
received dole-outs from their children and grandchildren.
From the foregoing discussion, it may be concluded that people 
from Barangay San Juan have less command over credit resources 
than the people of Barangay Nangalisan. The villagers would not travel 
to the capital town of Masbate to secure a loan from any of its eight 
banking institutions because of several reasons. Firstly, they lacked 
information on what was required to secure a loan. Most of them do not 
understand the forms to be filled out and contracts to be signed. (This 
may be traced to the comparatively low level of average literacy and 
level of formal education the FGD participants in Barangay San Juan 
had.) Also, the majority do not have land, which is the usual collateral 
required by the banks. Moreover, since they rely on rainfed farming, 
their incomes are low and unstable and thus the farmers expect that 
there is a low possibility that the banks will lend to them because of the 
high lending risks. At the same time, another problem faced by the 
village people is the high transport costs to the town centre where the 
credit institutions are located. They said that the fare of 40 pesos (1.0 
US dollar) per person two-ways plus extra charge for baggage was too 
high for them105. Moreover, the local roads are rough and accidents 
were frequent.
Giving poor people ready access to credit may therefore be 
desirable primarily to improve their liquidity position and therefore allow 
them to live beyond subsistence during poor times. However, there is a
105 This finding is consistent with the results of a study by Abiad et al. (1988: 35) 
using cross-section data from six provinces in the Philippines. The study revealed that 
distance from the bank, among other factors, was considered important by borrowers 
when they decided to apply for a loan.
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need to think about a credit scheme to ensure that loans are repaid. 
Despite the many advantages that the rural people could derive from 
having credit facilities, immediately setting up a loan facility in Barangay 
San Juan may not be feasible given its existing economic and social 
conditions. Designing a credit facility in villages similar to Barangay 
San Juan should be part of an integrated and complementary package 
of interventions which would also address not only the need for credit but 
also related concerns such as improving the level of infrastructure in the 
area. This recommendation is consistent with an earlier finding by 
Collado (1975: 179) and the World Bank (1996: 16-7) that for credit to be 
functional it must be simultaneously combined with technical assistance, 
adequate market support (such as roads and transport), post harvest 
facilities (for storage, drying and milling), as well as price supports.
4.3.4 On forest resources
As shown earlier in Table 3, the majority of the people in Barangay 
San Juan rely more on the forests for their energy needs than those in 
Barangay Nangalisan. The difference may reflect, among others, the 
comparatively lower levels of income and formal education and the non­
existence of formal credit markets in San Juan (than in Nangalisan). 
Also the people rely on non-electric sources of energy since Barangay 
San Juan is located in an island province and it is possible that due to 
scale economies of producing electricity, the cost of providing this utility 
may far exceed the low level of demand by rural households for this 
utility.
Since most of the people in Barangay San Juan do not have 
sufficient money to purchase commercial forms of fuel, such as liquefied
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petroleum gas, they gather fuelwood from the forest106. Also, since the 
people of San Juan have comparatively lower levels of education, it may 
be that they appreciate less the importance of protecting the forests 
themselves. It is also possible that the forests, as like other common 
property resources, were used as substitutes for loans in the absence of 
well-functioning credit markets as a resource for generating income 
(Baland and Platteau 1996: 172-3)107.
This is not to say that in Barangay Nangalisan cutting and burning 
of trees do not occur. However, people replace these trees by 
replanting. Moreover, the timberland in Barangay Nangalisan is part of 
the national government's watershed area in the Cordillera 
Administrative Region. As a watershed area, no form of production is 
allowed by the government (Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources 1990: 353). Also, the presence of alternative energy 
resources such as electricity and liquefied petroleum gas and other 
income-generating activities took some pressure off the forests of 
Barangay Nangalisan. Thus, in marked contrast to most of the rural 
villages in the Philippines, Barangay Nangalisan was able to preserve a 
substantial portion of its forests.
106 This does not mean, however, that collection of fuelwood by itself has led to 
deforestation in the village. The provincial master plan attributes the zero forest cover of 
Masbate to 'rampant illegal logging in the past1 (Development Partners Inc. 1996: 4). At 
the national level, the government, citing the results of studies conducted by Meyer in 
1984 and the FAO in 1988, points out that the major cause of destruction and 
degradation of the rainforest in the Philippines is subsistence farming (DENR 1990: 168). 
Kummer (1992: 66), on the other hand, in a study of post-war deforestation in the 
Philippines, states that it appears that logging (legal and illegal) and the expansion of 
agriculture are the primary causes of loss of forest cover in the country.
107 Apart from imperfections in the credit market, Baland and Platteau (1996: 167-72) 
pointed out that common property resources may also have a significant role in rural 
markets that have imperfect labour and insurance markets. Also, see Dasgupta and Maler 
(1995: 2381).
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However, in the absence of effective monitoring by the 
government and the lack of security of tenure (people in the village hold 
tax declarations instead of certificates of land ownership), it is possible 
that the forest will be depleted over time. People from neighbouring 
villages were in fact observed to travel to Barangay Nangalisan to cut 
trees for making furniture and wooden handicrafts without being 
apprehended by local authorities. In the Benguet uplands, deforestation 
is considered a serious problem arising from greater population 
pressure and illegal timber operations (Russell 1989: 5).
The experience of Barangay San Juan in conserving their forest 
resources is completely different from that of Barangay Nangalisan. In 
Barangay San Juan, first-growth forest trees were cut in the early 1960s 
to build houses. The senior members of the community who participated 
in the FGDs reported that they used to have a forest guard during that 
time. However, the forest guard allowed people from the lowlands to cut 
trees or adopt slash-and-burn agriculture. The village elders said it was 
known to the people in the village that the forest guard received money 
and wild animals in exchange for permission to use forest resources. 
When only a few trees remained, the forest guard left the village. An 
inventory conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR) in 1984 revealed that 151,000 hectares classified as 
forest land in the province of Masbate had no forest cover (Provincial 
Government of Masbate 1991: 39). Denudation of the forests, in turn, 
had contributed to soil erosion and the shortage of water in the province 
(Development Partners, Inc. 1996). In 1994, the DENR started its 
reforestation program by entering into forest stewardship agreements 
with the local people. According to the municipal development officer of 
Mandaon, a total area of 360 hectares in Barangay San Juan is
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expected to be reforested under the Integrated Social Forestry Program 
(ISFP). Under the ISFP, the community led by the village council 
manages a portion of the forest land in the village. The council allocates 
to a member of the community a minimum area of five hectares of forest 
land to plant trees on. In exchange for taking care of the forest land, the 
community member may use 20 per cent of the area for planting fruit 
trees, the produce of which they could consume or sell in the market. 
However, in early 1997 the farmer-beneficiaries of the ISFP were forced 
to vacate their forest lots by cattle ranchers and some have already 
waived their rights in favour of the latter (personal communication of the 
provincial environmental and natural resources officer, Mandaon, 
Masbate, January 1997). While the cattle ranchers do not possess any 
legal rights to the land since this is public land, the DENR seems to be 
helpless in evicting the cattle ranchers (and their wards) because the 
ranchers are part of a politically strong and influential group in the 
community.
The interaction between the different members of the community 
and the government in managing the forests of San Juan as described in 
the preceding paragraph may be viewed as a game theoretic exercise. 
The classic 'prisoners' dilemma' game108, however, may not be 
applicable to what occurred in Barangay San Juan. This is mainly 
because the use of common property resources such as the forests in 
Barangay San Juan involved more than two agents and are not a one- 
shot game (that is the interaction between and among the players does 
not end with one round of activity). Also, these interactions may not be 
easily isolated from the other economic, social and political activities at
108 For a description of the classic prisoners' dilemma game, see Varian (1992: 261- 
2).
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Barangay San Juan.109 Thus the single-shot prisoners' dilemma game 
may not adequately capture the situation in rural villages similar to that of 
Barangay San Juan. What may be more applicable is a game where 
there is no co-operation between and among agents not because of the 
lack of communication but due to the absence of social and political 
sanctions that can be brought against the comparatively rich people and 
politically well-connected (that is the ranch-owners). The interests of this 
group, therefore, prevails over the rest of the community.
While the communities seem unable to preserve their forests, 
especially Barangay San Juan, the results of the focus group 
discussions revealed that the people from Barangays Nangalisan and 
San Juan were in fact aware of the importance of the forests. The FGD 
participants said that they get water, fuelwood, lumber, fruits and plants 
from the forests. All the participants were of the opinion that there are 
advantages to protecting the forests. If they cannot be protected at the 
present time (1997), the FGD participants said that the condition of the 
forests will be serious in the next five years (2002) because the air will 
be warmer and there will be no more water, wild animals and plants. 
Some of the FGD participants said that when the forests are depleted, 
the village will not be protected from natural calamities, such as 
typhoons. Other participants said that when there are no trees, floods 
will occur and the soil, which is their main source of livelihood, will lose 
its vegetation. As a consequence of forest depletion, the members of the 
community predict that there will be hunger and people may die.
109 In small groups or communities, interactions on resource management are usually 
linked with other sectors in which its members interact. See Baland and Platteau (1996: 
76) on this point.
190
Interestingly, in contrast to the belief of FGD participants in 
Barangay Nangalisan that it is the community's responsibility to avoid 
the depletion of forest resources, half of the fathers and a majority of the 
mothers in Barangay San Juan who participated in the focus group 
discussions believe that it is the role of the government to protect the 
forests. This complacent attitude may also have contributed to the 
denudation of the forests in Barangay San Juan.
4.4 Public Policy and Methodology 
4.4.1 Public policy implications
As indicated earlier, it is understandable that parents in absolutely 
well-being poor and income poor households with little or no access to 
credit markets will give sole priority to the immediate survival of their 
families. They have few, if any, funds to expend on the formal education 
of their children. In addition, the expected benefits derived from any 
private investments these parents make in the education of their children 
are likely to be discounted comparatively heavily since these parents 
almost certainly are comparatively risk averse especially given the 
depletion of forest resources. This situation will discourage even further 
investment in the education of children in absolutely poor communities.
It follows that one way to encourage income-poor parents in 
developing countries to invest more in the education of their children is 
to increase the level of access that these parents have to the formal 
credit market system. This greater access to the formal credit market will 
allow these households to be in a better position to mitigate, probably ex 
post, the variability of income streams. This consequence, along with 
the increased availability of credit presumably will also result in parents
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investing more in the education of their children. A similar set of 
observations has been made by Jacoby and Skoufias (1997: 331), 
although they arrived at this conclusion by a route quite different to that 
taken here. (The Jacoby-Skoufias study will be returned to in the next 
sub-section.)
Exactly how this reform of the credit system should be 
implemented, without there being a wastage of public funds, is a matter 
briefly discussed in the accompanying footnote.110 What is emphasised 
here, however, is that increasing the level of access to the formal credit 
market for comparatively poor households implies that personal income 
inequality is being reduced in the community concerned, albeit in a 
particular way. This observation becomes pertinent once it is noted that 
Perotti (1996: 179ff) provides evidence in an econometric study based 
on cross-country data that the level of enrolment in secondary education 
in a community increases with a reduction in the level of inequality in the 
distribution of personal incomes in this community - that is after allowing 
for a range of other relevant factors. Hence the relevant regression 
results presented by Perotti are consistent with the line of argument 
developed earlier - an argument based on the information derived from 
the baseline surveys and FGDs held in the two Filipino villages of 
interest here.
110 The provision of subsidised credit, without stringent monitoring of the repayment 
of the loans provided, is likely to lead to a high level of defaulting of loans. Thus, to 
ensure that default rates are kept comparatively low, systems need to be in place for the 
careful supervision of all loans provided. It may also be required that a system of penalties 
is imposed on those who default on the loans they are provided with. Such system may 
take the form of lending to a single member of a group (of say five members) of potential 
recipients. Should any member default, then no other member of the group will receive a 
loan in the future. While the Grameen Bank, for instance, threatens to employ this 
technique to induce the repayment of loans, this threat of imposing this type of group 
penalty is rarely imposed. Rather, to reduce the risk of defaulting, loans are carefully 
supervised by the Bank's staff to determine that those receiving loans have the capacity 
to repay them on time and in full. On this matter see Jain (1996).
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A further inference that can be drawn from the information 
reported earlier is that any additional public investment in primary and 
secondary school education in poor villages in the Philippines (and 
probably elsewhere) should be combined with complementary public 
expenditures directed at alleviating the dearth of infrastructure available 
to these villages. To explain, earlier it was indicated that the relative 
dearth of infrastructure in Barangay San Juan probably contributed to 
reducing the benefits to be derived from investments in education in that 
barangay. Expressed differently, any improvement in the infrastructure 
(such as roads, irrigation, electricity supply and health care facilities) 
made available to this barangay almost certainly would raise the private 
and social benefits to be derived from any public investment in 
education. This would seem to be especially so in a country where, 
according to the World Bank (1996: 16-7) , there is a relative dearth of 
basic infrastructure compared to that found in comparable countries. On 
the other hand, the provision of higher levels of formal education also 
will tend to increase the level of benefits derived from the investments in 
irrigation, community reforestation programs, roads and other 
infrastructure. What is being suggested here, therefore, is that there are 
complementary effects, or synergisms, that operate between the public 
and private investments in education and investments in other types of 
infrastructure in rural Philippines.111 This in turn implies that literacy­
enhancing programs and subsidies for the provision of basic education
111 Albeit based upon information for a quite different and particular context (to be 
found in rural India in 1961 - 81), Foster and Rozenzweig (1996: 951) came to a similar 
conclusion. In this instance only two pieces of infrastructure were considered - the 
provision of primary school education and a new agricultural technology (associated with 
high yielding varieties of food grains). They established, not surprisingly, that the return 
on investing in any one of these classes of infrastructure was dependent on how much 
was invested in the other type of infrastructure.
193
are necessary, but definitely not sufficient, for raising, comparatively 
rapidly, the level of well-being of people in poor villages in rural 
Philippines. For such a growth in well-being to take place what is 
required is a suitably balanced package of appropriate government 
measures - not just some elements of such a package. This 
recommendation is also along the lines of a remark made by Professor 
Solita Monsod of the University of the Philippines School of Economics 
that the Estrada Administration should intensify its efforts to improve 
access by the poor to resources such as 'credit, education, that includes 
asset redistribution (and) export encouragement of the labo[u]r-intensive 
kind' (Richer families earned more in 1997, says NSO 1998: 7).
4.4.2 An aside on methodology
To conclude this discussion attention returns to a matter touched 
upon in the introduction; namely, the apparent comparative advantage of 
the methodology employed in this chapter. To demonstrate this 
advantage first it is noted that a central conclusion arrived at here is 
similar to that to be found in Jacoby and Skoufias (1997: 331) where 
they state that 'credit market constraints ... do play a role in the human 
capital investment decisions of both large and small farm households, 
though the evidence is less compelling for the former group'.
The route Jacoby and Skoufias took in arriving at this conclusion 
was based upon constructing a formal economic model of school 
attendance in a community subject to the constraint that households 
have limited access to a formal credit market to assist with mitigating 
comparatively unstable income streams. The severity of this constraint 
was made dependent upon the size of the income farming households
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receive. This model was then tested by drawing inferences from 
econometric estimates of coefficients in equations meant to represent the 
formal economic model. Most important of all, the data set used in this 
testing was drawn from a rather limited sample - that for two villages in 
South India. It also seems reasonable to assert that this data set was not 
well suited for the testing of the thesis considered by Jacoby and 
Skoufias.
In contrast, the relevant argument developed in the previous 
discussion was based upon information generated by baseline surveys 
and answers to questions posed in FGDs that were explicitly concerned 
with determining (a) if there were links between the completeness of 
credit markets and private investments in formal education and, if these 
links existed, (b) the qualitative importance of these links. In the attempt 
to ensure that useful information was generated in this way, only 
households that possessed a diverse range of relevant characteristics 
were interviewed. Thus relevant and useful comparison could be made 
based on the information generated by the FGDs and the baseline 
surveys without the need to draw comparatively tenuous inferences from 
this information by way of applying appropriate statistical techniques.
The results derived from such an approach suggest that a case 
can be made for the greater, but judicious, use of focus group 
discussions in developing communities to obtain deeper insights into 
how these communities really function, and how various factors 
constrain their development. These insights, in turn, should provide a 
firmer foundation upon which to determine the design of an appropriate 
and effective public policy. That said, the use of relevant and judicious 
focus group discussions could be a comparatively costly way of
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generating relevant information. Nevertheless, these costs may be much 
less than the benefits, discounted at the appropriate rate, derived from 
making effective use of this information.
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Part III
Consequences of Poverty in the Philippines
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Chapter 5
Demographic and Health Consequences of
Rural Poverty
- A Study at the Macro Level
5.1 Introduction
The previous part of this thesis attempted to determine the 
possible causes of poverty in the Philippines. The discussion in this part 
of the thesis turns to determining some of the consequences for Filipino 
society that flow from the level of poverty to be found in that society. In 
this chapter attention concentrates on determining the influence of the 
level of poverty and other factors on demographic variables and 
measures of the health status for certain groups in the community. In 
carrying out this study use is made of provincial data.
The reason for considering this general issue is that the level of 
poverty may influence the level of demand for children, health status to 
be found in the community and the mobility of individuals in the Filipino 
community. Changes in the level of this latter of group of variables may, 
in turn, influence the rate of growth of real gross national product per 
capita (the rate of economic growth for short). To explain, suppose, for 
example, a rise in the total fertility rate results in raising the rate of growth 
of population. This latter change may, in turn, well impede the rate of 
economic growth for the Philippines. (There is some evidence to support 
this conjecture to be found in Perotti (1996). Perotti only used cross-
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country data, however.) If this is so, then a reduction in the level of 
poverty should be part of any attempt to curb the rate of growth of 
population and, thereby, increase the rate of growth of the Philippine 
economy.112 Similarly, raising the health status of the community should 
assist in increasing the rate of economic growth, as should increasing 
the mobility of labour between employment opportunities in the 
Philippines. Again, if a reduction in the level of poverty assists in raising 
the health status, and level of labour mobility for members of this 
community, then a reduction in the level of poverty again should assist in 
raising the rate of economic growth in the Philippines.
The author is not aware of any studies which have looked into the 
possible influence of poverty on demographic and health variables using 
provincial data in the Philippines. Most of the studies either used 
regional data or looked at the influence of income and other economic 
and social indicators on only one or two demographic or health 
variables. This chapter studies the influence of rural poverty on 
demographic and health conditions in the Philippines using a more 
disaggregated data set.
5.2 Objectives of the study
This chapter will attempt to look at the effects of rural poverty on 
fertility, infant and child mortality, morbidity (resulting from water-borne 
diseases) and rural to urban migration making use of relevant data for 
the Philippines. The latter set of variables was selected because it may
112 However, the right sort of economic growth - namely, growth that results from 
increasing the level of education in the community - will also contribute towards 
decreasing the rate of economic growth. This topic is discussed in Martina (1996).
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be considered as containing basic indicators of demographic and health 
conditions. However, the results of this chapter should be treated with 
caution because causality may be in the reverse direction as well (that is, 
these variables may, in turn, influence rural poverty) and thus 
simultaneous equation bias may occur.
More specifically, the chapter aims to address the following 
questions:
a) What is the effect of rural poverty on infant mortality rates? Do 
rising levels of rural poverty reduce or increase infant mortality 
rates? Do rising infant mortality rates, in turn, have a positive or 
negative effect on fertility rates? What is the effect of rural poverty 
on child mortality rates?
b) What is the effect of rurai poverty on morbidity resulting from 
water-borne diseases? Do rising levels of rural poverty reduce or 
increase morbidity rates?
c) What is the effect of rural poverty on migration? Does a rising 
level of rural poverty encourage people to leave the area or, 
instead, does rural-urban migration decrease?
5.3 Hypotheses testing
The following hypotheses shall be tested by making use of data 
for the Philippines:
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a) All else being equal, rural income-only poverty has a direct 
positive influence on infant and child mortality. Low incomes mean a 
reduced ability for expecting mothers to improve their nutritional intake 
thereby affecting the health condition of their babies, and reduced ability 
for parents to provide adequate nutrition for their growing children. If 
well-being poverty is also considered, so that consideration is also given 
to the access income-poor households have to a range of relevant public 
goods, then the lack of public goods such as basic education, potable 
water and sanitation also will increase infant and child mortality rates in 
poor households. This is so since these households will be more 
exposed to water-borne diseases, which are a major cause of infant and 
child deaths.
b) All else being equal, rural poverty has both an indirect positive 
and negative relationship with fertility. The indirect positive relationship 
is through its effect on infant mortality rates. Rural poverty will increase 
infant mortality rates which, in turn, will increase fertility rates. Couples 
who lose an infant are more likely to replace them with another. The 
indirect negative relationship may arise from the lack of material assets 
owned by the poor. This is since assets such as land can be used by 
parents as a ‘bargaining tool’ in negotiations with their children to take 
care of them in their old age. Since they have fewer assets, such as land 
or savings to give to their children as inheritance, there is less incentive 
for poor couples to have more children.
c) All else being equal, rural poverty has an indirect positive 
relationship with morbidity resulting from water-borne diseases. Low 
incomes mean a reduced ability to improve nutritional intake which, in 
turn, may result in higher susceptibility to diseases. Again, if well-being
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poverty is taken into account, the lack of potable water and sanitation 
facilities as well as basic education increase morbidity rates resulting 
from water-borne diseases such as diarrhoea, cholera, bacillary 
dysentery, typhoid fever, paratyphoid fever and viral hepatitis.
d) All else being equal, rural poverty has both a direct negative 
and positive relationship with net migration (that is, in-migration less out­
migration). Poor people are discouraged from leaving their birthplace 
because of the high cost of migrating (which includes financial and 
psychic costs) and because they are more averse to risk than persons 
who are better off. Their risk-averseness is caused by the high economic 
levels of uncertainty arising from factors such as unstable incomes and 
instability resulting from the lack of education, accessible credit and 
social security systems. At low income levels, however, poor people 
may be risk-loving; they migrate to other places despite the risks and the 
costs of moving, as they are economically desperate.
5.4 Some comments on the data set
Prior to discussing the regression models, a brief description of the 
data set used in this chapter is presented in this section. Table 1 
presents a summary of the data used in these models. A definition of the 
variables is contained in the appendix (see Annex 10). Outliers in the 
data set (which are determined by the use of a scatter plot) that were 
expected to distort the results of regression were deleted. Removal of 
three outliers in the data set, consisting of two observations in net 
migration and one observation in morbidity from water-borne diseases, 
resulted in a slight decrease in the total number of observations from 73
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to 71 in the case of the net migration model and to 72 observations in the 
case of the morbidity model.
Correlation between some of the independent variables may be 
detected using the correlation matrix (see Table 2 in Annex 11). For 
instance, ELEC was found highly correlated with POT, SAN, NAGL, 
DEPR, URB, FLIT, ACADEG and DIST; NAGL with URB and ACADEG; 
POPDEN with URB; and LANFO with ILLIT. This information indicates
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
INFMORT 58.137 8 .447 40 .66 78.11
CMORT 26.841 6 .546 14.62 44 .15
FERT 3.488 0 .317 2.8 4.1
MWB 2030.082 3308 .2 5 34 28463
NMIG 754.417 6438 .8 16 -6.117 55014
POVI 48.481 14.410 4 .900 74 .900
FAMEXPH 1.804 0 .826 0.4 5
MAL 18.687 5.231 5.22 33 .47
AGEFEM 20.666 0 .712 19.4 22.8
FLIT 71 .529 10 .933 36 .300 90 .800
ILLIT 8.679 7.109 1.400 4 0 .200
ACADEG 10.099 3.194 3.100 20 .800
ELEC 42.842 20 .620 9 .400 90 .900
POT 58.484 17.935 13.500 90 .300
SAN 50.258 19.798 8 .700 93 .300
NAGL 43.714 14.017 12.000 77 .300
DEPR 80.422 6.739 66 .700 94 .700
HSIZ 5.349 0.227 4.800 6 .100
URB 35.190 17.612 9.000 95 .200
LANFO 0.478 0.127 0 .216 0.831
IRRIG 0.483 0.268 0.020 1.000
POPDEN 205.600 172.825 23 .03 895.1
DIST 0.904 0.836 0 2
ROADEN 1.464 0.683 0.525 4.941
PAVRODEN 0.194 0.147 0.021 0 .640
D 6.836 3.659 1.000 13.000
that multicollinearity may be present when attempting to estimate 
regression equations (5.1) to (5.5). Hence, it is not possible to measure 
the separate influences of the correlated variables on the dependent
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variable. Thus, a two-stage estimation procedure was employed and will 
be discussed in the next section.
5.5. Regression models
To determine the relationship between rural poverty and the 
demographic and health variables, the following five models were 
considered:
logINFMORTj = ß0 + ßl POVI + ß2 FAMEXPH + ß3 lLLIT+ ß4 MAL+
ß5POT+ ß6SAN+ ßyDIST (5.1)
where:
logINFMORTj
POVI
FAMEXPH
ILLIT
MAL
POT113
SAN114
DIST
= Logarithm of Infant Mortality Rate; the number 
per 1,000 live births that did not reach the age 
of one (1) in 1991 per province.
= poverty incidence in 1991 per province 
= average family expenditures on health in 1991 
per province
= illiteracy rate in 1990 per province 
= malnutrition rate in 1990 per province 
=proportion of households with potable water in 
1990 per province
=proportion of households with sanitary toilet 
facilities in 1990 per province 
=dummy variable for distance. The variable takes 
a value of 0 if the province is located in Luzon 
(except for Mindoro and Palawan which takes a 
value of 1 because of their relatively longer 
distance from MetroManila as compared to the 
other provinces within the Luzon island); 1 if in the 
Visayas; and 2 if in Mindanao.
logCMORTj = ß0 + ßl POVI + ß2 FAMEXPH + ß3 POT+ß4 SAN +
+ ß5ILLIT + ßßMAL + ßyDIST (5.2)
where:
logCMORTj = logarithm of Child Mortality Rate; the number 
per 1,000 children that did not reach the age of 
five (5) in 1991 per province.
POVI = poverty incidence in 1991 per province
113 Potable source of water supply refers to water suitable for drinking from 
community water systems and tubed/piped deep wells (NSO 1993: 2).
114 A sanitary toilet facility refers to water-carriage system of excreta disposal which 
includes flush/water sealed, sewer/septic tank and other depository (NSO 1993: 2).
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FAMEXPH
POT
SAN
ILLIT
MAL
DIST
= average family expenditures on health in 1991 
per province
= proportion of households with potable water in 
1990 per province
= proportion of households with sanitary toilet 
facilities in 1990 per province 
= illiteracy rate in 1990 per province 
= malnutrition rate in 1990 per province 
= dummy variable for distance. The variable takes 
a value of 0 if the province is located in Luzon 
(except for Mindoro and Palawan which takes a 
value of 1 because of their relatively longer 
distance from MetroManila as compared to the 
other provinces within the Luzon island); 1 if in the 
Visayas; and 2 if in Mindanao.
FERTj = ß0 + ßi POVIj + ß2loglNFMORT + B3AGEFEM +
B4FEMLIT + ß5MALIT + BßURB + ByDIST (5.3)
where:
FERT = Fertility rates in 1990 per province
POVIj = Poverty incidence in 1991 per province
logINFMORT = number per 1000 live births that did not reach 
the age of one (1) in 1991 per province (in log 
form)
AGEFEM = average age at marriage of female population in 
1990 per province
FEMLIT = Female basic literacy rate in 1991 per province 
MALIT = Male basic literacy rate in 1991 per province
URB = proportion of households living in an urbanised
area in 1990 per province
DIST =dummy variable for distance. The variable takes a
value of 0 if the province is located in Luzon 
(except for Mindoro and Palawan which takes a 
value of 1 because of their relatively longer 
distance from MetroManila as compared to the 
other provinces within the Luzon island); 1 if in the 
Visayas; and 2 if in Mindanao.
logMWBj = B0 + ß i POVIj + B2POT+ BßSAN + B4MAL +
B4 IU.IT + BöDIST (5.4)
where:
LogMWBj115 = Logarithm of morbidity resulting from water­
borne diseases per 100,000 population in 1991 
per province
POVIj = poverty incidence in 1991 per province
POT =proportion of households with potable water in
1990 per province
l l b  Data on morbidity resulting from water-borne diseases per province include 
recorded incidences of diarrhoea, typhoid and paratyphoid fever, and other salmonella 
infections (DOH 1991).
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SAN =proportion of households with sanitary toilet
facilities in 1990 per province 
MAL = malnutrition rate in 1990 per province
ILLIT = illiteracy rate in 1990 per province
DIST =dummy variable for distance. The variable takes a
value of 0 if the province is located in Luzon 
(except for Mindoro and Palawan which takes a 
value of 1 because of their relatively longer 
distance from MetroManila as compared to the 
other provinces within the Luzon island); 1 if in the 
Visayas; and 2 if in Mindanao.
NMIGj = ß0 + ßi POVIj + B2POPDEN + B3URB + B4ELEC + B5POT +
BöSAN + B7LANFO + B8FLIT + B8ROADEN + BgDIST (5.5)
where:
NMIGj
POVIj
POPDEN
URB
ELEC
POT
SAN
LANFO
FLIT
ROADEN
DIST
= Net Migration Rates; the proportion of net 
migrants (in-migrants less out-migrants) to total 
population in 1991 per province.
= poverty incidence in 1991 per province 
= population density; population per square 
kilometre in 1990 per province 
= proportion of households iiving in an urbanised 
area in 1990 per province 
= proportion of households with electricity 
in 1990 per province
= proportion of households with potable water 
in 1990 per province
= proportion of households with sanitary toilet 
facilities in 1990 per province 
= proportion of total area of farms in the province in 1991 
which were fully-owned and operated and not tenanted 
= functional literacy rate in 1989 per province 
= road density; kilometres of road divided by the 
population per province in 1991 
=dummy variable for distance. The variable takes 
a value of 0 if the province is located in Luzon 
(except for Mindoro and Palawan which takes a 
value of 1 because of their relatively longer 
distance from MetroManila as compared to the 
other provinces within the Luzon island); 1 if in 
the Visayas; and 2 if in Mindanao.
Since the objective of the study is to determine if there is a 
statistically significant relationship between income-poverty (using 
poverty incidence as the dependent variable) as well as non-income 
measures of poverty (using health and sanitation facilities and education 
as explanatory variables) and five different dependent variables, the 
above statistical models were made as simple as possible, without,
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however, sacrificing the explanatory power of the model as a whole and 
other independent variables contained therein. The idea is to capture 
the effect of income and well-being poverty variables on fertility rates, 
infant and child mortality, morbidity and net migration. The independent 
variables, other than poverty incidence, were based on different 
models/studies made of fertility, infant mortality, child mortality, morbidity 
from water-borne diseases and net migration.
I now consider each of the regression models in turn.
a) The regression model represented by equation (5.1) is based 
on the Anand and Ravallion model (1993). Using cross-country data, 
Anand and Ravallion attempted to determine the separate influences of 
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, real health subsidy 
expenditure per capita and the level of the headcount poverty on the 
infant mortality rate. Their findings indicated that the latter two variables 
had a statistically significant influence on the infant mortality rate - a rise 
in the health expenditure, and a fall in the headcount measure of poverty 
reduced the infant mortality rate. However, an increase in real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita had no influence on the infant 
mortality rate. In the present study, cross-section data for the Philippines 
was used to test Model 1. In the present study the proportion of family 
expenditure spent on health (FAMEXPH) per province was used to 
measure private expenditures on health care. In addition, basic 
infrastructure (POT and SAN), health (MAL), education (ILLIT) and 
distance (DIST) variables were included in the regression model.
All else being equal, POVIj is hypothesised to have a positive 
influence on logINFMORTj. Less income may mean fewer chances of
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providing an infant as well as a pregnant woman with adequate nutrition 
and health care.
ILLIT and MAL are expected to have a positive influence on 
logINFMORTj, while FAMEXPH, POT and SAN are expected to have a 
negative effect on the same variable. A less literate or less educated 
person, especially in the case of females, is expected to have a lower 
appreciation of the importance of adequate nutrition and hygienic 
practices than one who is literate or more educated (Caldwell and 
MacDonald 1982). The lack of proper and adequate nutrition is also 
expected to increase infant deaths. Moreover, assuming all others are 
equal, it is expected that the higher the proportion of the household 
budget spent on medical care and the better the access to potable and 
sanitary toilet facilities, the lower is the infant mortality rate.
It is also hypothesised that the further away a person lives from 
Luzon (the main island where the nation’s major metropolitan area is 
located), the lower the quality of medical care facilities and thus the 
higher is the infant mortality rate. DIST is therefore expected to have a 
positive effect on logINFMORTj. Given the typology, or the geography of 
the Philippines, however, it is not possible to determine accurately the 
distance from a province outside of Luzon (particularly the island 
provinces) to MetroManila. Thus, dummy variables were used in the 
regression model.
Other indicators which aim to capture the effect of government 
health programs on logINFMORTj, such as the number of government 
hospitals, maternity clinics or physicians per capita (Frankenberg 1995) 
or government expenditures on health per person, were not included in
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the model due to the absence of provincial data. Data on the quality of 
health facilities and services at the provincial level likewise are 
unavailable. The lack of data on possible variables which may have a 
significant relationship to infant mortality rates may therefore result in low 
adjusted coefficients of determination.
b) The regression model represented by equation (5.2) is based 
on a various studies which looked into the possible relationship between 
some social variables (based on the availability of data) and child 
mortality. While the author supports the basic premise of Mosley and 
Chen (1984: 25) in their analytical framework for the study of child 
survival in developing countries that 'all social and economic 
determinants of child mortality necessarily operate through a common 
set of biological mechanisms, or proximate determinants116, to exert an 
impact on mortality', this chapter follows traditional social science 
research on child mortality which studies the association between 
economic and social indicators and child mortality rates. This approach 
is taken because, as mentioned in the introduction to this section, the 
objective of this chapter is to look at the influence of poverty incidence on 
specific demographic as well as heath variables.
Similar to the previous regression model, POVIj is likewise 
hypothesised to be positively related to logCMORTj. Less income may 
also mean fewer chances for a household of providing a child with 
adequate nutrition and health care.
116 Mosley and Chen (1984: 27) categorised the proximate determinants of child 
survival into five: maternal factors (age, parity and birth interval); environmental 
contamination (air, food/water/fingers, skin/soil/inanimate objects, insect vectors), 
nutrient deficiency (calories, protein, micronutrients (that is, vitamins and minerals), injury 
(accidental and intentional) and personal illness control (personal preventive measures 
and medical treatment).
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ILLIT, MAL and DIST are also expected to have a positive 
influence on logCMORTj. Similar to the previous model, a less literate or 
educated person is expected to appreciate less the importance of 
adequate nutrition and hygienic practices than one who is literate or 
more educated (Caldwell and MacDonald 1982). On the other hand, 
due to its relationship with infectious disease, mild-to-moderate 
malnutrition was found to increase the chances of a child dying before 
he or she reaches the age of five (Martorell and Ho 1984, Pelletier et al. 
1993, 1994 and 1995 and Pelletier 1994). Similar to the infant mortality 
model, the further away a province is located from Luzon, the higher is 
the child mortality rate as explained earlier.
FAMEXPH, POT and SAN are hypothesised to have a negative 
effect on logCMORTj. Assuming all others things are equal, the higher 
the proportion of the household budget spent on health care, particularly 
preventive as opposed to curative health care, the lower is the predicted 
child mortality rate. Also, having clean and safe water for drinking and 
the preparation of food as well as sanitary toilet facilities, among others, 
tend to reduce exposure to disease (Mosley and Chen 1984: 36-7). 
Similarly, other indicators which aim to capture the effect of government 
health programs on CMORTj, such as the number of government 
hospitals, maternity clinics or physicians per capita or government 
expenditures on health per person or the quality of health facilities and 
services at the provincial level, were not included in the model due to the 
absence of provincial data. Similar to the infant mortality model, the lack 
of data on possible variables which may have a significant relationship 
to child mortality rates may therefore result in a low coefficient of 
determination.
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c) The regression model set out in equation (5.3) is based on 
studies made on the variables which may affect fertility rates. Apart from 
average age at marriage of female population which is a proximate117 or 
direct determinant of fertility, the model will look at the possible influence 
of socioeconomic factors on fertility rates. I recognise, however, that 
these economic and social variables may have an indirect rather than a 
direct effect on fertility rates.
The model, therefore, tests various theories set out in the relevant 
literature that concentrates on studying the relationship between social 
and economic indicators and fertility rates. For instance, on the 
relationship between poverty incidence and fertility rates, Dasgupta 
(1993) hypothesised that, holding all else being equal, the poorer an 
area is, the higher is the demand for children. More particularly, in 
developing countries the poor tend to have more children than the non­
poor (Birdsall and Griffin 1993). Dasgupta, Folke and Mäler (1994) also 
claimed that rapid population growth, arising from high fertility rates, is a 
result of poverty as well as institutional failures.
Urbanisation is expected to have an inverse relationship with 
fertility rates. Since the expected minimum income necessary to raise a 
child is larger in the urban areas, the more urbanised a province is, the 
lower is the fertility rate. Urbanisation is also associated with 
comparatively higher levels of average income, higher levels of
117 Davis and Blake (1956) identified 11 intermediate variables which have a direct 
effect on fertility. Two decades later, Bongaarts (1978) trimmed the number of these 
variables into eight to allow for quantification. These variables are as follows: proportions 
of women married or in sexual unions; patterns of sexual activity, breastfeeding and 
lactational amenorrhoea, contraception (including sterilisation), induced abortion, foetal 
loss, natural infertility and pathological infertility.
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education, formation of nuclear instead of extended families, better 
social services (such as education, health and family planning) and 
better infrastructure in contrast to that found in rural areas. These factors 
may contribute to a higher fertility rate in rural areas (Murdoch 1980: 48). 
Relatedly, distance is expected to have a positive influence on fertility 
rates. The further away a province is located from Luzon, the less 
urbanised it is, and the higher is the demand for children.
Infant mortality rates and fertility rates are expected to be positively 
related to one another (Birdsall and Griffin 1993). The higher the infant 
deaths, the more is the demand for children as replacement of the 
children lost. It is possible, however, that there is a time lag between the 
reduction in infant mortality rates and the decline in fertility rates. For 
instance, Murdoch (1980: 44) cites evidence from a study of infant 
mortality rates and fertility rates conducted by the World Health Office in 
53 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America between 1945 and 1970, 
that indicates that the average time lag was about ten years. However, 
due to the absence of data on infant mortality rates in 1980 per province, 
data in 1990 were used instead.
Assuming all others are equal, the higher is the average age at 
marriage of the female population in the province, the lower is the fertility 
rate. It is expected that married females are more likely to have children 
than those who are single.
Increases in the level of functional literacy are expected to reduce 
the demand for children. A more literate person may have a greater 
appreciation of the importance of improving the quality of their children 
through better education and health care rather than increasing the
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number of their children. Also, as the opportunity cost of having children 
goes up, the importance of the child's contribution to family income may 
go down. In the rural areas, couples invest in the education of children 
in the hope that later their children may find employment outside of 
agriculture.118
Past studies also have revealed that there is a negative 
relationship between female literacy rates (FEMLIT) and fertility rates (for 
example, Hill and King 1993 and Birdsall and Griffin 1993). More female 
education is expected to delay the age of marriage, increase the 
demand for family planning services and their effective use, make 
women more involved in fertility decisions, and raise the probability of 
having healthy and educated children (Caldwell 1986 and Birdsall and 
Griffin 1993). It also raises the opportunity cost of having children as a 
better educated woman is more likely to be in the work force earning a 
wage higher than that earned had this woman not received this level of 
education. However, due to the absence of disaggregated information 
on the average level of educational attainment by gender at the 
provincial level, literacy rates by gender were used instead.
Availability of family planning services was not included in the 
model as an explanatory variable as all provinces have family planning 
health centres and health workers. Other relevant attributes of family 
planning programs (such as accessibility, quality and effectiveness of
118 A study of poor rural communities in Southern India in the early 1980s showed 
that parents invested in the education of their children with the expectation that the latter 
would find work outside of agriculture (Caldwell et al. 1982 and 1986). This behaviour 
was likewise observed in poor communities in rural Bangladesh (Duza and Nag 1993). 
Murdoch (1980) points out, however, that an exception to the inverse relationship 
between education and fertility may be observed in very poor societies where a few years 
of elementary education may have no effect on fertility rates and may even raise it.
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these services which may be important in lowering birth rates) likewise 
were not included in the regression equation, as such data were not 
available.
d) The regression model represented by equation (5.4) is based 
on the general production function with a few modifications used by 
Wibowo and Tisdell (1993). In their model, morbidity arising from water­
borne diseases was the dependent variable (MWB) and the percentage 
of the population with access to a safe water supply (POT) and to excreta 
disposal facilities (SAN) were the explanatory variables. A variable 
which is missing from this model is information on distance from the 
source of water supply. Nonetheless, their findings revealed that the 
higher the percentage of households with access to the afore-cited 
facilities, the lower the morbidity rates.
POVIj, ILLIT and MAL were added to the Wibowo and Tisdell 
model. POVIj is hypothesised to have a positive effect on logMWBj. The 
higher the incidence of poverty, illiteracy and malnutrition in the 
province, the higher also are the morbidity rates from water-borne 
diseases. Due to low incomes and illiteracy, the poor are unable to have 
their own potable water and sanitation facilities or at the very least, be 
near to where public facilities are located. It is also expected that the 
less literate the population of a province is, the lower will the predicted 
morbidity rates be. All else equal, a more literate person is believed to 
have a better appreciation of the importance of a clean and healthy 
environment. Malnutrition, on the other hand, is expected to lower a 
person's natural defences from getting sick (Pelletier et al. 1993, 1994 
and 1995 and Pelletier 1994).
214
Distance is expected to have a positive effect on morbidity rates. 
The further away a province is located from Luzon, the less likely it will 
have adequate and safe water supply, sanitary disposal facilities and 
medical infrastructure.
e) The fifth regression model, that is represented by equation 
(5.5), uses a modified version of the gravity model approach to the 
analysis of the causes of migration - a model which ‘measures the 
relationship between motion, mass and distance’ (Schapiro 1986: 47). 
The model is very much applicable to the Philippines because of its 
geography.
Net migration (NMIG) is defined as in-migration less out-migration. 
Hence, if positive, then the province is an in-migration area (there are 
more people entering than leaving) and if negative, then net out­
migration applies. Table 1 shows that the mean net migration figure 
across provinces in 1991 was positive. This means that, on the average, 
a province in the Philippines was an in-migration area during that year.
Poverty incidence (POVIj) is expected to induce the poor who are 
risk-averse to stay in their province. Less well-off households face high 
levels of income risk and are more risk-averse than households who are 
better-off (Dasgupta 1993: 199-201 and Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
1993). At very low income levels, however, a poor person tends to 
become risk-loving as this individual is economically desperate and will 
tend to migrate elsewhere to look for employment opportunities such as 
farm labour and factory work. Thus poverty incidence may either have a 
positive or negative influence on net migration.
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As an area becomes more urbanised, it is more likely that people 
will stay in the area since urbanisation (URB) is associated with the 
availability of ‘modern’ infrastructure facilities such as hospitals and 
universities. Other variables that are expected to be 'puli' factors (or 
incentives for people to stay in a locality) are the availability of electricity 
(ELEC), potable water (POT), sanitary toilet facilities (SAN), land 
ownership (LANFO) and roads (ROADEN).
As for population density (POPDEN) and functional literacy (FLIT), 
it is hypothesised in the case of these variables that they are negatively 
related to NMIGj. The reason is that migration theory suggests that areas 
with high population density, all else being equal, tends to push 
population out (Schapiro 1986). More functionally literate people, on the 
other hand, are assumed to be less risk-averse and may tend to leave 
the province to seek gainful employment opportunities in the urban or 
town centres.
Distance is expected to have a positive effect on NMIGj. Distance 
has an inhibiting effect due to the monetary and psychic costs of moving 
from one area to another. It is hypothesised that the further away a 
person lives from Luzon (the main island where MetroManila, the 
nation's major metropolitan area is located), the less likely it is that this 
person will permanently leave her/his place of residence.
A variable left out in the model, however, is the incidence of crime 
- a variable that would capture the effect of the peace and order on the 
rate of migration. Thus, the higher the incidence of crime in a province, it 
is hypothesised, the higher the level of migration from this province. Due 
to the lack of relevant data, however, this hypothesis was not tested.
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As mentioned earlier, some of the independent variables are 
correlated with each other. When run together, the variables which are 
highly correlated may result in biased coefficients and, in particular, 
some variables have estimated coefficients that are not significantly 
different from zero. As mentioned in Chapter 3, to remedy this 
multicollinearity problem one possible solution is to drop relevant 
variables from the regression equation (Greene 1997: 423). This most 
likely will cause the resulting equation being mis-specified (Greene 
1997: 423). Thus rather than employ this approach of dropping certain 
variables, instead use was made of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation procedure - a procedure discussed earlier in Chapter 3.
To explain, in each of the regression equations (5.1) to (5.5),
POVIj was used as an instrumental variable. To derive this instrumental 
variable, first a basic regression equation was estimated with POVIj set
as the dependent variable. The independent variables were variables 
such as SAN, LANFO and NAGL. The relevant form of this first 
regression equation was estimated using the Huber-White Cluster 
Method discussed earlier in Chapter 3 - a method based on the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) approach. Next, the predicted values of POVIj were 
used as an instrumental variable in the second stage of the estimation 
procedure used to estimate the five different regression equations 
discussed earlier (Greene 1997: 741).
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5.6 Regression results and analysis
The results of regression are set out in Tables 3 to 7. Poverty 
incidence was found statistically significant in equations (5.1) and (5.3). 
The results derived for each model will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs.
The preferred result set out in Table 3 is that shown in regression 
equation number 3. Using a two-stage least squares method, POVIj was 
found to have a positive influence on logINFMORT at the five per cent 
level of significance. This means that the higher the poverty incidence in 
a province, the greater is the predicted infant mortality rate. Other 
variables that were found statistically significant were FAMEXPH and 
ILLIT. Family expenditures on health were found to be negatively related 
to infant mortality, while illiteracy had a positive influence on infant 
deaths at the five per cent significance level. This means that education 
and health are highly statistically significant in reducing infant mortality 
rates.
Malnutrition was likewise found to be positively related to 
logINFMORTj using ordinary least squares. POT was not found to have 
a significant influence on logINFMORTj while SAN was found statistically 
significant but only through its effect on POVIj as shown in Columns 2 
and 3. DIST was likewise not found significant using the OLS nor 2SLS 
method of estimation. This may be interpreted to mean that location 
does not have any bearing on provincial variation in infant mortality 
rates.
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1) Infant Mortality Model.
Table 3. Coefficient Estimates derived using the Huber-White 
cluster regression formula*
Number of the regression equation
1 2 3
D e p e n d e n t logINFMORT logINFMORT POVI logINFMOR POVI
V a r i a b l e T
E s t i m a t i o n
M e t h o d
(OLS) (2SLS) (OLS) (2SLS) (OLS)
constant 3 .80 0 3 .704 1 0 2 .3 9 6 3 .692 1 0 2 .3 9 6
(29 .00) (25 .09) (8.68) (2 4 .8 6 ) (8.68)
POVI - 0.001 0 .004 0 .005
(-0 .56) (2.24) (2 .30)
FAMEXPH -0 .0 2 3 -0 .053 -0 .0 57
(-1.64) (-2 .73) (-2 .55)
MAL 0 .01 2 0 .009 0 .009
(2 .69) (1.66) (1 .53)
ILLIT 0 .009 0 .007 0 .007
(4.26) (2.66) (2.26)
DIST 0 .0 3 5 0 .010
(1 .83) (0.61)
SAN -0 .344 -0 .344
(-3.33) (-3 .33)
LANFO -48 .87 -48 .87
(-3 .50) (-3 .50)
NAGL -0 .303 -0 .303
(-3.00) (-3 .00)
R2 0 .5 4 6 0 .3 8 8 0 .3 0 9 0 .3 3 4 0 .3 0 9
1 2 .8 8 4 8 .0 3 8 .2 7 4 9 .6 0 8 .2 7
F Statistic
7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
no. of
observations
* All variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity 
using the Huber-White method. See the appendix (Annex 10) for the sources of 
data.
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2) Child Mortality Model
Table 4. Coefficient Estimates derived using the Huber-White 
cluster regression formula*
Number of the regression equation
1 2 3
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
lo g C M O R T lo g C M O R T P O V I lo g C M O R T P O V I
E s t i m a t i o n
M e t h o d (O L S ) (2 S L S ) (O L S ) (2 S L S ) (O L S )
constant 3.112 2.844 102.396 2.802 102.396
(12.31) (8.68) (8.68) (8.74) (8.68)
POVI - 0.001 0.006 0.008
(-0.77) (2.67) (3.09)
FAMEXPH -0.042 -0.088 -0.096
(-1.91) (-2.79) (-2.67)
MAL 0.017 0.014 0.014
(2.18) (1.44) (1.34)
POT -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(-1.78) (-0.79) (-0.68)
ILLIT 0.011 0.005 0.009
(2.39) (1.93) (1.68)
DIST 0.044 0.009
(1.47) (0.37)
SAN -0.344 -0.344
(-3.33) (-3.33)
LANFO -48.87 -48.87
(-3.50) (-3.50)
NAGL -0.303 -0.303
(-3.00) (-3.00)
R2 0.528 0.383 0.309 0.327 0.309
11.44 35.29 8.27 34.74 8.27
F Statistic
73 73 73 73 73
no. of
observations
* All variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity 
using the Huber-White method. See the appendix (Annex 10) for the sources of 
data.
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The preferred result set out in Table 4 is that shown in regression 
equation number 3. Again, using a two-stage least squares method of 
estimation, poverty incidence was found to have a positive incidence on 
child mortality rates at the five per cent level of significance. This means 
that the higher the poverty incidence in a province, the greater is the 
predicted child mortality rate.
Another variable that was found significantly related to logCMORTj 
was FAMEXPH. MAL and ILLIT were found to have a positive influence 
on child mortality rates at the five per cent significance level when 
ordinary least squares (OLS) is used. In the case of the results obtained 
for malnutrition, they are consistent with the findings of Pelletier (1994) 
and Pelletier et al. (1994 and 1995) in a study of 53 developing 
countries; namely, that malnutrition, particularly the mild-to-moderate 
type, has a multiplicative effect on child mortality (aged 6 to 59 months). 
This variable is not significant, however, in the regression equations 
estimated using the two-stage least squares method of estimation. The 
variable POT, on the other hand, was found to have a negative influence 
on logCMORTj at the ten per cent level of significance using OLS - but 
this variable also is not significant in the regression equations estimated 
using the two-stage least squares method of estimation. Similar to the 
results of regression of equation (5.1), DIST had no significant influence 
on logCMORTj.
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3) Fertility Model
Table 5. Coefficient Estimates derived using the Huber-White 
cluster regression formula*
Number of the regression equation
1 2 3 4
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
FERT FERT FERT FERT POVI
E s t i m a t i o n
M e t h o d
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (2SLS) (OLS)
constant -5.860 -6.848 -6.459 -2.536 177.562
(-2.98) (-3.24) (-3.33) (-1.11) (4.56)
POVI 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.010
(2.106) (2.30) (2.23) (1.67)
LogINFMORT 1.516 1.603 1.577 0.935
(7.13) (5.93) (6.72) (2.35)
AGEFEM 0.030 0.032 0.029 0.088
(0.47) (0.58) (0.51) (1.21)
FEMLIT 0.025
(4.56)
MALIT 0.031
(4.23)
FEMALIT 0.014 -0.540
(4.73) (-3.09)
DIST -.021 0.001 -0.010 -0.078
(-0.36) (0.014) (-0.18) (-0.91)
LANFO -48.873
(2.84)
IRRIG -14.640
(-2.19)
R2 0.443 0.411 0.274 0.179 0.236
12.48 9.75 9.92 3.31 5.54
F Statistic
73 73 73 73 73
no. of
observations
* All variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity 
using the Huber-White method. See the appendix (Annex 10) for sources of data.
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Poverty incidence was found to have a positive effect on fertility 
rates as shown in Columns 1 to 3. As hypothesised, LogINFMORT was 
likewise found to have a positive influence on FERT. However, AGEFEM 
and DIST, were found to have no significant influence on FERT. 
FEMLIT and MALIT were found to be statistically significant as shown in 
Columns 1 and 2, respectively. However, the coefficients of these 
variables had the opposite sign to what intuition may suggest. When 
FEMLIT and MALIT are combined into one variable (FEMALIT), the new 
variable remains statistically significant but still has the wrong sign.
Nevertheless, FEMALIT seems to have the expected, albeit 
indirect, negative influence on FERT when FEMALIT operates through 
the level of POVIj. As can be seen in regression equation 4 in Table 5, 
FEMALIT has the expected negative influence on POVIj, while this latter 
variable (when treated as an instrumental variable) has the expected 
positive influence on FERT (at just above the ten per cent level of 
significance).
4) Morbidity Model
The results of regression set out in Table 6 revealed that poverty 
incidence does not have a statistically significant influence on morbidity 
from water-borne diseases. Only one variable was found to be 
significantly related to logMWBj and that is MAL. The rate of malnutrition 
was found to have a positive influence on morbidity rates from water­
borne diseases at the ten per cent significance level. This result is 
consistent with those to be found in the previously-cited study by 
Pelletieretal. (1993).
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Table 6. Coefficient Estimates derived using the Huber-White 
cluster regression formula*
Number of the regression equation
1 2 3 4
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
logMWB logMWB logMWB POVI logMWB POVI
E s t i m a t i o n
M e t h o d
(OLS) (OLS) (2SLS) (OLS) (2SLS) (OLS)
constant 6.477 6.143 6.578 69.719 6.765 102.174
(12.40) (5.23) (5.84) (8.72) (9.20) (8.61)
POVI 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.003
(0.19) (0.24) (0.34) (0.21)
POT -0.001 -0.004 -0.004
(-0.12) (-0.52) (-0.64)
SAN 0.002 -0.344
(0.51) (-3.32)
ILLIT 0.018 0.023 1.052
(0.79) (1.09) (2.93)
MAL 0.028 0.031 0.025 0.026
(1.92) (1.57) (1.92) (2.00)
DIST -0.012 -0.008 -0.003 0.014
(-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.03) (0.11)
LANFO -48.815 -49.155
(-2.74) (-3.49)
IRRIG -14.383
(-2.10)
NAGL -0.292
(-3.04)
R2 0.075 0.076 0.052 0.218 0.059 0.305
1.61 1.86 1.16 4.93 1.31 8.20
F Statistic
72 72 72 72 72 72
no. of
observations
* 2SLS. All variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity 
using the Huber-White method. See the appendix (Annex 10) for sources of data.
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While the regression results using either OLS or 2SLS showed
that not one of the explanatory variables was found significantly related
to logMWBj apart from MAL, the observed signs of the estimated
regression coefficients for the explanatory variables hold some interest. 
For instance, as expected, POVIj is positively related to logMWBj. This
means that the higher the incidence of poverty, the higher is the 
morbidity rate from water-borne diseases.
Other variables that had regression coefficients with the same sign 
as hypothesised are POT (negatively related to logMWBj) and ILLIT 
(positively related to logMWBj). Surprisingly, however, SAN was found 
positively related to logMWBj. It is possible that the presence of the other 
independent variables in the same equation may be affecting the sign of 
the regression coefficients.
5) Net Migration Model
After a series of regressions using different combinations of the 
variables listed in equation (5.5), the most insightful regression results 
are shown in Table 7. POVIj was not found to have a statistically 
significant influence on NMIGj (see Columns 1 to 3). It is possible that 
because several of the independent variables are highly correlated with 
POVIj (such as ELEC, POT and SAN), the regression coefficient of POVIj 
became statistically insignificant. A two-stage least squares regression, 
therefore, was performed to check whether this hypothesis is true or not. 
The results using 2SLS are shown in columns 4 and 5. Indeed, with all 
others things being equal, POVIj was found to have a significant 
negative influence on NMIGj. This means the higher the poverty
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incidence in the province, the more people migrate to other places. It is 
possible that low incomes and the lack of gainful employment 
opportunities are pushing people out of the province. The results should 
be treated with caution, however, because the other independent 
variables which were earlier found to influence NMIGj (namely, 
POPDEN, URB, FLIT and ROADEN) became statistically insignificant 
with POVIj in the equation. Also, the coefficient of determination (or R2) 
of the equations in Columns 4 and 5 with NMIGj as the dependent 
variable was found to be nil. This means that the regression as a whole 
does not explain any variation in NMIGj.
As to the other independent variables in equation (5.5), as 
expected URB, ELEC, SAN, LANFO and DIST were found to have a 
positive influence on NMIGj. This means that the more urbanised a 
province is and the better the access to electricity and sanitation, the 
more in-migrants there are than out-migrants. It is possible that people 
are encouraged to go to urban centres because they have relatively 
more modern infrastructure facilities and higher wages. Also, it is 
possible that distance has an inhibiting effect, so that provinces farther 
away from Luzon tend not to be out-migration areas. Access to potable 
water (POT), however, was not found significantly related to NMIGj even 
after dropping variables with which POT is highly correlated, such as 
SAN and ELEC.
Surprisingly, POPDEN and FLIT were found to have a positive 
influence and ROADEN a negative influence on NMIGj. This means that 
having more people in an area and being functionally literate are 'puli' 
rather than 'push' factors. It may be inferred, therefore, that people may
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Table 7. Coefficient Estimates derived using the Huber-White 
cluster regression formula*
Number of the regression equation
1 2 3 4 5
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
NMIG NMIG NMIG NMIG POVI NMIG POVI
E s t i m a t i o n
M e t h o d
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (2SLS) (OLS) (2SLS) (OLS)
constant -1.646 -13.880 -12.609 7.436 91.99 7.83 91.99
(-1.10) (-3.89) (-3.69) (1.82) (8.14) (1.51) (8.14)
POVI - 0.028 0.012 0.016 -0.181 -0.188
(-1.34) (0.62) (0.74) (-2.60) (-2.08)
ELEC 0.070
(4.48)
POPDEN 0.003 -0.0002
(2.24) (-0.14)
SAN 0.061 0.052 -0.450 -0.450
(5.45) (4.68) -4.03 -4.03
URB 0.046 -0.010
(1.86) (-0.22)
LANFO 10.812 9.291 -44.78 -44.78
(4.03) (3.81) (-3.00) (-3.00)
FLIT 0.076 0.056 0.031 0.035
(2.26) (1.96) (0.92) (0.96)
ROADEN -0.811 -1.028 -0.820 -0.879 -0.937
(-2.06) (-2.57) (-2.16) (-0.98) (-1.06)
DIST 0.853
(2.60)
R2 0.343 0.488 0.495 nil 0.278 nil
0.278
5.58 9.56 9.37 4.02 8.39 3.26 8.39
F Statistic
71 71 71 71 71 71 71
no. of
observations
* All variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White method. See the appendix 
(Annex 10) for the sources of data.
prefer to stay in a densely populated province because it may have a 
comparatively extensive labour market and more infrastructure facilities 
than a less-populated province. POPDEN was in fact found highly
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correlated with URB and ELEC (see Table 2 in Annex 11). As for FLIT, 
the relevant results suggest that, due to positive externalities, people 
prefer to live among people who are functionally literate. Turning to the 
variable ROADEN, its negative influence on NMIGj may be explained by 
the fact that roads improve mobility and encourage people to leave the 
province.
5.7 Conclusions
The incidence of poverty was found to have a significant effect on 
some demographic and health variables. Using data across the 
provinces of the Philippines in 1990 and 1991, the results indicate that, 
with other things remaining the same, poverty has a positive effect on 
infant and child mortality as well as on fertility rates and a negative 
influence on net migration. Poverty, however, was not found to have a 
statistically significant effect on morbidity from water-borne diseases.
If these results prove to be robust on further testing, then they have 
policy implications of some importance. For instance, reducing, if not 
eliminating, the incidence of poverty in a province will tend to help, as a 
subsidiary consequence, in improving the level of health in this province 
- as measured, for example, by the reduction in the level of the infant 
mortality rate. This latter improvement, along with the reduction in the 
level of poverty, will also assist in reducing the total fertility rate in a 
province. Finally, the findings presented earlier also suggest that 
addressing rural poverty will tend to discourage people from migrating to 
the cities.
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Chapter 6
The Height for Age of Young Filipino 
Children - A Study at the Micro Level
6.1 Introduction
After considering some of the consequences of income-only 
poverty at the macro level, this chapter turns to analysing some of the 
consequences of per capita income combined with other economic and 
social variables on the health status of young children in two rural 
villages in the Philippines. This latter point can be expressed differently 
if it is supposed that a measure of well-being poverty is some 
combination of the per capita incomes received by less weil off 
households along with the access these households have to certain 
social infrastructure (such as schooling, electricity, housing and 
preventive health services). Granting this loose definition of well-being 
poverty, then the present study essentially is concerned with determining 
the influence that well-being poverty has on the health status of young 
children.
That said, the way in which the health status of young children is 
measured in this chapter is the height for age in early childhood. In 
developing countries this measure has been used widely as a measure 
of the health status of children in these countries. What is emphasised 
here is that recently this measure has come to be seen as being an
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important indicator of community well-being since it is now realised, due 
to the work of Pelletier (1994) and many others cited in Pelletier (1994: 
2955S - 6S) that as the height for age for young children falters, relative 
to some suitable norm, these children become more exposed to the risk 
of death. This risk appears to rise sharply after the height for age of a 
child falls further and further below 85 - 90 per cent of the relevant 
norm.119
No doubt, in addition, associated with this increased risk of 
mortality is an increased risk of morbidity amongst children in early 
childhood. What is more, should the height for age for a child falter in 
early childhood, and the natural environment in which the child lives 
does not improve over time, then probably the height of this person will 
never recover to its full potential (Martorell et al. 1994). There is also 
evidence to indicate that the mental capacities of malnourished children 
are also impaired, compared to the capacities of children who are not 
malnourished (Grantham-McGregor 1990). This near life-long stunting, 
both physical and mental, of a child clearly will impose a psychic and 
economic cost on this person which may well reach into this person's 
adult life. So, in the instance of this person being called upon to perform 
physical labour in order to generate a livelihood, it is known that a 
stunted person has a reduced capacity to perform physical labour (Spurr 
1990). As a consequence this person will receive a lower money 
income (Haddad and Bouis 1991 and Thomas and Strauss 1997)120.
119 That this percentage is so high has come as something of a surprise to 
researchers (Pelletier et al. 1995).
120 Thomas and Strauss (1997) allow for the endogeneity that possibly runs between 
wage and health status. This endogeneity arises since an improvement in health status 
contributes to an increase in the wage rate, and vice versa. If this endogeneity is not 
allowed for, then a measure of the importance of some relevant variable - for example, the 
extent of the influence of an improvement in the level of nutrition on wage rates - will tend 
to be biased upwards.
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The cost of this stunting also will carry over into the next generation since 
mothers who are stunted also tend to give birth to children with a 
comparatively low birth weight (Waterlow 1993).
It follows on from these observations that if a community is to be 
able to increase its long-term rate of economic development, then a part 
of such an endeavour will be to improve the health status of its members, 
and especially the young children in this community. What is more, the 
previous remarks also suggest that the health status of a young children 
in a developing country, as measured by the height for age of young 
children, may be taken to be a useful proxy measure of the level of well­
being of the developing community concerned. Part of the reason for 
making this statement is that Dasgupta and Weale (1992: 124) have 
argued, based on supporting empirical evidence, that the best single 
measure of the level of well-being, or overall development for a 
developing community is the measure of life expectancy at birth for the 
community concerned. However, the level of life expectancy at birth will 
be strongly influenced by the level of child mortality rates - the higher 
these rates the lower the level of life expectancy: What is more, and as 
indicated earlier the child mortality rate will be influenced by the height 
for age of young children. Thus this latter variable may be viewed as a 
useful proxy variable to employ as a measure of the overall level of well­
being in a developing community. And if this line of argument is 
accepted then any increase in the level of the health status of young 
children in the community concerned may be taken to be a good 
representation of an improvement in the level of well-being in this 
community.
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The question now becomes one of how can this improvement in 
the health status of young children best be achieved in the Philippines. 
This is the question which I attempt to answer in this chapter by way of 
considering, essentially, the influence that well-being poverty has on the 
height for age of young children in two carefully-selected villages in the 
Philippines.
To begin to answer this question it needs to be determined what 
factors most influence the height for age of young children in a 
developing country.121 The relevant literature bearing on this matter, to 
be cited later, is not extensive and the list of relevant factors does not 
seem to be complete. Thus in the attempt to fill in some of the detail, the 
present study makes use of a data set derived from field work carried out 
in 1997 in two carefully-selected villages studied in Chapter 4. One of 
the villages selected for intensive study was relatively poor both in terms 
of the level of per capita income and in the level of access to basic 
infrastructure, while the other was comparatively well off on both counts. 
This selection of these villages implies that the data collected for any 
relevant variable are likely to possess a comparatively large variance - 
even though only a modest number of observations were made of the 
variable concerned. In addition, this field work allowed comparatively 
detailed sets of data to be collected for variables which tend not be found 
in national household surveys. Both of these issues are important for 
generating robust and useful statistical results.
121 There are other indicators of health conditions of young children such as weight 
for age and height for weight. However, I used height for age because it is a widely used 
indicator of health condition of children in developing countries such as the Philippines 
and because of time and logistical constraints.
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In the next section the study site is described and discussed. In 
section 6.3 the relevant literature is discussed within the context of a 
suggested set of variables that suitably may be employed in a regression 
model. The regression results are discussed in section 6.4 and 
concluding remarks are made in section 6.5.
A number of results are to be reported here that have not been 
widely reported, if reported at all, in the relevant empirical literature. Of 
these results, perhaps one of the more important is that the level of 
education received by the mother and father of a young child seems to 
work along channels that only indirectly influence the height for age of a 
young child. The rest of the reported results are summarised in the 
concluding section.
6.2 The study site
To ensure that the data collected in the field work were drawn 
from a population which possessed a comparatively wide range of 
relevant characteristics, the field work was carried out in the villages, or 
barangays of San Juan in Mandaon, Masbate and Nangalisan in Tuba, 
Benguet - Masbate being one of the poorest and Benguet being one of 
the better-off provinces in the Philippines. As for the geographic location 
of these provinces, Masbate is an island province whereas Benguet is 
landlocked, while both provinces are part of the island group of Luzon in 
the Philippines.
A detailed discussion was provided in Chapter 4, section 2, 
concerning the relevant characteristics of these two barangays.
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However, to save the reader the task of referring back to that section, 
some of the relevant information set out there will be set out here.
To generate detailed information concerning the households in 
each village, households were randomly selected from each village 
based on a list provided by the village secretary. The list was confirmed 
with other key informants such as the barangay chairman and the 
teachers. A household is defined as a 'social unit consisting of a person 
living alone or a group of persons who: (a) sleep in the same housing 
unit; and (b) have a common arrangement in the preparation and 
consumption of food' (NSO 1995: xii). A survey of the economic and 
social characteristics of 191 households (88 households in Barangay 
San Juan and 103 households in Barangay  Nangalisan) was 
conducted with the use of a questionnaire. The survey questionnaire 
(see Annex 7) consists of three parts: the first consists of basic questions 
on the members of the household, the existence of household amenities 
(such as water supply, sanitary toilet facility, electricity and home 
appliances) and access to general service facilities/centres (such as 
schools, village hall, postal service, church, market place and public 
transportation); the second consists of questions on household income 
(sources of income disaggregated into agriculture and non-agriculture 
as well as regular and seasonal); the third part refers to matters relating 
to women's work, reproduction, access to and use of health and family 
planning facilities and services in the community and includes, as well, 
questions on the health of the children (such as episodes of diarrhoea 
and treatment). Also, the actual height of children five years of age and 
below was measured by the author by using an engineer's metre.
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In Table 1 are set out some economic characteristics for the 
households in Barangays San Juan and Nangalisan, based on this 
initial survey conducted in these two villages. Clearly, the average 
household in Barangay Nangalisan is better-off compared to that in 
Barangay San Juan. This is so both in terms of the average level of 
household income received and access to infrastructure facilities. The 
reported average income of a household in Barangay Nangalisan 
(Benguet) is about 1.6 times greater than that for a household in 
Barangay San Juan (Masbate). Households in Barangay San Juan on 
average have homes further away from their domestic water supplies 
than do households in Barangay Nangalisan - indeed many households 
in Barangay Nangalisan have water connections to their houses. 
Households in Barangay San Juan, however, have to rely on public 
wells. The survey results indicate that it will take an average household 
in Barangay San Juan a return time of 16 minutes to acquire water, as 
against three minutes in Barangay Nangalisan. As for the structure of 
dwellings in San Juan, the majority (86 per cent of those interviewed) 
used either palm bamboo or wood planks for their house flooring. In 
contrast, most of the houses in Barangay Nangalisan have cement 
floors. Barangay San Juan also has a lower proportion of households 
with access to electricity and sanitary toilet facilities. For most of the 
infrastructure variables, Table 1 reveals that there was no variation 
within the poor barangay. Both villages, however, have a substantial 
proportion of households with radios.
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Table 1. Selected Economic Indicators for Two Villages in the 
Philippines, 1997
INDICATOR : Barangay San Juan: Barangay Nangalisan
Masbate)___________(Benguet)
(Number of households)
Average annual nominal household
88
33,694
103
55,347income in Philippine pesos (1996)
BASIC AMENITIES
Ave. Length of Time to travel
to source of water and back (in mins.) 
Main material of household floor (%):
16.0 3.0
Cement 2.0 71.0
Palm bamboo 66.0 8.0
Wood Planks 20.0 16.0
Earth/Sand 11.0 4.0
Vinyl 1.0 0
Parquet or Polished Wood 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Proportion of households with:
0 1.0
electricity for home consumption (%) 0 65.0
electricity for home production (%) 0 16.0
electric or gas range or stove 8.0 24.3
potable water (%) 0 80.6
sanitary toilet facilities (%) 3.4 58.2
radio (%) 81.0 82.0
Note: Apart from income, all the data contained in the table are 1997 figures. 
Source: Household survey questionnaires
Some social indicators for the two villages are set out in Table 2. 
This survey data indicate that people living in Barangay Nangalisan are 
comparatively better-off than the people of Barangay San Juan in terms 
of education. Basic literacy rates are higher in Barangay Nangalisan 
than in Barangay San Juan. The overall basic literacy rate for Barangay 
Nangalisan is almost the same as that for Benguet province in 1990. (In 
fact the basic literacy figure for Barangay San Juan is similar to that for
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Masbate province almost 30 years ago (in 1970).) The levels of formal 
education received by both the fathers and mothers in the households 
surveyed were higher in Barangay Nangalisan than in Barangay San 
Juan.
The health status of children is relatively better in Barangay 
Nangalisan based on data for height for age and the proportion of 
children with episodes of diarrhoea. To begin with the proportion of 
children between one month and sixty months who were below the 
median height for age using Filipino standards was higher in Barangay 
San Juan. (The distribution of the height for age in the Philippines is that 
provided by the Philippine National Nutrition Council and set out in 
Florentino et al. (1992).) In addition, in Barangay San Juan almost 100 
per cent of the children between one month and sixty months in the two 
villages have heights below the height for age standard based on the 95 
percentile.
That said, the purpose of the present study is to attempt to explain 
this relative stunting amongst the children in these two barangays. 
Before turning to consider this issue in some detail, however, it is noted 
that this stunting is certainly related to the level of diarrhoea that was to 
be found in these two barangays. And factors that may explain this 
incidence may be the level of formal education received by the parents 
and the relative ease of access to safe water in these two barangays. As 
for this latter observation, it is based upon the study by Tonglet et al. 
(1992) linking the incidence of diarrhoea in children and the time taken 
to walk to the nearest safe water supply. (Burger and Esrey (1995) 
provide a survey of the literature on the link between childhood diseases
237
and ease of access to safe water.) It is studies of this sort, and the results 
they generate, that, in part, motivate the present discussion.
Table 2. Selected Social Indicators for Two Villages 
in the Philippines, 1997
INDICATOR : Barangay San Juan: Barangay Nangalisan
(Masbate)_______ : (Benguet)
(Number of households) 
EDUCATION
Literacy Rate (10 years old and 
over)
88 103
Total 78.2 92.2
Male 73.5 92.6
Female 82.7 91.9
Average no. of years of
education - fathers 6.75 8.67
Average number of years of
education - mothers 5.72 9.24
Percentage of persons 25 years 
old and over with academic degree 
Percentage of persons 15 years 
of age and over with no education:
3.9 14.8
Male .02 .02
Female .04 .04
HEALTH
Percentage of children aged 1 to 60 
months below standard height: 
(based on P50 percentile) 78.0 60.0
(based on P95 percentile) 
Percentage of children < 5 yrs. 
old with diarrhoea episodes in
98.0 87.0
the last two weeks prior to the 12.0 7.0
interview
Duration of diarrhoea episode (no. of
days)
range 1 to 15 1 to 10
mean values 4.14 3.43
Source: Household survey questionnaires
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6.3. Considering factors that influence the height for 
age in early childhood
6.3.1 Some comments on the data set
Prior to discussing the regression models, a brief description of 
the data set used in this chapter is presented in this section. Table 3 
presents a summary of the data used in these models. A definition of the 
variables is contained in the appendix (see Annex 12). As indicated 
earlier, the height of the children was measured while performing the 
initial basic survey. All the other information were obtained with the use 
of a survey questionnaire (see Annex 7). For instance, the data on 
income was based on responses to multiple questions on sources of 
income in 1996. Since income data is usually affected by problems of 
recall and confidentiality, I carefully reviewed the sources of income 
together with the head of each surveyed household. I also explained to 
the respondent that I am not connected with the government or any 
private institution and that the study is being conducted solely for 
academic purposes. It was also made clear that the private income data 
collected would not to be passed on to any other party. To assist with 
convincing the surveyed household of this fact I also allowed some time 
prior to the conduct of the household survey to gain the confidence of the 
respondents and the people in the village in general.
Of the 191 households included in the survey of rural households, 
there were 118 children with ages between one to sixty months whose 
heights were measured. Of the 118 children in the sample, 62 per 
cent (or 73 children) were from Barangay San Juan. As to composition
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by gender, about 56 per cent (or 66 children) were male. Since some of 
the households in the survey (about 15 per cent) had more than one 
child, sampling was not restricted to one child per household.
Table 3. Summary Statistics*
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
H 4.241 8.172 -15.23 30.52
FEMED 7.525 3.281 0 16
MALED 7.458 3.871 0 14
FEMALED 14.983 6.699 0 30
AGE 25.102 16.266 1 60
SQAGE 892.441 942.066 1 3600
CUBAGE 36788.12 54190.06 1 216000
AGEGAP 33.597 20.569 12 72
NCHLD 1.186 0.969 0 4
GENDER 0.559 0.498 0 1
EGSTOVE 0.161 0.369 0 1
FRIDGE 0.169 0.377 0 1
ELEC 0.322 0.469 0 1
PWF 0.492 0.502 0 1
TIME 7.974 14.092 0 60
NWAGE 3.110 1.753 2 9
IRRIG 0.280 0.451 0 1
LANO 0.443 1.534 0 12
HOUSE 2.178 1.075 1 4
INCOME 45282.11 87890.35 0 618500
PCAPINC 7920.44 20450.72 0 154625
FOC 1.237 0.427 1 2
MOC 0.983 0.784 0 2
D 0.602 0.492 0 1
*See Annex 12 for a listing of the variables.
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Outliers in the data set (which were determined by the use of a 
scatter plot) were deleted from the sample as this unusual data were 
suspected of containing measurement errors. After the removal of these 
outliers there remained 115 complete sets of observations. It was this 
data set that was used in the statistical analysis.
As for the possible correlations between the various variables that 
might be used in the statistical analysis, this may be detected by 
calculating the correlation coefficients between all these variables. The 
matrix of these variables is set out in Table 4 in Annex 13. What these 
correlation coefficients indicate is that, for instance, FEMED was found to 
be highly correlated with MALED; HOUSE with ELEC and PWF; ELEC 
with FRIDGE and the village dummy, D, with MALED, TIME and HOUSE. 
This information indicates that when these variables are employed to 
estimate a relevant form of a regression equation, multicollinearity may 
be present. The presence of this high collinearity means that it is not 
possible to measure the separate influences on the dependent variable 
of the particular variables that are correlated. However, as will be 
demonstrated later, it is still possible to gain some insights into how each 
variable, in sets of variables that are highly correlated, influences the 
height for age of young children. As indicated later, this insight is gained 
by the application of a two-stage estimation procedure.
6.3.2 The regression model 
6.3.2.1 The basic model
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Various hypotheses are tested in the attempt to identify what 
factors influence the normalised height for age of young children.122 
This is done by estimating the size of various coefficients in relevant 
econometric equations. These equations are then subjected to a range 
of statistical tests.
The normalisation of the height for age of young children allows
for the fact that the height of a child will be influenced by its age. Thus 
the norm, rij, used for a child of a given age i was set at the mean height
for Filipino children at this age.123 Thus for a child j of age i (up to age 
five) whose height was hy the health status for this child was measured
by: Hjj := [(nj - hjj)/nj].124 The variable, H, is called here the h-score.
(This definition is similar to the height for age z-score cited in the relevant 
nutrition literature (for example, Pelletier (1994)) - a measure that is 
based on the mean height for age for the community and allows for the 
variance in the height for age for this community.)
The variables measured in the initial surveys provide a range of 
relevant variables to be used as independent variables in appropriate 
regression equations. The general form of these equations is:
Hjik = bo + bxjik + Mjik- <6-1)
122 In the relevant literature the health status of children has been measured by using 
other variables such as weight-for-age and weight-for-height. Due to the lack of time and 
research funds, no attempt was made to measure these alternative measures of health 
status.
123 As mentioned in section 6.2 in the main text, the standard for the height for age 
of children in the Philippines was taken from Florentino et al. (1992).
★
124 Another measure of health status that was also experimented with was H -  : =  (n. - 
h..). The econometric results obtained by using this dependent variable were not as 
satisfactory as those derived by employing H.. (as the dependent variable).
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where j refers to the individual child of age i. As for the subscript, k, it
denotes the cluster of data observations from a particular barangay. The 
term, x ^ ,  denotes a vector of independent and exogenous variables.
The term, denotes an error term whose value is assumed to be
dependent on which cluster of data is used to estimate the relevant form 
of the regression equation.
The vector of coefficients, b, and the constant term, bQ, were
estimated by applying the Huber-White cluster method. This estimation 
method was employed to mitigate the possible presence of (a) the 
cluster problem - which was likely to arise if the data collected from 
within a particular barangay are correlated - and (b) heteroscedasticity. 
Since there were substantial relevant differences between the two 
villages, the data under study may be bimodal and thus result in 
clustering. The cluster problem causes the standard errors (or t- 
statistics) to be biased.125 Heteroscedasticity, on the other hand, causes 
both the standard errors to be biased and the ordinary least squares 
method of estimation to be inefficient.126
As for the independent variable, the relevant literature cites 
genetic endowments and the level, and type of nutrients made available 
to children as the main factors affecting the height for age of young 
children (Martorell and Ho 1984, Bouis and Haddad 1990, Bhargava 
1994, Martorell et al. 1994 and Haughton and Haughton 1997). As for
125 Deaton (1995: 1817 - 9 and 1997: 74 - 8) provides a discussion of the cluster 
problem.
126 A discussion on how the difficulties raised by the presence of heteroscedasticity 
may be overcome is provided in White (1980) and Deaton (1997: 78 - 80).
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the level of availability of nutrients is concerned, there is a range of 
factors that could influence this variable - such as the amount of time 
mothers have to allocate to each one of her children, the morbidity rate of 
children who have not yet begun school, health and sanitation practices 
and facilities, and the nutritional knowledge of mothers (Bouis and 
Haddad 1990). Unfortunately, however, apart from information on the 
use of some health and sanitation facilities, it was not possible in the 
survey to measure the various variables that have just been mentioned.
Nevertheless, there is a range of other variables that may provide 
equally useful relevant information - especially from the point of view of 
designing more effective relevant policies aimed at improving the health 
status of young children. Such variables are the level of education of 
mothers and fathers, the amount of income per capita received by a 
household, the quality of the household dwelling, access to electricity 
and so on. So, for instance, the level of per capita income received by a 
household can reasonably be expected to influence the amount of 
nutrition a child in this household will receive. Thus it seems reasonable 
to hypothesise that this variable, and after allowing for other 
considerations, can be expected to influence the size of H of a given 
child under the age of five.
To expand on this general theme, the years of formal schooling of 
the mother as well as the father are expected to decrease the size of the 
h-score of children in the household concerned. This hypothesis is 
supported by the findings contained in most of the relevant literature on 
education and health in developing countries as surveyed by Levine et 
al. (1994) and Jejeebjoy (1995: Chapter 6). Similarly, an increase in the 
size of the variable combining the education of the mother and the father
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is likely to reduce the level of the h-score. This is so, since as the level of 
education of the fathers and the mothers increase they tend to 
appreciate more the importance of adequate and proper nourishment for 
their children, and are more informed on matters of public health. Also, 
an increase in the level of this variable will increase the level of income 
received by the household that, in turn, allows the provision of better 
quality of housing and higher levels of nutrition for the children in this 
household. Thus the level of education can be expected to work through 
a number of other variables that, in turn, influence the level of the h-score 
for children. This matter is expanded upon later.
As for the influence of a child's age on its height relative to the 
chosen norm, it is thought that the age of the child has no influence 
during the first three months of life. This is so since the child probably is 
being breastfed and, therefore, is exposed to comparatively few 
pathogens in the natural environment (Huffman and Steel 1995: 147 and 
the references cited there). As the age of the child rises above three 
months of age, however, more children begin to be weaned and come to 
be increasingly exposed to more sources of disease. Consequently the 
height of the child begins to falter. Eventually, however, children 
probably begin to build up some immunity to the pathogens in the 
natural environment and, therefore, their height for age (relative to the 
norm) begins to recover to some degree - other relevant things having 
been allowed for.
A decrease in the age difference between the youngest and the 
eldest child (under the age of 96 months) in the household is expected to 
result in an increase in the level of the h-score for a young child in this 
household - other things remaining the same. This relationship is
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hypothesised since as the age difference decreases there will tend to be 
more competition between young children for the limited resources in the 
household - and the amount of food present in the household, and the 
amount of time the parents have available to attend to the needs of a 
young child. This hypothesised relationship is consistent with the 
research findings of Horton (1988) and Haughton and Haughton (1997). 
The results presented in these studies are open to question, however, 
since the estimates of the relevant regression equations did not allow (as 
is done here) for the cluster problem.
In the present study, the maximum age of the eldest child was set 
at 96 months (or eight years old). Then the age gap for a household was 
measured by the actual difference between the ages of the eldest and 
the youngest child in this household. However, for households with only 
one child, or households with two or more children for which the age gap 
between each child was thirty-six months or more, then the age gap was 
set at thirty-six months. The reason for imposing this assumption is that it 
seems reasonable to suppose that thirty-six months (or three years) is a 
sufficient period for a child to be weaned satisfactorily.
As to the gender of the child, it is possible that male children may 
either have lower or higher heights for age than female children. Since 
male children are expected to assist in more heavy and strenuous work 
on the farm, they are fed more than their female siblings who usually 
assist their mothers and elder female siblings in household chores. That 
said, it is also recognised that since boys generally help in carrying 
heavy loads on the farm then it is possible that it would be more difficult 
for them to reach their potential height for their age than girls. Related 
studies were conducted by Horton (1988) and Haughton and Haughton
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(1997). Using data from the Philippines in 1976, Horton found that while 
girls had lower weights-for-height than boys, both girls and boys were 
equally stunted. On the other hand, Haughton and Haughton, in a study 
of child malnutrition in Vietnam also found no evidence of any gender 
bias against girls, with boys having a lower weight for height z-score, 
ceteris paribus, and were more stunted than girls although the latter 
effect was not found statistically significant at the five per cent level. In 
the present study gender is allowed for by assigning a value of one (1) to 
male, and zero (0) to female young children.
To summarise the previous discussion, the basic model for a 
household takes the following form. The variable is the dependent
variable. The first independent variable is one of three alternative 
measures of education: the logarithm of the mother's years of schooling, 
or the logarithm of the father's years of schooling, or the logarithm of the 
sum of the mother's and father's years of schooling. The second set of 
independent variables consists of the age of a child in the household, 
this age squared and then cubed. Each of these variables is treated 
separately in the basic model. The third independent variable is a 
measure of the age gap of children within the household. Finally, the 
gender of a child is allowed for.
6.3.2.2 Extensions of the basic model
The basic model was extended by considering three alternative 
models. The reason for these alternative models was that they provided 
a way of contending with the problem posed by the relatively high levels 
of correlation between single, or groups of independent variables such 
as the level of education of fathers and mothers, household income per
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capita, the quality of housing and factors contributing to household 
infrastructure. Because of the resulting multicollinearity problem that 
arises when including all of these variables as independent variables in 
the basic model, some of these variables were excluded from this model 
even though it was believed that these variables in actual fact had a 
statistically significant independent influence on the level of the h-score 
of a child. To capture at least to some degree the influence of these 
variables on the height for age of young children, the basic model was 
extended in various ways.
The first extension takes the form of the following set of variables 
being included as independent variables in the basic model: both the 
logarithm value of the combined mother's and father's years of 
schooling, the logarithm of per capita household income, along with 
relevant variables to measure the influence of the age of the child, the 
age gap and the gender of the child on the height for age of this child. 
The additional independent variable that was included in this revised 
basic equation - the logarithm of household income per capita - may be 
expected to influence the level of the h-score for young children in a 
number of ways, such as through the level of nutrition available to young 
children, the quality of housing and private health facilities available to a 
household. This general observation tends to be confirmed by a study of 
pre-schoolers in Bukidnon Province on the island of Mindanao in the 
Philippines where Bouis and Haddad (1990) found a strong association 
between income and height for age for children less than one year old. 
(They attributed this finding to the possible better nutrition of mothers in 
high-income groups during pregnancy and breastfeeding.) The results 
presented later also confirm that there is a statistically significant
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(negative) relationship between the level of logarithm income per capita 
and the h-score - that is after allowing for other things.
That said, the level of household income was also thought to be 
influenced by the level of education for the mother and the father. Thus 
in a specification of a second regression equation, logarithm of per 
capita household income was the dependent variable while two of the 
independent variables were the mother’s years of schooling and the 
father’s years of schooling. Other independent variables that also were 
thought to influence the level of household income were whether or not 
the household has access to electricity, the number of members in the 
household who were employed, whether or not the household has 
access to irrigation and whether or not the household owns the land it 
farms. These variables were also included in the specification of the 
second equation to be estimated.
This specification of the household income (the second) equation 
was estimated using ordinary least squares. The results obtained were 
then used to provide the predicted value of household income per capita 
(the dependent variable). This estimate was then used as an 
instrumental variable for household income per capita in the estimation 
of the basic (first) equation. Thus the basic equation was estimated by 
making use of the two-stage least squares estimation procedure. To 
provide a point of comparison, the basic equation was also estimated by 
making use of the ordinary least squares method.
To summarise this line of argument, let y be the new independent 
variable that was introduced into the basic model set out in equation 6.1. 
This gives the following:
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Hjik= bo + b i y j i k + b 'xj i k + ejik (6 .2)
where e ^  denotes the random error term. The new independent
variable, y, is influenced, however, by another vector of independent 
variables, w ^ . This relationship is represented in equation 6.3,
Vjik = d0 + d'wjik + ijik- (6.3)
where jj^  is the random error for this equation.
Ordinary least squares was used to estimate the vector of
coefficients, d, in equation 6.3. The resulting estimates of these
coefficients were used, along with the vector of independent variables, 
Wjj ,^ to provide an estimate of y ^ . This estimate, in turn, was used as an
instrumental variable to assist with providing a two-stage least squares 
estimate of the coefficients in equation 6.2.
Turning to the second extension of the basic model, it is the same 
as before except that the quality of housing was included in the basic 
equation - an equation in which household income per capita (not the 
logarithm household income per capita) may or may not be present. The 
quality of housing was measured by an index that takes a smaller value 
the higher the quality of the family home. A house with a cement floor 
was assigned a value of 1; a house with a wooden floor was assigned a 
value of 2; one with a bamboo floor a value of 3 and a house with an 
earthen floor was assigned a value of 4. It is hypothesised that as the 
quality (measured by the type of flooring) of the family home improves, 
so the height for age of the child will increase.
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A related result that is consistent with this conjecture is to be found 
in Pebley and Goldman (1995) - although a result based on data for 
Guatemala. A relevant study that does use data for the Philippines, 
however, is that by Solon (1989). In this instance the quality of flooring, 
ceteris paribus, was found to have a positive influence on children's 
health in two urban areas in the Philippines. The result was based, 
however, only on the respondent's own valuation of the health status of 
their children - not, as done here, on some reasonably objective 
measure of health status such as the height for age of young children.
As for the possible reasons why this relationship should exist, it 
might be conjectured that the level of the quality of housing for a 
household may be taken to be a proxy measure of household income 
per capita - the higher the quality the higher the level of income per 
capita. (In fact the relevant correlation coefficient in Table 4 indicates 
only a limited relationship between these two variables.) Perhaps of 
more importance is the possibility that an improvement in the quality of 
housing should assist with reducing the likelihood of the spread of 
disease within the household concerned. Thus the quality of household 
housing, in turn, can be expected to operate through a number of other 
variables (or along a number of channels) that most likely influence the 
height for age of young children. In support of this conjecture is the fact 
that of the 48 households who owned dwellings with a cement floor, 41 
of them (85 per cent) had private water facilities. In addition, the 
correlation coefficient between the quality of housing and the quality of 
sanitation and safe water facilities (PWF) was 0.55. Thus those who 
owned better quality housing tended also to have access to better quality 
sanitation and safe water facilities. (This high level of correlation
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between these variables also suggests that should the quality of the 
water supply and sanitation, along with the quality of housing, both be 
included in the same regression equation, then multicollinearity would 
be present in the estimation of this equation.)
As before, the level of the quality of housing and household 
income per capita both are likely to be influenced by a range of other 
variables - such as the level of education of the parents and their 
occupation. Thus in the second regression equation (see Table 6) the 
logarithm of the quality of housing, or the household income per capita 
were treated as dependent variables and were regressed on the level of 
education of the parents and their occupation. As before the regression 
result obtained (by applying the ordinary least squares method of 
estimation) was used to provide the predicted value of the respective 
dependent variables. These respective estimates were then used as an 
instrumental variable in the relevant form of the basic (first) equation. As 
before, the basic equation was estimated by making use of the two-stage 
least squares estimation procedure.
The third extension of the model looks into the main source of 
energy as well as the presence of a refrigerator in the household as 
possibly influencing height for age together with per capita income, both 
in logarithm and non-logarithm form. One reason for considering these 
variables is that high levels of indoor pollution are known to contribute to 
respiratory infection amongst young children (World Bank 1993: 91 and 
the references cited on 179 - 80). Those children who are so infected 
may experience an increase in the shortfall in their heights for age. The 
hypothesis to be tested, therefore, is that children in those households 
that use firewood as the main source of energy (instead of some other
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source of energy) tend to have larger deficits in their height for age - 
other things remaining the same.
The other reason for considering these variables is that the use of 
refrigerators reduces the contamination of food. But this food 
contamination is likely to increase the likelihood of a young child who 
consumes this food of experiencing a range of diarrhoeal diseases that 
contributes towards impeding the physical development of this child. 
Thus it is hypothesised that, with other things being the same, a 
household that has a refrigerator will have children who reach a higher 
level of height for age than children in a household that does not have 
this facility. (As far as I am aware, there is no relevant literature that 
considers this hypothesis.)
In the attempt to allow for the presence of indoor pollution, each 
household was identified by the main energy source it used for cooking. 
Those households that mainly used firewood for cooking were presumed 
to experience comparatively high levels of indoor pollution. These 
households were differentiated from those whose main energy source 
for cooking was either electricity or natural gas. A dummy variable takes 
a value of zero (0) if a household uses firewood as the main energy 
source and a value of one (1) otherwise.
It is possible, however, that cooking with electricity or gas is 
associated with other unobserved variables that were not included in the 
specification of the model, or may be acting as a proxy variable for other 
factors that influence the height for age - such as the presence of a 
refrigerator in a household. Indeed, the data revealed that households 
that have electricity or gas were more likely to have a refrigerator. Of the
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17 households cooking with electricity or gas, 14 (or 82 per cent) were to 
be found in Barangay Nangalisan, and of the 14 dwellings, seven of 
them (50 per cent) had a refrigerator. In addition, the correlation 
coefficient between the use of electricity or gas for cooking and the use 
of refrigerators was 0.43 - those who used electricity or gas as their main 
energy source tended also to have a refrigerator. Nevertheless, in the 
attempt to identify the possible influence of this variable on the height for 
age of young children, use was made of a dummy variable. Specifically, 
a dummy variable is assumed to take a value of zero (0) if the household 
has a refrigerator, and a value of one (1) otherwise.
Since cooking with electricity or gas may be a proxy variable for 
refrigeration and vice versa, these variables were run in separate 
regression equations in the third extension of the basic model. Both 
variables are expected to have a significant negative influence on height 
for age differentials, assuming all other variables are held constant.
6.4 Regression results and analysis 
6.4.1 The basic model
After some experimentation with a range of relevant variables 
discussed in the preceding section, the regression equations which gave 
the most robust, stable and insightful results are those set out in Tables 5 
to 8. With some exceptions that are considered later, most of the 
coefficient estimates set out in these tables were statistically significant at 
just above the five per cent level, or less. In addition, all coefficient 
estimates have the signs which intuition suggests they should have. 
This last assertion is explained by way of considering, in turn, each 
variable that is referred to in these tables.
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Table 5 presents the results of regression of the basic model as 
represented in the general form set out in equation 6.1. These results 
indicate that, with other things being kept the same, an increase in the 
logarithm of the level of the mother's years of schooling increases the 
height of her child when set against the average height of Filipino 
children of the same age as the particular child being considered - in 
other words, reduces the level of the h-score for this child. However, the 
mother's years of education was found less statistically significant than 
that of father's education.
Although not set out in Table 5, when both of these variables (in 
logarithmic form) were included in the same regression equation, their 
respective coefficients were not significantly different from zero. This 
probably is due, in part, to the fact that these two variables were 
correlated to a reasonably high degree and, thus, multicollinearity was a 
problem. The correlation coefficient between these two variables was 
0.63. (See Table 4 in Annex 13.) Nevertheless, when these two 
variables were summed into a single variable, the influence of the 
logarithm of the total level of formal education received by the parents in 
a household was highly statistically significant and of the expected sign. 
(See regression equation 3 in Table 5.)
The relevant results found in the regression equations set out in 
Table 5 also tend to provide support for the earlier conjectures on the 
age variable as discussed in sub-section 6.3.1. Specifically, while 
holding other things the same, the trinomial form of the function, linking
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Table 5. Basic Model: Coefficient Estimates derived using 
the Huber-White cluster regression formula*
Number of the regression equation
Independent 1 2 3
Variables (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
constant 11.313 9.921 15.308
(5.29) (13.16) (84.95)
log mother's years of - 2.863
schooling (-1.78)
log father's years of -2.098
schooling (-23.57)
log of mother's plus father's -3.567
years of schooling (-12.62)
age of child above three 0.463 0.405 0.448
months (2.11) (1.67) (2.06)
age of child squared -0.018 -0.017 -0.018
(-2.10) (-1.68) (-1.92)
age of child cubed .0001 .0001 .0001
(1.35) (1.06) (1.19)
age gap between the -0.057 -0.057 -0.056
youngest and eldest child in (-45.22) (-50.48) (-36.53)
the household
gender 0.275 0.524 0.220
(65.55) (2.90) (2.17)
R2 0.160 0.156 0.174
no. of 115 114 115
observations
Note: All variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White method.
Source of data: household survey questionnaires
the h-score to the age of a young child, indicates that, to begin with, the 
value of the h-score begins to increase with age above three months. 
This increase takes place at a diminishing rate, however. At around 
thirty-two months the level of the h-score for the average child reaches its 
largest value. This calculation is based on the assumption that the 
height of a child begins to falter only after three months of age. (This
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assumption is made since up to this age the child has not begun to be 
weaned.)127
After the age of about thirty-two months the average child begins 
to recover some of its potential height. By about sixty months, however, 
the h-score for the average child still has not recovered fully - that is, the 
average child still has not recovered all its loss in height in the earlier 
period (three to thirty-two months).128 These observations are 
represented, approximately, in figure 1 by the graph relating the h-score 
to the age of a young child between zero and sixty months - that is after 
allowing for other relevant considerations. The graph may be thought of 
as taking an asymmetric inverted-u shape.
These results tend to confirm a finding by Chen (1983) and others 
(Martorell 1995: 20 - 21 and Strauss 1990); namely, that the height of 
children falters during the time a child is being weaned. These results 
also indicate, however, that children (at least in the Filipino villages 
considered here) do build up some immunity to pathogens in the 
environment. Nevertheless, the calculations represented in figure 1 
suggest the possibility that the average child in the Filipino villages
127 The figure of thirty-two months is derived, as follows (based on regression 3 in 
Table 3):
y = 15.308 + 0.448x - 0.018x2 + 0.0001 x3
On taking the first derivative of this equation, and setting the resulting equation 
equal to zero, we have:
(dy/dx) = [0.448 -0.018x + 0.0001 x^ = 0
Through a process of numerical calculations, it turns out that this equation takes a value of 
zero when x ~29 months. Now three months are added to allow for the assumption that 
the age of a child does not falter during the first three months of life.
128 This statement is based on the equation (drawn from regression 3 in Table 3)
y =15.308 + 0.448X - 0.018x2 + 0.0001 x3 
When x is set equal to 57, this equation takes a positive value of 0.08.
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surveyed may never recover to her/his potential height for age if this 
child remains within the same unaltered natural environment. (This is a 
topic for future research - research which could be directed towards 
testing a conclusion arrived at by Martorell et al. (1994) in their survey of 
a wide range of relevant empirical results; namely, if a child whose 
height has faltered in the first year of life continues to live in a 
contaminated environment, then the height for this individual probably 
will never recover fully to its potential height.)
Figure 1. Height-for-Age h-Score After Allowing for Other 
Things
h-score
age of child in months
The results just reported on the non-linear relationship between 
normalised height and age of young children also have some similarities 
with certain empirical findings reported in Deolalikar (1996). He found, 
based on data for Kenya, that infants, particularly in their first two years of 
life, experienced a recovery in weight after a short-fall at birth. Deolalikar 
(1996) does not provide, however, any empirical results on whether or 
not there was any loss, and then a recovery in the height of young 
children during the period of weaning.
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A further result indicated by all the reported regression equations 
set out in Table 5 was that an increase in the age gap between the 
eldest and the youngest child in a household resulted in a decrease in 
the value of the h-score for a young child (relative to the chosen norm) 
who is a member of this household - other things remaining the same. 
This result is consistent with the relevant results presented in Horton 
(1988) and Haughton and Haughton (1997). This result is not 
inconsistent with the relevant hypothesis set out in sub-section 3.2.1; 
namely, as the age difference between the eldest and the youngest 
children in the household decreases, the value of the h-score for a 
young child will increase in size since, holding other things the same, 
young children will now have to compete more for the limited resources 
in the household.
As indicated by all the reported regression equations set out in 
Table 5, the gender of the child has a significant positive influence on the 
height for age for a young child (relative to the chosen norm) - other 
things remaining the same. This means that a male child has a higher h- 
score than that for a female child. This result becomes questionable, 
however, once allowance is made for other possible dependent 
variables. This point is demonstrated by the regression results 
presented in the next sub-section.
6.4.2 Extensions of the basic model
The discussion now turns to consider regression estimates of the 
extension of the basic model discussed in sub-section 6.3.2.2. As 
pointed out in that section, these extensions are directed at allowing for
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additional independent variables (than those set out in Table 5) that 
possibly influence the height for age of young children.
The regression results set out in Table 6 are concerned with the 
first extension of the basic model. The basic equation was expanded to 
allow for the logarithmic value of household income per capita. On 
estimating the resulting equation using the ordinary least squares 
method, it was seen that the logarithmic value of household income per 
capita took the expected sign and was statistically significant. The sum 
of the mother's and father's years of schooling and the age gap between 
children were still significant. Also the age of children still influences the 
value of the h-score in the inverted-u pattern. However, the gender of 
children no longer was statistically significant in determining the value of 
the h-score.
A range of factors, however, may influence the level of income 
received by a household. Thus logarithmic value of household income 
per capita was treated as the dependent variable and then regressed on 
a range of variables that are thought to influence the size of the 
dependent variable. The results are set out in regression equation 3 in 
Table 6. The results of employing logarithm per capita income as an 
instrumental variable showed that the logarithm of the mother’s years of 
schooling and access to electricity significantly increase the logarithm of 
per capita income (see equation 3). The level of the father's years of 
schooling was not, however, found to be significantly related to per 
capita income.
When the predicted value of logarithm of household income per 
capita was used as the instrument in the basic model (which includes the
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logarithm of household income per capita), and this model was 
estimated using the two-stage least squares method, the logarithm of 
household income per capita was found to be even more statistically 
significant than in the initial estimation of the basic equation. (See 
regression equations 2 and 1 in Table 6.) However, the level of 
education of the parents no longer was statistically significant when 
using the two-stage least squares method of estimation. These various 
results suggest that possibly it is the mother's level of equation that 
matters, not the father's, when determining the value of the h-score for a 
child (at least when logarithm per capita income is an important variable 
for determining the h-score of a child). And that the channel along which 
the mother's level of education most influences the child's h-score is by 
way of its effect on the level of income received by the household.
That said, there appears to be other, alternative, indirect channels 
along which the level of education received by a mother and father 
influences their child's h-score. This was indicated in the regression 
results based on the second extension of the basic model. In this 
instance the logarithm of the quality of the household dwelling and 
household income per capita both were included in the basic model. 
The regression results for this expanded version of the basic model that 
are set out in regression equation 1 in Table 7 indicate that all the 
regression coefficients, except one, for the dependent variables have the 
expected sign and were statistically significant at the standard levels of 
significance. The exception was the regression coefficient for the gender 
of the child concerned.
The quality of housing, with and without per capita income present 
in the regression equation, was found to have a significant influence on
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the value of the h-score for age of children, assuming all other variables 
are held constant. The relevant statistically significant coefficient 
estimates for this variable, reported in Table 7, suggest that as the quality 
of the family home deteriorates (respectively improves), so the value of 
the h-score increases (respectively decreases) in size.129 As indicated 
in sub-section 6.3.2, this result is consistent with that found in Pebley and 
Goldman (1995) - a result based on data for Guatemala.
This result was confirmed when allowance was made for the 
possibility that the level of the quality of the household dwelling may be 
determined by a range of factors. The factors that are identified (see 
regression equation 6 in Table 7) were the combined level of schooling 
of the mother and the father and the occupation of the mother and father 
of the child (although the coefficient for the father's occupation was not 
statistically significant). Making use of this result to estimate the basic 
equation (but without household per capita income present), by making 
use of the two-stage least squares method, again the estimated 
coefficient for the quality of the household dwelling was statistically 
significant and of the right sign - as were the other estimated coefficients 
for the other variables in the basic model (except that for the gender of 
the child). That said, what the results in regression equations 5 and 6 in 
Table 7 suggest is that the level of schooling of the parents operates 
along at least two channels in the process of influencing the value of the 
h-scores of their children.
129 Remember that the index of the quality of housing takes a smaller value the 
higher the quality of the family dwelling.
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Table 6. First Extension of the Basic Model: Coefficient 
Estimates derived using the Huber-White cluster 
regression formula*
Number of the regression equation
1
(OLS)
2
I (2SLS)
3
(OLS)
D e p e n d e n t V a riab les H5 H5 LogPCapInc
In d e p e n d e n t
V a ria b le s
constant 18.205
(41.84)
29.998
(4.09)
6.848
(13.04)
log of mother's years of schooling 0.558
(2.86)
log of father's years of schooling 0.074
(0.15)
log of mother's plus father's 
years of schooling
-2.870
(-4.15)
0.113
(0.04)
age of child above three 
months
0.534
(2.08)
0.626
(3.65)
age of child squared -0.021
(-1.80)
-0.022
(-2.73)
age of child cubed .0002
(1.21)
.0002
(1.92)
age gap between the youngest and 
eldest child in the household
-0.052
(-6.96)
-0.024
(-5.97)
gender 0.260
(0.76)
0.973
(1.09)
household with 
electricity
0.518
(39.00)
number of working members 
in the family
-0.034
(-0.56)
household which uses irrigation 
for farming
-0.090
(-1.10)
household owns land being farmed -0.007
(-0.32)
log per capita income -0.653
(-4.50)
-3.438
(-23.14)
R2 0.191 0.020 0.121
no. of
observations
113 112 112
Note: All variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity 
using the Huber-White method.
Source of data: household survey questionnaires
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Table 7. Second Extension of the Basic Model: Coefficient 
Estimates derived using the Huber-White cluster 
regression formula*
Number of the regression equation
1
(OLS)
2
(2SLS)
3
(OLS)
4
(OLS)
5
(2SLS)
6
(OLS)
Dependent
V ariab les
H5 H5 PCapInc H5 H5 logHouse
Independent
V ariab les
constant 8.591
(7.00)
1.899
(0.82)
1532.79
(0.16)
8.779
(11.90)
1.502
(0.66)
1.979
(7.68)
log of 
mother's 
plus father's 
years of 
schooling
-1.832
(-2.06)
-7542.52
(-0.88)
-1.911
(-2.29)
-0.369
(-5.94)
age of child 
above three 
months
0.486
(2.88)
0.507
(3.16)
0.467
(2.52)
0.490
(2.84)
age of child 
squared
-0.020
(-2.98)
-0.021
(-3.72)
-0.019
(-2.61)
-0.021
(-3.44)
age of child 
cubed
0.0002
(2.20)
.0002
(3.08)
.0001
(1.72)
0.0002
(2.49)
age gap 
between the 
youngest and 
eldest child in 
the
household
-0.048
(-17.58)
-0.042
(-29.95)
-0.049
(-26.6)
-0.042
(-15.01)
gender 0.332
(1.38)
0.218
(0.30)
0.058
(0.14)
-0.087
(-0.08)
log quality of 
housing
3.170
(3.38)
5.988
(10.36)
3.336
(4.52)
6.757
(5.43)
Per capita 
income
-0.00006
(-4.18)
-.00005
(-2.49)
Father’s
Occupation
17069.93
(2.80)
-0.161
(-0.74)
Mother’s
Occupation
5315.16
(0.93)
-0.153
(-3.76)
R2 0.231 0.203 0.139 0.213 0.172 0.234
no. of
observations
115 115 115 115 115 115
Note: All variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity 
using the Huber-White method.
Source of data: household survey questionnaires
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Turning to the independent variable, per capita income, as 
indicated earlier in the basic model the regression coefficient for this 
variable was statistically significant and of the right sign. Interestingly, 
however, when allowance was made for the possibility that household 
income per capita is influenced by other independent variables, it was 
found that the logarithm of the combined amount of the father’s and 
mother’s schooling was found not to be statistically significant. Rather 
the father’s occupation was found to be significantly related to household 
income per capita (see regression equation 3 in Table 7).
The regression results relating to the third version of the basic 
model are set out in Table 8. These results do not contradict the earlier 
conjecture that when the main source of energy is not firewood, then this 
fact tends to lower the level of the h-score for young children - other 
things remaining the same. (See regression equation 1 in Table 8.) 
Similarly, if a refrigerator is present in the household, then this fact also 
appears to lower the level of the h-score for young children - other things 
remaining the same. (See regression equation 2 in Table 8.) Indeed the 
regression coefficients for both of these variables, when treated 
separately, were highly statistically significant. And this is so if 
household income per capita was included in either the logarithmic or 
the non-logarithmic form. These general findings do not seem to have 
been reported elsewhere in the relevant literature.
That said, when these two variables were included in the same 
regression equation, then these two variables proved not to have 
statistically significant coefficients. Thus multicollinearity seems to be a 
problem when both of these variables are included in the basic equation. 
It is not clear, therefore, how important each one of these two variables
265
(energy source and the presence of a refrigerator) is for determining the 
level of the h-score in a household.
Table 8. Third Extension of the Basic Model: Coefficient 
Estimates derived using the Huber-White cluster 
regression formula
Number of the regression equation
1 2 3 4
Independent
Variables
constant 13.554 13.19 11.631 12.452
(7.40) (4.29) (8.78) (10.89)
log of mother's plus father's -1.433 -2.005 -2.270 -2.524
years of schooling (-1.28) (-2.64) (-2.86) (-3.44)
age of child above three 0.632 0.571 0.542 0.501
months (3.50) (2.48) (4.21) (3.11)
age of child -0.025 -0.023 -0.021 -0.020
squared (-2.90) (-2.40) (-3.70) (-3.07)
age of child 0.0002 .0002 0.0002 0.0002
cubed (2.03) (1-70) (2.58) (2.09)
age gap between the -0.039 -0.046 -0.043 0.046
youngest and eldest child in (-2.06) (-3.73) (-3.71) (-6.36)
the household
gender 0.289 0.498 0.528 0.668
(2.54) (1.32) (30.30) (2.58)
main source of energy for -3.094 -2.409
cooking not firewood (-4.71) (-3.08)
household with -3.754 -2.911
refrigerator (-5.83) (-5.50)
logarithm of per capita -0.557 -0.272
income (-5.12) (-1.26)
per capita -0.00005 -0.00004
income (-11.53) (-95.65)
2 0.214 0.213 0.210 0.209adjusted R
no. of 113 113 115 115
observations
Note: All variables in brackets refer to the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity 
using the Huber-White method.
Source of data: household survey questionnaires
Other variables were included in various regression equations 
that were not reported in Tables 3 to 6. These variables were: the age of 
the mother, the age of the father, the quality of sanitation and the time 
taken to obtain water from the nearest stand pipe. The relevant
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coefficient estimates for these variables were found not to be statistically 
significantly different from zero. It is possible, however, that these 
variables are important for determining the level of the h-score for young 
children. However, possibly their particular influence is masked by the 
other independent variables allowed for, and indicated in Tables 5 to 8.
6.5 Conclusions
The present study confirms a result that many others have found; 
namely, that two of the variables that influence the ievel of the health 
status for a child (as measured by this child's h-score) in early childhood 
in a developing community are the level of formal education received by 
the mother and father of this child. Apart from these variables, the sum of 
level of schooling received by the mother and father has a statistically 
significant positive influence on the health status of young children. It is 
emphasised that the statistical results presented here suggest, however, 
that the main influence of level of education received by the parents on 
the health status of children seems to be an indirect influence. So for 
example, the education levels of the parents seem to have its greatest 
influence on the level of household income per capita, or the quality of 
the household dwelling. And these latter two variables, in turn, influence 
the health status of the children in the household. Once this indirect 
influence of the level of education received by the parents on the health 
status of young children has been allowed for, the level of education of 
the parents apparently has little or no direct influence on the health 
status of the children. This finding may just reflect, however, the 
presence of multicollinearity between relevant sets of variables 
employed in the basic model as represented in the regression results 
presented in Table 5.
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Be that as it may, and since the multicollinearity problem cannot 
be easily circumvented (see Greene 1997: 423 - 4), as far as can be 
determined, and as indicated earlier, the main channels along which the 
level of the education received by the mother and father influence the 
health status of the children in a household in a developing country is an 
indirect influence. This would appear to be the first time that this has 
been demonstrated in the relevant literature with the use of econometric 
techniques of analysis. That said, this general matter has been 
described by Caldwell (1986).
As for the other factors that appear to influence the health status of 
young children, two of them are the level of household income per capita 
and the quality of the household dwelling. As indicated earlier, this latter 
variable is very seldom cited in the relevant literature. A similar remark 
can be made of the way in which the age of a young child seems to 
influence the health status of children; namely, with other things 
remaining the same, after three months of age the h-score for a young 
child, on average, tends to follow a non-linear asymmetric inverted-u 
shaped path.
Other factors that also are rarely, if ever, mentioned in the relevant 
literature, but which are identified in the present empirical study as 
beneficially influencing the health status of young children, are: (i) an 
increase in the age gap of the eldest and youngest child in a family; (ii) 
the use of electricity or natural gas instead of firewood as the main 
source of energy in the household and (iii) the presence of a refrigerator 
in the household.
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Further research is required, however, to test the robustness of 
these latter four findings. Since only two communities were included in 
the sample, clearly more work needs to be done to test the sort of 
hypotheses considered in the previous sections. The most satisfactory 
testing of these hypotheses would consist of carrying out well designed 
controlled experiments to determine the influence of the particular 
independent variable of interest on the normalised height for age of 
young children. Such research is time consuming and expensive to 
perform, however. Nevertheless, given the importance of the results that 
are likely to be generated by such research, it would seem that a good 
case can be made for performing this type of careful research.
However, if the three results listed above prove to be robust once 
further testing has been performed, then these results would suggest a 
number of implications for public policy aimed at reducing well-being 
poverty in developing countries - and the Philippines in particular. In the 
instance of the influence of the age of a young child on its h-score, it is 
clear that a particularly vulnerable time in a child's life is in the period 
three to twenty-five months and possibly a little beyond. (This point has 
been noted by Martorell (1995: 19) and the references cited there.) 
Strategies need to be employed, therefore, to ensure that parents are 
aware that it is in this period of their child's life that the child faces the 
greatest danger from having their health status impaired - possibly 
irreversibly impaired. Also, government interventions that take the form 
of well-designed child nutrition and health care, or child health survey 
programs are likely to provide the special assistance required to ensure 
that children reach their potential. (Such a program that carefully links a 
preventive child health care system with a nutrition program is discussed 
in Binswanger and Landell-Mills (1995).)
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As for point (i) listed above, it suggests that more public effort may 
need to be made to encourage parents to increase the spacing between 
the children they have. This increased spacing will raise the health 
status of the children that are born into the household. This observation, 
in turn, raises the whole issue of how best to reduce the total fertility rate 
in a developing community. This important matter is far too large to be 
covered in this chapter, however.
Various parts of the argument developed earlier suggest that there 
are social gains to be derived from some appropriate form of public 
action directed at improving the quality of the housing (and associated 
facilities) that poor households have access to. Precisely what form this 
public action should take to attain the socially best results equally is also 
a large topic and, therefore, cannot be investigated here.
As for reducing the level of indoor pollution in a community, this 
does not necessarily mean that some public policy should be directed at 
encouraging the replacement of firewood with electricity or natural gas 
as the main source of energy for households in the community. Nor 
does this research advocate that the government provide refrigerators to 
all households in the community. For communities in developing 
countries, these may be expensive policy options to implement. 
Alternative and more effective policies may be to inform households how 
to improve the ventilation in their dwelling and provide information to 
households that indicates the public health benefits to be derived from 
keeping food in a refrigerator. The effectiveness of such a program, 
however, almost certainly would be dependent on the level of basic
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education to be found in the community and the level of access 
households have to electricity.
Finally, but not least, as emphasised in the introduction to this 
chapter increasing the normalised height for age of young children in a 
developing country fairly represents an improvement of the level of well­
being in this community. The most effective way of achieving this 
presumably desirable outcome is not, however, by reducing the level of 
income-only poverty (which results by way of increasing the level of 
household real income per capita). This assertion is based upon the 
empirical results - albeit qualified results - presented in Tables 6 to 8. 
Rather, these empirical results, and the remarks made previously in this 
section, suggest that a more effective policy program would take the form 
of possessing a number of components - components that include 
reducing income-only poverty, increasing the level of basic education in 
the community, providing a well-designed preventive child health care 
program, improving the quality of housing and, if possible, increasing 
access to electricity and natural gas. In short (and drawing on the 
sketched definition of well-being poverty provided in the introduction) the 
developing community needs to attempt to reduce the level of well-being 
poverty as the most effective route to take to increase the normalised age 
for height of young children. Hopefully this conclusion is confirmed by 
future research.
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Introduction
Poverty remains as a formidable challenge for the Philippine 
Government. Despite the Government's various development plans, 
policies and programs from 1962 to 1997 that directly or indirectly 
addressed the plight of the poor, the number of Filipinos living below the 
poverty line is still substantial. Nevertheless, and as indicated in the 
introduction, while the latest (1997) Philippine Government statistics 
showed that the proportion of the population at or below the poverty line 
declined between 1985 to 1997, the World Bank data on head-count 
poverty (although less recent) showed otherwise. World Bank figures 
revealed that the proportion of the population below the poverty line was 
52 per cent in 1985 and 54 per cent in 1991 (World Bank 1998: 197). 
Whichever figures are used, the point being raised here is that the 
successful alleviation, or better yet the eradication of income-only and 
well-being poverty (as defined in the main text) in the Philippines 
remains an elusive development goal.
To gain a better understanding of poverty in the Philippines and 
how it may be alleviated, this study initially considered if the objective of 
alleviating poverty is part of the system of justice agreed to in the 
Philippines. The reason for wanting to generate this information is that 
the authorities in the Philippines need to know if there is widespread 
support within the Filipino community for the setting of this social 
objective. As pointed out at the beginning of Chapter 2, if there is no
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such support it seems reasonable to assert that any attempt to set up a 
poverty alleviation program in the Philippines would meet with little 
success. It was also pointed out that care needs to be taken in the 
methods used to generate this information so as not to produce 
misleading information. It is important that individuals are faced with the 
consequences of their decisions. To generate reliable relevant 
information, a quite different approach had to be adopted. Game- 
theoretic experiments were used to determine if diverse groups of 
Filipinos could arrive at a consensus in the selection of a principle of 
distributive justice. In these experiments the participants were faced with 
comparatively severe forms of economic uncertainty and threats of 
uncertain social, political, and/or economic consequences if certain 
decisions were not made. It turned out that the system of justice 
unanimously agreed to by all groups was the priority given to the 
elimination of poverty.
But what policies should be followed to mitigate this poverty? To 
be able to answer this question with any degree of certainty, attention 
first needs to be given to determining what factors contribute to 
communities in the Philippines experiencing different levels of poverty. 
In attempting to gain a better understanding of the causes of poverty it is 
expected that valuable insights can be derived as how to improve 
poverty-alleviation policies in the Philippines. This was the next matter 
this study considered.
Finally, the study attempted to determine what were some of the 
possible consequences of poverty, particularly on demographic 
behaviour and the health status of communities in the Philippines. The 
reason for considering this general issue is that the level of poverty may
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influence the level of demand for children, health status to be found in 
the community and the mobility of individuals in the Filipino community. 
Changes in the level of this latter group of variables may, in turn, 
influence the rate of economic growth. If income poverty does have 
these consequences, then this fact demonstrates the need to alleviate 
poverty.
In addition, in the process of analysing the consequences of 
income-only poverty, insights were also derived as to how best to 
alleviate well-being poverty (as measured by such variables as life 
expectancy at birth). Specifically, in attempting to determine the 
consequences of income-poverty, the analysis indicated that well-being 
poverty can be reduced by increasing the levels of basic education, the 
provision of better quality housing and providing greater access to 
electricity.
The main findings relating to these broad issues are set out in the 
next section. In the final section attention turns to considering some of 
the policy implications that reasonably can be inferred from these 
findings.
7.2 Main Findings
The experimental results obtained in Chapter 2 indicate that 
groups of individuals, when faced with relevant types of uncertainty, are 
able to decide unanimously on a single system of justice in distribution. 
The system of justice decided upon is a version of Rawls' first principle of 
justice and the priority rule and Popper’s principle of minimising
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avoidable suffering - a decision reached by way of individuals being free 
to choose a system of justice from a number of alternatives (although a 
choice subject to various relevant types of uncertainty). The participants 
also explained their decisions in language which reflected that they have 
an understanding of the uncertain economic and social realities that they 
and members of their community face.
A further unanticipated insight derived from this study is that it 
indicates how a community with broad social values similar to those to 
be found in the Philippine community can reach a unanimous agreement 
over what system of justice should be applied in this community. How 
this level of agreement can be reached requires the replacement of a 
number of the conditions used to derive Arrow's impossibility theorem. 
Above all, members of a community need to be faced with certain types 
of uncertainty - the types of uncertainty that are comparatively prevalent 
in the Philippines. The relevant insights developed in this regard 
suggest that the findings presented in Chapter 2 make a useful 
contribution to political philosophy and social choice theory.
Now that the elimination of poverty has been identified as a (if not 
the) major issue of social concern amongst reasonably representative 
groups in Philippine society, attention next turns to determining some of 
the important factors that may influence the level of poverty in the 
Philippines. Chapter 3 analysed the possible causes of variation of the 
incidence of income-only poverty and incomes across the provinces of 
the Philippines using cross-section data in 1990 and 1991. Assuming all 
other things remaining the same, the analysis indicates that the 
incidence of land ownership, the level of sanitary toilet facilities and the 
proportion of non-agricultural workers in the labour force explains to a
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statistically significant degree variations in poverty levels across 
provinces. In addition, these variables, along with the availability of 
irrigation facilities and being located in the island of Luzon were also 
found to be statistically significant in explaining variations in the levels of 
household incomes across the provinces. The regression results also 
indicate that the proportion of non-agricultural earners, in turn, is 
influenced by the level of access to electricity, the level of urbanisation, 
the rate of illiteracy, having an academic degree and the availability of 
paved roads. These latter econometric results suggest, therefore, that 
the links, or lines of causation between the independent variables and 
the level of poverty possibly are more complex than may be inferred from 
the results presented in comparable studies of poverty - studies that do 
not allow for variables operating in an indirect way, through other 
variables, on the level of poverty. So, for instance, at least in part, the 
level of education influences, indirectly, the level of poverty by first 
influencing the proportion of non-agricultural earners. This latter 
variable in turn influences the level of poverty in the various regions of 
the Philippines.
In deriving this latter result it should be pointed out that this insight 
was derived to some degree by accident. To explain this point, it was 
found that multicollinearity between various variables was a serious 
statistical problem. In the attempt to circumvent this problem to some 
degree, two-stage least squares was employed. The results obtained 
suggested, as just indicated, that the level of education has an indirect 
influence on the level of poverty in the various regions of the Philippines.
In contrast to the analysis presented in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 
use was made of micro data to determine, at the village level, the
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possible links between the level of education, credit, deforestation and 
well-being poverty. Two diverse Filipino village communities were 
intensively surveyed and then focus group discussions were held with 
members of these communities. The baseline survey and the 
discussions indicate that there is a positive relationship between the 
level of education and well-being (as defined in Chapter 4). However, 
members of the less well-off community, compared to the better-off one, 
perceived fewer benefits to be derived from investing in education. 
Consequently, those households with better access to credit and basic 
infrastructure invested more in education. Also, households with no 
access to credit, and who had low levels of education and income relied 
more on the forests for their sustenance. The discussion in this chapter 
also indicated that the methodology employed (a combination of a 
survey of sample households and the conducting of focus group 
discussions) could be used more extensively to determine how best to 
design poverty-alleviation policies in any developing country.
Turning to the next set of issues concerning some of the 
consequences that flow from the level of poverty that exists in the 
Philippines, the discussion in Chapter 5 assesses the demographic and 
health consequences of poverty. Attention concentrated on determining 
if the level of poverty influences fertility rates, infant and child mortality 
rates, morbidity rates (resulting from water-borne diseases) and net 
migration in the Philippines. To determine the relationship between rural 
poverty and selected demographic and health variables, four regression 
models, making use of cross-section data, were examined. (As in 
Chapter 3, since multicollinearity was a serious problem, the Two-Stage 
Least Squares Method was used in the estimation of relevant regression 
equations.) The regression results indicate that the incidence of poverty
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is found to have a significant influence on some demographic and health 
variables. For instance, with other things remaining the same, the level 
of poverty has a positive influence on infant and child mortality rates as 
well as fertility rates. The level of poverty has a negative influence on net 
migration. Poverty, however, was found not to have a statistically 
significant effect on morbidity from water-borne diseases. If these results 
prove to be robust on further testing, then they have policy implications of 
some importance. For instance, reducing (if not eliminating) the 
incidence of poverty in a province will tend to help as a subsidiary 
consequence in improving the level of health as measured, for example, 
by the reduction in the level of the infant mortality rate. Similarly, a 
reduction in the level of poverty will assist in the reduction in the fertility 
rate in the Philippines.
In Chapter 6, a multi-variate regression analysis was performed to 
determine what factors are likeiy to influence the normalised height for 
age of children in early childhood in rural communities in developing 
countries. The statistical analysis confirms a result that many others 
have found; namely, that the level of formal education received by the 
mother and father influences the height for age of their children. Apart 
from these variables, the sum of the level of schooling received by the 
mother and that of the father has a statistically significant positive 
influence on the health status of young children. The influence of this 
education, however, seems mainly to have an indirect effect on the 
height for age of the child concerned. So, for example, the level of 
education of the parents seems to have its greatest influence on the level 
of income per capita, or the quality of the household dwelling. These 
latter two variables, in turn, influence the health status of the children in 
the household. Once this indirect influence of the level of education
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received by the parents (on the health status of young children) has 
been allowed for, the level of education of the parents has little or no 
direct influence on the health status of the children. As far as can be 
determined, this tentative empirical identification of the main channels 
along which the levels of the education received by the mother and the 
father influence the health status of the children in a household has not 
been demonstrated, empirically, elsewhere in the relevant literature.
There are other factors that are identified in the empirical study in 
Chapter 6 that appear to influence the health status of young children. 
Specifically, with other things remaining the same in the villages 
concerned, the following results were obtained:
• after three months of age the height for age of young children, on 
average, tends to follow a non-linear, asymmetric inverted u-shaped 
path;
• an increase in the age gap (as defined in chapter 6) of the eldest and 
youngest child in a family positively influences the height for age of a 
young child in this family;
• the use of electricity or natural gas, instead of firewood, as the main 
source of energy in the household positively influences the height for 
age of a young child in this family, and
• the presence of a refrigerator in the household also seems to have a 
positive influence on the height for age of a young child in this family.
That said, further research is required, however, to test the 
robustness of these latter four findings - findings that are not widely cited, 
if at all, in the relevant literature. The main weakness with the study 
reported in Chapter 6 is that the sample of communities surveyed is not
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as complete as I would have liked. (Financial limitations prevented 
further surveys being carried out at the time (in 1997)). It is clear to me 
that more work needs to be done to test the sort of hypotheses 
considered in this chapter. Nevertheless, if the findings in this chapter 
prove to be robust once further testing has been performed, then these 
results suggest a number of implications for public policy in developing 
countries - aimed at reducing well-being poverty.
7.3 Policy Issues
Turning to the policy implications that may be drawn from the 
various studies reported in this conclusion, empirical evidence has been 
provided to support the high priority given by the Philippine government, 
as well as various sections of Filipino society, for the alleviation of 
poverty. The results of game-theoretic experiments carried out in the 
Philippines and presented in Chapter 2 demonstrate that pluralistic 
groups of individuals from a community whose members are well aware 
of the uncertainties that pervade the lives of the less well-off in their 
country can agree unanimously on a floor-income constraint system of 
justice. This system of justice, which is interpreted here as a version of 
Rawls’ first principle of justice and the priority rule and Popper’s principle 
of minimising avoidable suffering, is where all in the community are 
provided with a floor level of income, after which the community is left 
free to maximise the average level of income for all in the community. As 
pointed out in Chapter 2, if such a system of justice is implemented, then 
it removes one of the major uncertainties facing members of the 
community; namely, the risk of falling into destitution. As articulated by 
the participants of the game-theoretic experiments, for the community not
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to mitigate this economic uncertainty to a reasonable degree would 
contribute, in an important way, towards precipitating political and social 
instability.
In addition, and as pointed out at the beginning of Chapter 2, 
fundamental to a poverty-alleviation program being successfully 
implemented is that such a program receive wide community support. 
And this support is given within the context that all in the community are 
aware of all the major consequences that flow from the implementation 
of such a program. That the empirical results presented in Chapter 2 
suggest that such a program would receive such support, and within 
such a context, implies that a well-designed poverty-alleviation program 
has an improved chance of success (compared to a situation where such 
a program did not receive wide community support).
Policy implications also flow from the results presented in Chapter 
3. If the results derived from various regression equations turn out to be 
robust after using improved data sets, then this implies that increasing 
the proportion of households: who own the land that they till; are working 
outside of agriculture; have access to electricity; and receive a relatively 
large amount of basic education will raise the level of average real 
incomes for these households. These changes will also contribute to 
reducing poverty since the higher the level of average household 
incomes or per capita income in a province, the lower is the incidence of 
poverty in the province concerned.
The regression results presented in Chapter 3 also strongly 
suggest that a reasonable way of reducing the level of poverty and 
raising real incomes per capita at the provincial level in the Philippines is
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to improve the supply of a range of basic infrastructure. This basic range
of pieces of infrastructure refers to:
• basic education directed at reducing functional illiteracy;
• electricity for household and manufacturing purposes;
• irrigation to increase farm yields;
• paved roads to improve mobility and transport of produce;
• basic preventive health care, as represented by the provision of 
sanitation facilities and;
• credit systems to finance the purchase of complementary farm inputs 
such as seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, tractors and water, as well as to 
smooth out household income streams.
The provision of an improved supply of basic infrastructure in the 
Philippines is also a policy implication that may be inferred from the 
analysis presented in Chapter 4 where use was made of data at the 
village level. The study indicates that in the circumstances that poor, 
isolated communities are faced with in rural Philippines - communities 
that do not have access to a range of basic pieces of infrastructure (such 
as all-weather roads, electricity, a safe water supply and a preventive 
health system) - there apparently are few social, or private benefits to be 
derived from increased expenditures on subsidising the formal 
education, credit systems and investing in reforestation programs in such 
communities. The reason is that synergisms appear to operate or a 
degree of complementarity exists between a number of elements that 
make up a basic system of infrastructure for such communities. Thus the 
increased provision of any individual infrastructure system (such as 
expenditure on improved school facilities), without the other elements
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also being increased in size, probably contributes comparatively little to 
increasing the level of well-being for the community concerned. In 
contrast, increasing the level of the supply of a number of 
complementary types of infrastructure is likely to result in the marked 
improvement of the level of well-being of poor Filipino families.
Another important policy objective that may be inferred from the 
findings presented in Chapter 4 is that of increasing the level of access 
that income-poor parents in developing countries have to the formal 
credit market system. This greater access to the formal credit market will 
allow these households to be in a better position to mitigate, probably ex 
post, the variability of income streams. This consequence, along with the 
increased availability of credit, presumably also will result in parents 
investing more in the education of their children.
Turning to the matter of the consequences that flow from the level 
of poverty that exists in the Philippines, the regression results presented 
in Chapter 5 have policy implications of some importance (that is if 
proven to be robust on further testing). For instance, reducing, if not 
eliminating, the incidence of poverty in a province will tend to help as a 
subsidiary consequence in improving the level of health status in this 
province - as measured, for example, by the reduction in the level of the 
infant mortality rate. This latter improvement, along with the reduction in 
the level of poverty, will also assist in reducing the total fertility rate in a 
province. The findings in Chapter 5 also suggest that addressing rural 
poverty will tend to discourage people from migrating to the cities.
If the regression results presented in Chapter 6 prove to be robust 
after further testing has been performed, then these results also suggest
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a number of implications for public policy in developing countries. The 
policies are briefly summarised, as follows (for a detailed discussion, see 
sub-section 6.5):
• Strategies need to be employed (possibly in the form of information 
dissemination schemes) to ensure that parents are aware that it is in 
the period three to twenty-five (25) months (and possibly a little 
beyond) of their child’s life that a child faces the greatest danger from 
having their health status impaired - possibly irreversibly impaired. 
Also, government interventions that take the form of well-designed 
child nutrition and health care or child health survey programs are 
likely to provide the special assistance required to ensure that 
children reach their physical potential.
• More public effort may need to be made to encourage parents to 
increase the spacing between the children they have. This increased 
spacing is expected to raise the health status of children that are born 
into the household.
• There are social gains to be derived from some appropriate public 
action directed at improving the quality of housing (and associated 
facilities) that poor households have access to. (Precisely what form 
this public action should take to attain the socially best results equally 
is a large topic and therefore was not investigated in this study.)
• Health programs may include informing households on how to 
improve the ventilation in their dwelling and providing information to 
households on the public health benefits to be derived from keeping 
food in a refrigerator. The effectiveness of such a program, however, 
almost certainly would be dependent on the level of basic education 
to be found in the community and the level of access households 
have to electricity.
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• A more effective policy program of increasing the normalised height 
for age of young children in a developing country would take the form 
of possessing a number of components - components that include 
reducing income-only poverty, increasing the level of basic education 
in the community, providing a well-designed preventive health care 
program, improving the quality of housing and increasing access to 
electricity and natural gas.
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Annex 1 
(Chapter 2)
SELECTED TRANSCRIPTS of FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
Diverse Groups of Filipinos Deciding on a System of Economic Justice
Executive Summary 
Participants
A. STUDENTS IN METROMANiLA
B. STUDENTS OUTSIDE OF METROMANILA
C. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN METROMANILA
D. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES OUTSIDE OF METROMANILA
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Executive Summary
What is a just distribution of income where, in the individual situation, individuals are 
faced with considerable uncertainty as to how much income they will receive in the future? 
Given different principles for income redistribution what rule will Filipinos support? If there are 
trade-offs, what form will they take?
The results of the group discussions revealed that Filipinos do reach a unanimous 
agreement on a single system of justice in distribution. It was observed that in cases wherein 
the participants in the group discussions took their time to discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of each principle of income redistribution, the group arrived at very interesting 
insights on the concept of distributive justice. On the other hand, when the group members 
hurriedly discussed and decided on a principle of justice, there was very little understanding 
gained from the exercise.
All the groups supported a principle maximising the average income subject to a floor 
constraint. The system of justice decided upon is a version of Rawls’ first principle of justice 
and the priority rule and Popper’s principle of minimising avoidable suffering. Majority of the 
participants were concerned that everyone in the society received a minimum income or an 
income which does not fall below a set level. The arguments for the selection of a floor 
constraint principle include basic consumption or survival, security, self-esteem, incentives 
for productivity, and personal as well as societal stability. The concern for stability of income, 
particularly of the least advantaged sectors of the society, and its perceived linkage with 
political stability is consistent with Rawls’ (1993) theory that the two are interlinked. Some 
groups also expressed their concern that the level of the floor constraint should not be a fixed 
amount and should be adjusted according to the cost of living and the capability of the 
government to provide everyone of its working age population a minimum amount of income. 
Some of the participants pointed out that the floor constraint should not be set at a very high 
level to: (i) maintain the incentive to work; (ii) cover more low income people; and (iii) avoid a 
possible inflationary effect.
Enclosed are some of the transcripts which were taken from the full report. The full 
transcripts are available upon request.
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(MM Students Group 14) 20 January 1997 1045 AM - 1135 AM
Male Voice 1: So, I would like to get the preferences of the group.
Female Voice 1: Wait.
Female Voice 2: C for me?
Male Voice: C?
Moderator: Why?
Male Voice: And subject to what floor constraint?
Female Voice 2: Do I have to say what is my floor constraint?
Moderator: Yes, but let us listen to why you chose that rule first.
Female Voice 2: Based on reality?
Moderator: Say on a monthly basis for an individual.
Female Voice 2: I have no idea. A floor constraint? Maybe, 50,000 pesos. (Laughter)
Male Voice: That’s too high. (Laughter)
Female Voice 2: Okay. Ten thousand pesos?
Moderator: Note that when the floor income is high that amount will have to be provided by those who 
earn more than the floor.
Male Voice: So, 10,000 pesos?
Female Voice 2: Oh yeah, does that mean everybody has a job?
Male Voice: Not necessarily.
Female Voice 2: Majority or all?
Male Voice: We consider all. The floor should be provided to all and at the same time we maximise the 
average.
Moderator: How about the others? (Laughter)
Female Voice 3: A, perhaps. We maximise the floor. So that for the poor, this would be the lowest 
income they would get. So, we set a specific amount...is that right? For example if the floor income is 
set at a very high level, the rich would not be upset. That is, if you want to be rich then you could be rich 
but let us take care of those in the low income bracket. Is that right? Do I make sense?
Female Voice 4: Me, I like B. Not pure equality but the disparity should not be too wide.
Male Voice: When you speak of a wide disparity then the income of those receiving high incomes are 
very high and those receiving low incomes are really very low. So, when you speak of a disparity that is 
the range and not the average. The average amount may be a big amount but the disparity is the range 
between the highest and the lowest amount which may be big. For instance, if there is a person who 
earns one million pesos a month and another who earns 1,000 pesos a month, then the average income 
of the two is around say 500,000 pesos a month. The average income doesn’t show that one is 
receiving 1,000 pesos a month.
Male Voice: So, do you still prefer B?
Female Voice 1: Same as her, I like C. If you have a floor, everybody has the same floor income. As to 
the amount at least 10,000 pesos for food, groceries and for some, housing.
Female Voice 3: Isn’t it that the floor is for those receiving the lowest incomes only and not necessarily 
all?
Female Voice 1: The floor income is not the same as the floor constraint. By maximising the floor 
income, you raise the incomes of those receiving the lowest income in the society. The third rule 
maximises the average with a floor constraint, that is, you want to ensure that no one falls below a 
certain income level.
Male Voice: Me, I chose B. (Laughter) Because it is the easiest to compute I guess and there is a 
chance, the highest chance, that you will get the biggest monetary pay-off. Because it is the average. 
The chances are that you would fall in the median and you would get a larger amount. So, there are two 
Bs, two Cs and one A. Let us all choose B. It is the easiest to compute. (Laughter)
Female Voice 3: I suggest you all choose A. (Laughter)
Male Voice: C, you see is difficult because it is hard to determine the floor constraint. In B, okay, you 
maximise the...For the average income...there is a term for that in economics, it is called per capita, I 
think.
Female Voice 2: For C, there is a floor constraint such that all will be able to earn that amount.
Moderator: Why? What makes you say that everyone must have this minimum amount?
Female Voice 2: For security.
Female Voice 1: For example, we all receive 10,000 pesos then all of us are sure of a 10,000 peso 
income. If there is more, then that is good. What is important is that there is an assured amount. Isn’t it
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that if we choose to maximise the average income this would all depend on probability when you draw a 
piece of paper from a bag? For example, when there are so many of you in medium low, you will get a 
relatively smaller amount than when you are in the high income class. Am I right? Unlike for a certain 
category we will all get 10,000 pesos then even if we get other incentives, we would all get the basic 
which is my starting point of 10,000 pesos.
Female Voice 2: In my view, C is more applicable because there are really so many poor.
Male Voice: However, don’t you realise who will bear that amount? For example, the 10,000 pesos...the 
minimum floor constraint of 10,000 pesos. Who is going to bear that? It is either that...for example, the 
Metro-Aides they get 10,000 pesos a piece minimum. Right? So, who will bear that? Say, the 
government but eventually it will be borne by the whole society also through taxes. So, eventually, it 
will also be borne by taxpayers or if not that, say, by our generous businessmen. They will have to 
subsidise those Metro-Aides. But you see the businessmen will not agree such that when it falls on the 
community as a whole for example in the form of taxes, it will just be like you are making someone 
better- off at your expense. So, perhaps it would be best just to maximise the average income, 
because that way you only look at per capita income. Per capita income is an economic indicator. So it 
is said that a country is really well-off, if its per capita income is above a certain level. So, on the 
average, the economy is doing this much because it doesn’t say that there are no poor people but we 
are saying that the income is at a certain average level.
Female Voice 1: You are from the School of Economics, am I right? (Laughter)
Male Voice: Because even if you say a minimum of 10,000 pesos, it is not possible. If you say a 
minimum of 10,000 pesos you know what will happen? There will be many who will lose their jobs. For 
example, the businesses, they cannot afford that. For instance, the minimum is 3,000 pesos, they can 
accommodate so many. For example, the five of us they can accommodate us because their budget 
for their employees is 15,000 pesos. If we ask for 3,000 pesos a piece, they can accommodate the five 
of us. Now, if all of us asked for 10,000 a piece how many could they accommodate? Only one which 
means that the four of us will be laid off or will be out of work and only one will benefit. So, it is more 
equitable this way because all of us will have jobs rather than just one of us getting a job. So, it is really 
so unrealistic to say that there is a minimum. That is why we are targeting in economics a minimum 
wage because if the minimum, wage continues to go up the businesses simply cannot afford it. They 
would rather look at other factors of production. So they turn to machinery and stuff. Because it would 
be too cheaper that way when the labour costs are increasing. It is really unrealistic. Of course, it is 
the best situation for all of us to earn 10,000 pesos a piece but looking at it in reality it could never 
happen because the businessmen will not agree. If it is borne by the public then it is not a different kind 
of...you should get a salary that you really deserve.
Female Voice 2: Your point is from the business side. Because, say if the businessmen cannot 
accommodate, why is it that they are called millionaires? They are earning a huge amount of money. 
Why don’t they share their money with others? Their huge incomes are due to the people who are 
working. Without other people, how could these businessmen earn? Isn’t it? Say you have these 
machinery? Who makes these machinery, anyway? Isn’t it that it is the people also? Who operates 
these machinery? People. So, you have to take people into consideration. You said that when the 
floor constraint goes up the businessmen cannot afford it so they lay off workers. So, how about us? 
The floor constraint should consider the prices of goods. Otherwise, people will leave the country to 
cope with the cost of living. At least, if you have a floor constraint, then there is a sure income for 
every month and the person will feel more stable. For Filipinos, security of tenure is very important and 
security in itself. Isn’t it?
Moderator: Why do you think it is important?
Female Voice 2: I don’t know. I just observed that there is the SSS [Social Security System], the GSIS 
[Government Service Insurance System] that people apply for. For accidents, you have to have some 
money. Some people are also becoming more materialistic and that would be a big help.
Moderator: If you don’t have this feeling of security what happens?
Female Voice 2: If you don’t have this feeling of security what happens? Panic! You will panic. Isn’t it 
that when you do not have money, you have a big problem? (Laughter) Shit, I don’t have money! So, 
that is what happens to them. They will resort to borrowing and everything. For me, it is better to be 
sure that you can get some money somewhere when you need it.
Moderator: So, what do the others think? What can you say?
Female Voice 4: Okay, now I want C. (Laughter)
Female Voice 3: Just like what I said earlier everybody has a right. When you are rich it is your right to 
be rich because you worked hard for it. However, even if you are rich you do not forget the poor. So.... 
Moderator: What did you choose? Which principle?
Female Voice 3: A -- maximise the floor income. Let us not forget the...for example, in the U.S. [United 
States] the poor are not as poor as those in the Philippines because their maximum floor income...their 
poorest are perhaps already our middle class. But the richest in the States continue to be rich.
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Moderator: What can you say about your other group members’ arguments such as the security issue? 
The choice should be unanimous so what are you more inclined to support? C or B? Floor constraint or 
maximising the average income?
Female Voices: C (Laughter)
Male Voice: Choose B.
Female Voice 3: Why don’t you all choose A? (Laughter)
Male Voice: Choose B and I will give you jobs.
Female Voice 3: What did you ladies want?
Female Voices: C.
Female Voice 3: My next choice is C. (Laughter)
Male Voice: Okay, so C wins it. So, C.
Moderator: If C, what is your floor constraint? What level? It was already mentioned in the discussion 
that you think 10,000 pesos is too high. So, for an individual to meet his basic needs to be able to live 
comfortably? Just enough for the person.
Male Voice: Five thousand pesos.
Female Voice 1: Five thousand pesos.
Female Voice 2: Six thousand pesos 
Female Voice 3: For casuals?
Male Voice: Three thousand pesos.
Female Voice 4: Four thousand pesos.
Male Voice: Not too low nor too high. Or else there will be people who lose jobs and so let us maximise 
the average income. The salary they get is what they deserve. It is what they were able to work for. 
That is what they could reach so why give them more?
Moderator: So does everybody agree with 3,000 pesos?
Female Voice 2: Four thousand pesos. Well, okay, 3,000 pesos.
Other Voices: Okay, 3,000 pesos.
END
(MM Students - Group 15) 23 January 1997 330 PM - 530 PM
Male Voice: Okay, let us start. Maybe, after reading the paper we realised that this is the first time we 
encountered some terms used here -- these principles for distributive justice. How about the others? 
Is this the first time you heard these terms?
Other Voices: Yes.
Male Voice: We are all the same in that respect. Even if we are not very familiar with these principles, 
which principle do you think you could relate with or is applicable in your situation. You?
Female Voice 1: Maybe we should rank each of them and see if we have the same ranking.
Male Voice: How did you rank?
Female Voice: One by one.
Male Voice: Okay, so who chose A?
Female Voice 2: Me.
Male Voice: I also chose A. So, who chose B?
Female Voice 3: Me.
Male Voice: Who else? C?
Female Voices: Me.
Male Voice: Three. So, what is C? That’s...
Female Voice 3: With a floor constraint.
Male Voice: Since the three of you selected C, why did you choose that?
Female Voice 1: Because C is when you say that this amount and no income should go below that and 
you also consider the average. I don’t know. I just feel that the distribution is more just that way. But, 
how about you first?
Female Voice 4: As you said earlier there is a floor constraint for the income. At least by that we are 
assured that...because my idea of justice is that it should be equitable. That first and we should also 
consider how much your work, and the time, and your labour, are tantamount to what you earn. It is 
good if there is a set minimum wage. That’s my idea here, a floor constraint wherein the income will not 
fall below that level. It will be determined based on a feasible amount that will allow a family to survive in 
an area. So, if 8,000 pesos will allow a family to live then that will be the floor constraint. No income 
should go below that amount of 8,000 pesos. That’s it.
Male Voice: But for your choice, Principle Number three with a floor constraint, isn’t it that you should 
consider inflation, standards of living, for example, prices of commodities which are increasing? If you 
have a constraint in the distribution of income it is as if you have a limit or a bottom line -- a minimum 
amount that you would give to the poorest in the society. What if...your tendency is if you were the one
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to be taxed, your tendency is to accumulate more property or more money so that you can pay the 
taxes. What about that and considering inflation?
Female Voice 3: I think you are referring to the range constraint.
Male Voice: Isn’t it that in setting a constraint you are assigning a value, a level in which no member of 
your society will receive lower than that amount? Isn’t it?
Female Voice 1: When you maximise the average with a floor constraint you are considering the income 
of the poorest of the poor. That is, I think the very essence of justice. The poor, regardless of 
whatever income the highest or the middle class receives, at least the lowest level could be helped. At 
least, they feel secured. They won’t worry that even if there are those who are very, very rich and at the 
same time or simultaneously there are those who are very, very, very poor. What makes a floor 
constraint necessary is to make people feel secured.
Female Voice 4: As to the issue of inflation, when you set a floor constraint, this should be subject 
to...you should study first...when prices vary. Because we do not know how inflation will be linked to 
the floor constraint and to the other principles in there. That is why my idea there why I chose number 3 
is that it varies depending on what would allow a family to survive.
Female Voice 2: But, in number 3, there are other incomes above the chosen floor which are taxed at 
the same percentage rate so that tax revenue... Are they the same as far as taxes are concerned? If 
your income is higher than the average will you be taxed at the same rate? Shouldn’t it be that as your 
income increases, the tax rate should also increase? That is why I did not choose number 3. For 
instance, in the case of Lucio Tan, he has a lot of income. Say the tax rate is 1.5 per cent and the 
average monthly income is 1 million pesos than all of us above the average will be taxed the same way.
I don’t think that is good. That is why I chose A. Since more than half of the Filipino people are below 
the poverty line so I thought of principle A because in a society you have to give priority to the majority 
-- those below the poverty line so we have to maximise the floor income. I do not believe that when very 
rich people are taxed by the government they tend not to work any more. For example, will you allow 
your business to get bankrupt because you do not want to be taxed by the government? People who 
pay huge amount of taxes still work.
Female Voice 4: The problem with what you are saying is that they will be discouraged to work but 
neither would they be encouraged to go beyond what they should be doing later. They will only work to a 
certain level because beyond that the government will get. So there won’t be anyone to finance the 
additional income needed.
Female Voice 2: If there are some people at the high income level who do not want to work any more 
then there are still many people who will strive and work more. There are poor people because there are 
rich people.
Male Voice: Besides, the key word here is justice. What constitutes justice in a situation which allows 
that set-up to be spared where the rich can adapt? It is easy for the rich to adapt in a system of 
taxation where there is a floor constraint. Even if you deduct money he could adapt because he has 
available resources.
Female Voice 4: In a sense your principle is just for the poor but not tor the rich.
Female Voice 2: I read in the Philippine Constitution that in our tax system in appropriating money the 
poor should be given first priority.
Male Voice: When you say justice the principle should reflect the interest of the majority, isn’t it?
Female Voice 2: And since there are a lot of poor....
Male Voice: In the first place, why are there rich people? That is a by-product of the fact that there are 
other people who are poor. Those income that should go to the poor goes to the rich instead. Isn’t it? If 
that is not the dynamics of it, then why is it that the income which ought to go to the poor are with the 
rich?
Female Voice 1: You can still get rich but not at the expense of the poor.
Female Voice 4: If you look at this issue ideologically our ideas will clash because we have different 
values. If our basis is the point that the rich can adapt, I don’t think...
Female Voice 1: Because if it’s the same percentage, say 10,000 pesos and 5,000 pesos then we take 
out 20 percent from each, won’t that be equitable?
Female Voice 2: So how about the incomes of the rich?
Female Voice 1: So you still want to reduce their incomes at a lower level? So what will their incentive 
be?
Female Voice 2: If you tax only a few people with so many poor people, the income won’t be enough. So 
we would have more taxes.
Female Voice 4: I think that it would be all right if our objective is to make all incomes equal. That would 
be difficult.
Female Voice 2: No, I am not saying that. The resources are just not enough.
Female Voice 1: What you are saying is that in our situation there are so many poor people that if we 
adopt the third principle the amount that we would get if we distribute it would not be enough.
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Female Voice 2: Yes. that is why when you are rich there should be a higher tax rate imposed on you. 
For instance, 10 per cent of one million pesos, 15 per cent of five million pesos. An increase of five per 
cent from one million pesos to five million pesos would give you more resources. But let us check... 
Female Voice 4: In reality could that be done?
Female Voice 2: That is the law. Theoretically, it’s up to the BIR.
Moderator: We are using the Philippine context here. You have to generate tax revenues to help 
certain groups in your society. If you want to subsidise the poor then you have to get the money from 
somewhere. How about the marginally poor? For A, you are helping those in the low income class. 
Female Voice 2: I thought that the low income group are just one group. So, we have high, middle, and 
low. Now I realise that among the low there may also be other levels.
Moderator: So, now we have two As, one B, and three Cs. So, what do you think?
Female Voice 3: In my case...Have you had Social Science 2 already?
Other Voices: No.
Female Voice 3: A philosopher, I forgot who, once said that the concept of justice is such that whatever 
your income is should be based on how much work you put in. So, by maximising the average, as 
stated in the handbook, we assume we are giving everyone as much incentive to produce as possible. 
There will be no redistribution and hence, no taxation. My understanding of this is that your salary 
should be equal to whatever effort you gave. I think in principles A, C, and D you are being taxed when 
you should not be taxed. I think that is unfair. If I earned, for example, 10,000 pesos only and I was 
taxed 20 per cent, why should I subsidise you the poor?
Female Voice 1: But there is, say labour. What you are saying is that whatever effort you give in you 
should be paid accordingly. But usually when you have menial labour or work you usually think why is it 
that I receive very low when i worked long hours and I toiled the field. Why did I only get ten pesos? 
So, if you were a common tao (human being), you would say it is not justified. However, the work you 
did was mechanical. You didn’t use much mental effort. There was not too much process. It is difficult 
to value labour, if we look at it from what we think should be its right value. That should not be the case. 
For example, you swept the floor and you covered a big area. But you only swept the floor. That’s one 
type of work only. For the person who offered his labour, that would hurt him because of the opportunity 
cost of sweeping the floor which he would have used for doing something else. He might have earned 
more. That is the problem with giving a value to that.
Female Voice 3: Why should we give low incomes to that type of work?
Female Voice 1: No, it’s not that.
Female Voice 3: For example, we work equal hours a month. For instance, I am a Metro-Aide and you 
are an executive. We both work eight hours a day. Why is it that...for me, if we work equal hours, no 
matter work you did should not affect what you will earn.
Female Voice 2: His wage is so low compared to the executive who only sits in his office so...
Female Voice 3: The more so that the salary of the executive who does not do anything should not be 
high because he did not earn his salary.
Female Voice 2: Yes, his salary is more than the effort he gives to the job. Why?
Female Voice 1: Differences in the salaries have a value. Probably some people make mistakes in 
forecasting their salaries. Their transaction costs in getting those jobs are high. And demand... 
Moderator: Why is it that there are differences in the salaries of all those who graduated together? Or 
why is it that not all of us graduate? What factor(s) cause(s) this? Some do not even finish high school 
or elementary school. When we are born there is some element which does not put us in the same 
footing. What is that?
Female Voice No. 4: Culture? Culture-bound?
Female Voice 2: Our level of intelligence is not the same. To some degree our productivity, too. So, if 
your level of intelligence would...
Female Voice No. 2: Say that our level of intelligence for a particular point is like this. Of course, if you 
are born poor and the other was born rich both would be able to develop skills even if their level of 
intelligence is not the same. The poor would be constrained...
Female Voice 2: When you are born, people are not equal already.
Moderator: That is what we call as ‘accidents of birth’. When we are born, we did not choose to be born 
poor, or in the middle class, or rich. Others, even if they were born poor, they overcame their plight 
through sheer hard work. However, he had to contend with the fact that he had a few resources. This 
will affect his ability to earn. So, if we relate this to the principles of justice that we are discussing, then 
what may be the effect of ‘accidents of birth’?
Female Voice 4: If a child were born in a squatters' area, he would choose A.
Male Voice: I am part of A.
Female Voice 4: You would choose A definitely.
Male Voice: You would not choose C with a floor constraint.
Female Voice 3: You could choose C too because you would also benefit from it.
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Male Voice: If you look at all the principles, the poor would benefit anyway.
Female Voice 3: What if he was marginally poor?
Female Voice 2: The poor will benefit from number 3 and the rich from number 2.
Female Voice 4: Let’s adopt C. Anyway, the same tax rate will be imposed on everyone. Twenty percent 
for all above the floor constraint for them to sustain the floor constraint. The same percentage rate not 
amount. There is an incentive.
Moderator: How about the range? Why didn’t you discuss the principle with a range constraint?
Female Voice 2: We have not tackled it.
Female Voice 4: Because I don’t want to tackle it any more. (Laughter)
Female Voice 2: Actually, initially it was my first choice.
Moderator: For instance, the gap between the richest and the poorest should not exceed two million 
pesos. That is your policy. What do you think?
Female Voice No. 2: It is not feasible. For some people their income is only 5,000 pesos per month and 
others two million pesos. It would not be possible to make them close such that their difference should 
not exceed a certain amount.
Female Voice No. 4: On the issue of punishing them for that, I think implementation of that policy would 
be difficult. I think it would be cruel.
Female Voice No. 1: For those with a floor constraint, you could help them who worked to receive a 
minimum wage. If you work eight hours a day you will receive a certain amount. My understanding is 
that in maximising the average because there is no taxation, you cannot get this minimum income. You 
tax some groups to subsidise other people when you have a floor constraint.
Moderator: So, what is the group’s choice?
Male Voice: I still want to maximise the floor income.
Female Voice 4: Then what if we propose an alternative principle to the four?
Female Voice 2: In A, isn’t it that in our SFAP [Scholarships and Financial Assistance Program]...! have 
a friend who is not needy at all because their income bracket is high and she pays a little only. It seems 
you can fool the system. I don’t know. Some are studying at the expense of others. Isn’t it?
Male Voice: I don’t know. Maybe it’s a kind of upbringing or my background. I don’t believe in it, 
really...
Moderator: In what?
Male Voice: In C.
Moderator: Why?
Other Voices: Why?
Male Voice: I think that it is not right.
Female Voice 2: Gut feel?
Female Voice 1: Sort of.
Female Voice 4; But as policy-makers, we should...
Male Voice: Yes, yes...
Moderator: What is the difference between A and C?
Male Voice: For one thing in A you are considering the worst-off. I think that you should consider the 
worst-off, isn’t it? Not those in the middle class. Because if you look at it from our side, who are the 
destitute among us? Majority are the peasants because our country is agricultural. From experience, 
whatever wealth our country has comes from the products of peasants and workers.
Female Voice 2: I don’t think that they are the worst-off in the society. The worst-off are in the urban 
areas...in the city.
Female Voice 2: In the poverty line, we should also include those in the rural areas.
Male Voice: The perspective that the worst-off are in the shanties is wrong because the wealth of the 
country comes from the productive forces.
Female Voice 2: Why, do those in the shanties not plant?
Male Voice: That is my point. They do not plant.
Female Voice 5: What is the worst-off group?
Male Voice: What is the work of those in the squatters' area? They are also labourers.
Female Voice 2: At least they work. The worst-off are those who do not have work. They just stand by. 
(Laughter)
Male Voice: But no, because...
Female Voice 5: Whom do you want to help, the farmers or the...
Male Voice: The majority in our society, isn’t it?
Female Voice 5: Who are really worst-off? Can you define what you mean by the term?
Male Voice: Those in the bottom. For example...
Female Voice 4: Who, the farmers?
Male Voice: Of course, they are the majority.
Female Voice 5: Are they really the worst-off group? I don’t think so.
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Female Voice 4: My idea of worst is those who work ten times but who can afford to eat only once. Or 
even work 100 times and eat only once.
Male Voice: It is really the peasants.
Female Voice 4: No, it is not them. There are more worst-off people than them.
Male Voice: Peasants and labourers. It just so happened that in our society they are also the majority. 
Don’t you see that?
Female Voice 2: He is anti-rich.
Male Voice: No, I am not anti-rich.
Female Voice 4: It is not an issue of being anti-rich.
Female Voice 2: Are you anti-people?
Male Voice: Again, I am not anti-rich. This is not a fight against the rich only. You should not direct 
your fight to the person but to the whole system.
Female Voice 4: But that is what you are doing. If you say worst-off, there is a certain group which you 
do not consider also. What of those in the medium low? The marginally poor?
Female Voice 2: I really thought that there were just three levels -- high, medium, and low. The low 
income class would include those in the medium low.
Male Voice: The medium low or middle low...
Female Voice 2: I was thinking the low income class might be too dependent. Others say that the poor 
when they already have money they are already contented so they might not work any more. But if you 
give them just a little, maybe that would be okay.
Female Voice 5: At least if you work that would ensure that you would get something to survive based 
on a minimum standard of living. If their incomes are not enough, then the government subsidises. 
Maybe, they won’t complain any more. I think that is feasible.
Other Voices: Yes, so four for C.
Male Voice: Let us go back to the concept of ‘accidents of birth’ - wherein a person is not sure if he 
would be born poor. In C where there is a floor constraint, you still maintain the same social 
stratification. In other words, this means that you still have the rich people and the poor people. Even 
if you uplift the standards of living of people, you still have half of the people rich and half of the people 
who are poor. But when you reach that stage that you are only giving cosmetic surgery to the poor. In 
the eyes of the poor they are still poor. Even if you say that the income that they get or their subsidy 
came from the rich, they are still poor.
Female Voice 1: At least, if that is what happened their situation improved. That’s okay, isn’t it?
Male Voice: Who wants to be poor for the rest of one’s life?
Female Voice 5: It’s up to...Okay, you speak first.
Female Voice 2: What you are saying is that even if the situation is more okay, the person is still poor. 
You are down-grading them. So, what if they are still poor, at least they live okay.
Male Voice: Because knowing that they do not deserve that.
Female Voice 5: Why are you saying that they don’t deserve that? They worked for it.
Male Voice: Okay, justify to me why the rich deserve to be rich. For instance, the capitalists who have 
the buildings constructed, whose labour do they utilise? He provides the investment but who builds the 
structure itself? If there were no labourers...
Female Voice 4: Okay, let me ask you something. Let’s say, we are policy-makers here and what we are 
trying to do here is to come up with a taxation policy or income redistribution policy that is equal. 
Moderator: Fair or just.
Female Voice 4: I mean fair or just. Okay, just. So, what is your idea of a just society? Because if your 
idea of a just society is equal where there is no rich nor poor then it is difficult to come up with a policy. I 
cannot think that way. It’s ideal.
Female Voice 1: If you made all people equal, then who will build the structures?
Female Voice 3: You can still come up with a policy. Even if you were rich or poor, you have to work 
also.
Female Voice 4: If you say an individual can only do this type of work where is the motivation there? 
What if you give the poor a chance to improve the quality of his life? Or maybe the poor becomes worst- 
off? You are giving way for development. The poor when he knows he is poor will work hard to improve 
his standard of living. Rich people, on the other hand, are interested to secure their wealth. This 
means that everyone has a purpose in living.
Female Voice 2: To attain equilibrium, assure a person quality living where he won’t die nor suffer. Just 
right. Everybody should be that way. If he could attain that, then subsidise the person. And how do we 
subsidise, then we tax.
Female Voice 4: The taxation would still be just because if you are rich you can afford to pay 20 per cent 
to 30 per cent of your income.
Female Voice 2: I don’t think we could convince him because he just doesn’t want to listen.
Male Voice: Let’s not go to the nitty-gritty but I can see a loophole in C.
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Female Voice 4: What loophole?
Male Voice: I cannot pinpoint exactly.
Female Voice 5: If you cannot tell us the loophole and it is the most probable then that’s okay already. 
Your opinion is just gut feeling and you cannot explain your basis.
Male Voice: If you see the people around you, the way they suffer...
Female Voice 2: They won’t suffer under C, isn’t it? Because you are giving them a minimum wage. 
Moderator: As policy-makers, you will adopt a policy which you will ensure that it is implemented. For C, 
what would you have to ensure to capture his concern?
Female Voice 4: You will ensure that the taxation is implemented and you can subsidise those who need 
to be subsidised. And the floor constraint...the level should be such that the family would be able to 
survive.
Moderator: What feature should the floor constraint have to capture his concern about the worst-off 
and her concern about incentives?
Female Voice 2: On the floor constraint, you should check it as to the inflation rate.
Other Voices: It should be adjusted.
Moderator: Should it be high or low?
Female Voice 2: It should not be too high.
Female Voice 4: It depends on the situation.
Female Voice 1: It would allow people to live and cover their needs. Food, clothing and shelter, for 
example.
Female Voice 2: Also their health.
Female Voice 1: And education.
Female Voice 4: A decent living which is sustainable.
Moderator: So what you are saying is that your floor constraint will cover the basic needs of everyone -  
that you guarantee such a minimum income and beyond that it would be up to the person?
Female Voice 4: Basic and security. I think it is hard to say basic needs only without security. It would 
mean you cannot sustain your basic needs.
Moderator: Could you elaborate?
Female Voice 4: Health and education. You need that later. Basic is just food, clothing and shelter but 
with security at least their options would be maximised.
Male Voice: Coming from the perspective that we are acting as policy-makers, I can now see the 
loophole.
Female Voice 4: What?
Male Voice: For example, if you were the policy-maker and you are to adopt such a policy that would not 
be possible. For instance, in my case...are congressmen included here...those who enact the law? 
Moderator: Yes.
Male Voice: I think it is not possible for me, a Member of Congress, to allow taxation of the rich with a 
floor constraint. I will not pass a law that I would be the first one affected.
Female Voice 4: The more that I will not pass a tax that would go to unknown workers that you were 
referring to.
Female Voice 5: Who will determine these workers in the first place? That is the difficulty with your 
proposal.
Male Voice: But you can still follow them up outside the...I just don’t like that principle. (Laughter) 
Female Voice 2: I think he is really biased. He admits he doesn’t want C so whatever we do he just 
doesn’t want to agree. Even if he has no reason...
Female Voice 5: I doubt it if we could convince him.
Female Voice 2: I told you he is biased.
Female Voice 1: Problem which I can see with is in the table.
Male Voice: I can see a positive thing about it. You can...It is as you are not limited to lobbying for 
reforms through policy-making struggles. You can do other things, aside from that which has to do with 
the tax system, if you are biased to it.
Female Voice 1: With what? A?
Male Voice: Yes.
Other Voices: A?
Female Voice 4: When you look at A you look at it as an ideology. I am looking at A as a policy-maker. 
What is feasible? My problem is that...
Male Voice: But policy is always influenced by ideology.
Female Voice 4: Of course.
Female Voice 2: Look at it this way whatever our decision is, it should be implementable regardless of 
our interests. If it is implemented, what will happen?
Female Voice 1: It seems you do not pity the worst-off because this group...
Male Voice: If you look at it, you can implement all if...
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Female Voice 5: But look at the results...If we adopt A, what would happen? If C, then what? What is 
the best?
Male Voice: Still A.
Female Voice 2: A is good but it is not feasible especially in the Philippines.
Female Voice 4: What do you mean?
Female Voice 5: In A, who will determine the worst-off? That’s the problem.
Female Voice 2: Statistics.
Male Voice: The people themselves.
Female Voice 5; What do you mean by statistics?
Female Voice 2: The true facts. You would look at a person’s salary, the number of children, if...
Male Voice 1: Actually, it is not only statistics. Statistics can be easily produced.
Female Voice 2: The true statistics.
Male Voice: Yes. Statistics which are not only those recorded but from your experience. If you are 
exposed to...
Female Voice 4: Are you referring to our own experience?
Male Voice: Not only you but also those around you. If you are exposed to people who are worst-off, 
you will feel what they feel and then you would tend to adopt that standpoint.
Female Voice 5: I think it is also selfish to look at your own standpoint only. Consider everyone not only 
others.
Male Voice: That’s unfair because today...
Female Voice 2: In any policy not everybody is happy. There are policies which make people happy or 
unhappy.
Female Voice 5: But let us see which policy would make most people happy. Not only the poor people. 
Female Voice 2: What policy is feasible? What would be allowed by the majority? Not only the poor 
because we also have those in the medium low income class.
Other Voices: Yes.
Female Voice 5: Also, the problem with definitions. Who will decide?
Female Voice 2: You are only helping those in the low income class.
Female Voice 4: I am also exposed to such a reality. Okay, maybe all of us. If you live in a poor urban 
area, you see them every day of your life. How would you be able to see them? It is not because you 
pity them that you protect these people. By doing that, you are not protecting them from themselves. 
Because, we can not focus on helping them only. And...
Male Voice: But with a floor constraint, that is what is happening. You pity these people.
Other Voices: No.
Female Voice 4: They still have to work.
Male Voice: Where will you get what you will give to them?
Female Voice 4: You tax those in the upper-income bracket and subsidise the poor. The rich won’t 
know that the tax went to specific persons. That should be your outlook -- that when you are rich you 
will think my money went to these persons. What I can see in A -  what others say that there are people 
who are poor and you give them money. In effect...
Moderator: Why should the government ensure that there is a minimum income?
Female Voice 2: Because it is the workers who produce goods in their factories.
Female Voice 1: And it would raise social chaos.
Female Voice 4: The danger of...poverty.
Female Voice 5: Political instability. If the society is not stable, then...
Female Voice 2: There would often be rallies by the people.
Female Voice 3: Isn’t it that in A, if I were the most poor, I would look at it as charity? It’s too much 
charity. In C, give me an assurance that if I work this number of hours I’d live a decent living. My life 
would be better. And I have a chance I would not feel I am indebted to you that you gave me this and 
that. The tendency is that you would look down on me if we adopt A. I am the worst-off person and I 
was given something.
Female Voice 4: It seems you are working against the persons you wanted to protect. Isn’t it?
Moderator: So what now?
Male Voice: Votation. (Laughter)
Other Voices: Five is to one.
Male Voice: Okay, five is to one.
Female Voice 5: Because you just don’t want C no matter how good our arguments are.
Moderator: You may still want to think and discuss if you wish. Do you?
Female Voice 4: No, his mind is closed.
Male Voice: It is not that I have closed my mind. That’s my conviction, so that’s it. Who are the 
majority in the Philippine society -- is it the worst-off or the medium-low?
Female Voice 4: But what will happen there? There would be chaos.
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Male Voice: No. If I give priority to the worst-off then next the medium low. It is not possible to just help 
the worst-off only.
Female Voice 3: Until they are the same?
Female Voice 2: But in principle A, you are only concerned with the worst-off.
Male Voice: But isn’t it that the medium-low may go down to the level of the worst-off, isn’t it?
Female Voice 4: For a time. In principle A, there is such a possibility.
Female Voice 2: Then some people will get angry.
Female Voice 4: C would also capture the worst-off.
Moderator: Why?
Male Voice: I don’t think so.
Moderator: Think about it.
Female Voice 5: He just won’t concede.
Female Voice 2: Give us an example.
Moderator: Why do you think C will not capture the worst-off?
Male Voice: No. I just don’t like C. (Laughter)
Other Voices: Well, that is not allowed.
Male Voice: Why not? I am not convinced with your arguments.
Moderator: I want to hear your arguments.
Other Voices: Who knows? You might even convince us. Come on.
Moderator: I also want to learn from what you are saying. If you are just answering this way because 
you are not open to other people’s ideas, that’s another case.
Other Voices: Come on.
Male Voice: For me I equate justice with democracy. So, when you are democratic...
Female Voice 4: But you are not democratic with A.
Male Voice: When you are democratic, it’s the majority over the minority. Who are your majority?
Female Voice 1: The working class is not the majority.
Female Voice 4: In the definition of A, they are not the majority because it looks only on the worst-off. 
Male Voice: When you have such a narrow definition of worst-off that is far from reality.
Female Voice 4: Then we are changing the principle. Think of a new principle.
Female Voice 5: What you are saying is that this is the principle but you are expanding it to something 
else and you insist on it. The principle tells us...
Female Voice 2: The principles have a limited definition.
Female Voice 4: Now, you have to convince me to adopt A but do not change definitions.
Female Voice 3: Isn’t it that the interest of A is that when you raise the income level of A then you don’t 
have a problem any more? How about those in the middle low? If their incomes cannot sustain a decent 
living, then what would happen to them?
Female Voice 2: Also, most of those who are worst-off, they do not work. More of the medium low.
Male Voice: Same as those in the high income bracket.
Female Voice 4: It is not true that the rich do not really work. They cannot afford not to work in the long 
run.
Female Voice 1: There are a lot of poor people who are happy. As long as they can eat, give what their 
child needs, and to have some security. The rich are in fact insecure. They are not better-off 
compared to the poor who are happy.
Female Voice 4: And money is not an assurance of happiness. Especially when you are very rich, you 
are not contented. Here we are coming up with a policy where there is security and addresses the basic 
needs. If you are not happy with that, then...
Moderator: Since this group has to adopt a principle by the majority rule, what would be the floor level 
that your group will adopt? Say, a monthly income for a single individual.
Female Voice 4: It depends on where the person lives.
Moderator: On the average, whether in MetroManila or outside MetroManila.
Female Voice 2: A minimum income per month. For me, 30,000 pesos.
Female Voice 3: Seven thousand pesos.
Female Voice 4: Ten thousand pesos for security.
Moderator: What do you notice when the floor constraint is set at a high level?
Female Voice 1: A larger amount will be deducted. (Laughter)
Moderator: If it’s too high, you have to give up some options and revenues. So you have to come up 
with a ‘reasonable’ floor constraint. And what is ‘reasonable’? Define it yourselves.
Female Voice 4: ‘Reasonable’ means it would allow a person to survive by providing security and some 
basic needs.
Moderator: How much would that be?
Female Voice 4: Six thousand pesos.
Moderator: Does everybody agree?
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Female Voice 5: Would that be enough?
Male Voice: There are some people who are earning 8,000 pesos a month. In such a set-up there are 
still a lot of poor people.
Female Voice 5: Are they still poor with 8,000 pesos a month?
Female Voice 1: Per individual?
Female Voice 5: Maybe they live beyond their means.
Female Voice 4: One day they live like millionaires. That’s their way of life.
Female Voice 5: Yes.
Female Voice 3: Six thousand pesos a month. Would that be okay?
Female Voice 5: I am not sure.
Other Voices: I think that is okay.
Female voice 3: Flow much is the minimum wage in the Philippines?
Female Voice 3: What if you are renting? Say, 8,000 pesos.
Moderator: It seems you have to decide between 6,000 pesos and 8,000 pesos.
Other Voices: Perhaps, 8,000 pesos.
Female Voice 2: Isn’t it that when the minimum wage is too high then the employers might lay off 
workers.
Moderator: That’s possible.
Female Voice 2: It is better to have more people with jobs.
Female Voice 4: You are just alone. If you are alone, do not rent an apartment on your own. Stay in a 
boarding house.
Female Voice 2: For food and...
Female Voice 4: One hundred eighty-five pesos a day for food and some additional for security. I bet 
they did not assess that because they are not concerned with that.
Voices: I think 185 pesos a day would be enough. Pay for insurance, too.
Female Voice 2: The rich might complain.
Moderator: So what now?
Female Voice 4: Eight thousand pesos, but it seems to be high.
Female Voice 2: No lay-off of workers, remember?
Female Voice 5: Isn’t 8,000 pesos too high?
Other Voices: That’s all right.
END
(Outside MM Students - Group 4) 13 February 1997 230 PM - 400 PM
Moderator: How many of you chose A as their first choice? None. B? None. C? Three. And D? One. 
Explain why you chose D.
Female Voice 1: I have chosen D because it assures that the range or the difference between the 
highest and the lowest is per a specified amount only. So, can I explain outside the...
Moderator: Yes.
Female Voice 1: Another reason why I chose D is because most of societal problems are induced by the 
differences between the highest income earners and the lowest income earners. So if you want to 
minimise the difference then most probably the problems in relation to that difference will be more or 
less discarded.
Moderator: For those who chose C, why did you choose C?
Male Voice 1: I chose C because there must be at least a minimum income distribution.
Moderator: A minimum income guaranteed to everyone? Why?
Male Voice 1: To at least effect probably equality in incomes.
Moderator: Maybe equitable? You, why did you choose C?
Female Voice 2: Because I think if you have a minimum floor more are better off than the average. 
Moderator: More people will be better-off? Which segment of the population are you referring to?
Female Voice 2: The lower income class.
Moderator: How about you, why did you choose C?
Male Voice 2: Can I speak in Tagalog?
Moderator: Yes. (Laughter)
Male Voice 2: The lower class are ensured that they will receive shall we say a minimum income which 
would be okay for them. [Translated]
Moderator: So they chose C because they want to guarantee this minimum income. But why should this 
minimum income be given? She said to benefit the lower income class. Do you share the same view? 
Male Voice 2: Yes.
Moderator: But A benefits the low income class. Why did you choose C over A?
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Male Voice 2: Because C is more justified. It is not biased. It is also fair to the high, medium high, 
medium, and medium low income classes.
Moderator: I noticed that the three of you chose D as your second choice. So, why did you choose C 
over D?
Male Voice 1: Because D looks at the difference between the highest and the lowest incomes or the in- 
between levels while in letter C you are maximising the average at the same time there is a floor 
constraint.
Moderator: How about you? D is your second choice. Why did you choose C over D?
Male Voice 1: Because I was looking at the prescribed constraint. You are setting a stability in the 
income or money received. Why C over D? Because...
Moderator: They both maximise the average but one has a floor constraint while the other has a range 
constraint.
Male Voice 1: You can establish up to what level a person’s income will go down.
Moderator: Why is it necessary for their income not to go down a certain level?
Male Voice 1: Because you have to consider the stability of income.
Moderator: Stability of income?
Male Voice 1: And the stability of society as well. Because if your income is very low...
Female Voice 1: The reason I chose C over D is that the incomes of those in the highest income levels 
are too high as compared to those at the floor level. So, those who are at the floor levels are relatively 
at a disadvantage compared to those in the highest.
Moderator: What can the others say about that? She said that it is a disadvantage...because there is a 
very wide disparity between the highest and the lowest income levels.
Male Voice 1: You cannot avoid having rich people earning high incomes. What is happening now is 
they monopolise businesses. You cannot stop them in the sense that what they want... You do not 
have any right to stop them if they want to earn more.
Moderator: What can you say about C?
Female Voice 1: But in that sense the reason they chose C is to improve or stabilise the position of the 
lowest earners. However, they will still be prone to abuse by the highest income earners because, for 
example, their income is very high as compared to those at the floor level. If you allow these two forces 
to fight it off those who are within the floor constraint are at a disadvantage although you won’t go below 
the floor constraint.
Moderator: So think of a peso figure, a monthly income, where you can say that there should only be a 
disparity of X amount between the highest income class and the lowest income class. Can you think of 
such a figure?
Female Voice 1: Thirty thousand pesos.
Moderator: Do you mean to say that incomes will be redistributed such that entrepreneurs cannot earn 
more than 30,000 pesos as compared to the lowest income class? Do you think that is possible? 
Female Voice 1: That is possible but it is not beneficial. Instead of saying that the range should be 
constant, if the high income earners increase their incomes then the incomes of those below should 
also increase. As long as the range is...
Moderator: So, you would also raise the incomes of those below as your high income earners increase 
their incomes?
Female Voice 1: Yes.
Moderator: So what do the others think about that?
Male Voice 2: It is difficult to maintain a constant range constraint which she said. You cannot avoid 
the attitude of those in the highest income levels who are very eager to earn more.
Moderator: Who else wants to add?
Male Voice 1: My point is that we are setting the standard such that the income should not go down a 
certain level but you could still improve. That is why you do not have a ceiling or a range constraint so 
that there is an improvement. At the same time you are preventing the income to fall so that their 
incomes will not go down too low. I am interested in improvement and progress.
Male Voice 2: The possibility that you stop people from earning more than a certain amount is difficult. 
The possibility that you raise the income of those below to attain that constant is...also difficult 
because you consider their attitude to work and you give them a salary higher than their work or not 
commensurate to their work.
Moderator: What can you say about that?
Female Voice 1: The advantage of C is somehow the disadvantage of D. It seems that it is possible to 
maintain the range but it is the way to ensure the...My basis is if there is a disparity or greater disparity 
between the highest and the lowest incomes the society will not be stable. There will always be a 
pressure...
Moderator: He said that if there is no floor constraint the more that there won’t be stability because it is 
possible that those in the lowest income levels will be...
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Female Voice 1: Exploited...
Moderator: Exploited or they might get angry, is that so?
Female Voice 1: Do we really have to choose one [principle] only? Because, if you combine the two 
[principles] you will maximise the benefit. For example, you decide on a floor constraint and within that 
or beyond that, there will be nothing more. When it increases, the range should be 30,000 pesos for 
example. You are not suggesting zero income. There is a floor as well as a range constraint. Their 
combination is the best in relation to...
Moderator: What you are saying is that there is a floor constraint and the range is managed. What do 
the others think?
Female Voice 1: Still D with the qualification that no one gets zero income.
Male Voice 2: That is why when you said that no one will get zero such is not possible because there is 
a possibility for that to happen.
Female Voice 1: The others should convince me!
Moderator: He said that if you raise the incomes of those at the lowest levels you would be giving them 
money even if they do not work because you raised their incomes to a high level. So, those who want to 
work are demotivated because there are a lot of free-riders.
Female Voice 1: I can see the advantage of C.
Moderator: So, what is in C? Is it easy to set a floor constraint in C?
Male Voice 2: Easier compared to D because in D you have to argue on what income level is high and 
what is low.
Moderator: So when you decide as a Committee member you have to broaden your perspective. What if 
I was rich, poor, or in the middle class? That is how you decide.
Male Voice 2: That is why at the start you would have to agree on the range. What is the upper bound? 
The lower bound? Then you deduct or subtract one from the other to get the range constraint. You 
would have to argue on the income levels.
Male Voice 1: On the issue of free-riders, you will give the lower income people salaries higher than 
what they worked for. Perhaps, if you look at their ratio or the percentage to those who work maybe 
that would be minimal. The reason you work is that you want to improve your life...isn’t it? To survive 
and not to rely on those who work. So, in setting the floor constraint, you are giving a person an initial 
sum where he could start off.
Moderator: A starting point?
Male Voice 1: Yes.
Moderator: If you were a single individual and let’s talk of a monthly income, this start-off point, how 
much would that be if you were setting the constraint?
Male Voice 1: Annual?
Moderator: Monthly?
Male Voice 1: Around 20,000 pesos.
Moderator: Do you agree with such an amount? You are saying that you will give all the working age 
population 20,000 pesos each as a minimum guarantee. Is it high, too low, or what?
Female Voice 1: It depends on the prices.
Moderator: Prices, yes?
Male Voice 1: It depends on the economic situation of the country. If you are industrialised, then that 
would be too low.
Moderator: We are using the Philippine context.
Male Voice 1: Philippine context? (Laughter) Perhaps, that would still be low if we are talking of an 
ordinary worker.
Moderator: A minimum income.
Male Voice 1: So say, 10,000 pesos.
Moderator: Do you agree?
Female Voice 2: Yes.
Female Voice 1: It depends on the buying capacity of the money in the Philippines.
Moderator: In today’s pesos. You can say too low or too high depending on what kind of expenses you 
are thinking of. What would that cover?
Female Voice 1: If you were single and you don’t own your house you have to rent.
Moderator: Rental, okay.
Female Voice 1: Food, every day.
Moderator: For an average Filipino, whether you are in the rural or urban areas, how much should that 
minimum income be?
Female Voice 2: The lifestyle in the urban areas differs from that in the rural areas.
Moderator: Think of government policy now. There is such a term called minimum wage, isn’t it? It 
works like a floor constraint because you are saying that this is a minimum amount. The minimum wage 
that is adopted in the urban and rural areas differs. It also differs between skilled and unskilled,
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agricultural and non-agricultural, etc. So, it is possible to set a floor constraint. For instance, how much 
should a Filipino earn, in today’s pesos, to cover what you said, food, clothing, shelter, transportation, 
and other utilities? Flow much?
Male Voice 2: The minimum wage set by the government, is how much? One hundred pesos plus per 
day is okay.
Moderator: One hundred eighty-five pesos a day. So, if you round it off to 200 pesos and given 30 days 
that is 6,000 pesos a month.
Male Voice 2: That’s okay.
Other Voices: Okay.
END
(MM Government Employees - Group 2) DSWD 21 January 1997 1115 AM - 100 PM
Moderator: Okay, so per the process, A versus B? Who wants A? None. So, A is out? No one wants 
to maximise the floor income? B versus C? Flow many want B? One. Flow many Cs? Two. How about 
you?
Female Voices: D.
Moderator: Okay, we have two Ds, two Cs, and one B. You have to arrive at an unanimous decision. 
Okay?
Female Voice 2: Maximise the average income subject to a range constraint because there is a 
possibility that there is a zero income based on maximising the income of the individual. As such, you 
will really be able to see the situation happening in the community. Why did the person get zero 
income? Because you will see from the lowest to the highest.
Male Voice 1: Are you saying that the process is systematic?
Female Voice 2: Yes, the process is systematic. You can see the truth of what is really happening at 
present.
Moderator: Your role here is that you are the policy-makers who will set the principle. So, if that is the 
principle that you will impose on the society, are you saying that it is possible that in your society there 
are those who may receive zero incomes?
Female Voice 2: That is possible. As a policy-maker you can see what is wrong with the situation. 
Female Voice 1: Besides, it is natural...it is realistic...That there are people in the community who do 
not have incomes.
Female Voice 2: Now, you have to adopt an action that would make it possible to remove this situation. 
Female Voice 1: If you do not act then nothing will happen.
Moderator: At the moment, you will already choose a principle given that you have already assessed 
the situation. So, imagine that you have already assessed the situation and that there is a possibility 
that some people will receive zero incomes. So, you have to agree among yourselves what policy 
should we adopt to have a just income distribution in Philippine society. So how about the Cs, what can 
you say?
Female Voice 2: So, we have already assessed the situation today?
Moderator: Yes, you have already assessed the situation. So, what principle should policy-makers 
adopt for the rest of the society for the income distribution to be just or fair to all?
Male Voice 1: Me, I like B because I do not like anyone to receive zero.
Female Voice 1 and Male Voice 2: It is possible to have zero income in B.
Female Voice 1: Two persons, one receiving zero and the other one million pesos, their average is 
500,000 pesos.
Male Voice 2: You are only getting the average income.
Female Voice 1: The government should have a policy such as income-generating projects for 
individuals with no jobs or with no income so that the distribution is clean or fair.
Moderator: As policy-makers, you are already in-charge of income distribution and you are with the 
government. Your role is to adopt a policy for distributing income. It is already your group who will 
decide to adopt such a policy.
Male Voice 2: Are we not considering inflation here?
Moderator: You may consider it.
Male Voice 2: Okay, I chose C because given the Philippine context and to be realistic there is really 
zero income. So, the proposal is to maximise the average with a floor constraint that means incomes 
will be distributed in such a way that every Filipino will have a fixed income - a minimum income. That is 
why I chose C because we all know there are those who get zero income and with C they will have 
purchasing power. They should also partake of the wealth.
Male Voice 3: In C, it could be shown clearly what really is the floor income of each individual. From 
there, we maximise the average income. For example, we have already determined the floor constraint,
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the lowest possible income of every Filipino, then we can maximise the average from the floor. That is 
how I understand it.
Moderator: So what can the Ds and B say?
Female Voice 1: We are sticking to D. (Laughter)
Moderator: How about you, sir?
Male Voice 1: B, maybe D. They should justify their choice.
Moderator: So, why D? Given that you have to now decide a principle of justice, why D? Think of peso 
values. For your range constraint, it means that the high income earners should not earn more than x 
amount over the lowest income earners. Think of a peso figure. So, the two of you have to set a range 
constraint. What range do you think should be the difference between the highest and the lowest 
[incomes]? So, how much is your range constraint?
Female Voice 1: Is it not that the gap between the richest and the poorest is wide?
Moderator: So, how much?
Male Voice 1: I think that is not realistic.
Moderator: Why?
Male Voice 1: Because you cannot control the purchasing power and the earning capacity of a person. 
They are not the same for everyone.
Moderator: So what do the others think?
Male Voice 2: It depends on the economy that we have. For example, if the Communist Party ruled over 
our country, then we can dictate how much. In Russia and China, for instance, the State can decide 
the clothes that you will wear, the food that you will eat, and how much money you will have. I will give 
an example. For D, there is a possibility of having zero incomes. You will have to set the range between 
the rich and the poor. Say for example, for D, the two of you are rich and I am poor. Your income is one 
peso and mine is zero. Our purchasing power is small in money value because the difference is small. 
Whereas, in C, what we are pushing here is that at least all of us have something. Regardless if you are 
very rich or not, all of us will not go below say, for instance our floor constraint is 6,000 pesos or 10,000 
pesos a month. This means that each of us would not earn less than say, 10,000 pesos a month. The 
only choices here are between earning zero income and all of us earning something.
Female Voice 1: You did not consider in your idea that the range changes depending on your 
responsibilities and educational qualifications. That is why your salary is higher. For instance, your 
salary is higher than mine because you have more responsibilities.
Male Voice 3: In C there should be a floor constraint or the lowest income. We are not saying that your 
salary should be higher than that. So, we set a floor constraint that is the lowest. It could go up.
Male Voice 1: The reason I do not want C or D is that I do not believe that it is possible economically. 
You cannot control the earning power of a person who wants to earn. If you can control it then we can 
have a constraint.
Moderator: It is up to you to set that as a policy.
Male Voice 2: It is only up to our imagination.
Male Voice 1: Oh, I see. It depends on...
Moderator: Look at what is happening in the Philippines. There is an instrument for setting a floor. What 
instrument do you think is being used by our government?
Male Voice 1: The government promises to help but this is not true. For instance, it [the government] 
provides pensions on instalment basis when it can pay for it in cash.
Moderator: That is, given that you already have incomes. If you do not have incomes, for instance, 
what law or policy am I referring to? The minimum wage law.
Voices: Oh, yes, the minimum wage law.
Female Voice 1: That is for those who are earning only. For those who are not?
Moderator: We are talking of incomes here.
Male Voice 1: What about those who do not work? What is the guarantee that we can give an income to 
all the people?
Male Voice 2: In the Philippines, it may be hard to apply. But we should come up with an agreement. In 
other countries with welfare states...
Moderator: It is possible that the government provides non-cash benefits. Even if you do not have a 
job, if you impute the value of the services that the government provides, there is a value to it. For 
example, the peso value of free primary education.
Male Voice 1: If you have free housing, you monetise that.
Moderator: In the case of low-cost housing, the government provides a subsidy.
Male Voice 3: If you do not have a job, at least you have a monthly income.
Male Voice 1: In the Philippines, the problem is that laws are not followed. That is your constraint. Too 
many laws which are not followed. We should come up with a democratic society.
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Moderator: So, imagine that you are the policy-makers now. What policy will you adopt? So still two Cs, 
two Ds, and still one B?
Male Voices 2 and 3: Still C.
Male Voice 1: If you talk of a range constraint, people will not really agree to that?
Male Voice 2: Ideally, letter C. In other countries, for example, Canada and Australia that are welfare 
states, everybody gets benefits. The government is serving its people the best that they can. Not like 
in the Philippines, here the disparity between the richest and the poorest is very wide despite the 
constitutional provision that income and wealth should be redistributed. So, we go for C. This is a 
Utopia but at least we are entitled to a welfare state.
Moderator: So, what do the others think?
Female Voice 1: We can find a way out of the zero incomes.
Male Voice 3: It is not possible to subsidise everybody.
Female Voice 1: Provide income-generating projects for those who do not have jobs.
Male Voice 3: It depends on the skill and the acceptability. Even if you give to them these projects, if 
they do not want to work, so?
Male Voice 1: However, most of the people prefer what you call ‘instant’. So, it is difficult to adopt a 
policy.
Male Voice 2: What is your ideal society? Let us forget the Philippine context. Start from nothing. So, 
you create your society. Say, given B, why do you want such kind of distribution for your ideal society. 
How would you explain that?
Male Voice 1: I was thinking of a society where all our incomes are divided equally. Very ideal...equally 
distributed.
Male Voice 3: Is their effort equally distributed, also?
Male Voice 1: No.
Male Voice 3: If not, is that fair?
Male Voice 1: Some of them will have different abilities.
Male Voice 2: I do not think that is fair. Your format is a communist society.
Male Voice 1: Yes, it is communist.
Female Voice 2: I do not support that. Because under a communist society not everybody does the 
same thing. So, for instance my neighbour works differently from me and we receive the same income. 
Those who are occupying high positions give the orders and those below follow orders and they are the 
ones who work. Those who give orders just sit down. So, if you do not look at that angle, how could we 
say that incomes are distributed equally?
Male Voice 1: Okay, it is hard to see. Everything starts from a need. Say, our gross national income. 
Now, how do we distribute it such that there is no one who will be unable to eat.
Male Voice 2: That is why we go for C because of that situation. Since everybody has a need so 
everyone has something to sustain that need. In our society, the powerful overcomes the weak. The 
more powerful can overcome the weak because of these inequalities as well as the deficiencies of the 
weak. So, the government should at least provide the person protection, everything so that a person 
can live decently. Because in any society, if you are the most educated or most trained, you will 
achieve a status and you will be more powerful. So, the more powerful can defeat the weaker ones and 
this is the example in the Philippine context. So, the rich become richer and the poor loses more 
because there is no redistribution. So, all individuals receive an income for the person to live decently. 
The reason we are against D is that you are suppressing the individual from becoming richer according 
to what he earns. For example, if you are hardworking and I am against the policy that you can only get 
those properties because you have reached a certain level. So, if you still want to work, you become 
less motivated to improve yourself such that you could have helped improve your economy.
Male Voice 1: What I was thinking of was a utopian society. Not everybody would agree to that. Only a 
minority thinks that way. That is called Utopia.
Moderator: Think of the stability of the society. When you adopt a principle, there should not be chaos. 
If there is chaos as well as instability, the policy-makers may also lose their jobs.
Male Voice 3: The people should be satisfied with your policy.
Male Voice 1: Yes, if you think of what is ideal. However, it is difficult to look into the issue of 
competitiveness given the utopian state.
Moderator: So what is your group’s decision? (Laughter) If you could not decide, then I will choose. 
Were you convinced by the D people? Do you think you will end up with a majority rule?
Male Voice 1: No.
Male Voice 2: One more C and we are okay.
Moderator: What if you were the ones who got into the low income bracket or due to ‘accidents of birth’ 
you were born poor? We are not sure that we are all rich.
Male Voice 2: Have you accepted that you get zero while in our society all of us have some money? 
Male Voice 1: That is why I did not choose D.
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Moderator: In B, you may also get zero income.
Male Voice 1: How come?
Moderator: In B, if you receive zero and I earn one million divided by two, we have an average of 
500,000 pesos. Your argument does not support B.
Male Voice 1: Why?
Moderator: Because you can get zero income. If you earn zero and I earn one million pesos our average 
income is 500,000 pesos. We can maximise the average income but your income is zero. So?
Male Voice 1: Who am I protecting?
Moderator: You said you prefer an equal distribution?
Male Voice 1: Yes.
Moderator: It is not among the four. It is not the same as B.
Male Voice 1: What rule allows equal distribution of income?
Moderator: None.
Male Voice 1: So, my choice is not among the four.
Male Voice 2: The income distribution may be equal but the effort is not equal. How is that? If the 
income distribution is equal and the effort is equal, then that’s okay.
Moderator: Again, think of the stability of your society. As policy-makers you lose your jobs in less 
than a week’s time.
Male Voice 1: I really think my ideas are not of this world.
Moderator: In reality, an equal distribution of income is not possible. Because even if I work hard and 
the other person just sleeps, we would earn the same income.
Male Voice 1: Such is possible in a Utopian society.
Male Voice 2: For the sake of argument, then? We are left with two principles. C or D?
Male Voice: I will stick with the range constraint or D.
Moderator: If D, what is your peso figure for the range constraint?
Male Voice 2: What is the difference between the earnings of the richest and the poorest?
Moderator: If you had the Ayalas or Zobels earning two million pesos a month, they should not exceed 
the income of the lowest income class by how much? For the range, you have to set a range amount. 
Male Voice 2: So, what is your range?
Male Voice 1: Fifty thousand pesos a month. Because, as you increase the high [the maximum income] 
you should also increase the low [minimum income]. That [range] will not be too high.
Male Voice 2: Say higher figures, one million pesos, zero income, and 50,000 pesos.
Male Voice 1: For instance, the salary standardisation law for government employees.
Moderator: We are looking at the whole society.
Male Voice 1: The objective of the salary standardisation law is to make the salaries of government 
employees closer to those in the private sector. What happened is that people on top moved 
elsewhere.
Moderator: Salary standardisation is one way of adopting principle D because you are reducing the 
disparity in incomes across government offices and between the government and the private sector. 
The 'good' employees availed of the Early Retirement Law. Most of them went to business.
Male Voice 2: We should consider our basic needs. Very basic. That will be our floor. Say, 50,000 
pesos a month to meet all your requirements. Then, that is the minimum depending on the status of our 
economy. So, if the economy is good or as our Gross National Product increases, the minimum income 
rises. Because the target of government is 1,000 dollars per capita by the year 2000 so it will ensure 
that every individual will earn that much. What we are saying is that we want to make sure and secure 
that we will receive something no matter what happens. The government will provide that.
Male Voice 1: The government already has a concept of basic needs.
Male Voice 2: Yes, that just shows that such is what our families need.
Male Voice 1: Oh, is that so?
Male Voice 2: Of course, the rich will not agree readily to this scheme. The government should find 
ways of generating a huge income to sustain the Social Reform Agenda. Not so easy to say that 
incomes and wealth are equal. It takes much political will.
Male Voice 1: My perspective is very narrow.
Moderator: So, as policy-makers, you have to be broad-minded. You should see all aspects.
Male Voice 2: For the best interest of the people, perhaps we adopt management by objective? 
Moderator: Do you agree with maximising the average with a floor constraint of 10,000 pesos?
Male Voice 1: I agree as long as the poorest receive money.
Other Voices: Of course, they will be covered.
Moderator: How about the two others?
Female Voices: Okay.
Moderator: So, how much, 6,000 pesos or 10,000 pesos?
Female Voice 1: Six thousand pesos is too small. Ten thousand pesos, then.
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Female Voice 2: Realistic only. Basic needs -- food, clothing, and shelter. It depends on the number of 
children. Ten thousand pesos is not enough.
Moderator: If you talk of so many children, it would depend on for instance, how many family members 
work. So to simplify things, let us say for a single individual.
Female Voice 2: Ten thousand pesos.
Female Voice 1: Ten thousand pesos also.
Male Voice 2: Realistically, 1,300 dollars per capita. How much was the minimum amount that the NEDA 
set for a family of six?
Moderator: Let us stick to individual incomes. So?
Male Voice 1: Okay, 10,000 pesos then.
END
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Female Voice 1: (Laughter) Maybe, we should start from our first choice in our last ranking. We might 
have the same number one choice so we may not have a long discussion.
Female Voice 2: Me, I am consistent with B from the first ranking to the last.
Female Voice 3: Me, too. B. You?
Male Voice: In the last ranking I chose D.
Female Voice 1: You?
Female Voice 4: I have consistently chosen D. You?
Female Voice 5: Average income, also.
Female Voice 1: So, there are already three Bs and two Ds.
Moderator: So, why B and D?
Female Voice 2: Let us concentrate on those two.
Moderator: Now assume that you are policy-makers who are here to adopt a principle of distributive 
justice for the rest of the Philippine society.
Female Voice 2: I should think of myself, too.
Female Voice 1: Our goal should be noble. (Laughter)
Female Voice 2: Okay, assume that we are noble.
Female Voice 1: Pretend you were God. (Laughter)
Moderator: So, for those who chose D can you think of a possible range constraint where the disparity 
between high and low should not exceed that amount in the Philippine context? Do you think that it is 
possible to stop the rich from earning beyond a certain amount?
Voices: No.
Moderator: Do you think it is a disadvantage to adopt D?
Female Voice 1: What we chose is the ideal and not necessarily looking at the real situation.
Moderator: Think of the real world.
Female Voice 3: Average income? Is that real?
Female Voice 1: Why not C?
Moderator: Why C?
Female Voice 1: Because, you cannot control the range constraint. You are hindering some people, 
being in a democratic country, from aspiring to receive a higher income if they could. It is also a pity for 
the poor. So, there should be floor constraint such that the difference is not too wide...the rich may not 
affect others which is super-super that we do not belong to the same planet.
Moderator: So, who agrees with her?
Female Voice 4: What is C again?
Voices: There is a floor constraint. A minimum income for everyone.
Female Voice 2: Like a minimum wage.
Female Voice 1: Yes, a minimum wage. Just like the present. Number 3.
Female Voice 3: It seems that principle is what we are adopting at present, I think. In my case I chose 
average income because it is somewhat ideal. It is not possible for all effort or everyone to be equally 
skilled and have the same income. What I am always looking at is the maximum amount. So 
mathematically speaking, it is the average income which is the highest. So that has consistently been 
my answer. At first I chose number 3.
Moderator: The third and the fourth also maximise the average but with a constraint.
Female Voice 3: Yes. That is why Numbers 2 and 3 compete in my computation. For my third and fourth 
ranking, I would go for 3. My first two, I chose average income. That is where the distribution of income 
is equitable among all. A mix of ideal and...
Moderator: So, is C okay with you?
Female Voice 3: Yes, I could stretch to C.
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Moderator: How about the others?
Female Voice 1: What is yours?
Female Voice 4: B. My second choice is C.
Female Voice 3: However, my dream is number 2. (Laughter)
Moderator: So, how about the others? Is that okay with you?
Female Voice 2: Perhaps, C because they already chose C.
Moderator: No, it’s not that way. You have to choose your principle.
Female Voice 1: It is boring to just maximise the average. What is the implication of choosing C? 
Moderator: In C there is a floor constraint.
Female Voice 1: In C, if you are more patient, you have a chance to go up. You can work harder 
because you want to earn more and you can be compensated for that with income. That is what I think. 
For me, if your income is the same, I do not think...people want to have something to look at. For 
example all of us we have the same room, R2, but in terms of work, he works harder and I am lazy but 
our income is the same. That’s okay with me and not for him. If we base merit on effort, then I will work 
harder so I can reach his income...is it not? Rather than us having the same income, he could maintain 
or exert more effort for his income to go higher.
Moderator: So if you chose C, in terms of individual incomes on a monthly basis, what would be a 
reasonable floor?
Female Voice 1 and Male Voice: Monthly?
Female Voice 3: Five thousand pesos. (Laughter)
Female Voice 1: Possible.
Female Voice 3: In my case I do not have a family and that’s just an exact amount. I cannot even save 
much. (Laughter)
Female Voice 4: House rental. Food. Is that exact? Let us add some more.
Other Voices: How?
Male Voice: If the floor is 10,000 pesos that is okay if you are in the urban areas. In the provinces, that 
is too much. If we talk of a national floor, the figure would change.
Female Voice 2: I think 10,000 pesos is enough.
Moderator: As you increase the floor at too high a level, you have to give up more income distribution 
options. If you guarantee a minimum income to everyone you have to generate tax revenues to give 
everyone that minimum income.
Female Voice 1: That’s right or else the 10,000 pesos will be in paper only and we cannot provide that. 
Okay, 1,000 pesos then. (Laughter) Joke only! You are too serious.
Female Voice 4: What is the minimum income in the province?
Female Voice 1 :1 do not know. I am not from the AgriCom.
Male Voice: Under the New...(Laughter) 185 pesos a day.
Female Voice 1: For the province, what?
Male Voice: If you are in MetroManila, that’s okay.
Female Voice 2: Six thousand five hundred pesos. That’s okay.
Female Voice 4: Anyway, there are provinces with a high cost of living.
Male Voice: Five thousand pesos, then.
Voices: Okay.
END
(Outside MM Government Employees - Group 3) DA 4 February 1997 230 PM - 315 
PM
Moderator: So, who prefers A? None. Who prefers B? C? Three Cs, one D and one B. So for the Cs, 
since you are the majority, can you explain why you chose C?
Male Voice 1: Do we have to cite the floor constraint?
Moderator: Later.
Male Voice 1: We chose C because it separates the average income but the average income is qualified 
to the floor constraint which will eventually lead to a more equitable distribution of income among the 
populace. With the floor constraint, you can say that you considered the poorest of the poor and the 
poor. It is more of an idealistic choice. (Laughter)
Female Voice 1: As he said, we are giving a guarantee that everyone is provided a minimum amount. I 
think we should really provide a minimum income to everyone especially those who are already working 
so that...
Moderator: To cover what type of needs?
Female Voice 1: To cover all the basic needs.
Moderator: What is your concept of basic needs?
Female Voice 1: Access to education and food.
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Moderator: Does everybody agree? For others, what was your basis for choosing C as your most 
preferred principle?
Female Voice 2: In this particular concept you are ensuring that everybody gets a minimum and the 
average is maximised also.
Moderator: Okay, now let us listen to the other two. After listening to the three, do you agree or do you 
want to change your answer or do you want to stick to your answer? Ms. B, they said that with C you 
also maximise the average. They have also considered getting the highest possible average income. 
However, they subjected it to a floor first. So, do you agree?
Female Voice 3: Yes. (Laughter)
Moderator: So, you agree with them now? How about you, why did you choose D?
Female Voice 4: In D you also consider maximising the average income and the range. When you set it, 
you get the difference between the rich and the poor.
Female Voice 2: It is also possible that some people receive zero income. Is it okay with you for some 
people to receive zero income? No? So, Is C okay with you?
Female Voice 4: Okay.
Moderator: So, if everybody agrees on C, maximising the average subject to a floor, how much monthly 
income could you think of which you guarantee that everyone should receive? It should be a minimum 
because we are guaranteeing every one of our working age population that guaranteed income monthly. 
A single individual or otherwise, we have to consider the number of working members in a family. So, for 
a single individual? Monthly?
Female Voice 1: Five thousand pesos.
Male Voice: That’s too low.
Female Voice 1: A family of six has a poverty threshold of 11,000 pesos.
Moderator: For a single individual.
Female Voice 1: Five thousand pesos.
Moderator: Does everybody agree?
Male Voice: I disagree. That’s too low. Using the present scenario of the Philippine economic situation 
what is ideal is 15,000 pesos a month. That is for a single individual.
Female Voice 1: Have you considered if you have the resources?
Male Voice: The resources are there. It is just a matter of prioritising where the resources go. For 
instance, what government is paying it should not pay yet until you come to recover. So, 15,000 
pesos.
Moderator: So, 15,000 pesos monthly multiplied by 12 annually is 180,000 pesos.
Male Voice: One hundred eighty thousand pesos? Yes, as far as I am concerned.
Female Voice 1: Clothing and food are basic needs.
Moderator: No luxuries?
Female Voice 1: No luxuries. That is not considered a basic need. If we only consider three basic 
needs then we have food at 3,000 pesos, shelter of 1,000 pesos, and clothing of 1,000 pesos, that is, 
already 5,000 pesos. Add 1,000 pesos for utilities. Six thousand pesos, that is, per individual. That is 
the basic. So plus 1,000 pesos for miscellaneous items is 7,000 pesos.
Moderator: So, 7,000 pesos? Does everybody agree?
Female Voice 2: Earlier, we only considered one-half -- the one who will receive. How about the one who 
is providing? Do we have enough resources to pay because we have chosen C? So we are assuming 
that everybody gets an income. Let us say we set the minimum at 15,000 pesos. Then we have to 
exert extra effort in the collection of taxes or some other means.
Moderator: Yes, you have to get the income from somewhere.
Female Voice 2: Consider not only the employees but also the one paying our salaries.
Male Voice: Our employers, that’s right.
Female Voice 2: So let us set the floor at the minimum.
Moderator: So, 7,000 pesos. Does everybody agree? Okay, so we formally agreed on a 7,000 peso 
monthly income. Principle C.
END
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Annex 2 
(Chapter 2)
HANDBOOK A
This handbook concerns people's attitudes to distributive justice. I 
am interested in getting your opinions on a range of issues relating to the 
justice of income redistribution policies where, in an initial situation, you 
are faced with considerable uncertainty as to what future income you may 
receive. Because it is about attitudes there are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers 
to central issues. This handbook does not aim to test your intelligence. 
Your responses will help shed some light on how Filipinos perceive 
distributive justice given considerable uncertainty as to future relevant 
events. The handbook is anonymous so please do not write your name on 
it.
Thank you for your participation.
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The experiment devised here attempts to determine an answer to the following 
question: ‘What is a just distribution of income in a situation where, in the initial situation, 
individuals are faced with considerable uncertainty as to future relevant events?’ The reason 
for posing this question is that the wealth and income any individual in the Philippines will 
have access to during her/his lifetime will be influenced, considerably, by unpredictable 
events and circumstances. Casual observation of Filipino society suggests that this 
uncertainty results in personal incomes being unequally distributed throughout this 
community. Societies can deal with these inequities and risks by adopting suitable income 
redistribution policies. The purpose of the experiment performed here is to attempt to 
determine which redistribution policies are thought to be just in initial situations where 
individuals are faced with considerable uncertainty as to what future level of income they may 
receive. The experiments are constructed in such a way as to face participants in this 
experiment with just such an uncertain situation.
The experiment is divided into three parts.
In the first part of the experiment each of you will be introduced to a few theories of 
justice. To do this you will consider some examples, and make some choices. These choices 
will have real monetary consequences for you. Your pay, or reward, for the first part of the 
experiment will be based on your choices. You will have one hour to complete the first part 
during which time you will be given a series of questions. These questions are merely to 
determine if you have understood the concepts which are being used in the experiment, if 
you do not answer the questions correctly, then you are to go back to the review material and 
correct wrong answers. Once you have mastered the material, you can go on to make 
choices for which you will be paid. If you do not learn the material in a reasonable amount of 
time, you will not be able to earn as much money as possible since you must finish the first 
part of the experiment within one hour. But you should have plenty of time to finish this part 
of the experiment. Everyone will go on to the second part either after one hour or after 
everyone has finished Part 1, whichever occurs first.
In the second part of the experiment you will be asked, as a group, to discuss notions 
of justice. After the discussion, you will be asked to reach a group decision on which principle 
of justice you like best. The pay you receive in Part li of the experiment will be based on the 
principle which the group chooses.
In the third part you will be asked some background questions about yourself. Upon 
completion of the third part you will receive the sum, in cash, of your earnings from the two 
parts of the experiment. The money you receive is to be yours alone. No discussion, or 
agreement, to share earnings is permitted.
PART 1
This experiment is concerned with the justice of different income distributions. Let 
us begin by discussing some ways of judging the justice of an income distribution. A number 
of principles have been suggested for these sorts of judgments and we shall illustrate them 
by pointing out four such principles. But there are obviously other possible alternatives. You 
may well think of some alternatives yourself!
1. Maximising the Floor Income
The most just distribution of income is that which maximises the floor (or
lowest) income in the society.
The principle considers only the welfare of the worst-off individual in society. In judging 
among income distributions, the distribution which ensures the poorest person the highest 
level of income is considered to be the most just.
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2. Maximising the Average Income
The most just distribution of income is that which maximises the level of the 
average income in the society.
Since you do not know what level of income you may receive, application of this rule 
maximises your average, or mathematically expected, income.
3. Maximising the Average with a Floor Constraint of Peso___________
The most just distribution of income is that which maximises the average 
income only after a certain specified minimum income is guaranteed to 
everyone.
Such a principle ensures that the attempt to maximise the average is constrained so as to 
ensure that individuals 'at the bottom' receive a specified minimum. If this principle is chosen 
then one must specify the value of the floor (lowest income).
4. Maximising the Average with a Range Constraint of Peso_______
The most just distribution of income is that which attempts to maximise the 
average income only after guaranteeing that the difference between the 
poorest and richest individuals' incomes (that is, the range of personal 
incomes) in the society is not greater than a specified amount.
Such a principle ensures that the attempt to maximise the average does not allow income 
differences in income levels received by rich and poor individuals to exceed a specified 
amount. If this principle is chosen then one must specify the peso difference between the 
high and low incomes.
Of course, there are other possible principles, and you may think of some of them.
Now, that you have been familiarised with these four principles, please answer the 
following questions:
Rank order, according to your preferences, the following four principles of distributive 
justice by placing in the blanks below the letters (a), (b), (c) and (d), signifying the principles. 
Indicate ties by placing the tied principles in the same space.
most preferred ______  ______  ______ ______least preferred
a. maximise the floor income
b. maximise the average income
c. maximise the average income, subject to a floor constraint
d. maximise the average income, subject to a range constraint
How do you feel about your ranking of these principles? (Circle the appropriate 
answer).
1. very unsure
2. unsure
3. no opinion
4. sure
5. very sure
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To familiarise you with the sorts of choices you will be making, consider the following 
sample situation.
Sample Situation
Consider the following four income distributions (each of the money entries represents an 
annual peso income for a household):
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 96,000 84,000 93,000 63,000
Medium high 81,000 66,000 72,000 60,000
Medium 72,000 60,000 63,000 57,000
Medium Low 39,000 51,000 48,000 48,000
Low 36,000 39,000 42,000 45,000
Average Income*
Floor Income 36,000 39,000 42,000 45,000
Range 60,000 45,000 51,000 18,000
*For reasons which will become clear below, the average income is not shown for each 
income distribution.
You are to make a choice from among the four principles of justice which are 
mentioned above: (a) maximising the floor, (b) maximising the average, (c) maximising the 
average with a floor constraint, and (d) maximising the average with a range constraint. If you 
choose (c) or (d), you will have to tell me what the floor or range constraint is before you can 
be said to have made a well-defined choice. Your choice of a principle will select one of the 
four income distributions as the most just.
Only one of the income distributions is consistent with each principle. That means 
that your selection of a principle also selects one of the four income distributions as the one
you prefer. Indicate your choice of principle here (either a, b, c, or d):___ . If you chose (c) or
(d), indicate the floor or range constraint here (peso value):_______.
In making this choice, recall that your choice will yield you a payoff. How will your 
choice determine your pay? If, for example you choose (a) to maximise the floor or low 
income, you will have picked that distribution (from the four in the sample question) which has 
the highest floor. (In this case distribution 4). This ensures that you would get at least 45,000 
pesos if you were to be the worst-off individual. This is the most that a member of the low 
income class could get from any of these distributions.
Let us say you choose a principle which leads to the selection of distribution 4: 
maximising the floor or low income. After your choice has been made, five predetermined 
numbers will be used to determine your payoff. They represent the probability or chance that 
you will 'be in' each of the five income classes and hence receive the payoffs associated with 
the income class. The numbers add up to one, and are each some fraction bigger than zero 
and smaller than one. Thus, the numbers can be thought of as the proportion of the 
population (of some hypothetical society) which receives that particular income level in the 
distribution. You will be assigned to an income class using these proportions. You will then
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receive one peso for each 10,000 pesos received by a member of the income class you have 
been assigned to.
To see how your payoff is calculated, again consider the illustration above and 
assume that you have chosen to maximise the floor income. Suppose the distribution of a 
fictitious population over these income classes has been set at:
Income Class
Percentage of 
the Population
high 5
medium high 10
medium 50
medium low 25
low 10
This means that you have a 5 per cent chance of being assigned to the highest 
income class. Were you to be so assigned, you would get a payoff of 6 pesos and thirty 
centavos - the highest in distribution #4 (in this case, the distribution which maximises the 
floor or low income). Similarly, you have a 10 per cent chance of being assigned to the 
medium high dass, etc. If you were assigned to the medium class (in this example, the most 
likely with a likelihood of 50 per cent) you would get 5 pesos and seventy centavos. These 
assignments to income classes will be made randomly by your drawing a piece of paper from a 
bag. You may think of them as 'accidents of birth'.
Now what if you chose to maximise the average income? The average income in the 
society must be calculated by taking into account the proportion of the population which 
receives each particular income in the income distribution. Taking this into account the 
average income for each of the income distributions is as stated in the following table:
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 96,000 84,000 93,000 63,000
Medium high 81,000 66,000 72,000 60,000
Medium 72,000 60,000 63,000 57,000
Medium Low 39,000 51,000 48,000 48,000
Low 36,000 39,000 42,000 45,000
Average Income 62,250 57,450 59,550 54,150
Floor Income 36,000 39,000 42,000 45,000
Range 60,000 45,000 51,000 18,000
If you choose the principle of maximising the average income, this would select 
distribution #1, which has an average income of 62,250 pesos. Therefore, on average, 
people selecting this principle in this example would receive 6 pesos and 20 centavos 
(rounded off).
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In all the subsequent situations you will be given the average income for each income 
distribution but will not be told the proportion of the population in each income class. The 
proportions of the society in each income class will vary from one situation to another.
What if one chose to maximise the average with some constraint: say a floor 
constraint? How would this work? If you want to maximise the average while guaranteeing 
that no one receives an income below, let's say 42,000 pesos, only those income 
distributions with a floor of 42,000 pesos or more are acceptable: in this case distributions #3 
and #4. Of these, distribution #3 has a higher average income and therefore maximises the 
average with a floor constraint of 42,000 pesos. Notice that lowering the constraint to 39,000 
pesos, allows us to consider distribution #2 as well. This does not affect which distribution 
would be picked, however, because #3 has a higher average than #2. Lowering it still further, 
to 36,000 pesos, would, on the other hand, allow distribution #1 to be considered and 
selected (since #1 has the highest average).
Finally, let us consider what happens if we choose to maximise the average income 
with a range constraint. The most restrictive range constraint applicable here is 18,000 
pesos, which would lead to a selection of distribution #4. If one increased the permitted 
difference between the high and low incomes to 45,000 pesos, income distribution #2 would 
be allowable and chosen since it has the higher average income.
Remember, the more demanding the constraint (that is, the smaller the range or the 
higher the floor), the larger the number of income distributions which are ruled out.
When you are shown your payoff, you will also be shown what you have gotten had 
you chosen any of the other three [principles]. This will permit you to see the consequences 
of your choices.
Before you make any choices of principles of justice, you are required to answer 
some questions to test your understanding of the principles of justice. You may refer to any 
part of the booklet in deciding on your answers. When you finish answering the questions, 
bring your answers to the moderator. If you make mistakes, you will be given chances to 
correct them - but do not erase any mistakes after the moderator has looked at them. The 
following information may help you to answer the following questions:
A. The range is the difference between the highest and lowest 
personal income levels in a distribution of personal income levels.
B. The floor is the lowest personal income level in a distribution of 
personal income levels.
C. If one choses to maximise the average 'with a floor constraint' of
30.000 pesos, this means: one selects that income distribution with 
the highest average subject to the constraint that everyone gets at 
least 30,000 pesos.
D. If one choses to maximise the average 'with a range constraint' of
20.000 pesos, this means: one selects the income distribution with 
the highest average subject to the constraint that the difference 
between the highest and lowest personal income level is no more 
than 20,000 pesos.
DO NOT GO TO THE NEXT SECTION UNTIL AFTER YOU PASS THE TEST.
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TEST
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 90,000 57,000 78,000 87,000
Medium high 75,000 54,000 60,000 66,000
Medium 60,000 48,000 54,000 54,000
Medium Low 45,000 42,000 45,000 42,000
Low 30,000 39,000 33,000 36,000
Average Income 60,000 48,000 54,000 57,000
Floor Income 
Range
1. In the blank space in the distributions above write in the floor (or low) income 
for each distribution.
2. In the blank spaces in the distributions above write in the range for each 
distribution.
3. Indicate which distribution would be selected as a result of the application of 
each of the following principles.
A. Maximisation of the floor income would select distribution______.
B. Maximisation of the average income would select distribution______.
C. Maximisation of the average income with a floor constraint of 34,500 pesos
would select distribution_______.
D. Maximisation of the average income with a range constraint of 48,000
pesos would select distribution_________.
4. If I were to choose to maximise the floor income, the lowest income I could
get would b e _____, the highest would b e __________ .
5. If I were to choose to maximise the average income, the lowest income I could
get would be________; the highest would b e ______.
6. Please answer the following question, true or false: After choosing a principle 
of justice, my payoff will be determined by the probability of being in each 
income class and the luck of the draw. Circle one: true or false.
Please bring the handbook to the moderator for your test answers to be corrected.
Now that you have some acquaintance with the principles of justice and before you begin 
making choices in the situations below, please indicate your preferences for the principles. 
Rank them from most preferred to least preferred by placing in the blank spaces below the 
letters (a), (b), (c), and (d), corresponding to the principles. Indicate ties by placing the tied 
principles in the same blanks.
most preferred ______  ______  ______ ______least preferred
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a. maximise the floor income
b. maximise the average income
c. maximise the average income, subject to a floor constraint
d. maximise the average income, subject to a range constraint
How do you feel about your ranking of these principles? (Circle the appropriate 
answer).
1. very unsure
2. unsure
3. no opinion
4. sure
5. very sure
Choices with Payoffs
Situation A. Would you now please consider the income distributions in the next page and 
choose a principle of justice which you feel would yield the best choice of an income 
distribution for the society. On your tally sheet (to be provided by the moderator) place a 
check mark in the column labelled situation A opposite your choice of principle. Be sure to fill 
in the other information required if you choose to maximise with a constraint.
Remember, in making this choice, you will be determining a real money payoff for 
yourself.
To get your payoff recorded bring your tally sheet to the moderator.
DO NOT GO TO THE NEXT SITUATION UNTIL YOU HAVE TAKEN YOUR TALLY 
SHEET TO THE MODERATOR.
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 84,000 105,000 90,000 75,000
Medium high 75,000 90,000 87,000 66,000
Medium 60,000 75,000 84,000 57,000
Medium Low 45,000 45,000 81,000 48,000
Low 36,000 30,000 18,000 39,000
Average Income 60,000 70,500 78,000 57,000
Floor Income 36,000 30,000 18,000 39,000
Range 48,000 75,000 72,000 36,000
Situation B. Would you now please consider the income distributions below and choose a 
principle of justice which you feel would yield the best choice of an income distribution for the 
society. On your tally sheet place a check mark in the column labelled situation B opposite 
your choice of principle. Be sure to fill in the other information required if you choose to 
maximise with a constraint.
Remember, in making this choice, you will be determining a real money payoff for 
yourself.
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To get your payoff recorded bring your tally sheet to the moderator.
DO NOT GO TO THE NEXT SITUATION UNTIL YOU HAVE TAKEN YOUR TALLY 
SHEET TO THE MODERATOR.
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 51,000 90,000 120,000 78,000
Medium high 48,000 75,000 90,000 72,000
Medium 45,000 60,000 75,000 66,000
Medium Low 42,000 45,000 60,000 60,000
Low 39,000 37,500 24,000 33,000
Average Income 44,400 57,600 70,650 62,700
Floor Income 39,000 37,500 24,000 33,000
Range 12,000 52,500 96,000 45,000
Situation C. Would you now please consider the income distributions below and choose a 
principle of justice which you feel would yield the best choice of an income distribution for the 
society. On your tally sheet place a check mark in the column labelled situation C opposite 
your choice of principle. Be sure to fill in the other information required if you choose to 
maximise with a constraint.
Remember, in making this choice, you will be determining a real money payoff for 
yourself. To get your payoff recorded bring your tally sheet to the moderator.
DO NOT GO TO THE NEXT SITUATION UNTIL YOU HAVE TAKEN YOUR TALLY 
SHEET TO THE MODERATOR.
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 300,000 105,000 90,000 72,000
Medium high 90,000 90,000 75,000 69,000
Medium 60,000 75,000 69,000 66,000
Medium Low 45,000 60,000 45,000 63,000
Low 39,000 24,000 36,000 33,000
Average Income 58,500 67,050 60,000 62,130
Floor Income 39,000 24,000 36,000 33,000
Range 261,000 81,000 54,000 39,000
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Situation D. Would you now please consider the income distributions below and choose a 
principle of justice which you feel would yield the best choice of an income distribution for the 
society. On your tally sheet place a check mark in the column labelled situation D opposite 
your choice of principle. Be sure to fill in the other information required if you choose to 
maximise with a constraint.
Remember, in making this choice, you will be determining a real money payoff for 
yourself. To get your payoff recorded bring your tally sheet to the moderator.
DO NOT GO TO THE NEXT SITUATION UNTIL YOU HAVE TAKEN YOUR TALLY 
SHEET TO THE MODERATOR.
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 105,000 90,000 60,000 90,000
Medium high 90,000 84,000 54,000 84,000
Medium 75,000 78,000 48,000 72,000
Medium Low 60,000 72,000 42,000 60,000
Low 39,000 36,000 36,000 42,000
Average Income 70,650 73,500 46,500 68,100
Floor Income 39,000 36,000 36,000 42,000
Range 66,000 54,000 24,000 48,000
Now that you have been further familiarised with the four principles, please answer the 
following question:
Rank order, according to your preferences, the following 4 principles of justice by 
placing in the blanks below the letters (a), (b), (c) and (d), corresponding to the principles. 
Indicate ties by placing the tied principles in the same space.
most preferred ______  ______  _____  ______least preferred
a. maximise the floor income
b. maximise the average income
c. maximise the average income, subject to a floor constraint
d. maximise the average income, subject to a range constraint
How do you feel about your ranking of these principles? (Circle the appropriate 
answer).
1. very unsure
2. unsure
3. no opinion
4. sure
5. very sure
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PART II
In this part of the experiment participants are formed into groups of five individuals. 
Members of each group are to have a full and open discussion to determine which principle of 
justice is to be adopted and applied by the group. Members of the group must come to a 
unanimous agreement concerning which principle of justice is to be adopted. If unanimous 
agreement is not reached then the moderator will select, at random, any one of a range of 
distributions of personal incomes and randomly assign, to each member of the group, an 
income level out of this income distribution.
Assuming the group has decided upon a principle of justice, this principle is then 
employed to determine which distribution, out of a range of distributions, of income to adopt. 
(Each distribution specifies five payoff amounts.) Next each member of the group will be 
randomly assigned an income from the income distribution decided upon. This will determine 
your payoff. You must follow the procedures below for the discussion and voting phase.
Discussion Phase
You begin by having a group discussion about which principle you should adopt. 
The group can terminate this discussion anytime after five minutes. If after five minutes you 
feel nothing more can be gained by further discussion, you are to tell this to the moderator.
You are not restricted, in any way, to the four principles of justice mentioned above. 
Thus, you can discuss and later adopt other principles. Any one of you can introduce and 
begin discussion of any principle. But not just any principle is a principle. There are two 
requirements which a principle must meet to be considered as a principle of justice.
First, the principle cannot use names. For example, a principle which 
gives all to one specified person is not permitted because it specifies a 
named person. However, a principle which gives all the income to some 
unspecified person is permitted.
Second, only feasible ‘just distributions’ should be considered. For 
example, strict equality is not a principle since it may not be achievable.
Finally, there are a few requirements you should bear in mind if you wish to adopt a 
principle which involves a constraint. You should think of peso figures as annual family 
incomes in a democratic society of moderate scarcity.
If you wish to consider a range constraint, you must specify the peso amount.
If you wish to consider a floor constraint, you are not in a position to know what floors 
are achievable. Of course, there is a maximum achievable floor income in the set of income 
distributions. This means that you have two ways of specifying a floor constraint: (1) You can 
specify an absolute peso amount which you wish to have as a floor constraint. If that peso 
amount is above the maximum floor achievable in our set of income distributions, you will be 
assigned the income distribution with the highest achievable floor. (2) You can specify your 
floor constraint as a peso amount below the maximum floor achievable in our distributions. 
This will guarantee the existence of such a distribution. Nevertheless, you will not know what 
the absolute peso amount of this floor is until after the voting has been completed.
Choice Phase
After your discussion you, as a group, are to vote to adopt a principle of distributive 
justice. Your voting will be according to the following procedure. The group will adopt a
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principle if, and only if, that principle is able to secure the unanimous support of the group 
against all other principles sketched above, plus any others which you have discussed. The 
principles are to be voted upon, two at a time. Only that principle which gets unanimous 
support in two-way contests against all other principles is actually adopted by the group. If no 
such proposal exists, then the group will have adopted no principle. In that case, any member 
of the group can ask for extra discussion, which can be terminated at any time using the 
procedure described above. A new vote would follow.
Your payoffs in this section will conform to the principle which you, as a group, adopt. 
TO REPEAT, REMEMBER THAT IF YOU, AS A GROUP, DO NOT ADOPT ANY PRINCIPLE 
THEN THE MODERATOR WILL SELECT ONE OF THE INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS AT 
RANDOM FOR YOU AS A GROUP. That choice of income distribution will conform to no 
particular characteristics. The income received by each member of the group is randomly 
selected out of the income distribution adopted by the moderator.
Remember: whatever income distribution is chosen, YOU WILL BE RANDOMLY 
PLACED IN AN INCOME CLASS IN THAT DISTRIBUTION, AND THAT DETERMINES THE 
MONEY INCOME YOU WILL RECEIVE. Are there any questions? If so, please ask them now, 
or at any time during this part of the experiment.
PART III
BACKGROUND DATA ON THE RESPONDENT
Please answer questions #1 to #11 by choosing from a five-point scale: (1) disagree strongly; 
(2) disagree somewhat; (3) neither agree nor disagree; (4) agree somewhat; and (5) agree 
strongly.
_______ 1. Relative equality of wealth is a good thing.
_______ 2. Government ought to have programs which give money to people like me when
unavoidable events interrupt our ability to support ourselves.
_______ 3. A proper role of government is to modify the distribution of earned income.
_______ 4. Governments should ensure that all poor people can afford a relatively decent
standard of living.
_______ 5. My expected monetary reward from this experiment was sufficient to affect my
choices.
_______ 6. My reason for agreeing to participate in this experiment was to earn money.
_______ 7. My reason for agreeing to participate in this experiment was my interest in the
project.
_______ 8. The greatest accomplishments in history were individual efforts.
_______ 9. In every country there are groups of people who are naturally inferior.
______ 10. An individual’s lifetime income is in part a result of many genetic and social
accidents. The luckiest get the greatest talents and the highest rewards such as status and 
wealth. The least fortunate get the lowest abilities and opportunities, and receive the 
associated costs of poverty.
______ 11. Life would hardly be worth living in a society in which I couldn’t give someone else
pleasure by my actions.
For question no. 12, express your answers as percentages on a 0-100 scale for each of the 
responses.
12. What percentage of your college expenses are met by each of the following:
(a) parent’s help; %
(b) income you earn; %
(c) trust monies; %
(d) scholarships; %
(e) loans; %
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(f) spouse’s help; or _____ %
(g) others (specify).__________ _____ %
TOTAL 100%
13. What minimum annual income (in thousands of today’s pesos) do you think you will find
satisfactory as your starting salary for your first job after graduation?_____________
14. What minimum annual income (in thousands of today’s pesos) do you think you will find
satisfactory at age thirty-five?______________
15. What minimum annual income (in thousands of today’s pesos) do you think you will find
satisfactory at age fifty?______________
16. Rate your ideological preference on a scale from 1 (most conservative) to 5 (most liberal).
a. most conservative 1
b. conservative 2
c. somewhere in the middle
of being conservative and liberal 3
d. liberal 4
e. most liberal 5
17. Suppose someone offered to sell you a lottery ticket. In this lottery, one out of every four 
tickets will win 1,500 pesos. What is the most you would be willing to pay for it?
18. Suppose you have a lottery ticket. In this lottery, one out of three tickets will win 1,500
pesos. If someone asked you to sell them the ticket, what is the minimum price you would sell 
it fo r?_______________
19. For how many years of your life was your father employed before you were seven? (If you
are not sure, estimate.)_______________
20. For how many years of your life was your mother employed before you were seven? (If
you are not sure, estimate.)_______________
21. Attitude to ideological preferences. Generally, you usually think of yourself as:______
a. With conservative ideas
b. With a moderately reformist attitude
c. Independent
d. No preference
22. With regard to each ideological preference, you feel: (a) complete opposition; (b) 
somewhat in opposition; (c) somewhere in the middle of opposition and support; (d) 
somewhat liberal; and (e) complete support. Indicate the letter in the spaces provided for 
below:
a. With conservative ideas__
b. With a moderately reformist attitude__
c. Independent____
23. For some people to succeed, others must fail. Answer yes or no________.
24. Describe your future career plans and aspirations. Answer yes or no in the spaces 
provided for.
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a. Public Service?
b. Politics?
c. Private Business?
d. Private professional? ________
PLEASE RETURN THE HANDBOOK TO THE MODERATOR. THANK YOU.
Reference: Fröhlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J. ,1992. Choosing Justice:an experimental 
approach in ethical theory, University of California Press, Berkeley.
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Annex II 
(Chapter 2)
HANDBOOK B
This handbook concerns people's attitudes to the distribution of 
monetary gains or losses among members of committees. I am interested in 
getting your views on a range of issues relating to the distribution of 
monetary gains and losses, where, in an initial situation, you are faced with 
considerable uncertainty as to what future income you may receive. 
Because it is about attitudes there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers to 
central issues. This handbook does not aim to test your intelligence. Your 
responses will help shed some light on how Filipinos perceive distribution of 
income among members of the society given considerable uncertainty as to 
future relevant events. The handbook is anonymous so please do not write 
your name on it.
Thank you for your participation.
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The experiment devised here attempts to determine an answer to the following 
question: ‘How would monetary gains or losses among members of committees be 
distributed in a situation where, in the initial situation, individuals are faced with considerable 
uncertainty as to future relevant events?’ The reason for posing this question is that the 
wealth and income any individual in the Philippines will have access to during her/his lifetime 
will be influenced, considerably, by unpredictable events and circumstances. Casual 
observation of Filipino society suggests that this uncertainty results in personal incomes 
being unequally distributed throughout this community. Societies can deal with these 
inequities and risks by adopting suitable income redistribution policies. The purpose of the 
experiment performed here is to attempt to determine which redistribution policies will be 
adopted in initial situations where individuals are faced with considerable uncertainty as to 
what future level of income they may receive. The experiments are constructed in such a way 
as to face participants in this experiment with just such an uncertain situation.
The experiment is divided into three parts.
In the first part of the experiment each of you will be introduced to four possible rules 
for distributing monetary gains and losses among committee members. Later on you will 
consider some sample income distributions and make some choices. These choices will have 
real monetary consequences for you. Your pay, or reward, for the first part of the experiment 
will be based on your choices. You will have one hour to complete the first part during which 
time you will be given a series of questions. These questions are merely to determine if you 
have understood the concepts which are being used in the experiment. If you do not answer 
the questions correctly, then you are to go back to the review material and correct wrong 
answers. Once you have mastered the material, you can go on to make choices for which you 
will be paid. If you do not learn the material in a reasonable amount of time, you wiil not be able 
to earn as much money as possible since you must finish the first part of the experiment within 
one hour. But you should have plenty of time to finish this part of the experiment. Everyone 
will go on to the second part either after one hour or after everyone has finished Part 1, 
whichever occurs first.
In the second part of the experiment you will be asked, as a group, to discuss 
possible rules for distributing monetary gains or losses. After the discussion, you will be 
asked to reach a group decision on which ruie for distributing the money you like best. The 
pay you receive in Part II of the experiment will be based on the rule which the group 
chooses.
In the third part you will be asked some background questions about yourself. Upon 
completion of the third part you will receive the sum in cash, of your earnings from the two 
parts of the experiment. The money you receive is to be yours alone. No discussion, or 
agreement, to share earnings is permitted.
PART 1
This experiment is concerned with committee decisions about rules to distribute 
income among members of the society which includes you. Let us begin by discussing the 
effect of different rules on what you will be provided with in the experiment. A number of 
rules have been suggested for adoption for the distribution of income and we shall illustrate 
them by pointing out four such rules. But there are obviously other possible alternatives. 
You may well think of some alternatives yourself!
1. Maximising the Floor Income
The best rule for distributing income is that which maximises the floor (or
lowest) income in the society.
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The rule considers only the income of the worst-off individual in society. In judging 
among income distributions, the distribution which ensures the poorest person (who might 
be you) the highest level of income is considered to be the best rule.
2. Maximising the Average Income
The best rule for distributing incomes is that which maximises the level of 
average income in the society.
Since you don't know what level of income you may receive, application of this rule maximises 
your average, or mathematically expected, income.
3. Maximising the Average with a Floor Constraint of Peso___________
The best rule for distributing income is that which maximises the average 
income only after a certain specified minimum income is guaranteed to 
everyone.
Such a rule ensures that the attempt to maximise the average is constrained so as to ensure 
that individuals 'at the bottom' receive a specified minimum. If this rule is chosen then one 
must specify the value of the floor (lowest income).
4. Maximising the Average with a Range Constraint of Peso_______
The best rule for distributing income is that which attempts to maximise the 
average income only after guaranteeing that the difference between the 
smallest and the largest incomes (that is, the range of personal incomes) in 
the society is not greater than a specified amount.
Such a rule ensures that the attempt to maximise the average does not allow income 
differences in income levels received by rich and poor individuals to exceed a specified 
amount. If this principle is chosen then one must specify the peso difference between the 
high and low incomes.
Of course, there are other possible rules, and you may think of some of them.
Now, that you have been familiarised with these four rules, please answer the 
following questions:
Rank order, according to your preferences, the following 4 rules for distributing 
income by placing in the blanks below the letters (a), (b), (c), and (d), signifying the rules. 
Indicate ties by placing the tied rules in the same space.
most preferred ______  ______  ______ ______least preferred
a. maximise the floor income
b. maximise the average income
c. maximise the average income, subject to a floor constraint
d. maximise the average income, subject to a range constraint
How do you feel about your ranking of these rules? (Circle the appropriate answer.)
1. very unsure
2. unsure
3. no opinion
4. sure
5. very sure
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To familiarise you with the sorts of choices you will be making, consider the following 
sample situation.
Sample Situation
Consider the following four income distributions (each of the money entries represents a 
yearly peso income for a household):
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 96,000 84,000 93,000 63,000
Medium high 81,000 66,000 72,000 60,000
Medium 72,000 60,000 63,000 57,000
Medium Low 39,000 51,000 48,000 48,000
Low 36,000 39,000 42,000 45,000
Average Income*
Floor Income 36,000 39,000 42,000 45,000
Range 60,000 45,000 51,000 18,000
* For reasons which will become clear below, the average income is not shown for each 
income distribution.
You are to make a choice from among the four rules which are mentioned above: (a) 
maximising the floor, (b) maximising the average, (c) maximising the average with a floor 
constraint, and (d) maximising the average with a range constraint. If you choose (c) or (d), 
you will have to tell me what the floor or range constraint is before you can be said to have 
made a well-defined choice. Your choice of a rule will be applied to the income distributions 
above.
Only one of the income distributions is consistent with each rule. That means that 
your selection of a rule also selects one of the four income distributions as the one you
prefer. Indicate your choice of a rule here (either a, b, c, or d )____. If you choose (c) or (d),
indicate the floor or range constraint here (peso value):_________.
In making this choice, recall that your choice will yield you a payoff. How will your 
choice determine your pay? If, for example you choose (a) to maximise the floor or low 
income, you will have picked that distribution (from the four in the sample question) which has 
the highest floor. (In this case distribution 4). This ensures that you would get at least 45,000 
pesos if you were to be the worst-off individual. This is the most that a member of the low 
income class could get from any of these distributions.
Let us say you choose a rule which leads to the selection of distribution 4: maximising 
the floor or low income. After your choice has been made, five predetermined numbers will 
be used to determine your payoff. They represent the probability or chance that you will 'be 
in' each of the five income classes and hence receive the payoffs associated with the income 
class. The numbers add up to one, and are each some fraction bigger than zero and smaller 
than one. Thus the numbers can be thought of as the proportion of the population (of some 
hypothetical society) which receives that particular income level in the distribution. You will be
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assigned to an income class using these proportions. You will then receive one peso for 
each 10,000 pesos received by a member of the income class you have been assigned to.
To see how your payoff is calculated, again consider the illustration above and 
assume that you have chosen to maximise the floor income. Suppose the distribution of a 
fictitious population over these income classes has been set at:
Income Class
Percentage of 
the Population
high 5
medium high 10
medium 50
medium low 25
low 10
This means that you have a 5 per cent chance of being assigned to the highest 
income class. Were you to be so assigned, you would get a payoff of 6 pesos and thirty 
centavos -  the highest in distribution #4 (in this case, the distribution which maximises the 
floor or low income). Similarly, you have a 10 per cent chance of being assigned to the 
medium high class, etc. If you were assigned to the medium class (in this example, the most 
likely with a likelihood of 50 per cent) you would get 5 pesos and seventy centavos. These 
assignments to income classes wiii be made randomly by your drawing a piece of paper from a 
bag. You may think of them as 'accidents of birth'.
Now what if you chose to maximise the average income? The average income in the 
society must be calculated by taking into account the proportion of the population which 
receives each particular income in the income distribution. Taking this into account the 
average income for each of the income distributions is as stated in the following table:
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 96,000 84,000 93,000 63,000
Medium high 81,000 66,000 72,000 60,000
Medium 72,000 60,000 63,000 57,000
Medium Low 39,000 51,000 48,000 48,000
Low 36,000 39,000 42,000 45,000
Average Income 62,250 57,450 59,550 54,150
Floor Income 36,000 39,000 42,000 45,000
Range 60,000 45,000 51,000 18,000
If you choose the rule of maximising the average income, this would select 
distribution #1, which has an average income of 62,250 pesos. Therefore, on average, 
people selecting this rule in this example would receive 6 pesos and 20 centavos (rounded 
off).
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In all the subsequent situations you will be given the average income for each income 
distribution but will not be told the proportion of the population in each income class. The 
proportions of the society in each income class will vary from one situation to another.
What if one chose to maximise the average with some constraint: say a floor constraint? 
How would this work? If you want to maximise the average while guaranteeing that no one 
receives an income below, let's say 42,000 pesos, only those income distributions with a floor 
of 42,000 pesos or more are acceptable: in this case distributions #3 and #4. Of these, 
distribution #3 has a higher average income and therefore maximises the average with a floor 
constraint of 42,000 pesos. Notice that lowering the constraint to 39,000 pesos, allows us to 
consider distribution #2 as well. This does not affect which distribution would be picked, 
however, because #3 has a higher average than #2. Lowering it still further, to 36,000 pesos, 
would, on the other hand, allow distribution #1 to be considered and selected (since #1 has 
the highest average).
Finally, let us consider what happens if we choose to maximise the average income 
with a range constraint. The most restrictive range constraint applicable here is 18,000 
pesos, which would lead to a selection of distribution #4. If one increased the permitted 
difference between the high and low incomes to 45,000 pesos, income distribution #2 would 
be allowable and chosen since it has the higher average income.
Remember, the more demanding the constraint (that is, the smaller the range or the 
higher the floor), the larger the number of income distributions which are ruled out.
When you are shown your payoff, you will also be shown what you have received had 
you chosen any of the other three rules. This will permit you to see the consequences of 
your choices.
Before you make any choices of rules of income distribution, you are required to 
answer some questions to test your understanding of the rules. You may refer to any part of 
the booklet in deciding on your answers. When you finish answering the questions, bring 
your answers to the moderator. If you make mistakes, you will be given chances to correct 
them - but do not erase any mistakes after the moderator has looked at them. The following 
information may help you to answer the following questions:
A. The range is the difference between the highest and lowest 
personal income levels in a distribution of personal income levels.
B. The floor is the lowest personal income level in a distribution of 
personal income levels.
C. If one choses to maximise the average 'with a floor constraint' of
30.000 pesos, this means: one selects that income distribution with 
the highest average subject to the constraint that everyone gets at 
least 30,000 pesos.
D. If one choses to maximise the average 'with a range constraint' of
20.000 pesos, this means: one selects the income distribution with 
the highest average subject to the constraint that the difference 
between the highest and lowest personal income level is no more 
than 20,000 pesos.
DO NOT GO TO THE NEXT SECTION UNTIL AFTER YOU PASS THE TEST.
TEST
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 90,000 57,000 78,000 87,000
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Medium high 75,000 54,000 60,000 66,000
Medium 60,000 48,000 54,000 54,000
Medium Low 45,000 42,000 45,000 42,000
Low 30,000 39,000 33,000 36,000
Average Income 60,000 48,000 54,000 57,000
Floor Income 
Range
1. In the blank space in the distributions above write in the floor (or low) income 
for each distribution.
2. In the blank spaces in the distributions above write in the range for each 
distribution.
3. Indicate which distribution would be selected as a result of the application of 
each of the following rules.
A. Maximisation of the floor income would select distribution______ .
B. Maximisation of the average income would select distribution______ .
C. Maximisation of the average income with a floor constraint of 34,500 pesos
would select distribution_______ .
D. Maximisation of the average income with a range constraint of 48,000
pesos would select distribution_________ .
4. If I were to choose to maximise the floor income, the lowest income I could
get would b e _____, the highest would b e __________ .
5. If I were to choose to maximise the average income, the lowest income I could
get would b e ________ ; the highest would b e ______ .
6. Please answer the following question, true or false: After choosing a rule 
about the distribution of income, my payoff will be determined by the 
probability of being in each income class and the luck of the draw. Circle one: 
true or false.
Please bring the handbook to the moderator for your test answers to be corrected.
Now that you have some acquaintance with the possible rules for distributing income, and 
before you begin making choices in the situations below, please indicate your preferences 
for the rules. Rank them from most preferred to least preferred by placing the letters (a), (b), 
(c), and (d), corresponding to the rules, in the blank spaces below. Indicate ties by placing tied 
rules in the same blanks.
most preferred _______  _______  ______  ______ least preferred
a. maximise the floor income
b. maximise the average income
c. maximise the average income, subject to a floor constraint
d. maximise the average income, subject to a range constraint
How do you feel about your ranking of these rules? (Circle the appropriate answer.)
1. very unsure
2. unsure
3. no opinion
4. sure
5. very sure
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Choices with Payoffs
Situation A. Would you now please consider the income distributions in the next page and 
choose a rule which you feel would yield the best choice of an income distribution for the 
society. On your tally sheet (to be provided by the moderator) place a check mark in the 
column labelled situation A opposite your choice of rule. Be sure to fill in the other 
information required if you choose to maximise with a constraint.
Remember, in making this choice, you will be determining a real money payoff for 
yourself.
To get your payoff recorded bring your tally sheet to the moderator.
DO NOT GO TO THE NEXT SITUATION UNTIL YOU HAVE TAKEN YOUR TALLY 
SHEET TO THE MODERATOR.
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 84,000 105,000 90,000 75,000
Medium high 75,000 90,000 87,000 66,000
Medium 60,000 75,000 84,000 57,000
Medium Low 45,000 45,000 81,000 48,000
Low 36,000 30,000 18,000 39,000
Average Income 60,000 70,500 78,000 57,000
Floor Income 36,000 30,000 18,000 39,000
Range 48,000 75,000 72,000 36,000
Situation B. Would you now please consider the income distributions below and choose a 
rule which you feel would yield the best choice of an income distribution tor the society. On 
your tally sheet place a check mark in the column labelled situation B opposite your choice of 
rule. Be sure to fill in the other information required if you choose to maximise with a 
constraint.
Remember, in making this choice, you will be determining a real money payoff for 
yourself. To get your payoff recorded bring your tally sheet to the moderator. DO NOT GO TO 
THE NEXT SITUATION UNTIL YOU HAVE TAKEN YOUR TALLY SHEET TO THE 
MODERATOR.
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 51,000 90,000 120,000 78,000
Medium high 48,000 75,000 90,000 72,000
Medium 45,000 60,000 75,000 66,000
Medium Low 42,000 45,000 60,000 60,000
Low 39,000 37,500 24,000 33,000
Average Income 44,400 57,600 70,650 62,700
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Floor Income 
Range
39.000
12.000
37.500
52.500
24.000
96.000
33.000
45.000
Situation C. Would you now please consider the income distributions in the next page and 
choose a rule which you feel would yield the best choice of an income distribution for the 
society. On your tally sheet place a check mark in the column labelled situation C opposite 
your choice of rule. Be sure to fill in the other information required if you choose to maximise 
with a constraint.
Remember, in making this choice, you will be determining a real money payoff for 
yourself. To get your payoff recorded bring your tally sheet to the moderator. DO NOT GO TO 
THE NEXT SITUATION UNTIL YOU HAVE TAKEN YOUR TALLY SHEET TO THE 
MODERATOR.
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 300,000 105,000 90,000 72,000
Medium high 90,000 90,000 75,000 69,000
Medium 60,000 75,000 69,000 66,000
Medium Low 45,000 60,000 45,000 63,000
Low 39,000 24,000 36,000 33,000
Average Income 58,500 67,050 60,000 62,130
Floor Income 39,000 24,000 36,000 33,000
Range 261,000 81,000 54,000 39,000
Situation D. Would you now please consider the income distributions below and choose a 
rule which you feel would yield the best choice of an income distribution for the society. On 
your tally sheet place a check mark in the column labelled situation D opposite your choice of 
rule. Be sure to fill in the other information required if you choose to maximise with a 
constraint.
Remember, in making this choice, you will be determining a real money payoff for 
yourself. To get your payoff recorded bring your tally sheet to the moderator.
DO NOT GO TO THE NEXT SITUATION UNTIL YOU HAVE TAKEN YOUR TALLY 
SHEET TO THE MODERATOR.
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 105,000 90,000 60,000 90,000
Medium high 90,000 84,000 54,000 84,000
Medium 75,000 78,000 48,000 72,000
Medium Low 60,000 72,000 42,000 60,000
Low 39,000 36,000 36,000 42,000
Average Income 70,650 73,500 46,500 68,100
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Floor Income 
Range
39.000
66.000
36.000
54.000
36.000
24.000
42.000
48.000
Now that you have been further familiarised with the four rules, please answer the following 
question:
Rank order, according to your preferences, the following 4 rules by placing in the 
blanks below the letters (a), (b), (c) and (d), corresponding to the rules. Indicate ties by placing 
the tied rules in the same space.
most preferred _______  _______  ______  ______ least preferred
a. maximise the floor income
b. maximise the average income
c. maximise the average income, subject to a floor constraint
d. maximise the average income, subject to a range constraint
How do you feel about your ranking of these rules? (Circle the appropriate answer.)
1. very unsure
2. unsure
3. no opinion
4. sure
5. very sure
PART II
In this part of the experiment participants are formed into groups of five individuals. 
Members of each group are to have a full and open discussion to determine which rule for the 
distribution of income is to be adopted and applied by the group. Members of the group must 
come to a unanimous agreement concerning which rule for distributing income is to be 
adopted, if unanimous agreement is not reached then the moderator wiU select, at random, 
anv one of a range of distributions of personal incomes and randomly assign, to each member 
of the group, an income level out of this income distribution.
Assuming the group has decided upon a rule for distributing income, this rule is then 
employed to determine which distribution, out of a range of distributions, of income to adopt. 
(Each distribution specifies five payoff amounts.) Next each member of the group will be 
randomly assigned an income from the income distribution decided upon. This will determine 
your payoff.
You must follow the procedures below for the discussion and voting phase.
Discussion Phase
You begin by having a group discussion about which rule you should adopt. The 
group can terminate this discussion anytime after five minutes. If after five minutes you feel 
nothing more can be gained by further discussion, you are to tell this to the moderator.
You are not restricted, in any way, to the four rules mentioned above. Thus, you 
can discuss and iater adopt other rules. Any one of you can introduce and begin discussion
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of any rule. But not just any rule is a rule. There are two requirements which a rule must meet 
to be considered as a rule.
First, the rule cannot use names. For example, a rule which 
gives all to one specified person is not permitted because it specifies a 
named person. However, a rule which gives all the income to some 
unspecified person is permitted.
Second, only feasible income distributions should be 
considered. For example, strict equality is not a rule since it may not be 
achievable.
Finally, there are a few requirements you should bear in mind if you wish to adopt a 
rule which involves a constraint. You should think of peso figures as annual family incomes in 
a democratic society of moderate scarcity.
If you wish to consider a range constraint, you must specify the peso amount.
If you wish to consider a floor constraint, you are not in a position to know what floors 
are achievable. Of course, there is a maximum achievable floor income in the set of income 
distributions. This means that you have two ways of specifying a floor constraint: (1) You can 
specify an absolute peso amount which you wish to have as a floor constraint. If that peso 
amount is above the maximum floor achievable in our set of income distributions, you will be 
assigned the income distribution with the highest achievable floor. (2) You can specify your 
floor constraint as a peso amount below the maximum floor achievable in our distributions. 
This will guarantee the existence of such a distribution. Nevertheless, you will not know what 
the absolute peso amount of this floor is until after the voting has been completed.
Choice Phase
After your discussion you, as a group, are to vote to adopt a rule. Your voting will be 
according to the following procedure. The group will adopt a rule if, and only if, that rule is 
able to secure the unanimous support of the group against all other rules sketched above, 
plus any others which you have discussed. The rules are to be voted upon, two at a time. 
Only that rule which gets unanimous support in two-way contests against all other rules is 
actually adopted by the group. If no such proposal exists, then the group will have adopted 
no rule. In that case, any member of the group can ask for extra discussion, which can be 
terminated at any time using the procedure described above. A new vote would follow.
Your payoffs in this section will conform to the rule which you, as a group, adopt. TO 
REPEAT, REMEMBER THAT IF YOU, AS A GROUP, DO NOT ADOPT ANY PRINCIPLE 
THEN THE MODERATOR WILL SELECT ONE OF THE INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS AT 
RANDOM FOR YOU AS A GROUP. That choice of income distribution will conform to no 
particular characteristics. The income received by each member of the group is randomly 
selected out of the income distribution adopted by the moderator.
Remember: whatever income distribution is chosen, YOU WILL BE RANDOMLY 
PLACED IN AN INCOME CLASS IN THAT DISTRIBUTION, AND THAT DETERMINES THE 
MONEY INCOME YOU WILL RECEIVE. Are there any questions? If so, please ask them now, 
or at any time during this part of the experiment.
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PART III
BACKGROUND DATA ON THE RESPONDENT
Please answer questions #1 to #11 by choosing from a five-point scale: (1) disagree strongly; 
(2) disagree somewhat; (3) neither agree nor disagree; (4) agree somewhat; and (5) agree 
strongly.
_______1. Relative equality of wealth is a good thing.
_______2. Government ought to have programs which give money to people like me when
unavoidable events interrupt our ability to support ourselves.
_______3. A proper role of government is to modify the distribution of earned income.
_______4. Governments should ensure that all poor people can afford a relatively decent
standard of living.
_______5. My expected monetary reward from this experiment was sufficient to affect my
choices.
_______6. My reason for agreeing to participate in this experiment was to earn money.
_______7. My reason for agreeing to participate in this experiment was my interest in the
project.
_______8. The greatest accomplishments in history were individual efforts.
_______9. In every country there are groups of people who are naturally inferior.
______ 10. An individual’s lifetime income is in part a result of many genetic and social
accidents. The luckiest get the greatest talents and the highest rewards such as status and 
wealth. The least fortunate get the lowest abilities and opportunities, and receive the 
associated costs of poverty.
______11. Life would hardly be worth living in a society in which I couldn’t give someone else
pleasure by my actions.
For question no. 12, express your answers as percentages on a 0-100 scale for each of the 
responses.
12. What percentage of your college expenses are met by each of the following:
(a) parent’s help; %
(b) income you earn; %
(c) trust monies; %
(d) scholarships; %
(e) loans; %
(f) spouse’s help; or %
(g) others (specify). %
TOTAL 100%
13. What minimum annual income (in thousands of today’s pesos) do you think you will find
satisfactory as your starting salary for your first job after graduation?_____________
14. What minimum annual income (in thousands of today’s pesos) do you think you will find
satisfactory at age thirty-five?______________
15. What minimum annual income (in thousands of today’s pesos) do you think you will find
satisfactory at age fifty?______________
16. Rate your ideological preference on a scale from 1 (most conservative) to 5 (most liberal).
a. most conservative 1
b. conservative 2
c. somewhere in the middle
of being conservative and liberal 3
d. liberal 4
e. most liberal 5
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17. Suppose someone offered to sell you a lottery ticket. In this lottery, one out of every four 
tickets will win 1,500 pesos. What is the most you would be willing to pay for it?
18. Suppose you have a lottery ticket. In this lottery, one out of three tickets will win 1,500
pesos. If someone asked you to sell them the ticket, what is the minimum price you would sell 
it fo r? _______________
19. For how many years of your life was your father employed before you were seven? (If you
are not sure, estimate.)_______________
20. For how many years of your life was your mother employed before you were seven? (If
you are not sure, estimate.)_______________
21. Attitude to ideologies. Generally, you usually think of yourself as:______
a. With conservative ideas
b. With a moderately reformist attitude
c. Independent
d. No preference
22. With regard to each ideological preference, you feel: (a) complete opposition; (b) 
somewhat in opposition; (c) somewhere in the middle of opposition and support; (d) 
somewhat liberal; and (e) complete support. Indicate the letter in the spaces provided for 
below:
a. With conservative ideas__
b. With a moderately reformist attitude__
c. Independent____
23. For some people to succeed, others must fail. Answer yes or no________.
24. Describe your future career plans and aspirations. Answer yes or no in the spaces 
provided for.
a. Public Service? _______
b. Politics? _______
c. Private Business?
d. Private professional? _______
PLEASE RETURN THE HANDBOOK TO THE MODERATOR. THANK YOU.
Reference: Fröhlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J. 1992. Choosing Justice: an experimental 
approach in ethical theory, University of California Press, Berkeley.
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Annex 3 
(Chapter 2)
HANDBOOK C
This handbook concerns people's attitudes to distributive justice, i 
am interested in getting vour opinions on a range of issues relating to the 
justice of income redistribution policies where, in an initial situation, you are 
faced with considerable uncertainty as to what future income you may 
receive. Because it is about attitudes there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers 
to central issues. This handbook does not aim to test your intelligence. 
Your responses will help shed some light on how Filipinos perceive 
distributive justice given considerable uncertainty as to future relevant 
events. The handbook is anonymous so please do not write your name on 
it.
Thank you for your participation.
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The experiment devised here attempts to determine an answer to the following 
question: ‘What is a just distribution of income in a situation where, in the initial situation, 
individuals are faced with considerable uncertainty as to future relevant events?’ The reason 
for posing this question is that the wealth and income any individual in the Philippines will 
have access to during her/his lifetime will be influenced, considerably, by unpredictable 
events and circumstances. Casual observation of Filipino society suggests that this 
uncertainty results in personal incomes being unequally distributed throughout this 
community. Societies can deal with these inequities and risks by adopting suitable income 
redistribution policies. The purpose of the experiment performed here is to attempt to 
determine which redistribution policies are thought to be just in initial situations where 
individuals are faced with considerable uncertainty as to what future level of income they may 
receive. The experiments are constructed in such a way as to face participants in this 
experiment with just such an uncertain situation.
The experiment is divided into four parts.
In the first part of the experiment each of you will be introduced to a few theories of 
just income distribution. You will have an hour to complete the first part, during which time 
you will be asked to answer some questions on the material. You will be paid 25 centavos for 
every question you answer correctly on this material the first time you take the test. These 
questions are merely to determine if you have understood the concepts which are being 
used in the experiment. If you do not answer the questions correctly, then you are to go back 
to the review material and correct wrong answers. Once you have mastered the material, you 
can try the missed questions again in another test, this time getting ten centavos for each 
correct answer. Obviously, you will not be able to earn as much money as possible if you do 
not do well on the test. Everyone will go on to the second part after one hour, or after 
everyone has finished Part 1, whichever occurs first.
In the second part of the experiment you will be asked, as a group, to discuss notions 
of justice. After the discussion, you will be asked to reach a group decision on which principle 
of justice you like best.
In the third part you will be required to perform some tasks to earn some money. Your 
earned income will then be taxed or supplemented so that the final distribution of income in 
this part is in accordance with the principle adopted by the group in Part It.
In the last part you will be asked some background questions about yourself. Upon 
completion of the fourth part you will receive the sum in cash, of your earnings from the earlier 
part of the experiments. The money you receive is to be yours alone. No discussion, or 
agreement, to share your final pay is permitted. Any such discussions may void the 
experiment and lead to your earning nothing.
PART 1
This experiment is concerned with the justice of different income distributions. Let 
us begin by discussing some ways of judging the justice of an income distribution. A number 
of principles have been suggested for these sorts of judgments and we shall illustrate them 
by pointing out four such principles. But there are obviously other possible alternatives. You 
may well think of some alternatives yourself!
1. Maximising the Floor Income
The most just distribution of income is that which maximises the floor (or
lowest) income in the society.
The principle considers only the welfare of the worst-off individual in society. In 
judging among income distributions, the distribution which ensures the poorest person the 
highest level of income is considered to be the most just.
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2. Maximising the Average Income
The most just distribution of income is that which maximises the level of the 
average income in the society.
Since you do not know what level of income you may receive, application of this rule 
maximises your average, or mathematically expected, income.
3. Maximising the Average with a Floor Constraint of Peso___________
The most just distribution of income is that which maximises the average 
income only after a certain specified minimum income is guaranteed to 
everyone.
Such a principle ensures that the attempt to maximise the average is constrained so as to 
ensure that individuals 'at the bottom' receive a specified minimum. If this principle is chosen 
then one must specify the value of the floor (lowest income).
4. Maximising the Average with a Range Constraint of Peso_______
The most just distribution of income is that which attempts to maximise the 
average income only after guaranteeing that the difference between the 
poorest and richest individuals' incomes (that is, the range of personal 
incomes) in the society is not greater than a specified amount.
Such a principle ensures that the attempt to maximise the average does not allow income 
differences in income levels received by rich and poor individuals to exceed a specified 
amount. If this principle is chosen then one must specify the peso difference between the 
high and low incomes.
Of course, there are other possible principles, and you may think of some of them.
Now, that you have been familiarised with these four principles, please answer the 
following questions:
Rank order, according to your preferences, the following 4 principles of distributive 
justice by placing in the blanks below the letters (a), (b), (c), (d), signifying the principles. 
Indicate ties by placing the tied principles in the same space.
most preferred ______  ______  ______ ______least preferred
a. maximise the floor income
b. maximise the average income
c. maximise the average income, subject to a floor constraint
d. maximise the average income, subject to a range constraint
How do you feel about your ranking of these principles? (Circle the appropriate 
answer).
1. very unsure
2. unsure
3. no opinion
4. sure
5. very sure
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To familiarise you with the sorts of choices you will be making, consider the sample 
situation in the next page.
Sample Situation
A sample of four income distributions is shown below. Each of the money entries represents 
an annual peso income for a household.
Income distributions
Income Class 1 2 3 4
High 96,000 84,000 93,000 63,000
Medium high 81,000 66,000 72,000 60,000
Medium 72,000 60,000 63,000 57,000
Medium Low 39,000 51,000 48,000 48,000
Low 36,000 39,000 42,000 45,000
The amount that you would be able to keep would depend upon the principle of 
income distribution chosen. It is one thing to make one’s choice of an income distribution 
principle when one is fully aware of one’s individual talents and place in society. It is quite 
another to do so without such knowledge. Later you will be earning money by working at a 
task which, as yet, is unspecified. You do not know how well you will be able to perform that 
task, how much income you will generate, and hence in which income class you will be in. 
Recall that in the next part of the experiment you will try to reach a decision, with the other 
members of your group, as to which principle will govern the actual payments which will be 
made to each of you as a member of the group. Thus your choice of a principle of income 
distribution will, to a greater degree, determine how much you will be paid.
Precisely how will the selection of a principle relate to your earnings? To know this 
you must understand how your earned income will be redistributed on the basis of the 
principle chosen. Let us go over four principles listed above, and illustrate how income would 
be redistributed to be in conformity with each of these principles.
1. Maximising the floor requires that some of the income of persons who 
earn above the floor is used to finance an income transfer to the person 
receiving the minimum income in the group.
In the instance of this principle of justice your final (after-tax or 
after-transfer) income is going to be tied to the task you perform. To 
achieve this end in this experiment the floor income to be maximised is 
set at 80 per cent of the mean income for the group. We do this by taxing 
each of the individuals who earn more than 80 per cent of the mean by 
the same percentage of their incomes above the floor. The amount taxed 
away is transferred to low income recipients until the lowest income 
recipient receives the floor income. It is emphasised that the floor income 
is not set at 100 per cent of the mean income for the group in recognition 
of the argument that, to do so, would adversely affect the incentive to 
work diligently at performing the task set.
To explain further, when there is a link between income and work, 
some people feel that there should be a link between more or better
338
work and more income. Most supporters of this position argue that if an 
absolutely egalitarian income distribution was imposed there would be 
less work, less production, and hence less total income. This, therefore, 
could lead to less income for those at the bottom. Thus to maximise the 
floor some have argued that one needs to keep some incentives to 
encourage productive work.
2. Maximising the average, we assume means giving everyone as much 
incentive to produce as possible. We interpret this to mean that there will 
be no redistribution and, hence, no taxation.
3. Maximising the average with a floor constraint also requires a tax-cum- 
subsidy system.
In this case, all the incomes above the chosen floor are taxed at 
the same percentage rate so that enough tax revenue is raised to finance 
income transfers so that ail receive at least the floor income level. Thus 
each person’s ranking - by income - above the floor stays the same, but 
the differences are compressed because of the taxes and subsidies.
One complication must be considered here. Since the idea is to 
continue having incentives present to maintain productivity and income 
levels, we insist that if the floor is higher than 80 per cent of the average 
income, then the floor is set at 80 per cent of the average. This ensures 
that the minimal level of incentive is maintained and that the floor can 
never be higher under this principle than it could be if one were merely to 
maximise the income of the poorest member of the group.
4. Maximising the average with a range constraint means that the 
difference between the highest and the lowest income is restricted in 
accordance with the principle chosen. All the incomes that are 'too low'
(that is, the range between them and the top income is bigger than the 
acceptable limit) would receive additional income raised by taxing the 
others. All others would be taxed so that the money raised, when 
transferred to the individuals with the low incomes, would reduce the 
range to the required level. This will keep the average income 
unchanged and keep the income differences between the individuals in 
the same proportion as they were before taxes.
To illustrate, imagine that five persons in a society respectively 
have earned incomes of: 3,000; 15,000; 21,000; 33,000; and 303,000 
(all in pesos). Then the average income is 75,000 pesos and the range of 
earned income (between 3,000 pesos per year and 303,000 pesos) is 
300,000 pesos. If that society had a principle to maximise the average 
while restricting the range to 150,000, all four low-income individuals 
would require transfers to reduce the range to within 150,000. The 
average would stay the same (75,000 pesos), but the income differences 
would all be cut in half, so that the new distribution would be: 39,000;
45,000; 48,000; 54,000; and 189,000 (all in pesos).
Before you are permitted to join with the other members of the group to choose a 
principle of justice, you are required to answer some questions to determine if you have 
understood the concepts which are being used in the experiment. You will be paid 25 
centavos for every numbered question answered correctly. You may refer to any part of the 
booklet in deciding on your answers. When you finish answering the questions, bring your 
answers to the moderator. If you make mistakes, you will be given chances to take another 
test and show that you have understood the concepts which are being used in the
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experiment. But in the second test you will be paid only ten centavos per right answer, and 
you will only be asked to answer questions about material you did not master at first.
The following information may help you to answer the following questions:
A. The range is the difference between the highest and lowest 
personal income levels in a distribution of personal income levels.
B. The floor is the lowest personal income level in a distribution of 
personal income levels.
C. If one choses to maximise the average ‘with a floor constraint’ of
30.000 pesos, this means: one selects that income distribution with 
the highest average subject to the constraint that everyone gets at 
least 30,000 pesos.
D. If one choses to maximise the average ‘with a range constraint’ of
20.000 pesos, this means: one selects the income distribution with 
the highest average subject to the constraint that the difference 
between the highest and lowest personal income level is no more 
than 20,000 pesos.
DO NOT GO TO THE NEXT SECTION UNTIL AFTER YOU PASS THE TEST.
TEST
Income Class
Income distributions
1 2 3 4
High 90,000 57,000 78,000 87,000
Medium high 75,000 54,000 60,000 66,000
Medium 60,000 48,000 54,000 54,000
Medium Low 45,000 42,000 45,000 42,000
Low 30,000 39,000 33,000 36,000
Average Income 60,000 48,000 54,000 57,000
Floor Income 
Range
1. In the blank space in the distributions above write in the floor (or low) income 
for each distribution.
2. In the blank spaces in the distributions above write in the range for each 
distribution.
3. Indicate which distribution would be selected as a result of the application of 
each of the following principles.
A. Maximisation of the floor income would select distribution______.
B. Maximisation of the average income would select distribution______.
C. Maximisation of the average income with a floor constraint of 34,500 pesos
would select distribution_______.
D. Maximisation of the average income with a range constraint of 48,000
pesos would select distribution_________.
4. If I were to choose to maximise the floor income, the lowest income I could
get would b e _____, the highest would b e __________ .
5. If I were to choose to maximise the average income, the lowest income I could
get would b e ________; the highest would b e ______.
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6. Please answer the following question, true or false: After choosing a principle 
of justice, my payoff will be determined by the probability of being in each 
income class and the luck of the draw. Circle one: true or false.
Please bring the handbook to the moderator for your test answers to be corrected.
Now that you have some acquaintance with the principles of justice and before you begin to 
work toward a choice in the group, please indicate your preferences for the principles. Rank 
them from most preferred to least preferred by placing in the blank spaces below the letters 
(a), (b), (c), and (d), corresponding to the principles. Indicate ties by placing the tied principles 
in the same blanks.
most preferred ______  ______  ______ ______least preferred
a. maximise the floor income
b. maximise the average income
c. maximise the average income, subject to a floor constraint
d. maximise the average income, subject to a range constraint
How do you feel about your ranking of these principles? (Circle the appropriate 
answer).
1. very unsure
2. unsure
3. no opinion
4. sure
5. very sure
PART II
In this part of the experiment participants are formed into groups of five individuals. 
Members of each group are to have a full and open discussion to determine which principle of 
justice is to be adopted and applied by the group. Members of the group must come to a 
unanimous agreement concerning which principle of justice is to be adopted. If unanimous 
agreement is not reached then the moderator will select, at random, any one of a range of 
distributions of personal incomes and randomly assign, to each member of the group, an 
income level out of this income distribution.
Assuming the group has decided upon a principle of justice, this principle is then 
employed to determine which distribution, out of a range of distributions, of income to adopt. 
(Each distribution specifies five payoff amounts.) Next each member of the group will be 
randomly assigned an income from the income distribution decided upon. This will determine 
your payoff in the third part of the experiment.
You must follow the procedures below for the discussion and voting phase.
Discussion Phase
You begin by having a group discussion about which principle you should adopt. 
The group can terminate this discussion anytime after five minutes. If after five minutes you 
feel nothing more can be gained by further discussion, you are to tell this to the moderator.
You are not restricted, in any way, to the four principles of justice mentioned above. 
Thus, you can discuss and later adopt other principles. Any one of you can introduce and
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begin discussion of any principle. But not just any principle is a principle. There are two 
requirements which a principle must meet to be considered as a principle of justice.
First, the principle cannot use names. For example, a principle which 
gives all to one specified person is not permitted because it specifies a 
named person. However, a principle which gives all the income to some 
unspecified person is permitted.
Second, only feasible 'just distributions' should be considered. For 
example, strict equality is not a principle since it may not be achievable.
Finally, there are a few requirements you should bear in mind if you wish to adopt a 
principle which involves a constraint. You should think of peso figures as annual family 
incomes for a household in a democratic society of moderate scarcity.
If you wish to consider a range constraint, you must specify the peso amount.
If you wish to consider a floor constraint, you are not in a position to know what floors 
will actually be achievable. Of course, there is a maximum achievable floor income in the set of 
income distributions. You can specify an absolute peso amount which you wish to have as a 
floor constraint. If that peso amount is higher than 80 per cent of the average income, we will 
set the floor at 80 percent of the average income. If that peso amount is below 80 per cent of 
the average income, we will set the floor at that level. This will guarantee the existence of 
such a distribution. Nevertheless, you will not know what the absolute peso amount of this 
floor is until after the voting has been completed.
The floor income can be viewed as the minimum income a head of an average 
household is guaranteed each year.
Choice Phase
After your discussion you, as a group, are to vote to adopt a principle of distributive 
justice. Your voting will be according to the following procedure. The group will adopt a 
principle, if and only if, that principle is able to secure the unanimous support of the group 
against all other principles sketched above, plus any others which you have discussed. The 
principles are to be voted upon, two at a time. Only that principle which gets unanimous 
support in two-way contests against all other principles is actually adopted by the group. If no 
such proposal exists, then the group will have adopted no principle. In that case, any member 
of the group can ask for extra discussion, which can be terminated at any time using the 
procedure described above. A new vote would follow.
Your payoffs in Part III of the experiment will conform to the principle which you, as a 
group, adopt. TO REPEAT, REMEMBER THAT IF YOU, AS A GROUP DO NOT ADOPT ANY 
PRINCIPLE, THEN THE MODERATOR WILL SELECT A PRINCIPLE AT RANDOM WHICH 
WILL BE APPLIED TO YOUR EARNINGS IN THE THIRD PART OF THE EXPERIMENT. That 
choice of income distribution will conform to no particular characteristics.
PART III
In this part of the experiment you will be required to correct the spelling errors in three 
texts to earn some money. The texts will be provided by the moderator one at a time. Please 
read the instructions in the spelling documents very carefully. You will have four minutes for 
the first selection and three minutes each for the succeeding two selections. After 
completing each task, or time runs out, bring your paper to the moderator for scoring. The 
moderator, in turn, will ask you to answer an end-of-production-period document after each 
round of work.
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You will be paid 25 centavos for each of the first four errors found; 50 centavos for each of the 
next four errors found; and one peso for each subsequent error found. Your actual earnings 
at each job will be translated into an annual income by calculating how much you will earn in a 
year, given your rate of earnings in each production period. Your earned annual income may 
be taxed or subsidised in accordance with the principle adopted by the group in Part II of the 
experiment. To reiterate in case there was no group agreement, the final distribution of 
income will be based on the principle selected by random by the moderator. Are there any 
questions? If so, please ask them now, or at any time during this part of the experiment. DO 
NOT GO TO PART IV UNTIL AFTER YOU FINISH ANSWERING YOUR THIRD END-OF- 
PRODUCTION-PERIOD DOCUMENT.
PART IV BACKGROUND DATA ON THE RESPONDENT
Please answer questions #1 to #11 by choosing from a five-point scale: (1) disagree strongly; 
(2) disagree somewhat; (3) neither agree nor disagree; (4) agree somewhat; and (5) agree 
strongly.
_______1. Relative equality of wealth is a good thing.
_______2. Government ought to have programs which give money to people like me when
unavoidable events interrupt our ability to support ourselves.
_______3. A proper role of government is to modify the distribution of earned income.
_______4. Governments should ensure that all poor people can afford a relatively decent
standard of living.
_______5. My expected monetary reward from this experiment was sufficient to affect my
choices.
_______6. My reason for agreeing to participate in this experiment was to earn money.
_______7. My reason for agreeing to participate in this experiment was my interest in the
project.
_______8. The greatest accomplishments in history were individual efforts.
_______9. In every country there are groups of people who are naturally inferior.
______10. An individual’s lifetime income is in part a result of many genetic and social
accidents. The luckiest get the greatest talents and the highest rewards such as status and 
wealth. The least fortunate get the lowest abilities and opportunities, and receive the 
associated costs of poverty.
_____ 11. Life would hardly be worth living in a society in which I couldn’t give someone else
pleasure by my actions.
For question no. 12, express your answers as percentages on a 0-100 scale for each of the 
responses.
12. What percentage of your college expenses are met by each of the following:
(a) parent’s help; %
(b) income you earn; %
(c) trust monies; %
(d) scholarships; %
(e) loans; %
(f) spouse’s help; or %
(a) others (soecifvl %
TOTAL 100%
13. What minimum annual income (in thousands of today’s pesos) do you think you will find
satisfactory as your starting salary for your first job after graduation?______________
14. What minimum annual income (in thousands of today’s pesos) do you think you will find
satisfactory at age thirty-five?______________
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15. What minimum annual income (in thousands of today’s pesos) do you think you will find
satisfactory at age fifty?_______________
16. Rate your ideological preference on a scale from 1 (most conservative) to 5 (most liberal).
a. most conservative 1
b. conservative 2
c. somewhere in the middle
of being conservative and liberal 3
d. liberal 4
e. most liberal 5
17. Suppose someone offered to sell you a lottery ticket. In this lottery, one out of every four 
tickets will win 1,500 pesos. What is the most you would be willing to pay for it?
18. Suppose you have a lottery ticket. In this lottery, one out of three tickets will win 1,500
pesos. If someone asked you to sell them the ticket, what is the minimum price you would sell 
it fo r? _______________
19. For how many years of your life was your father employed before you were seven? (If you
are not sure, estimate.)_______________
20. For how many years of your life was your mother employed before you were seven? (If
you are not sure, estimate.)_______________
21. Attitude to ideologies. Generally, you usually think of yourself as:______
a. With conservative ideas
b. With a moderately reformist attitude
c. Independent
d. No preference
22. With regard to each ideological preference, you feel-, (a) complete opposition; (b) 
somewhat in opposition; (c) somewhere in the middle of opposition and support; (d) 
somewhat liberal; and (e) complete support. Indicate the letter in the spaces provided for 
below:
a. With conservative ideas__
b. With a moderately reformist attitude__
c. Independent____
23. For some people to succeed, others must fail. Answer yes or no ________.
24. Describe your future career plans and aspirations. Answer yes or no in the spaces 
provided for.
a. Public Service? _______
b. Politics? _______
c. Private Business? _______
d. Private professional?
PLEASE RETURN THE HANDBOOK TO THE MODERATOR. THANK YOU.
Reference: Fröhlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J. 1992. Choosing Justice: an experimental 
approach in ethical theory, University of California Press, Berkeley.
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Annex 5 
(Chapter 3)
This Annex describes the variables used in the regression models with their sources of data 
placed in parenthesis.
POVIj
logRAFIj
logRPCIj
ELEC
POT
SAN
NAGL
DEPR
HSIZ
URB
LANFO
IRRIG
DIST
FLIT
ILLIT
ACADEG
ROADEN 
PAVRODEN = 
D
Poverty incidence in 1991 by province (PCFP 1995) 
log Real Average Family Income per province in 1991 (NSO 1994b) 
log Real Per Capita Income per province in 1991 (NSO 1994b) 
proportion of households with electricity in 1990 per province 
(NSO 1993)
proportion of households with potable water in 1990 per province 
(NSO 1993)
proportion of households with sanitary toilet facilities in 1990 per 
province (NSO 1993)
proportion of the labour force in the non- agricultural sector in 1990 
per province (NSO 1993)
the average dependency burden ratio in 1990 per province; the 
number of household members less than or equal to 14 year old plus 
those above 65 years old divided by the number of persons in the 
household (NSO 1993)
average household size in 1990 per province (NSO 1993) 
proportion of households living in an urbanised area in 1990 per 
province (NSO 1993)
proportion of total area of farms in the province in 1991 which is 
fully-owned (NSO 1994a)
proportion of arable land in the province in 1991 which is irrigated 
(NSO 1994a)
dummy variable for distance. The variable takes a value of 0 if the 
province is located in Luzon (except for Mindoro and Palawan 
which takes a value of 1 because of its relatively longer distance 
from MetroManila as compared to the other provinces within 
the Luzon island); 1 if in the Visayas; and 2 if in Mindanao, 
functional literacy rate in 1989 per province (DECS and NSO 
1989)
illiteracy rate in 1990 per province (PCFP 1995) 
proportion of persons 25 years old and over with academic 
degree (NSO 1993)
road density per province (DPWH 1991) 
paved road density per province (DPWH 1991) 
regional delineation from 1 to 13 (NSO 1993)
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Annex 7 
(Chapter 4)
SURVEY OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS1
This survey is part of a study of rural households in the Philippines. It aims to get a 
general idea of the socio-economic background of possible participants in group discussions 
which will be conducted in two Philippine villages sometime in 1997. The groups will consist of 
members of households which are to be selected by systematic random sampling. The groupings 
for the discussions are as follows: fathers; mothers; eldest sons (never married); eldest daughters 
(never married); younger children (less than 15 years old), and grandparents. The groups will be 
asked their views on issues relating to their general well-being, fertility decisions, and caring for 
the environment (particularly the forests).
This questionnaire will be administered by an interviewer prior to the group discussions. It 
is divided into three parts:
(i) Part I contains basic questions on the members of the household, the existence of 
household amenities and access to service facilities/centres. The questions should be answered 
by the head of the household or any senior household member.
(ii) Part II contains questions on household income. Except for coping strategies which 
should be answered by the head of the household, all items in Part II should be answered by the 
head of the household or any member of the household who is responsible in the management of 
the household finances.
(iii) Part III refers to matters relating to woman's work, reproduction, and access to and 
use of health and family planning facilities and services in the community. It also includes some 
questions on the health of the children. These questions should bo answered by the wife of the 
head of the household or the head of the household if she is female.
The case study itself will not mention names and all information gathered in this survey is 
strictly confidential.
Province:__________________
Municipality:________________
Barangay:__________________
Household # :____
Address:_____________________________________________
Interviewer Visits:
Date
1 2 3 Final Visit
Interviewer's initials
Result*
* Result Codes:
1 Completed
2 No household member at home or no competent respondent at home at time of visit
3 Postponed; Interviewer was asked to return later
4 Other___________________ (specify)
References: National Statistics Office, 1994a. 1991 Family Income and Expenditures Survey, 
NSO, Manila and National Statistics Office, 1994b. National Demographic Survey 1993, NSO and 
Macro International Inc., Calverton, Maryland.
1 Most of the questions were patterned after those contained in the 1993 
Philippine National Demographic Survey and the 1991 Philippine Family Income and 
Expenditures Survey with some modifications as necessary.
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PART I. BASIC INFORMATION ON HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS, HOUSEHOLD 
AMENITIES, AND ACCESS TO SERVICE FACILITIES/CENTRES
Time of Interview Started:_______Time of Interview Ended:____________
I (WE) WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST SOME INFORMATION ABOUT THE PEOPLE WHO USUALLY 
LIVE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD OR WHO ARE STAYING WITH YOU NOW.
LINE.: USUAL RESIDENTS: RELATIONSHIP TO: FAMILY
NO. HEAD OF HH :TYPE
SEX: AGE: EDUCATION: BASIC
: : LITERACY
(Please give me What is the 
the names of the relationship of
persons who (NAME) to the
usually live in your head of the 
household starting household? 
with the head of Enter
the household? relationship
code.3
Enter Is How old Has Does
family (NAME) is (NAME) (NAME)
type.*3 male (NAME) ever been knowhow 
or as of her/ to school? to read, 
female? his last? If yes, write, and 
birthday what is count? 
the
highest
grade/year
(NAME)
completed?
Enter codes 
for grade/ 
year0.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
: REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
1 1 2: : 1 2
: REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
2 1 2: : 1 2
: REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
3 1 2: : 1 2
: REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
4 1 2: : 1 2
: REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
5 1 2: : 1 2
: REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
6 1 2: : 1 2
: REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
7 1 2: : 1 2
: REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
8 1 2: : 1 2
: REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
9 1 2: : 1 2
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: : REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
10 : : 1 2: : 1 2
: : REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
11 : : 1 2: : 1 2
: : REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
12 : : 1 2: : 1 2
: REL. TYPE M F:IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
13 : : 1 2: : 1 2
: : REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
14 : : 1 2: : 1 2
: : REL. TYPE M F :IN YRS.: CODE YES NO
15 : : 1 2: : 1 2
Just to make sure that I (we) have a complete listing, I (we) have listed________ people.
(8) Are there any other persons such as small children or infants that I (we) have not listed? 
Encircle: Yes or No.
If yes, enter each name in the above table. If no, go to question no. 9.
a RELATIONSHIP TO HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD CODES:
01 = HEAD
02 = WIFE OR HUSBAND
03 = SON OR DAUGHTER
04 = SON OR
DAUGHTER-IN-LAW
05 = GRANDCHILD
06 = PARENT
07 = PARENT -IN-LAW
b FAMILY TYPE CODES:
0 = NO FAMILY NUCLEUS 
1= FIRST FAMILY 
c CODES FOR GRADE/YEAR: 
00 = NO EDUCATION
11 = ELEMENTARY GRADE 1
12 =ELEMENTARY GRADE 2
13 = ELEMENTARY GRADE 3
14 = ELEMENTARY GRADE 4
15 = ELEMENTARY GRADE 5
08 = BROTHER/SISTER OR
BROTHER/SISTER-IN-LAW
09 = UNCLE/AUNT OR UNCLE/
AUNT-IN-LAW
10= COUSIN/ COUSIN-IN-LAW 
11 = NIECE/NEPHEW OR
NIECE/NEPHEW-IN-LAW
12=GRANDPARENT 
OR
GRANDPARENT-
IN-LAW
13=ADOPTED/
FOSTER CHILD
14 = NOT RELATED
15 = DON’T KNOW
2 = SECOND FAMILY
3 = THIRD FAMILY AND SO FORTH
16 = ELEMENTARY GRADE 6
17 = ELEMENTARY GRADE 7
21 = HIGH SCHOOL YEAR 1
22 = HIGH SCHOOL YEAR 2
23 = HIGH SCHOOL YEAR 3
24 = HIGH SCHOOL YEAR 4
31 = COLLEGE YR. 1
32 = COLLEGE YR. 2
33 = COLLEGE YR. 3
34 = COLLEGE YR. 4
35 = COLLEGE YR. 5
40 = COLLEGE GRADUATE
(9) Do you have any living children in the household who are between the ages of three months and 
60 months? If 'yes', REQUEST PERMISSION OF PARENTS IN THE HOUSEHOLD TO MEASURE 
THE HEIGHT OF THE CHILDREN AND RECORD THE INFORMATION IN THE TABLE BELOW. If 
‘no’, skip to question no. 10.
LINE NAME AGE HEIGHT
NO. (in mos.) (in centimetres)
(1)
(2)
350
(3)
(4)
QUESTION CODING CATEGORIES SKIP TO
(10) How do you classify 
your family? Are you 
a Tagalog, Bicolano, 
llocano, Cebuano, llonggo, 
Waray, Kapampangan, 
or what?
01= Tagalog
02 = Bicolano
03 = llocano
04 = Ibaloi
05 = Kankaney
06 = Cebuano
07 = llonggo
08 = Waray
09 = Kapampangan
10 = Other_______
(SPECIFY).
(11) How long has the head of the household been a 
resident of this province? No. of years:
NOW I (WE) WOULD LIKE SOME INFORMATION ON HOUSEHOLD AMENITIES.
QUESTION CODING CATEGORIES SKIP TO
(12) What is the main source of water 
your household uses for handwashing 
and dishwashing?
(13) How long does it take to go there, 
get water, and come back?
(14) Does your household get drinking 
water from this same source?
COMMUNITY WATER SYSTEM 
PIPED INTO
11 = RESIDENCE/YARD PLOT
12 = PUBLIC TAP 
TUBED/PIPED WELL/IMPROVED 
DUG WELL
PRIVATE WELL W/O FAUCET
21 = Within residence/yard/plot
22 = Not within residence/yard/plot
23 = PRIVATE WELL W/ FAUCET
24 = PUBLIC WELL
31 = OPEN/DUG WELL 
41 = DEVELOPED SPRING 
51 = RAIN WATER
71 = OTHER___________________
(SPECIFY)
MINUTES ______________
996 = PREMISES
1 = YES
2 = NO
14
14
(15) What is the main source of drinking 
water for members of your 
household?
COMMUNITY WATER SYSTEM 
PIPED INTO
11 = RESIDENCE/YARD PLOT
12 = PUBLIC TAP 
TUBED/PIPED WELL/IMPROVED 
DUG WELL
PRIVATE WELL W/O FAUCET
21 = Within residence/yard/plot
22 = Not within residence/yard/plot
23 = PRIVATE WELL W/ FAUCET
24 = PUBLIC WELL
31 = OPEN/DUG WELL 
41 = DEVELOPED SPRING 
51 = RAIN WATER
71 = OTHER__________________
(SPECIFY)
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(16) What kind of toilet facility does 
your household have?
(17) Does your household have:
electricity for home consumption?
electricity for home production? 
(e.g. dressmaking, 
carpentry)
an electric/gas range? 
a refrigerator? 
a television? 
a radio?
(18) What is the main source of
energy for cooking?
(19) How far is the forest from your house 
in kilometres?
(20) How many rooms in your 
household are used for sleeping?
(21) Main Material of the Floor.
(RECORD OBSERVATION)
(22) Does any member of your household 
own:
a bicycle? 
a motorcycle 
a car?
FLUSH TOILET (WATER SEALED)
11 = OWN FLUSH TOILET
12 = SHARED FLUSH TOILET
PIT TOILET/LATRINE
21 = TRADITIONAL PIT TOILET
22 = VENTILATED IMPROVED
PIT LATRINE
31 = NO FACILITY/BUSH/FIELD
41 = OTHER__________________
(SPECIFY)
YES NO
ELECTRICITY FOR HOME
CONSUMPTION 1 2
ELECTRICITY FOR HOME
PRODUCTION 1 2
ELECTRIC/GAS RANGE 1
REFRIGERATOR 1
TELEVISION 1
RADIO 1
01 = ELECTRICITY
02 = WOOD from backyard
03 = WOOD from forests
04 = CHARCOAL
05 = Other__________
(SPECIFY)
(kilometres)
ROOMS ___________
NATURAL FLOOR 
11 = EARTH/SAND 
RUDIMENTARY FLOOR
21 = WOOD PLANKS
22 = PALM BAMBOO 
FINISHED FLOOR
31 = PARQUET OR POLISHED WOOD
32 = VINYL OR ASPHALT STRIPS
33 = CERAMIC TILES
34 = CEMENT
35 = MARBLE
41 = OTHER_______________
(Specify)
YES NO
BICYCLE 1 2
MOTORCYCLE 1 2
CAR 1 2
NEXT, I (WE) WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE NEAREST AVAILABLE SCHOOLS AND 
SERVICE FACILITIES/CENTRES TO YOUR HOUSEHOLD.
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CM C\J CM CM
SERVICE FACILITY/CENTER : DISTANCE TO: MOST COMMON : TRAVEL TIME
: SERVICE TYPE OF TO GET THEREC
FACILITY/ TRANSPORT13
CENTER 
(IN KMS.) a
A. EDUCATION
1. Elementary Hour:
Mins.
2. High School Hour:
Mins.
3. Colleae/Universitv Hour:
Mins.
B. GENERAL SERVICES
1. Barangay Hall Hour:
Mins.
2. Postal Service Hour:
Mins.
3. Church/chapel/ Hour:
mosque with a Mins.
service at least once
a month
4. Market Place where Hour:
trading activities are Mins.
carried on at least
once a week.
5. Public library Hour:
Mins.
6. Cinema Hour:
Mins.
7. Public transportation Hour:
Mins.
a DISTANCE CODES: 00 = less than 1 kilometre/ located within barangay
01 = More than 1 kilometre (Indicate approximate distance)___
98 = Not known facility
b TRANSPORT CODES: 01 = Walking
02 = Private Vehicle/Cart
03 = Hired Vehicle/Cart
04 = Public Transport
05 = Other_____________
(SPECIFY)
c RECORD IN MINUTES IF LESS THAN 2 HOURS AND IN HOURS IF 2 HOURS OR MORE.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ■ f r*
PART II. HOUSEHOLD INCOME and OTHER RECEIPTS
Time of Interview S tarted :_______ Time of Interview Ended:_____________
I (WE) WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SOURCES OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME IN 1996 AND ON OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES.
A. SALARIES AND WAGES FROM EMPLOYMENT 
A1. SALARIES AND WAGES FROM REGULAR EMPLOYMENT
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
A1.1 AGRICULTURAL
CATEGORIES
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During the period January to December 1996,
did you or any member of your family receive
regularly salaries and wages from employment
in agricultural sectors, in cash (including allowances,
honoraria, tips, bonus, commissions, and others)
and in kind (including housing, food, grocery, 01 = YES
clothing, medical benefits, etc.)? 02 = NO A1.2
L IN E F IR S T  N A M E S P E C IF IC C A S H  E A R N IN G S E A R N IN G S  IN K IN D
N O . o f F A M IL Y  
M E M B E R
T Y P E  O F  
W O R K 3
(in  p e s o s ) (in  p e s o s )
(1 ) (2) (3) (4 ) (5)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
TOTAL 91010
a TYPE OF WORK
91011: CROP FARMING AND GARDENING (such as the growing of palay, corn, roots, 
and tubers, vegetables, fruits, nuts, orchids, ornamental plants, etc.)
91012: LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY RAISING (such as raising of carabaos, cattle, hogs, 
horses, chicken, ducks, etc. and the production of fresh milk, eggs, etc.)
91013: FISHING (such as capture fishing with a boat of three tons or less; gathering fry, 
shells, seaweeds, etc. and culturing fish, oyster, mussel, etc.)
91014: FORESTRY AND HUNTING (such as tree planting (ipil-ipil), firewood gathering, 
small-scale logging (excluding concessionaires), charcoal making, gathering forestry products 
(cogon, nipa, rattan, bamboo, resin, gum, etc.) or hunting wild animals/birds).
A1.2 NON-AGRICULTURAL
During the period January to December 1996, 
did you or any member of your family receive 
regularly salaries and wages from employment 
in non-agricultural sectors, in cash (including 
allowances, honoraria, tips, bonus, commissions, 
and others) and in kind (including housing, food,
grocery, clothing, medical benefits, etc.)? 01 = YES
02 = NO A2.1
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LIN E FIRST N AM E S P E C IF IC CASH EAR N IN G S E A R N IN G S  IN K IND
NO. of FA M ILY  
M EM BER
TYPE OF 
W O R K 3
(in pesos) (in pesos)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
TOTAL 91020
aCODES FOR TYPE OF WORK:
91021 = WHOLESALE AND RETAIL including market vending, sidewalk vending, and
peddling
91022 = MANUFACTURING such as working in the factories, mat weaving, tailoring, 
dressmaking, bagoong making, fish drying, etc.
91023 = COMMUNITY, SOCIAL, RECREATIONAL, AND PERSONAL SERVICES such as 
medical and dental practice, practice of trade, operation of schools, restaurants and hotels, etc.
91024 = TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE, AND COMMUNICATION SERVICES such as 
operation of jeepneys or taxis, storage and warehousing activities, messenger services, etc.
91025 = MINING AND QUARRYING such as mineral extraction like salt making, gold 
mining; gravel, sand and stone quarrying, etc.
91026 = CONSTRUCTION or repair of a house, building or any structure
91027 = ACTIVITIES NOT ELSEWHERE CLASSIFIED including utilities (such as 
electricity, gas and water), financing, insurance, real estate, and business services.
A2. SALARIES AND WAGES FROM SEASONAL/OCCASIONAL EMPLOYMENT
QUESTION
A2.1 AGRICULTURAL
CODING
CATEGORIES
During the period January to December 1996,
did you or any member of your family receive
salaries and wages from agricultural sectors,
as seasonal/ occasional workers (for example,
harvester) in cash (including allowances,
honoraria, tips, bonus, commissions, and others)
and in kind (including housing, food, grocery,
clothing, medical benefits, etc.) 01 =YES
02 = NO
SKIP TO
A2.2
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LIN E FIRST NAM E S P E C IF IC C AS H  EARN IN G S E A R N IN G S  IN KIND
NO . of FA M ILY  
M EM BER
TY P E  OF 
W O R K 3
(in pesos) (in pesos)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
TOTAL 91030
a CODES FOR TYPE OF WORK: 91011= CROP FARMING AND GARDENING
91012 = LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY RAISING
91013 = FISHING
91014 = FORESTRY AND HUNTING 
(See A1.1 for examples.)
QUESTION
A2.2 NON-AGRICULTURAL
CODING
CATEGORIES
During the period January to December 1996,
did you or any member of your family receive
salaries and wages from non-agricultural sectors,
as seasonal/ occasional workers (e.g. salesmen,
hostesses on commission, tip or piece-rate basis),
in cash (including allowances, honoraria, tips,
bonus, commissions and others) and in kind
(including housing, food, grocery, clothing, 01 =YES
medical benefits, etc.)? 02 = NO
SKIP TO
LINE FIRST NAME SPECIFIC CASH EARNINGS EARNINGS IN KIND
NO. of FAMILY 
MEMBER
TYPE OF 
WORK3
(in pesos) (in pesos)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1
356
TOTAL 91040
aCODES FOR TYPE OF WORK: 91021 = WHOLESALE AND RETAIL
91022 = MANUFACTURING
91023 = COMMUNITY, SOCIAL, RECREATIONAL, AND
PERSONAL SERVICES
91024 = TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE, AND
COMMUNICATION SERVICES
91025 = MINING AND QUARRYING
91026 = CONSTRUCTION
91027 = ACTIVITIES NOT ELSEWHERE CLASSIFIED 
(See A1.2 for examples.)
A3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES AND 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE AREA.
QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES OR
RESPONSE SKIP TO
A3.1. Are the following infrastructure facilities YES NO IF 'NO', TO
existing in your area? Question No.
A3.3.
a. Farm-to-Market Roads 1 2
b. Irrigation (all types) 1 2
c. Post-harvest Facilities 1 2
d. Other 1 2
(Specify)
A3.2. Do you have access to these facilities? YES NO
a. Farm-to-Market Roads 1 2
b. Irrigation (all types) 1 2
c. Post-harvest Facilities 1 2
d. Other_____________
(Specify)
A3.3. How does the presence of (or lack of) infrastructure facilities influence employment 
opportunities open to you? (Mention also electricity, water supply and sanitary toilet facilities and 
cross-refer with respondent's answers in Part I on household amenities.)
B. NET SHARE OF CROPS, FRUITS AND VEGETABLES PRODUCED OR 
LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY RAISED BY OTHER HOUSEHOLDS
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES
During the period January to December 1996, 
did you or any member of your family receive 
net share of crops, fruits and vegetables produced 
or livestock and poultry raised by other households?
If yes, how much was sold or consumed by the
family? 01= YES
02 = NO C
ITEM CODE TOTAL NET SOLD VALUE
VALUE OF FOR CONSUMED
SHARE CASH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Cereals (Palay, corn, other cereals) 92010
2. Roots and tubers 92020
3. Fruits and vegetables 92030
4. Livestock and poultry 92040
5. Livestock and poultry
products 92050
6. Others (specify)____________  92060
TOTAL 92000
C. OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME
C1. CASH RECEIPTS, GIFTS, SUPPORT, RELIEF, AND OTHER FORMS OF 
ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES
During the period January to December 1996,
did you or any member of your family receive
in cash, any receipt, gift or other assistance 01= YES
from abroad? 02 = NO C2
ITEM CODE IN CASH
(1) (2) (3)
1. Cash received from family 
members who are contract
workers 93011
2. Cash received from family 
members who are working
abroad 93012
3. Pensions, retirement, workmen's
compensation and other benefits 93013
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4. Cash gifts, support, relief, etc. 
from abroad
5. Dividends from investment abroad
TOTAL
93014
93015 
93010
C2. CASH RECEIPTS, SUPPORT, ASSISTANCE AND RELIEF FROM DOMESTIC 
SOURCE
QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES
SKIP TO
During the period January to December 1996, 
did you or any member of your family receive 
in cash any gift, support, assistance or relief 
from a domestic source?
01= YES 
02 = NO C3
SOURCE CODE IN CASH
(1) (2) (3)
1. Other families 93021
2. Government and private institutions 93022
TOTAL 93020
C3. RENTALS RECEIVED FROM NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS, BUILDINGS, 
SPACES, AND OTHER PROPERTIES
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES
During the period January to December 1996, 
did you or any member of your family receive 
in cash or in kind, rentals from non-agricultural land,
buildings, spaces, or other properties? 01 = YES
02 = NO 04
ITEM CODE IN CASH IN KIND
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Land 93031
2. Buildings 93032
3. Spaces 93033
4. Other properties 93034
TOTAL 93030 — —
C4. INTEREST
QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES
SKIP TO
During the period January to December 1996, 
did you or any member of your family receive 
in cash or in kind, interest from bank deposits 
and loans extended to other families? 01= YES 
02 = NO C5
359
ITEM CODE IN CASH IN KIND
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Interest from Bank deposits 93041 __________  XXXXXXXX
2. Interest from loans extended
to other families 93042 ..................................................
TOTAL 93040 =========== ==========
C5. PENSION AND RETIREMENT, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND SOCIAL 
SECURITY BENEFITS
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES
During the period January to December 1996,
did you or any member of your family receive
in cash or in kind, pensions and retirement,
worker's compensation, or social security
benefits? 01= YES
02 = NO C6
ITEM
(1)
CODE
(2)
IN CASH 
(3)
IN KIND 
(4)
1. Pension and retirement 93051
2. Workmen's compensation 93052
3. Social security benefits 93053
TOTAL 93050
C6. NET WINNINGS FROM GAMBLING, SWEEPSTAKES, AND COMMUNITY 
RAFFLE
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES
During the period January to December 1996,
did you or any member of your family receive
in cash or in kind, net winnings from gambling,
sweepstakes or raffle? 01 = YES
02 = NO C7
ITEM
(1)
CODE
(2)
IN CASH 
(3)
IN KIND 
(4)
1. Gambling (jueteng, cockfights,
mahjong, bingo, cards, etc.) 93061
2. Sweepstakes or Lotto 93062
3. Community raffle 93063
TOTAL 93060 —
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C7. OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME NOT ELSEWHERE CLASSIFIED
QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES
SKIP TO
During the period January to December 1996, 
did you or any member of your family receive 
in cash or in kind, other sources of income not 
elsewhere classified such as investment (stocks, 01= YES
bonds, etc.), any profit from sale of stocks, bonds, 
and real and personal property, back pay and proceeds 
from insurance, inheritance, and royalties and income 
of family members below 10 years old?
02 = NO D
SOURCE CODE IN CASH IN KIND
(1) (2) (3) (4)
_______________________(Specify) 93111
_______________________(Specify) 93112
TOTAL 93110
D. OTHER RECEIPTS
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES
During the period January to December 1996,
did you or any member of your family receive
anything, in cash or in kind, other receipts such
as sale of real property; sale of personal property
(clothing, jewelry, etc.); loans from other families
business firms and government institutions for
current consumption and investment payment
received for loan granted to others (excluding
interest); withdrawals from savings/business
equity, or other receipts? 01= YES
02 = NO E
ITEM
(1)
CODE
(2)
IN CASH 
(3)
IN KIND
(4)
1. Sale of real property 94001
2. Sale of personal property 94002
3. Loans from other families 94003
4. Loans from business firms 94004
(including sari-sari stores)
and government institutions
5. Payments received for loans 94005
granted to others
6. Withdrawals from savings/ 94006
business equity
7. Other receipts 94007
TOTAL 94000 —
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E. CHECKLIST FOR FAMILY SUSTENANCE and ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES
E1. FAMILY SUSTENANCE ACTIVITIES
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES
During the period January to December 
1996, did you or any member of your 
family produce goods mainly for home
consumption? 01= YES
02 = NO E2
TYPE OF ACTIVITY 
(1)
CODE
(2)
1. Fishing, gathering shells,
snail, seaweeds, corals, etc. 95010
2. Logging, gathering forest
products like firewood 95050
3. Hunting and trapping 95060
4. Farming, gardening 95080
a) Cereals 95081
b) Roots and tubers 95082
c) Fruits and Vegetables 95083
d) Others 95084
(specify)
5. Raising livestock and poultry 95090
a) Livestock and poultry 95091
b) Livestock and poultry
products 95092
TOTAL 95000
TOTAL VALUE
VALUE CONSUMED
(3) (4)
VALUE 
GIVEN AWAY 
AS GIFTS
(5)
E2. FAMILY ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES
During the period January to December
1996, did you or any member of your
family engage as operator in any of the IF 'YES', go to
following entrepreneurial activities? 
in
relevant activity
(SEE A1.1 and A1.2 for DESCRIPTION). E21 to E31.
YES NO IF'NO' TO ALL
1. Crop farming and Gardening 1 2 type of activities,
2. Livestock and Poultry Raising 1 2 go to F.
3. Fishing 1 2
4. Forestry and Hunting 1 2
5. Wholesale and Retail 1 2
6. Manufacturing 1 2
7. Community, Social, Recreational,
and Personal Services 1 2
8. Transportation, Storage and Communication
Services 1 2
9. Mining and Quarrying 1 2
10. Construction 1 2
11. Others 1 2
(SPECIFY)
362
ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES
E21. CROP FARMING AND GARDENING
E21.1 Did you or any members of your family harvest crops, fruits, and vegetables during the 
period specified? If yes, how much was consumed by the family or given away as gifts?
ITEM CODE TOTAL VALUE VALUE
VALUE CONSUMED GIVEN
AWAY
AS
GIFTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Cereals 00121
a) Palay 92011
b) Corn 92012
2. Roots and tubers 00122
a) Cassava 92022
b) Camote 92023
3. Fruits and vegetables 00123
a) Fruits 92031
b) Vegetables 92032
c) Coconut 92033
d) Others _____
4. Others (including orchids 
and ornamental 
plants) 00124
a) Tobacco 92003
b) Coffee 92071
c) Others _____
TOTAL VALUE 00120
E21.2 During the period specified, did you or any member of your family incur expenses, in cash or 
in kind, in the production of the crops harvested?
ITEM CODE IN IN TOTAL
CASH KIND
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Seeds 00131
2. Fertiliser 00132
3. Pesticide 00133
4. Fuel and oil 00134
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
Wages of hired labour 00135 
and paid family members
Interest paid on 
agricultural loan
(if any) 00136
Irrigation fees and 
other water charges 00137
Rent of land, equipment 
and work animal 00138
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9. 00139Other expenses 
TOTAL COSTS 00130
E21.3 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME FROM CROP FARMING and GARDENING
Code Amount
TOTAL VALUE 00120 _________
LESS: TOTAL COSTS 00130 _________
NET INCOME 00100 =========
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES OR 
RESPONSE
E21.4 If you are a share cropper, do you 
find any difficulties associated with this
system of payment? _________________________________________
E21.5 Where is your main market 
located?
E21.6 Who takes your products to the market?
E21.7 Who sells them?
E21.8 What difficulties do you have in 
marketing your products?
01 = Town centre
02 = City
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 = Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 = Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
E22. LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY RAISING
E22.1 Did you or any member of your family dispose of any livestock and poultry products, whether 
sold, consumed or given away or produce livestock/poultry products during the period specified? If 
'yes', how much was consumed by the family or given away as gifts?
ITEM CODE TOTAL
VALUE
VALUE
CONSUMED
VALUE
GIVEN
AW AY
AS
GIFTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Livestock and Poultry 00221
a) Pigs 92041
b) Cows 92042
c) Chicken 92043
d) Carabao 92044
e) Others _____
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2. Livestock/poultry products 00222
a) Milk 92051
b) Eggs 92052
c) Others ______
TOTAL VALUE 00220
E22.2 During the period specified, did you or any member of your family incur expenses, in cash or 
in kind, in raising the livestock and poultry disposed of?
ITEM
(1)
CODE
(2)
IN
CASH
(3)
IN
KIND
(4)
TOTAL
(5)
1. Acquisition cost of stock 00231
2. Feeds 00232
3. Medicine 00233
4. Labor 00234
5. Fuel and oil 00235
6. Electricity 00236
7. Other expenses 00237
TOTAL COSTS 00230 = = = = = = = = = -------------------------------------  — —
E22.3 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME FROM LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY RAISING
Code Amount
TOTAL VALUE 00220
LESS: TOTAL COSTS 00230
NET INCOME 00200
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES OR
RESPONSE
E22.4 Where is your main market 01 = Town centre
located? 02 = City
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
E22.5 Who takes your products to the market? 01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 = Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
E22.6 Who sells them? 01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 = Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
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E22.7 What difficulties do you have in 
marketing your products?
E23. FISHING
E23.1 Did you or any member of your family catch/gather/harvest fish or aquatic products during 
the period specified? If 'yes', how much was consumed by the family or given away as gifts?
ITEM CODE TOTAL VALUE VALUE
VALUE CONSUMED GIVEN AWAY
AS GIFTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Fish and other products 
Fry gathered 
Shells and other
00321
2. 00322
3.
00323products gathered 
Fish harvested4. 00324
5. Oyster and mussel 
harvested 00325
6. Other products 
harvested 00326
TOTAL VALUE 00220
E23.2 During the period specified, did you or any member of your family incur expenses, in cash or 
in kind, in catching, gathering, or culturing the fish or aquatic products reported above?
ITEM CODE
(1) (2)
1. Acquisition cost of 
fry/fingerlings 00331
2. Fertiliser, feeds, and 
pesticide 00332
3. Wages of hired labour and 
paid family members 00333
4. Ice 00334
5. Fuel and oil 00335
6. Other expenses 00336
TOTAL COSTS 00330
IN IN TOTAL
CASH KIND
(3) (4) (5)
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E23.3 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME FROM FISHING
Code
TOTAL VALUE 00320
LESS: TOTAL COSTS 00330
NET INCOME 00300
QUESTION
E23.4 Where is your main market 
located?
E23.5 Who takes your products to the market?
E23.6 Who sells them?
E23.7 What difficulties do you have in marketing 
your products?
Amount
CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES OR
RESPONSE
01 = Town centre
02 = City
07 = Other__________
(SPECIFY)
01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 = Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 = Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
E24. FORESTRY AND HUNTING
E24.1 Did you or any member of your family dispose of forestry products gathered or wild 
animals/birds hunted, whether sold, consumed, or given away during the period specified? If 'yes', 
how much was consumed by the family or given away as gifts?
ITEM
(1)
CODE
(2)
TOTAL
VALUE
(3)
VALUE
CONSUMED
(4)
VALUE
GIVEN
AWAY
AS
GIFTS
(5)
1. Charcoal 00421
2. Firewood 00422
3. Logs 00423
4. Other forest products 00424
5. Wild animals/birds 00425
TOTAL VALUE 00420 —
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E24.2 During the period specified, did you or any member of your family incur expenses, in 
gathering forest products or hunting wild animals/birds disposed of?
ITEM
(1)
CODE
(2)
IN
CASH
(3)
IN TOTAL
KIND
(4) (5)
1. Wages of hired labour
and paid family members 00431
2. Fuel and oil 00432
3. Others 00433
TOTAL COSTS 00430 ========= ==========
E24.3 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME FROM FORESTRY AND HUNTING
Code
TOTAL VALUE 00420
LESS: TOTAL COSTS 00430
NET INCOME 00400
QUESTION
E24.4 Where is your main market 
located?
E24.5 Who takes your products to the market?
E24.6 Who sells them?
E24.7 What difficulties do you have in marketing 
your products?
Amount
CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES OR
RESPONSE
01 = Town centre
02 = City
07 = Other__________
(SPECIFY)
01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 =  Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 = Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
E25. WHOLESALE AND RETAIL
QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES
E25.1 During the period specified, did you
or any member of your family sell goods 01 = Yes
either on wholesale or retail basis? 02 = No
SKIP TO
E26
E25.2 How many months did you sell such 
goods? 00521
368
E25.3 What is the average gross sales per
month? 00522 ........................
TOTAL SALES 00520 ============
E25.4 During the period specified, did you or any member of your family incur expenses, in cash or 
in kind, in selling such goods?
ITEM
(1)
CODE
(2)
IN
CASH
(3)
IN TOTAL
KIND
(4) (5)
1. Cost of goods sold 00531
2. Others (specify)
TOTAL COSTS 00530 = = = = = = = =  = = = = = = = = = =
E25.5 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME FROM WHOLESALE AND RETAIL
Code
TOTAL SALES 00520
LESS: TOTAL COSTS 00530
NET INCOME 00500
QUESTION
E25.6 Where is your main market 
located?
E25.7 Who takes your products to the market?
E25.8 Who sells them?
E25.9 What difficulties do you have in marketing 
your products?
Amount
CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES OR
RESPONSE
01 = Town centre
02 = City
07 = Other__________
(SPECIFY)
01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 = Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 = Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
E26. MANUFACTURING (Includes mat weaving, tailoring, dressmaking, bagoong 
making, and fish drying)
QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES SKIP TO
E26.1 During the period specified, did you
or any member of your family sell any of 01 = Yes
the goods manufactured? 02 = No E26.4
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E26.2 How many months did you sell such
goods? 00621 _
E26.3 What is the average gross sales per
month? 00622 --
TOTAL SALES 00620 =
E26.4 During the period specified, did you 01 = Yes 
or any member of your family consume 02 = No
or give away any of the goods manufactured?
ITEM CODE VALUE CODE VALUE
CONSUMED GIVEN AWAY
AS GIFTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Cereal preparation 00631 00641
2. Preparation from roots 
and tubers 00632 00642
3. Fruit and vegetable 
preparation 00633 00643
4. Meat preparation 00634 00644
5. Processed fish and 
marine products 00635 00645
6. Other food items 
(SPECIFY)
00636 00646
7. Alcoholic beverages 
(native wine) 00637 00647
8. Other non-food items 
(SPECIFY)
00638 00648
TOTAL 00630 00640
E26.5 During the period specified, did you or any member of your family incur expenses, in cash or 
in kind, in manufacturing the goods reported?
ITEM
( 1)
CODE IN IN
CASH KIND
(2) (3) (4)
TOTAL
(5)
1. Raw materials 00651
2. Others (specify)
TOTAL COSTS 00650
E26.6 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME FROM MANUFACTURING
TOTAL SALES 
PLUS: TOTAL CONSUMED 
PLUS: TOTAL GIFTS 
LESS: TOTAL COSTS
NET INCOME
Code Amount
00620 ______
00630 ______
00640 ______
00650 ______
00600
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SKIP TOQUESTION
E26.7 Where is your main market 
located?
E26.8 Who takes your products to the market?
E26.9 Who sells them?
E26.10 What difficulties do you have in marketing 
your products?
CODING
CATEGORIES OR 
RESPONSE
01 = Town centre
02 = City
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 = Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
01 = Respondent
02 = Wife
03 = Children
04 = Middleman
07 = Other_________
(SPECIFY)
E27. COMMUNITY, SOCIAL, RECREATIONAL, AND PERSONAL SERVICES 
(Includes medical and dental practice, practice of trade, operation of schools, 
restaurant, and hotels, etc.)
QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES SKIP TO
E27.1 During the period specified, did you
or any member of your family receive any 01 = Yes
compensation/payment for rendering such 02 = No E27.4
services?
E27.2 How many months did you render
service or practice your trade? 00721 ___________
E27.3 What is the average gross receipt per
month? 00722 ........................
TOTAL GROSS RECEIPTS 00720 ============
E27.4 During the period specified, did you or any member of your family incur expenses, in cash or 
in kind, in rendering such services?
ITEM CODE IN IN TOTAL
CASH KIND
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Materials and supplies 00731
2. Others (specify)
TOTAL COSTS 00730
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E27.5 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME FROM COMMUNITY, SOCIAL, RECREATIONAL, AND 
PERSONAL SERVICES
Code Amount
TOTAL GROSS RECEIPTS 00720 _________
LESS: TOTAL COSTS 00730 _________
NET INCOME 00700 =========
E28. TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE, AND COMMUNICATION SERVICES 
(Includes operation of jeepneys or taxis, storage and warehousing activities, 
tour and travel agencies, messenger services, etc.)
QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES SKIP TO
E28.1 During the period specified, did you
or any member of your family receive any 01 = Yes
compensation/payment for rendering such 02 = No E28.4
services?
E28.2 How many months did you operate
or render services? 00821 ___________
E28.3 What is the average gross receipt per
month? 00822 ___________
TOTAL GROSS RECEIPTS 00820 ==========
E28.4 During the period specified, did you or any member of your family incur expenses, in cash or 
in kind, in rendering such services?
ITEM CODE IN IN TOTAL
CASH KIND
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Fuel and oil 00831
2. Maintenance and repair 00832
3. Others (specify)
00833
TOTAL COSTS 00830 — ========= —
E28.5 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME FROM TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE AND 
COMMUNICATION SERVICES
Code Amount
TOTAL GROSS RECEIPTS 00820 _________
LESS: TOTAL COSTS 00830 _________
NET INCOME 00800
E29. MINING AND QUARRYING (Includes salt mining, gold mining, gravel and
sand quarrying, etc.)
QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES SKIP TO
E29.1 During the period specified, did you 
or any member of your family dispose of 01 = Yes
mining and quarrying products? 02 = No E30
E29.2 What is the total gross receipts? 00920 ---------------------
E29.3 During the period specified, did you or any member of your family incur expenses, in cash or 
in kind, in producing the products disposed of?
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ITEM
(1)
CODE
(2)
IN
CASH
(3)
IN
KIND
(4)
TOTAL
(5)
1. Materials and supplies 00931
2. Fuels 00932
3. Others (specify)
00933
TOTAL COSTS 00930 —
E29.4 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME FROM MINING AND QUARRYING
Code Amount
TOTAL GROSS RECEIPTS 00920 _________
LESS: TOTAL COSTS 00930 _________
NET INCOME 00900
E30. CONSTRUCTION (Includes repair of a house, building, or any structure)
QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES SKIP TO
E30.1 During the period specified, did you
or any member of your famiiy receive 01 = Yes
payment for the construction activity? 02 = No E30.3
E30.2 What is the total gross receipts? 01020 ------------■--------
E30.3 During the period specified, did you or any member of your family incur expenses, for the 
construction activity?
ITEM CODE IN IN TOTAL
CASH KIND
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Wages of hired labour 01031
and paid family members
2. Materials and supplies 01032
3. Others (specify)
01033
TOTAL COSTS 01030 = = = = = = = = = — —
E30.4 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME FROM CONSTRUCTION
Code Amount
TOTAL GROSS RECEIPTS 01020
LESS: TOTAL COSTS 01030
NET INCOME 01000
E31. ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES NOT ELSEWHERE CLASSIFIED 
(Including electricity, gas and water; financing; insurance; real estate; and 
business services)
QUESTION CODING
E31.1 During the period specified, did you
CATEGORIES SKIP TO
or any member of your family receive 01 = Yes
professional or service fee for activities 
not elsewhere classified such as legal,
02 = No E31.3
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accounting and engineering services; 
advertising services; and machinery and 
equipment renting and leasing?
E31.2 What is the total gross receipts? 01120 ============
E31.3 During the period specified, did you or any member of your family incur expenses, in this 
activity?
ITEM
(1)
CODE
(2)
IN
CASH
(3)
IN
KIND
(4)
TOTAL
(5)
1. Materials and supplies 01131
2. Fuels and lubricants 01132
3. Others (specify)
01133
TOTAL COSTS 01130 ========= — -------------- -------------------------------------------
E31.4 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME FROM ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES NOT
ELSEWHERE CLASSIFIED
Code Amount
TOTAL GROSS RECEIPTS 01120 ______
LESS: TOTAL COSTS 01130 ______
NET INCOME 01100 =========
F. GENERATING INCOME AND COPING STRATEGIES (to be answered by the
head of the household)
NOW, I (WE) WOULD LIKE TO TALK ABOUT WAYS OF GENERATING INCOME AND 
GENERATION AND THE HOUSEHOLD'S COPING STRATEGIES.
QUESTION
( 1)
Do you think that your total household income 
five years ago (1992) was adequate to cover 
your household expenses then?
(2 )
What strategies did your household adopt 
during the last five years to generate 
additional income?
(3)
Have you ever had emergency
situations in the past five years (1992-1996)?
cooing
CATEGORIES
01 = Yes
02 = No
SKIP TO 
Question #3
01 = Extend farmed area
02 = Shifted to labour-absorbing
productive techniques
03 = Cultivated high value
root crops
04 = Engaged in seasonal jobs
as wage labourers
05 = Sold home-made products
(Specify)
06 = Sold fuelwood and forest
products
07 = Family members migrated
elsewhere to seek employment
08 = Others_______________
(Specify)
01 = Yes
02 = No
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QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES/RESPONSE SKIP TO
(4)
What are these emergency situations? 01 = Illness in the family
Record all mentioned. 02 = Crop Failure
03 = Natural disaster_________
(Specify)
04 = Accident___________
(Specify)
05 = House burned
06 = Funeral
07 = Cost of litigation/Fine
08 = Weddings
96 = Other_____________
(Specify)
(5)
How did your household respond to the 01 = Borrowing from_______
emergency situation? (Specify)
02 = Mortgage o f_____________
(Specify)
03 = Sale o f__________
(Specify)
04 = Reduced consumption
05 = Children dropped out of
school
06 = Others____________
(Specify)
(6)
Who are the first, second, and third persons you First person______________
approach in times of need? Second Person____________
Third Person______________
PART III. WIFE'S BACKGROUND, KNOWLEDGE, USE OF, AND ACCESS TO 
HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING FACILITIES, and THE HEALTH STATUS OF
CHILDREN
Time of Interview Started:_______Time of Interview Ended:____________
FIRST, I (WE) WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU.
QUESTION
( 101)
For most of the time until you were 
12 years old, did you live in a city, in a town, 
or in a barrio/rural area?
( 102)
In what month and year were you born?
(103)
How old were you on your last birthday? 
COMPARE AND CORRECT 102 and PART 1 (6) IF 
INCONSISTENT.
(104)
Have you ever attended school?
COMPARE AND CORRECT PART 1 IF 
INCONSISTENT.
CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES/RESPONSE
01 = City
02 = Town
03 = Barrio/Rural Area
Month
Year_
Age in Completed 
Years:________
01 = Yes
02 = No 107
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(105)
What is the highest level of school you attended? 00 = Preschool 
COMPARE WITH AND CORRECT PART 1 (7) 01 = Elementary
IF INCONSISTENT. 02 = High School
03 = College or Higher
08 = Don't know 107
(106)
What is the highest grade/year you completed at that
level? COMPARE WITH AND CORRECT PART 1 (7) Grade/Year________
98 = Don't Know
01 = Roman Catholic
02 = Protestant
03 = Iglesia ni Kristo
04 = Aglipay
05 = Islam
06 = Other_________
(specify)
07 = None
NOW, I (WE) WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT WORKING.
(108)
Aside from your own housework, are
you currently working? 01 = Yes 110
02 = No
IF INCONSISTENT. 
(107)
What is your religion?
(109)
As you know, some women take up jobs for which 
they are paid in cash or in kind. Others sell things, 
have a small business or work on the family farm 
or in the family business.
Are you currently doing any of these things or any 01 = Yes 
other work? 02 = No
( 110)
What is (was) your most recent occupation? _______
That is, what kind of work do (did) you do?
( 111)
Were you paid for this work? 01 = Yes
CHECK ANSWER with PART II on 02 = No
household income.
( 112)
Where did you work? 01 = Away from home
02 = At home
(113)
Who usually takes care of (NAME OF 
YOUNGEST CHILD AT HOME) while you are 
working?
(114)
Does any other family member need to be 
cared for?
(115)
If YES: WHO ARE THEY?
RECORD ALL MENTIONED.
01= Husband/Partner
02 = Older Child (ren)
03 = Elderly Relatives
04 = Other Relatives
05 = Neighbors/ Friends
06 = Servants/Hired help
07 = Child is in School
08 = Institutional Childcare
09 = Other_____________
01 = Yes
02 = No
01 = Other young Children 
02= Elderly parents of 
respondent
114
201
3 7 6
03 = Elderly parents of
Husband
04 = Other elderly relatives
05 = Other____________
(SPECIFY)
NOW, I (WE) WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE NEAREST AVAILABLE HEALTH FACILITIES 
AND SERVICES.
(201)
From your house, which is the nearest health 
facility that provides health services?
(202)
How far is the facility from your house in kilometres?
(203)
How long does it take to get from here to the health facility?
(204)
How often do you visit the health facility?
(205)
Does HEALTH FACILITY provide: 
prenatal care? 
delivery care? 
child immunisation? 
family planning services? 
postnatal services?
(206)
If yes, have you availed of their 
services?
prenatal care?
delivery care?
child immunisation?
family planning services?
postnatal services?
QUESTION
(207)
If you have not availed of health facilities 
or services, cite reason.
01 = Govt, hospital
02 = RHU/Puericulture
Centre
03 = Barangay Health Station
04 = Private Hospital
05 = Private Clinic
06 = Mobile outreach point
07 = Other___________
(SPECIFY)
01= Once a week 
02= Once a month 
03= Once a year
04 = Other__________
(SPECIFY)
05 = Never 207
YES NO DON'T KNOW 
01 02 08
01 02 08
01 02 08
01 02 08
01 02 08
YES NO DON'T KNOW
01 02 08
01 02 08
01 02 08
01 02 08
01 02 08
CODING SKIP TO
CATEGQRIES/RESPONSE
01 = Too far
02 = No money
03 = Services are too
377
expensive
04 = Too busy
05 = Other__________
(SPECIFY)
NEXT, I (WE) WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT ALL THE BIRTHS YOU HAD DURING YOUR LIFE.
QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES/RESPONSE
SKIP TO
(301)
Have you ever given birth? 01 = Yes
02 = No 306
(302)
Do you have any sons or daughters 
to whom you have given 01 = Yes
birth who are now living with you? 02 = No 304
(303)
How many sons live with you? Sons at home
How many daughters live with you? Daughters at home
(304)
Do you have any sons or daughters to 
whom you have given birth who are still 01 = Yes
alive but do not live with 
you?
02 = No 306
(305)
How many sons are still alive but do not 
live with you?
And how many daughters are alive but do not
Sons elsewhere
live with you? Daughters elsewhere
(306)
Have you ever given birth to a boy or a girl who 
was born alive but later died? 01 = Yes
IF NO, PROBE: Any baby who cried or 
showed any sign of life but only survived 
a few hours or days?
02 = No 308
(307)
In all how many boys have died? Boys dead
And how many girls have died? Girls dead
(308)
Some pregnancies end before full term 
or has a stillbirth. 01 = Yes
Have you had any pregnancy that did not 
result in a live birth? 02= No 310
(309)
In all, how many such pregnancies have
there been? Pregnancy Loss
(310)
Just to make sure I (we) have this right, you have had
______ children who are still living (303 and 305)
______ children who have died (307)
______ pregnancies which did not result in a
live birth (309) Is that correct? 01 = Yes
02 = No
(401)
NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: CHECK PART 1.
Are there children 5 years old and below? 01 = Yes
02 = No
CORRECT AS 
NECESSARY
Go to 501
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ENTER THE LINE NUMBER, NAME, AND SURVIVAL STATUS OF EACH BIRTH SINCE JANUARY 
1992 IN THE TABLE. ASK THE CUESTIONS ABOUT ALL OF THESE BIRTHS. (IF THERE ARE 
MORE THAN 3 BIRTHS, USE ADDITIONAL FORMS.
NOW, I (WE) WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT MATTERS RELATING TO YOUR 
PREGNANCY(IES) AND THE HEALTH OF ALL YOUR CHILDREN BORN IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS 
(1992-1996).
(402)
LINE NUMBER (FROM PART 1)
(Last birth) (Next-to-last-birth) (Second-from-
last birth)
(403)
At the time you became 01 =THEN 01 = THEN 01 =THEN
pregnant with (NAME), 
did you want to become
(Skip to 405) (Skip to 405) (Skip to 405)
pregnant then, did you want 02 = LATER 02 = LATER 02 = LATER
to wait until later or did you 03 = NO MORE 03 = NO MORE 03 = NO MORE
want no more children at all? (Skip to 405) (Skip to 405) (Skip to 405)
(404)
How much longer would you Months Months Months
like to have waited? Years Years Years
Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know
(405)
When you were pregnant with Health Health Health
(NAME), did you see anyone for Professional Professional Professional
prenatal care for this pregnancy? A = Doctor A= Doctor A= Doctor
B = Nurse B= Nurse B = Nurse
C = Midwife C = Midwife C = Midwife
IF YES, whom did you see?
Anyone else? RECORD ALL Other Person Other Person Other Person
PERSONS SEEN. D =T rained Hilot D =Trained Hilot D =T rained Hilot
E = Untrained Hilot E= Untrained Hilot E= Untrained
Hilot
F = Other F = Other F = Other
(Specify) (Specify) (Specify)
G = No one G = No one G = No one
(406)
How many prenatal visits did you
(Skip to 407) (Skip to 407) (Skip to 407)
have during this pregnancy? No. of Visits No. of Visits No. of Visits
98 = Don't know 98 = Don't know 98 = Don't know
(407)
When you were pregnant with (NAME) 
were you given any of the following:
Iron Tablet/capsule?
Iodine capsule?
Tetanus toxoid?
(408)
Did you see anyone for post-natal 
check-up after the birth of (NAME) 
last child?
IF YES, Whom did you see?
Anyone else?
Record all persons seen.
YES NO DK YES NO DK YES NO DK
01 02 08 01 02 08 01 02 08
01 02 08 01 02 08 01 02 08
01 02 08 01 02 08 01 02 08
Health Professional XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
A = Doctor 
B = Nurse 
C = Midwife 
Other Person 
D = Trained Hilot 
E = Untrained Hilot
F = Other___________
(Specify)
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G = No one
(409)
Have you ever breastfeed (NAME)? 01 = Yes 
IF'YES', Skip to 411. 02 = No
01 = Yes 
02= No
01 = Yes
02 = No
(410)
Why did you not breastfeed 
(NAME)?
01 = Mother ILL/Weak 01: Mother
ILL/Weak
01= Mother 
ILL/Weak
02 = Child ILL/Weak 02 = Child ILL/Weak 02 = Child ILL/Weak
03 = Child Died 03 = Child Died 03 = Child Died
04 = Nipple/Breast 04 = Nipple/Breast 04 = Nipple/Breast
Problem Problem Problem
05 = Insufficient Milk 05 insuffic ient Milk 05 insuffic ient Milk
06 = Mother Working 06 = Mother Working 06 = Mother Working
07 = Child Refused 07 = Child Refused 07 = Child Refused
08 = Other 08 = Other 08 = Other
(Specify) (Specify) (Specify)
(411)
Has (NAME) had diarrhoea 01 = Yes 01 = Yes 01 = Yes
in the last two weeks? 02 = No 02 = No 02 = No
(412)
For how many days has the DAYS DAYS DAYS
diarrhoea lasted/did the diarrhoea last?
IF LESS THAN 1 DAY,
RECORD '00'.
(413)
Was anything given to treat the 01 = Yes 01 = Yes 01 = Yes
diarrhoea? 02 = No 02 = No 02 = No
(Skip to 414) (Skip to 414) (Skip to 414)
08 = Don't Know 08 = Don't Know 08 = Don't Know
(414)
What was given to treat the A = Fluid from ORS A = Fiuid from ORS A = Fluid from ORS
diarrhoea? Packet Packet Packet
B = Rice Water/"AM " B = Rice Water/"AM" B = Rice Water/"AM"
Anything else? C = Antibiotic C = Antibiotic C = Antibiotic
Record all mentioned. (Pill or Syrup) (Pill or Syrup) (Pill or Syrup)
D = Other Pill or D = Other Pill or D ;= Other Pill or
Syrup Syrup Syrup
E = Injection E = Injection E = Injection
F=(I.V.)lntravenous F = (I.V.)lntravenous F=(I.V.) Intravenous
G = Home Remedy/ G = Home Remedy/ (3 = Home Remedy/
Herbal Medicines Herbal Medicines Herbal Medicines
H = Other H = Other H = Other
(Specify) (Specify) (Specify)
(415)
Did you seek advice or treatment 01 = Yes 01 = Yes 01 = Yes
for diarrhoea? 02 = No 02 = No 02 = No
(Skip to 501) (Skip to 501) (Skip to 501)
(416)
Where did you seek advice or Public Sector Public Sector Public Sector
treatment? A = Govt. Hosp/Clinic A=Govt. A=Govt.
Hosp/Clinic Hosp/Clinic
B = Rural Health Unit B = Rural Health B = Rural Health
Unit Unit
Where else? C = Bgy.Health C = Bgy. Health C = Bgy. Health
Station Station Station
Record all mentioned. D = Mobile Clinic D = Mobile Clinic D = Mobile Clinic
E = Community E = Community E = Community
Health Worker Health Worker Health Worker
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Medical Private SectorMedical Private SectorMedical Private
F = Prvt. Hospital/ 
Clinic
G = Pharmacy 
H = Private Doctor
I = Mobile Clinic 
J = Community 
Health Worker
Sector
F = Prvt.Hospital/ F = Prvt.Hospital/
Clinic
G = Pharmacy 
H = Private Doctor
Clinic
G = Pharmacy 
H = Private 
Doctor
I = Mobile Clinic I = Mobile Clinic
J = Community J = Community
Health Worker Health Worker
Other Private Sector Other Private Sector Other Private
Sector
K = Store K = Store K = Store
L = Hilot/Herbolario L = Hilot/Herbolario L =Hilot/Herbolario
M= Other________  M= Other________ M= Other_______
(Specify) (Specify) (Specify)
NOW, I (WE) WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TO TALK ABOUT YOUR FAMILY SIZE.
QUESTION CODING SKIP TO
CATEGORIES/RESPONSE
(501)
Have you and your husband/partner ever discussed 01 = Yes 
the number of children you would like to have? 02 = No
(502)
Do you think your husband/partner wants the same 01 = Same Number 
number of children that you want, or does he want 02 = More children 
more or fewer than what you want? 03 = Fewer Children
04 = Don't Know
(503)
IF RESPONDENT HAS LIVING CHILDREN:
If you could go back to the time you did not have Number__________
any children and could choose exactly the number Other Answer_______
of children to have in your whole life, how many ___________________
would that be? ____________________
IF RESPONDENT HAS NO LIVING CHILDREN:
If you could choose exactly the number of children Number____
to have in your whole life, how many would that Other Answer 
be? ___________
(504)
Why do you desire this family size?
(505)
Do you have this family size? (CHECK 01 = Yes
with answers in Part I). 02 = No
(506)
What do you think is the best number of months 01 = Months___________
or years between the birth of one child and the birth 02 = Years_____________
of the next child? 996 = Other____________
(specify)
(507)
When you get old, do you expect to live with one or 01 = Yes 
more children? 02 = No
381
(508)
Where do you expect to live?
(509)
Do you expect to receive financial or material 
support from your children/relatives when you 
get old?
(510)
If family planning facilities were available, 
would you make use of them?
(511)
Please state your reason why you would or 
would not make use of family planning 
facilities.
01 = Respondent's house
02 = Child(ren's) house
03 = Other____________
(Specify)
01 = Yes
02 = No
03 = Depends on children
04 = Other____________
(Specify)
01 = Yes
02 = No
NEXT, I (WE) WOULD LIKE TO TALK ABOUT THE VARIOUS WAYS AND METHODS THAT A 
COUPLE CAN USE TO DELAY OR AVOID A PREGNANCY.
(601)
Which ways or methods of family planning have you heard about?
Encircle code 01 in column (3) for each method mentioned spontaneously at the onset. Then 
proceed down column (2) reading the name and description of each method not mentioned 
spontaneously. Encircle code 2 if method is recognised and code 3 if not recognised. Ask 403 and 
404 for each method with code 1 or 2 circled in 402.
LINE
NO.
(1)
(402) (403) (404)
METHOD Have you Have you Do you know where a
ever heard of ever used a person could go
(METHOD)? (METHOD)? to get (METHOD)?
(2) (3) (4) (5)
1. PILL. Women can take 01= Yes/spontaneous
a pill everyday. 02 = Yes/probed
03 = No
01 = Yes
02 = No
01 = Yes, same barangay
02 = Yes, another
barangay
03 = No
2. IUD. Women can have a 01 = Yes/spontaneous
loop or coil placed inside 02 = Yes/probed
the uterus by a doctor or 03 = No
a nurse.
01 = Yes
02 = No
01 = Yes, same barangay
02 = Yes, another
barangay
03 = No
3. INJECTIONS Women can 01= Yes/spontaneous 
have an injection by a 02 = Yes/probed
doctor or nurse which 03 = No
stops them from becoming 
pregnant for several months.
01 = Yes
02 = No
01 = Yes, same barangay
02 = Yes, another
barangay
03 = No
4. DIAPHRAGM, FOAM, 01= Yes/spontaneous
JELLY, CREAM. Women 02 = Yes/probed
can place a sponge, 03 = No
suppository, diaphragm, 
jelly, or cream inside before 
intercourse.
01 = Yes
02 = No
01 = Yes, same barangay
02 = Yes, another
barangay
03 = No
5. CONDOM Men can use a 01= Yes/spontaneous 
rubber sheath during sexual 02 = Yes/probed 
intercourse. 03 = No
01 = Yes
02 = No
01 = Yes, same barangay
02 = Yes, another
barangay
03 = No
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6 . LIGATION, FEMALE 01= Yes/spontaneous
STERILISATION. 02 = Yes/probed
Women can have an 03 = No
operation to avoid having 
any more children.
Have you 01= Yes, same barangay
ever had 02 = Yes, another
an operation barangay
to avoid 03 = No
having any
more
children?
01 = Yes
02 = No
7. VASECTOMY, MALE 01= Yes/spontaneous 
STERILISATION. 02 = Yes/probed
Men can have an 03 = No
operation to avoid having 
any more children.
Have you 01= Yes, same
and your barangay
partner ever 02 = Yes, another
had an operation barangay 
to avoid having 03 = No 
any more 
children?
01 = Yes
02 = No
8. NATURAL FAMILY 01= Yes/spontaneous 01= Yes Do you know where a
PLANNING, RHYTHM 02 = Yes/probed 02 = No person can obtain
PERIODIC ABSTINENCE 03 = No on how to use natural
family planning?
01 = Yes, same barangay
02 = Yes, another 
barangay
03 = No
9. WITHDRAWAL. 01= Yes/spontaneous
Men can be careful 02 = Yes/probed
and pull out before 03 = No
climax.
01 = Yes
02 = No
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
10. Have you heard of any 01= Yes/spontaneous
other ways or methods 02 = Yes/probed
that women or men 03 = No
can use to avoid 
pregnancy?
SPECIFY
1 01 = Yes x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
02 = No x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
2 01 = Yes x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
02 = No x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
3 01 = Yes x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
02 = No x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
IF YOU ARE USING AN ARTIFICIAL OTHERWISE,
METHOD OF CONTRACEPTION: GO TO 613.
(602)
How long does it take to travel from your home to 
SOURCE?
Minutes
Hours
(603)
Is it easy or difficult to get there? 01 = Yes
(604)
How did you travel to (SOURCE) the last time
02 = No 
01 = Walked
you went? 02 = Personal vehicle/cart
03 = Hired vehicle/cart
04 = Public transportation
05 = Other____________
(SPECIFY)
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QUESTION CODING
CATEGORIES/RESPONSE
SKIP TO
(605)
How much did it cost you to travel to and from
(SOURCE) on your last visit? Peso
99996 = Free 
99998 = Don't know
(606)
On which days of the week does this (SOURCE) 
provide family planning services/ supplies 01 = Everyday
02 = Other
(607)
Are the days when family planning services/ 
supplies are available at (SOURCE) convenient 
for you?
(SPECIFY)
01 = Yes
02 = No
08 = Don't know
(608)
Are the hours of operation at (SOURCE) convenient 
for you?
01 = Yes
02 = No
08 = Don't Know
(609)
On your last visit to SOURCE, were you unable 
to obtain your prescribed or preferred method 
because it was no longer in stock?
01 = Yes
02 = No
08 = Don't Know
(610)
What is the main reason you decided to use 
CURRENT BIRTH CONTROL METHOD 
rather than some other 
method of family planning?
(611)
Are you having any problem in using CURRENT 
METHOD?
01 = Recommendation of
Family Planning Worker
02 = Recommendation of
Friend/ Relative
03 = Side Effects of Other 
Method
04 = Convenience
05 = Access/ Availability
06 = Cost
07 = Wanted permanent method
08 = Husband preferred
09 = Wanted more effective method
10 = Religion
11 = Other_______________
(SPECIFY)
98 = Don't know
01 = Yes
02 = No 615
(612)
What is the main problem? 01 = Husband disapproves
02 = Side Effects
03 = Health Concerns
04 = Access/Availability
05 = Cost
06 = Inconvenient to Use
07 = Sterilised, Wants Children
08 = Other________________
(SPECIFY)
98 = Don't Know
(613)
I (We) see that you are not currently using a method 
to delay or avoid pregnancy, do you intend to use a birth 
control method at any time in the future?
01 = Yes
02 = No
08 = Don't Know
615
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What is the main reason you do not intend to use a 
method?
(614)
01 = Wants children
02 = Lack of knowledge
03 = Opposed to family
planning
04 = Cost too much
05 = Side Effects
06 = Health Concerns
07 = Hard to get Methods
08 = Religion
09 = Fatalistic
10 = Old/Difficult to get
pregnant/infrequent sex/ 
Husband Away
11 = Menopause/Had
hysterectomy
12 = Inconvenient
13 = Not married
14 = Other_____________
(SPECIFY)
98 = Don't Know
(615)
In what way do you think family planning facilities 
could be improved?
(616)
In the last month, have you heard a message about family 
planning on: the radio?
television?
RADIO
TELEVISION
YES NO 
1 2 
1 2
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Annex 8 
(Chapter 4)
PROTOCOL GUIDE FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS
(This guide shall be used by the moderator to elicit the views of different members of the household 
on issues relating to poverty, fertility and the environment - particularly caring for forest resources. 
)
GROUP I. FATHERS
A. POVERTY ISSUE [References: Beck (1989); Jodha (1988); Chambers (1983 
and 1995); Dasgupta (1995)]
1. Who are the poor? Who are the rich? Why do you think so?
2. Is the quality of your life, and that of members of your family improving? If 'yes', why? If 
'no', why?
In terms of:
2a. your annual (or monthly) income? your annual (or monthly) 
household income? sources of income?
2b. reliance on traditional patrons, landlords, and resourceful 
people for sustenance, employment and income 
[Note to moderator: After a brief free-for-all discussion
on the sub-topics (2b-f) ask respondents to raise their 
right hand if their answer is yes to the following 
questions (except for questions #2civ. #2fiv and #2fv1. 
Record the number.]
(i) Do you have household members working as tenants
or labourers at the present time? How about ten 
years ago?
(ii) Do you reside on patron's land/yard at present? Ten
years ago?
(iii) Do you borrow money or foodgrain from patrons
during off-season at present? Ten years ago?
(iv) Do you market farm produce only through your
patrons at present? Ten years ago?
(v) Do you take loans from other people besides patrons
at present? If 'yes', who are these people? How 
about ten years ago?
2c. dependence on low pay-off or inferior jobs/ options
(i) At the present time, do you engage in food gathering? 
fuel gathering? fodder gathering? How about ten 
years ago?
(ii) At present, do you have any household members
engaging in part-time petty jobs (helping in small 
chores in exchange for a meal as a wage)? Ten 
years ago?
(iii) At present, do you have members seasonally out-
migrating for a job? Ten years ago?
(iv) At present, how good do you think your schools
are? Ten years ago?
(v) At present, do you withdraw their children from
school during the crop season to help in the farm, 
to earn, etc. Ten years ago?
2d. mobility and liquidity position
(i) Do you sell 80 per cent of your marketed produce
during the post-harvest period at the present 
time? Ten years ago?
(ii) Do you keep 25 per cent of their surplus for sale up to
the next rain at the present time? Ten years ago?
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(iii) Do you purchase key provisions in bulk at the
present time? Ten years ago?
(iv) Do you rely on day-to-day petty purchases of key
provisions at the present time? Ten years ago?
(v) Do you make cash purchases during the slack season at
the present time? Ten years ago?
(vi) At present, do you possess ready cash up to 500
pesos or more at home during the slack season?
Ten years ago?
(vii) Do you have household members who travel by
paid transport more than twice a year to outside 
the province at the present time? Ten years ago?
2e. consumption patterns/practices
(i) At present, do you occasionally consume green
vegetables? Ten years ago?
(ii) At present, do you use milk/milk products regularly?
Ten years ago?
(iii) At present, do you consume sugar regularly? Ten
years ago?
(iv) At present, do you consume rice everyday? Ten
years ago?
(v) At present, do you have three meals a day during the
harvest season? the slack season? Ten years ago?
(vi) At present, do the women and children in your
household wear shoes regularly? Ten years ago?
(vii) At present, are the women in your household
provided maternity feeding up to a month or 
more? Ten years ago?
2f. housing condition and acquisition of consumer durables
(i) Do your households have gates with doors at present?
Ten years ago?
(ii) Do you have separate provision of stay for humans
and animals at present? Ten years ago?
(iii) Do you have a private place (such as a bathroom) for
women at present? Ten years ago?
(v) How good do you think your access to electricity is?
Ten years ago?
3. Do you think most of the people who were working on the same job as you did five years 
ago (1992) were poor? Why do you think so? [If they think most of the people were poor, probe: 
Why is this?]
4. Do you think most of the people who are working on the same occupation as you do at 
present (1997) are poor? Please explain your answer. [If they think most of the people are poor, 
probe: Why is this?]
5. Do you think you will be poor five years from now (2002)? What is your basis for saying 
so?
(iv) How good do you think your water supply facilities 
for washing and drinking are? Ten years ago'
6. How do you get on with day-to-day living? (that is, everyday survival strategies)
Possible strategies: (If mentioned, probe.)
- use of common property resources (collection of fuel, gathering of wild foods)
- changes in eating and food preparation
- shared rearing of livestock
- mutual support networks and power (do the poor help each other? if 'no1 why 
don't they cooperate with each other? are the poor helped by the rich? do the 
rich cheat the poor? do the poor get organised? If 'no1, why? Is self-respect 
important?)
7. How would you cope with contingencies requiring a substantial amount of money (such 
as a major illness in the family, crop failure, natural disaster, accidents, etc.)?
8. What do you want most in life? (that is, priorities in life)
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9. Do you participate in organisations? If 'yes', what type of organisations (e.g., Govt.- 
supported, private or religious) did you join in? Did you benefit from the services 
these organisations render? If 'yes', what benefits did you get?
If 'no1, why ?
10. Are there credit facilities available in your area? If 'yes', what are these 
facilities? Did you secure a loan from these sources?
If 'yes', did you encounter any problems in borrowing and in paying the principal and 
interest (if any)? What were these problems?
If 'no', why did you not secure a loan from these sources? Where did you borrow instead?
B. FERTILITY ISSUE [References: Caldwell et al. (1988a and 1988b); NSO 
(1994b); Dasgupta (1995) and Chambers (1995)]
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the husband and wife
discussing the number of children they should have?
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the husband and wife
agreeing on the number of children they should have?
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of parents or parents-in-law
influencing the couple’s decision as to the number of children their 
married children should have?
4. What are the good and bad things about having a large family?
COSTS
4a. Do you find the cost in bringing up children increasing or 
decreasing? What costs in particular? Do these costs influence 
the decision as to how many children you want?
BENEFITS
4b. Do your children help you in the farm or in your work? If 'yes', at 
what age do they start doing so?
4c. Do your children help you with other family chores? If 'yes', what 
specific chores?
Do they:
(a) cook food?
(b) wash dishes or clothes?
(c) iron clothes
(d) mind their siblings?
(e) go to the market?
(f) care for livestock?
(g) lead animals to pasture?
(h) fetch water?
(i) gather fuelwood?
(j) gather fodder?
(k) take messages to other people?
At what age do they start doing so?
How many hours a day do your children work for you? Do you 
need more children to help you in your work?
4d. When you get old, do you expect to live with one or more children?
4e. Do you expect to receive financial or material support from your 
children/relatives when you get old?
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of birth spacing?
5a. What do you think is the best number of months or years between 
the birth of one child and the birth of the next child?
6. What are the good and bad things about having sons?
7. What are the good and bad things about having daughters?
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8. What are the good and bad things about your neighbour's having a large 
family?
C. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE
1. How is the countryside changing? Good or bad?
la . What is its effect on you?
lb . What is its effect on your parents?
lc . What is its effect on your grandparents (if still living)?
ld . What is its effect on your children?
2. Where is the nearest forest? What do you get out of it?
3. If the size of the nearest forest has declined in the last five years, do you find
you need more labour (children?) to help with maintaining the household?
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of protecting the forests?
Who should protect the forests? If it cannot be protected, how serious do you 
think would the condition of the forests be in the next five years (2002)?
GROUP II. MOTHERS
A. POVERTY ISSUE [References: Beck (1989); Jodha (1988); Chambers (1983 
and 1995); and Dasgupta (1995)]
1. Who are the poor? Why do you think so?
2. Is the quality of your life, and that of members of your family improving? If 'yes', why? If 
'no', why?
In terms of:
2a. your annual (or monthly) income? your annual (or monthly) 
household income? sources of income?
2b. reliance on traditional patrons, landlords, and resourceful 
people for sustenance, employment and income 
[Note to moderator: After a brief free-for-all discussion
on the sub-topics (2b-f) ask respondents to raise their 
right hand if their answer is yes to the following 
questions (except for questions #2civ. #2fiv and #2fv1. 
Record the number.]
(i) Do you have household members working as tenants 
or labourers at the present time? How about ten 
years ago?
(ii) Do you reside on patron's land/yard at present? Ten 
years ago?
(iii) Do you borrow money or foodgrain from patrons 
during off-season at present? Ten years ago?
(iv) Do you market farm produce only through your 
patrons at present? Ten years ago?
(v) Do you take loans from other people besides patrons 
at present? If 'yes', who are these people? How
about ten years ago?
2c. dependence on low pay-off or inferior jobs/ options
(i) At the present time, do you engage in food gathering?
fuel gathering? fodder gathering? How about ten 
years ago?
(ii) At present, do you have any household members
engaging in part-time petty jobs (helping in small 
chores in exchange for a meal as a wage)? Ten 
years ago?
(iii) At present, do you have members seasonally out-
migrating for a job? Ten years ago?
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(iv) At present, how good do you think your schools
are? Ten years ago?
(v) At present, do you withdraw their children from
school during the crop season to help in the farm, 
to earn, etc. Ten years ago?
2d. mobility and liquidity position
(i) Do you sell 80 per cent of your marketed produce
during the post-harvest period at the present 
time? Ten years ago?
(ii) Do you keep 25 per cent of their surplus for sale up to
the next rain at the present time? Ten years ago?
(iii) Do you purchase key provisions in bulk at the
present time? Ten years ago?
(iv) Do you rely on day-to-day petty purchases of key
provisions at the present time? Ten years ago?
(v) Do you make cash purchases during slack season at
the present time? Ten years ago?
(vi) At present, do you possess ready cash up to 500
pesos or more at home during the slack season?
Ten years ago?
(vii) Do you have household members who travel by
paid transport more than twice a year to outside 
the province at the present time? Ten years ago?
2e. consumption patterns/practices
(i) At present, do you occasionally consume green
vegetables? Ten years ago?
(ii) At present, do you use milk/milk products regularly?
Ten years ago?
(iii) At present, do you consume sugar regularly? Ten
years ago?
(iv) At present, do you consume rice everyday? Ten
years ago?
(v) At present, do you have three meals a day during the
harvest season? the slack season? Ten years ago?
(vi) At present, do the women and children in your
household wear shoes regularly? Ten years ago?
(vii) At present, are the women in your household
provided maternity feeding up to a month or 
more? Ten years ago?
2f. housing condition and acquisition of consumer durables
(i) Do your households have gates with doors at present?
Ten years ago?
(ii) Do you have separate provision of stay for humans
and animals at present? Ten years ago?
(iii) Do you have a private place (such as a bathroom) for
women at present? Ten years ago?
(iv) How good do you think your water supply facilities
for washing and drinking are? Ten years ago?
(v) How good do you think your access to electricity is?
Ten years ago?
3. Do you think most of the women in your neighbourhood were poor five years ago 
(1992)? Why do you think so? [If they think most of the women were poor, probe: Why is this?]
4. Do you think most of the women in your neighbourhood are poor at present (1997)? 
Please explain your answer. [If they think most of the women are poor, probe: Why is this?]
5. Do you think women like you will be poor five years from now (2002)? What is your basis 
for saying so?
6. How do you get on with day-to-day living? (that is, everyday survival strategies)
Possible strategies: (If mentioned by the group, probe.)
- use of common property resources (collection of fuel, gathering of wild foods)
- changes in eating and food preparation
- shared rearing of livestock
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- mutual support networks and power (do the poor help each other? if 'no' why 
don't they cooperate with each other? are the poor helped by the rich? do the rich 
cheat the poor? do the poor get organised? If 'no', why? Is self-respect 
important?)
7. How would you cope with contingencies requiring a substantial amount of money (such 
as a major illness in the family, crop failure, natural disaster, accidents, etc.)?
8. Who are the first, second, and third persons you approach in times of need?
9. What do you want most in life? (priorities in life)
10. Do you participate in organisations?
If 'yes', what type of organisations (e.g., Govt.-supported, private or religious) did you 
join in? Did you benefit from the services these organisations render? If 'yes', what benefits did 
you get?
If 'no', why not?
Are there women's groups or groups for women's concerns in the area?
Do you go to their meetings? Do you listen to them? Do you imagine what they say? Did 
you get anything from the services these organisations render? If 'yes', what benefits did you get?
If 'no', why not?
10. Are there credit facilities available in your area? If 'yes', what are these facilities? Did 
you secure a loan from these sources?
If 'yes', did you encounter any problems in borrowing and in paying the principal and 
interest (if any)? What are these problems?
If 'no', why did you not secure a loan from these sources? Where did you borrow instead?
B. FERTILITY ISSUE [References: Caldwell et al. (1988a and 1988b); NSO 
(1994b); Dasgupta (1995); and Chambers (1995)]
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the husband and wife 
discussing the number of children they should have?
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the husband and wife 
agreeing on the number of children they should have?
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of parents or parents-in-law 
influencing the couple’s decision as to the number of children their 
married children should have?
4. What are the good and bad things about having a large family?
COSTS
4a. Do you find the cost in bringing up children increasing or 
decreasing? What costs in particular? Do these costs influence 
the decision as to how many children you want?
BENEFITS
4b. Do your children help you in the farm or in your work? If yes, at 
what age do they start doing so? Do they produce simple 
marketable products?
4c. Do your children help you with other family chores? If 'yes', what 
specific chores?
Do they:
(a) cook food?
(b) wash dishes or clothes?
(c) iron clothes
(d) mind their siblings?
(e) go to the market?
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(f) care for livestock?
(g) lead animals to pasture?
(h) fetch water?
(i) gather fuelwood?
(j) gather fodder?
(k) take messages to other people?
At what age do they start doing so?
How many hours a day do your children work for you? Do you 
need more children to help you in your work?
4d. When you get old, do you expect to live with one or more children? 
4e. Do you expect to receive financial or material support from your 
children/relatives when you get old?
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of birth spacing?
5a. What do you think is the best number of months or years between 
the birth of one child and the birth of the next child?
6. What are the good and bad things about having sons?
7. What are the good and bad things about having daughters?
8. What are the good and bad things about your neighbour's having a large
family?
C. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE
1. How is the countryside changing? Good or bad?
1a. What is its effect on you?
1 b. What is its effect on your parents?
lc . What is its effect on your grandparents (if still living)?
ld. What is its effect on your children?
2. Where is the nearest forest? What do you get out of it?
3. If the size of the nearest forest has declined in the last five years, do you find 
you need more labour (children?) to help with maintaining the household?
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of protecting the forests? Who 
should protect the forests? If it cannot be protected, how serious do you 
think would the condition of the forests be in the next five years (2002)?
GROUP III. ELDEST SONS (NEVER MARRIED1
A. POVERTY ISSUE [References: Beck (1989); Jodha (1988); Chambers (1983 
and 1995); Dasgupta (1995)]
1. Who are the poor? Why do you think so?
2. Is the quality of your life, and that of your family improving? If 'yes', why?
If 'no', why not?
3. Do you think most of the people in your neighbourhood were poor five years 
ago (1992)? Why do you think so? [If they think most of the people were poor, 
probe: Why is this?]
4. Do you think most of the people in your neighbourhood are poor at present 
(1997)? Please explain your answer. [If they think most of the people are poor, probe:
why do they think so?
5. Do you think most of the people in your neighbourhood will be poor five years from 
now (2002)? What is your basis for saying so?
6. What do you want most in life?
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7. Who are the first, second, and third persons your family approaches in times 
of need?
8. Do you participate in organisations?
If yes, what type of organisations (e.g., Govt.-supported, private or religious) 
did you join in? Did you benefit from the services these organisations render? If 'yes', 
what benefits did you get?
If no, why?
B. FERTILITY ISSUE [References: Caldwell et al. (1988a and 1988b); Dasgupta 
(1995); and Chambers (1995)]
1. Do you think your parents should discuss the number of children they 
should have?
2. Do you think your parents should both agree on the number of children 
they should have?
3. Do you think your grandparents should have a say on the number 
of children your parents should have?
4. What are the good and bad things about having a large family?
COSTS
4a. Do you find the cost in bringing up you and your siblings increasing 
or decreasing? What costs in particular? Do you think these costs 
influence the decision of your parents as to how many children 
they want?
BENEFITS
4b. Do you help in the farm or in your parents’ work? If yes, at what age did you 
start doing so?
4c. Do you help in other family chores? What specific chores?
Do you'.
(a) cook food?
(b) wash dishes or clothes?
(c) iron clothes
(d) mind their siblings?
(e) go to the market?
(f) care for livestock?
(g) lead animals to pasture?
(h) fetch water?
(i) gather fuelwood?
(j) gather fodder?
(k) take messages to other people?
If 'yes', at what age did you start doing so?
How many hours a day do you work on household chores? Do 
you need more children to help you in your work?
4d. When your parents get old, do you expect them to live with you or 
your siblings?
4e. Are you expected to provide financial or material support for 
your parents when they get old?
5. Do you prefer to have male siblings? Why do you prefer to have male 
siblings?
6. Do you prefer to have female siblings? Why do you prefer to have female 
siblings?
7. What are the good and bad things about your neighbour's having a large 
family?
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C. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE
1. How is the countryside changing? Good or bad?
1 a. What is its effect on you?
lb. What is its effect on your parents?
lc. What is its effect on your grandparents?
ld. What is its effect on your siblings?
2. Where is the nearest forest? What do you get out of it?
3. If the size of the nearest forest has declined in the last five years, do you find 
your parents need more labour (children?) to help with maintaining the household?
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of protecting the forests? Who 
should protect the forests? If it cannot be protected, how serious do you 
think would the condition of the forests be in the next five years (2002)?
GROUP IV. ELDEST DAUGHTERS (NEVER MARRIED)
A. POVERTY ISSUE [References: Beck (1989); Jodha (1988); Chambers (1983 
and 1995); and Dasgupta (1995)]
1. Who are the poor? Why do you think so?
2. Is the quality of your life, and that of your family improving? If 'yes', why? If 'no1, why
not?
3. Do you think most of the people in your neighbourhood were poor five years ago 
(1992)? Why do you think so? [If they think most of the people were poor, probe: Why is this?]
4. Do you think most of the people in your neighbourhood are poor at present (1997)? 
Please explain your answer. [If they think most of the people are poor, probe: Why is this?]
5. Do you think most of the people in your neighbourhood will be poor five years from now 
(2002)? What is your basis for saying so?
6. What do you want most in life?
7. Who are the first, second, and third persons your family approaches in times of need?
8. Do you participate in organisations? If 'yes', what type of organisations (for example, 
Govt.-supported, private or religious) did you join in? Did you benefit from the services these 
organisations render? If 'yes', what benefits did you get?
If no, why not?
B. FERTILITY ISSUE [References: Caldwell et al. (1988a and 1988b); NSO (1994b) 
Dasgupta (1995) and Chambers (1995)]
1. Do you think your parents should discuss the number of children they should have?
2. Do you think your parents should both agree on the number of children they should
have?
3. Do you think your grandparents should have a say on the number of children your 
parents should have?
4. What are the good and bad things about having a large family?
COSTS
4a. Do you find the cost in bringing up you and your siblings increasing 
or decreasing? What costs in particular? Do you think these costs 
influence the decision of your parents as to how many children 
they want?
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BENEFITS
4b. Do you help in the farm or in your parents’ work? If yes, at what age 
did you start doing so?
4c. Do you help in other family chores? What specific chores?
Do you:
(a) cook food?
(b) wash dishes or clothes?
(c) iron clothes
(d) mind their siblings?
(e) go to the market?
(f) care for livestock?
(g) lead animals to pasture?
(h) fetch water?
(i) gather fuelwood?
(j) gather fodder?
(k) take messages to other people?
If 'yes', at what age did you start doing so?
How many hours a day do you work on household chores? Do 
you need more children to help you in your work?
4d. When your parents get old, do you expect them to live with you or 
your siblings?
4e. Are you expected to provide financial or material support for 
your parents when they get old?
5. Do you prefer to have male siblings? Why do you prefer to have male siblings?
6. Do you prefer to have female siblings? Why do you prefer to have female siblings?
7. What are the good and bad things about your neighbour's having a large
family?
C. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE
1. How is the countryside changing? Good or bad?
1 a. What is its effect on you?
1 b. What is its effect on your parents?
lc . What is its effect on your grandparents?
ld . What is its effect on your siblings?
2. Where is the nearest forest? What do you get out of it?
3. If the size of the nearest forest has declined in the last five years, do you find 
your parents need more labour (children?) to help with maintaining the household?
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of protecting the forests?
Who should protect the forests? If it cannot be protected, how serious do you think 
would the condition of the forests be in the next five years (2002)?
GROUP V. YOUNGER CHILDREN
A. POVERTY ISSUE [References: Beck (1989); Jodha (1988); Chambers (1983 
and 1995); Dasgupta (1995)]
1. Who are the poor? Why do you think so?
2. Do you think most of the people in your neighbourhood are poor at present (1997)? Why 
do you think so?
3. What do you want most in life?
B. FERTILITY ISSUE [References: Caldwell et al. (1988a and 1988b); NSO 
(1994b); Dasgupta (1995); and Chambers (1995)]
1. What are the good and bad things about having many brothers and sisters?
2. Do you help at home in doing household chores? What specific chores?
395
Do you:
(a) wash dishes?
(b) fetch water?
(c) gather fuelwood?
(d) gather fodder?
(e) deliver messages?
If yes, at what age did you start doing so?
3. Do you go to school? Do you have time to do homework?
C. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE
Where is the nearest forest? What do you get out of it?
GROUP VI. GRANDPARENTS
A. POVERTY ISSUE [References: Beck (1989); Jodha (1988); Chambers (1983 
and 1995); and Dasgupta (1995)]
1. Who are the poor? Why do you think so?
2. Is the quality of your life, and that of members of your family improving? If 'yes', why? If 
'no', why not?
In terms of:
2a. your annual (or monthly) income? your annual (or monthly) 
household income? sources of income?
2b. reliance on traditional patrons, landlords, and resourceful 
people for sustenance, employment and income 
[Note to moderator: After a brief free-for-all discussion 
on the sub-topics (2b-f) ask respondents to raise their 
right hand if their answer is yes to the following 
questions (except for questions #2civ. #2fiv and #2fv1. 
Record the number.]
(i) Do you have household members working as tenants 
or labourers at the present time? How about ten
years ago?
(ii) Do you reside on patron's land/yard at present? Ten 
years ago?
(iii) Do you borrow money or foodgrain from patrons 
during off-season at present? Ten years ago?
(iv) Do you market farm produce only through your 
patrons at present? Ten years ago?
(v) Do you take loans from other people besides patrons 
at present? If 'yes', who are these people? How
about ten years ago?
2c. dependence on low pay-off or inferior jobs/ options
(i) At the present time, do you engage in food gathering? 
fuel gathering? fodder gathering? How about ten 
years ago?
(ii) At present, do you have any household members 
engaging in part-time petty jobs (helping in small 
chores in exchange for a meal as a wage)? Ten 
years ago?
(iii) At present, do you have members seasonally out- 
migrating for a job? Ten years ago?
(iv) At present, how good do you think your schools 
are? Ten years ago?
(v) At present, do you withdraw their children from 
school during the crop season to help in the farm, 
to earn, etc. Ten years ago?
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2d. mobility and liquidity position
(i) Do you sell 80 per cent of your marketed produce 
during the post-harvest period at the present 
time? Ten years ago?
(ii) Do you keep 25 per cent of their surplus for sale up to 
the next rain at the present time? Ten years ago?
(iii) Do you purchase key provisions in bulk at the 
present time? Ten years ago?
(iv) Do you rely on day-to-day petty purchases of key 
provisions at the present time? Ten years ago?
(v) Do you make cash purchases during slack season at 
the present time? Ten years ago?
(vi) At present, do you possess ready cash up to 500 
pesos or more at home during the slack season?
Ten years ago?
(vii) Do you have household members who travel by 
paid transport more than twice a year to outside 
the province at the present time? Ten years ago?
2e. consumption patterns/practices
(i) At present, do you occasionally consume green 
vegetables? Ten years ago?
(ii) At present, do you use milk/milk products regularly?
Ten years ago?
(iii) At present, do you consume sugar regularly? Ten 
years ago?
(iv) At present, do you consume rice everyday? Ten 
years ago?
(v) At present, do you have three meals a day during the 
harvest season? the slack season? Ten years ago?
(vi) At present, do the women and children in your 
household wear shoes regularly? Ten years ago?
(vii) At present, are the women in your household 
provided maternity feeding up to a month or more?
Ten years ago?
2f. housing condition and acquisition of consumer durables
(i) Do your households have gates with doors at present?
Ten years ago?
(ii) Do you have separate provision of stay for humans 
and animals at present? Ten years ago?
(iii) Do you have a private place (such as a bathroom) for 
women at present? Ten years ago?
(iv) How good do you think your water supply facilities 
for washing and drinking are? Ten years ago?
(v) How good do you think your access to electricity is?
Ten years ago?
3. Do you think most of the people in your neighbourhood were poor five years ago 
(1992)? Why do you think so? [If they think most of the people were poor, probe: Why is this?]
4. Do you think most of the people in your neighbourhood are poor at present (1997)? Why 
do you think so? [If they think most of the people are poor, probe: Why is this?]
5. Do you think most of the people in your neighbourhood will be poor five years from now 
(2002)? What is your basis for saying so?
B. FERTILITY ISSUE [References: Caldwell et al. (1988a and 1988b); NSO 
(1994b); Dasgupta (1995); and Chambers (1995)]
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of married couples discussing the number 
of children they should have?
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of married couples agreeing on the 
number of children they should have?
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of parents or parents-in-law 
influencing the couple’s decision as to the number of children their 
married children should have?
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4. What are the good and bad things about having a large family?
COSTS
4a. Do you find the cost in bringing up children increasing or 
decreasing? What costs in particular? Do you think these costs 
influence your married children's decision as to how many 
children they want?
BENEFITS
4b. Do your grandchildren help you in the farm or in your work? If yes, 
at what age do they start doing so? Do they produce simple 
marketable products?
4c. Do your grandchildren help their parents with other family chores?
If 'yes', what specific chores?
Do they:
(a) cook food?
(b) wash dishes or clothes?
(c) iron clothes
(d) mind their siblings?
(e) go to the market?
(f) care for livestock?
(g) lead animals to pasture?
(h) fetch water?
(i) gather fuelwood?
(j) gather fodder?
(k) take messages to other people?
At what age do they start doing so?
How many hours a day do your grandchildren work for their 
parents? Do you think your married children need more children 
to help them in their work?
4d. Where do you live now: own home, children’s home, or grandchildren’s home? 
4e. Do you receive financial or material support from your 
children/grandchildren?
5. What are the good and bad things about having sons? grandsons?
6. What are the good and bad things about having daughters? granddaughters?
C. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE
1. How is the countryside changing? Good or bad?
la. What is its effect on you?
lb. What is its effect on your children?
lc . What is its effect on your grandchildren?
2. How have changes in the countryside affected the community?
3. Where is the nearest forest? What do you get out of it?
4. If the size of the nearest forest has declined in the last five years, do you find 
your married children need more labour (children?) to help with maintaining the 
household?
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of protecting the forests? Who should 
protect the forests? If it cannot be protected, how serious do you think would the 
condition of the forests be in the next five years (2002)?
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w
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re
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ai
d 
ye
s 
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ca
us
e 
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ei
r 
fa
m
ily
 
m
em
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rs
 h
av
e 
jo
bs
 a
nd
 
th
ey
 h
el
p 
ea
ch
 o
th
er
.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
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S
on
s
B
en
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et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l s
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d 
ye
s 
be
ca
us
e 
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m
ily
 m
em
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rs
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nd
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p 
ea
ch
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th
er
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n 
ar
e 
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nt
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ol
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d 
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w
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ey
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e 
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ia
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es
.
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 if
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rs
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ha
rd
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 e
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.
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ot
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et
 v
ill
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Al
l s
ai
d 
ye
s.
 T
he
y 
ca
n 
no
w
 p
ro
vi
de
 th
ei
r c
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ld
re
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w
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at
er
ia
l t
hi
ng
s.
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he
y 
w
er
e 
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le
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 d
iv
er
si
fy
 
th
ei
r 
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ur
ce
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 in
co
m
e 
by
 ta
ki
ng
 c
ar
e 
of
 p
ig
s,
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ng
 a
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 s
el
lin
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of
 
pr
od
uc
ts
 a
nd
 p
la
nt
in
g 
ve
ge
ta
bl
es
. 
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ey
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k 
ha
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nd
 m
ar
rie
d 
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le
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lp
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r.
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te
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 b
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th
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th
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hi
le
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re
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id
 n
o 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 d
id
 
no
t 
no
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e 
an
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im
pr
ov
em
en
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 in
 th
ei
r 
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 o
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liv
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g.
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s
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sw
er
ed
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o 
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us
e 
on
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r t
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n 
th
ey
 w
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e 
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t 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
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e 
w
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ot
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r s
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d 
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o 
m
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y 
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id
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ei
r 
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 d
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 n
ot
 c
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e 
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ca
us
e 
th
e 
pr
ic
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c 
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m
m
od
iti
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 r
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el
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 o
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nd
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 d
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re
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e 
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 d
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t 
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ur
ce
s 
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m
e.
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 p
at
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 p
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st
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em
pl
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en
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an
d 
in
co
m
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ou
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av
e 
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us
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ol
d 
m
em
be
rs
 w
or
ki
ng
 a
s 
te
na
nt
s 
or
 la
bo
ur
er
s 
at
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e 
pr
es
en
t t
im
e?
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ow
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ut
 te
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ye
ar
s 
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G
ra
nd
pa
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nt
s
B
en
gu
et
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ag
e:
M
aj
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w
er
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o.
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e 
re
st
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re
 te
na
nt
s 
or
 
la
bo
ur
er
s.
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as
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e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
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ill
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e:
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or
ity
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ai
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ye
s.
 T
he
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w
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ke
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as
 te
na
nt
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da
ily
 la
bo
ur
er
s.
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he
 
sa
m
e 
si
tu
at
io
n,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 
ag
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Y
ou
ng
er
 C
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re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
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ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
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ba
te
 v
ill
ag
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ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
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ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
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en
gu
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ill
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e:
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ot
 a
sk
ed
)
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ill
ag
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ot
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ed
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ld
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ev
er
 M
ar
rie
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ill
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e:
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ot
 a
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ed
)
M
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te
 v
ill
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ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
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ill
ag
e:
S
om
e 
ar
e 
te
na
nt
s 
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 d
ai
ly
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bo
ur
er
s.
 T
he
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t 
an
sw
er
ed
 n
o 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
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ai
d 
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w
ne
d 
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ei
r 
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nd
s 
an
d 
hi
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d 
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bo
ur
er
s.
 T
en
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rs
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 m
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ur
er
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nl
y 
a 
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 o
f t
he
m
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e 
fa
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s 
of
 th
ei
r o
w
n.
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am
e 
si
tu
at
io
n,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 a
go
.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
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e:
S
om
e 
sa
id
 y
es
, 
w
hi
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e 
re
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se
ve
nt
y-
ei
gh
t 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 
sa
id
 n
o.
 T
en
 y
ea
rs
 a
go
, 
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al
l f
ar
m
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bo
ur
er
s.
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om
e 
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th
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id
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ra
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h 
ca
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ta
ke
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, 
w
hi
le
 th
e 
re
st
 (
ei
gh
ty
-tw
o 
pe
r c
en
t) 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
Th
e 
sa
m
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
40
2
!) 
D
o 
yo
u 
re
si
de
 o
n 
pa
tro
ns
 la
nd
/y
ar
d 
at
 p
re
se
nt
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 
O
nl
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te
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pe
r c
en
t s
ai
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ye
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ag
o.
M
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ba
te
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ye
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at
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 C
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ot
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)
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D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
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)
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ot
 a
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)
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te
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ot
 a
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)
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ot
he
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 v
ill
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ity
 a
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er
ed
 n
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O
nl
y 
tw
en
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 y
es
. 
Th
e 
sa
m
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
te
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ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
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ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
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ity
 s
ai
d 
ye
s.
 O
nl
y 
a 
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w
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f t
he
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 li
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 in
 th
ei
r 
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n 
la
nd
. T
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 s
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e 
si
tu
at
io
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te
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ye
ar
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ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
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 v
ill
ag
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Al
l f
at
he
rs
 a
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w
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Th
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m
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
te
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ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
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ba
te
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ill
ag
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M
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ity
 a
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w
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ed
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es
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ey
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th
er
 in
 th
ei
r 
pa
tro
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la
nd
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r 
in
 p
ub
lic
 
la
nd
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O
nl
y 
on
e 
sa
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 n
o.
 
Th
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m
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tu
at
io
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te
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ye
ar
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ag
o.
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nt
 b
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ro
w
ed
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 to
 b
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 w
at
er
 
bu
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s 
an
d 
fa
rm
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pu
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tu
at
io
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 t
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ag
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M
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ll 
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no
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m
e 
si
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at
io
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ye
ar
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ou
ng
er
 C
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e:
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ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
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te
 v
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ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
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ev
er
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ar
rie
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D
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te
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et
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ill
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e:
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ot
 a
sk
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)
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ag
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)
E
ld
es
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ev
er
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ar
rie
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s
B
en
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et
 v
ill
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e:
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ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
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te
 v
ill
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e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 n
o.
 T
he
 
sa
m
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
S
om
e 
sa
id
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es
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O
th
er
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id
 
no
 b
ec
au
se
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pa
tro
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 li
ve
 in
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to
w
n 
ca
pi
ta
l w
hi
ch
 is
 to
o 
fa
r 
aw
ay
 fr
om
 th
em
. T
he
 
sa
m
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
te
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ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
B
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gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
E
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ep
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or
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ne
, 
al
l 
fa
th
er
s 
an
sw
er
ed
 n
o.
 T
he
 
sa
m
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
te
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ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
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ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
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om
et
im
es
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o 
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t 
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t o
f t
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 ti
m
e 
th
ey
 g
et
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ba
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he
 s
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e 
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at
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n 
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n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
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ag
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ns
w
er
ed
 n
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e 
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at
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n,
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rs
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go
.
M
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te
 v
ill
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no
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he
 s
am
e 
si
tu
at
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n,
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en
 y
ea
rs
 a
go
.
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ou
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er
 C
hi
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n
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 v
ill
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e:
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ot
 a
sk
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)
M
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te
 v
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e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
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t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
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D
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B
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et
 v
ill
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e:
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ot
 a
sk
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)
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te
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)
E
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ev
er
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ill
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ot
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sk
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)
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te
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B
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ill
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no
. T
w
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r c
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t o
f t
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pa
rti
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pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 y
es
. 
S
om
et
im
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 th
ey
 s
ai
d 
th
ei
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ar
m
 p
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 a
re
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st
 e
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ug
h 
fo
r t
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pt
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n.
 T
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e 
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ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
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 v
ill
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e:
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ll 
an
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s 
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se
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e 
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th
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ot
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to
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el
l. 
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m
e 
si
tu
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n 
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ye
ar
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Fa
th
er
s
B
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 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l s
ai
d 
no
. T
he
y 
se
ll 
th
ei
r 
pr
od
uc
ts
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ire
ct
ly
 t
o 
w
ho
le
sa
le
rs
 in
 t
he
 c
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m
ar
ke
t. 
Th
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m
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 T
he
y 
se
ll 
th
ei
r f
ar
m
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
th
em
se
lv
es
. 
Th
ey
 s
ai
d,
 
ho
w
ev
er
, 
th
at
 m
os
t o
f t
he
 
tim
e 
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ei
r 
pr
od
uc
e 
is
 ju
st
 
en
ou
gh
 fo
r t
he
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co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
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 fa
th
er
 
sa
id
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at
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he
n 
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y 
he
 w
ou
ld
 a
sk
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 lo
ca
l 
m
id
dl
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an
 to
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uy
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is
 
pr
od
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e.
 T
he
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io
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ye
ar
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o.
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 c
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 p
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 c
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 b
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at
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 c
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ey
 e
ng
ag
ed
 
in
 th
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 b
uy
 fr
om
 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
t. 
Th
e 
sa
m
e 
si
tu
at
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r f
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 p
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ar
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ev
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 c
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pa
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pa
nt
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er
ed
 n
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 F
or
 th
e 
re
st
 
of
 t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
, 
ho
w
ev
er
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th
ey
 a
cc
ep
te
d 
pa
la
y 
(u
nm
ill
ed
 r
ic
e)
 o
r 
ve
ge
ta
bl
es
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at
he
r 
th
an
 
m
ea
ls
 in
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
fo
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th
ei
r 
la
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ur
. T
he
 s
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si
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at
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 o
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te
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ye
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ag
o.
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ed
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re
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iv
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nl
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tu
at
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te
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ye
ar
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ag
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Fa
th
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ag
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ed
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m
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si
tu
at
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ye
ar
s 
ag
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ill
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t f
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l o
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at
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ey
 h
av
e 
fa
m
ily
 
m
em
be
rs
 w
ho
 w
or
ke
d 
ov
er
se
as
. 
Th
ey
 a
ls
o 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
th
at
 le
ss
 
fa
m
ily
 m
em
be
rs
 w
or
ke
d 
ov
er
se
as
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
S
ix
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
ha
d 
th
ei
r 
gr
an
dc
hi
ld
re
n 
w
or
ki
ng
 in
 
M
et
ro
po
lit
an
 M
an
ila
 a
s 
do
m
es
tic
 h
el
pe
rs
. 
Th
e 
sa
m
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 w
as
 
ob
se
rv
ed
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t 
N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
In
st
ea
d 
of
 s
ea
so
na
l 
m
ig
ra
tio
n,
 a
bo
ut
 th
irt
y 
-th
re
e 
pe
r c
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m
ily
 m
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rs
 
w
ho
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er
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at
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ill
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en
ty
 p
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nt
 o
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th
e 
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rti
ci
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nt
s 
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id
 t
he
ir 
re
la
tiv
es
 
w
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ke
d 
ov
er
se
as
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at
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ov
er
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 c
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ct
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ge
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ra
tio
n,
 a
bo
ut
 s
ix
ty
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 p
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 g
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ur
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ch
oo
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ow
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bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
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ag
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nt
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ba
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ill
ag
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ai
d 
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sc
ho
ol
 is
 
go
od
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ed
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n 
th
ei
r 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n 
of
 th
ei
r 
gr
an
dc
hi
ld
re
n.
 
Th
e 
sa
m
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si
tu
at
io
n 
w
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 o
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er
ve
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te
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ye
ar
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ag
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Y
ou
ng
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hi
ld
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n
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ba
te
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ill
ag
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ot
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sk
ed
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E
ld
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ev
er
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ar
rie
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D
au
gh
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ill
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ot
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sk
ed
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E
ld
es
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ev
er
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ar
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d 
S
on
s
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ba
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ill
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e:
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ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 s
ai
d 
th
e 
sc
ho
ol
s 
in
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 a
re
 g
oo
d 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
co
ul
d 
al
re
ad
y 
re
ad
 a
nd
 
ta
lk
 a
nd
 th
ey
 le
ar
n 
m
uc
h.
 
Th
e 
te
ac
he
rs
 a
re
 k
in
d.
 
O
ne
 m
ot
he
r 
di
sa
gr
ee
s 
w
ith
 h
er
 g
ro
up
 m
at
es
. 
S
he
 s
ai
d 
th
e 
sc
ho
ol
 is
 
po
or
 b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
ar
e 
in
co
m
pl
et
e 
an
d 
th
ey
 o
nl
y 
ha
ve
 a
 
pr
im
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 (
G
ra
de
s 
on
e 
to
 fo
ur
). 
Th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
as
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l s
ai
d 
th
e 
sc
ho
ol
s 
ar
e 
go
od
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
ei
r 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n 
of
 th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n.
 T
he
y 
sa
id
 th
ei
r 
ba
si
s 
fo
r 
ha
vi
ng
 s
ai
d 
so
 
w
as
 th
at
 s
om
e 
ki
ds
 h
av
e 
re
ac
he
d 
co
lle
ge
. 
Th
ey
 
no
tic
ed
, 
ho
w
ev
er
, 
th
at
 
th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
ge
t t
ire
d 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 li
ve
 fa
r 
fro
m
 th
e 
sc
ho
ol
. 
S
om
e 
sa
id
 th
e 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
ar
e 
ol
d 
an
d 
th
e 
sc
ho
ol
 s
up
pl
ie
s 
ar
e 
ta
tte
re
d 
al
re
ad
y.
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he
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si
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at
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ob
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ed
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
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r 
gr
an
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hi
ld
re
n 
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nt
in
ue
d 
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ei
r 
st
ud
ie
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d 
he
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on
ly
 d
ur
in
g 
va
ca
tio
n 
tim
e.
 S
om
e 
of
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
ch
ild
re
n 
vo
lu
nt
ee
re
d 
to
 
st
op
 s
tu
dy
in
g 
an
d 
co
nc
en
tra
te
 o
n 
w
or
ki
ng
 
in
 th
e 
fa
rm
. 
In
 th
ei
r t
im
e,
 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
of
te
n 
ab
se
nt
 
fro
m
 s
ch
oo
l b
ec
au
se
 
th
ey
 h
ad
 to
 w
or
k 
in
 th
e 
up
la
nd
s.
 O
ne
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t 
sa
id
 h
er
 m
ot
he
r t
ol
d 
he
r 
th
at
 in
st
ea
d 
of
 g
oi
ng
 to
 
sc
ho
ol
 s
he
 h
ad
 to
 w
or
k 
in
 
th
e 
fa
rm
. 
B
ec
au
se
 th
ey
 
la
ck
ed
 fo
od
 s
he
, 
to
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 h
er
 
si
bl
in
gs
, 
ha
d 
to
 p
la
nt
 r
ic
e 
an
d 
sw
ee
t p
ot
at
o.
 O
th
er
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 t
he
y 
ha
d 
to
 d
is
co
nt
in
ue
 th
ei
r 
st
ud
ie
s 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 
w
er
e 
ei
th
er
 to
o 
po
or
 o
r 
th
e 
w
ar
 c
au
se
d 
th
em
 to
 
st
op
.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
sa
id
 n
o.
 S
om
e 
m
ot
he
rs
 r
eq
ue
st
ed
 th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
to
 g
o 
ho
m
e 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 a
fte
r 
sc
ho
ol
 
to
 h
el
p 
at
 h
om
e.
 T
he
y 
sa
id
 th
at
 in
 t
he
ir 
ca
se
 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
yo
un
g 
th
ei
r 
pa
re
nt
s 
w
an
te
d 
th
em
 to
 w
ith
dr
aw
 fr
om
 
sc
ho
ol
 to
 w
or
k 
at
 h
om
e 
an
d 
in
 th
e 
fa
rm
. 
B
ec
au
se
 
th
ey
 w
an
te
d 
to
 c
on
tin
ue
 
st
ud
yi
ng
, 
th
ey
 w
ok
e 
up
 
ea
rly
 a
nd
 h
el
pe
d 
w
ith
 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
ch
or
es
 a
nd
 
th
en
 th
ey
 w
en
t t
o 
th
e 
sc
ho
ol
 a
fte
rw
ar
ds
. 
Fo
r 
ot
he
rs
, 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
as
ke
d 
by
 th
ei
r 
pa
re
nt
s 
to
 h
el
p 
th
em
 in
 th
e 
fa
rm
 d
ur
in
g 
w
ee
ke
nd
s.
 O
ne
 m
ot
he
r 
ha
d 
to
 s
to
p 
st
ud
yi
ng
 
be
ca
us
e 
he
r f
am
ily
 w
as
 
po
or
.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 
sa
id
 o
cc
as
io
na
lly
 o
nl
y.
 
Th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
as
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
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C
on
tin
ua
tio
n 
- 
(5
) 
A
t p
re
se
nt
, 
do
 y
ou
 w
ith
dr
aw
 y
ou
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
fro
m
 s
ch
oo
l d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
cr
op
 s
ea
so
n 
to
 h
el
p 
in
 th
e 
fa
rm
 to
 e
ar
n,
 e
tc
. 
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 T
he
 
sa
m
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
as
 
ob
se
rv
ed
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
 
In
 t
he
ir 
ca
se
, 
m
os
t o
f 
th
em
 d
id
 n
ot
 c
om
pl
et
e 
el
em
en
ta
ry
 s
ch
oo
l 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
w
ar
. 
A
fte
r 
th
e 
w
ar
 th
ey
 g
ot
 m
ar
rie
d 
in
st
ea
d 
of
 g
oi
ng
 b
ac
k 
to
 
sc
ho
ol
. 
O
th
er
s 
re
ac
he
d 
th
e 
fir
st
 g
ra
de
 o
nl
y 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
to
o 
po
or
 s
o 
th
ey
 h
el
pe
d 
th
ei
r 
pa
re
nt
s 
in
 th
e 
fa
rm
.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
sa
id
 n
o.
 T
he
ir 
ch
ild
re
n 
he
lp
 th
em
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 d
o 
no
t 
ha
ve
 a
 c
la
ss
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
on
e 
m
ot
he
r 
re
la
te
d 
th
at
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 
w
er
e 
yo
un
ge
r t
he
y 
w
er
e 
to
ld
 t
o 
st
op
 s
tu
dy
in
g.
 
A
no
th
er
 s
ai
d 
he
r 
pa
re
nt
s 
to
ld
 h
er
 to
 s
tu
dy
 b
ut
 s
he
 
de
ci
de
d 
to
 g
et
 m
ar
rie
d 
ea
rly
. 
O
th
er
 m
ot
he
rs
 
w
an
te
d 
to
 s
tu
dy
 b
ut
 th
ei
r 
pa
re
nt
s 
w
er
e 
to
o 
po
or
 to
 
se
nd
 th
em
 to
 s
ch
oo
l.
Fa
th
er
s
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o 
be
ca
us
e 
ei
th
er
 th
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
ar
e 
st
ill
 s
m
al
l o
r 
th
ey
 a
sk
 th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
to
 
he
lp
 th
em
 w
he
n 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
no
 c
la
ss
es
 o
r 
du
rin
g 
w
ee
ke
nd
s.
 O
ne
 s
ai
d 
ye
s 
bu
t o
nl
y 
w
he
n 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y.
 T
he
 s
am
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
as
 o
bs
er
ve
d 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
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do
 y
ou
 s
el
l 
80
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 y
ou
r 
m
ar
ke
te
d 
pr
od
uc
e 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
po
st
-h
ar
ve
st
 p
er
io
d 
at
 t
he
 p
re
se
nt
 t
im
e?
 H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o? co
c
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4
:) 
D
o 
yo
u 
ke
ep
 2
5 
pe
r c
en
t o
f y
ou
r 
su
rp
lu
s 
fo
r 
sa
le
 u
p 
to
 th
e 
ne
xt
 r
ai
n 
at
 th
e 
pr
es
en
t t
im
e?
 H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l s
ai
d 
m
os
t o
f t
he
 fa
rm
 
pr
od
uc
e 
is
 c
on
su
m
ed
 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 s
ol
d 
so
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
rp
lu
s.
 T
he
 s
am
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
as
 o
bs
er
ve
d 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l s
ai
d 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
rp
lu
s.
 T
he
 s
itu
at
io
n 
w
as
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
ni
ne
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
rp
lu
s 
of
 
un
m
ill
ed
 r
ic
e.
 T
he
y 
ev
en
 
bu
y 
ric
e.
 S
am
e,
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 
V
eg
et
ab
le
s 
ar
e 
pe
ris
ha
bl
e 
so
 th
ey
 a
re
 
so
ld
 im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
. 
O
n 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
ha
nd
, 
ric
e 
is
 fo
r 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
an
d 
m
os
t o
f 
th
e 
tim
e 
th
ei
r 
ha
rv
es
t 
is 
ju
st
 e
no
ug
h 
to
 fe
ed
 th
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
m
em
be
rs
. 
Th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
as
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
sa
id
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
rp
lu
s.
 S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 
ag
o.
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5
i) 
D
o 
yo
u 
pu
rc
ha
se
 k
ey
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
in
 b
ul
k 
or
 d
o 
yo
u 
re
ly
 o
n 
da
y-
to
-d
ay
 p
ur
ch
as
es
 o
f k
ey
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
at
 t
he
 p
re
se
nt
 ti
m
e?
 H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y-
fiv
e 
pe
r c
en
t o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 
th
ey
 b
ou
gh
t 
ite
m
s 
fo
r 
da
ily
 n
ee
ds
 o
nl
y 
be
ca
us
e 
th
er
e 
is
 n
ot
 e
no
ug
h 
m
on
ey
. T
he
 s
am
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
as
 o
bs
er
ve
d 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 s
ai
d 
da
y-
to
-d
ay
 
pu
rc
ha
se
s.
 T
he
 b
et
te
r-
 
of
f o
ne
s 
bu
y 
by
 b
ul
k 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 s
ai
d 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
 i
s 
fa
r.
S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 a
go
.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
or
e 
(s
ix
ty
-tw
o 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
th
ey
 r
el
ie
d 
on
 d
ay
-to
-d
ay
 
pu
rc
ha
se
s 
on
ly
. 
Th
e 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
w
el
l-o
ff 
m
ot
he
rs
 s
ai
d 
th
er
e 
is
 a
n 
ad
va
nt
ag
e 
to
 b
uy
in
g 
by
 
bu
lk
 b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
pr
ic
e 
is 
di
sc
ou
nt
ed
 (
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 
ric
e 
an
d 
sa
lt)
. 
H
en
ce
, 
th
ey
 b
uy
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
fo
r 
a 
w
ee
k 
to
 tw
o 
w
ee
ks
. T
he
 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
as
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 s
ai
d 
th
ey
 r
el
y 
on
 
da
y-
to
-d
ay
 p
ur
ch
as
es
 
fro
m
 th
e 
lo
ca
l s
to
re
 
ba
se
d 
on
 w
ha
t t
he
y 
co
ul
d 
af
fo
rd
. 
Th
e 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
w
el
l-o
ff 
m
ot
he
rs
 g
o 
to
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t t
o 
pu
rc
ha
se
 th
ei
r 
ne
ed
s 
fo
r o
ne
 w
ee
k 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
to
w
n 
is 
fa
r 
fro
m
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
. 
S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
H
al
f s
ai
d 
th
ey
 p
ur
ch
as
e 
ke
y 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 b
y 
bu
lk
 
be
ca
us
e 
tra
ns
po
rta
tio
n 
is
 d
iff
ic
ul
t w
hi
le
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
ha
lf 
re
ly
 o
n 
da
y-
to
-d
ay
 
pu
rc
ha
se
s 
on
ly
. 
Th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
as
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 s
ai
d 
th
ey
 r
el
y 
on
 
da
y-
to
-d
ay
 p
ur
ch
as
es
 
on
ly
. 
Th
e 
re
st
 (
th
os
e 
w
ith
 
at
 le
as
t t
w
o 
ye
ar
s 
of
 
co
lle
ge
) 
bu
y 
by
 b
ul
k 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
th
e 
m
on
ey
 b
ec
au
se
 th
ey
 
sa
id
 th
ey
 li
ve
 fa
r 
aw
ay
 
fro
m
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t. 
S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
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6
it, 
do
 y
ou
 m
ak
e 
ca
sh
 p
ur
ch
as
es
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
sl
ac
k 
se
as
on
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
Be
ng
ue
t v
illa
ge
:
A
lm
os
t a
ll 
sa
id
 th
ey
 o
fte
n 
pa
y 
in
 c
as
h 
bu
t 
so
m
et
im
es
 b
y 
cr
ed
it.
 T
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o,
 t
he
y 
sa
id
 
m
os
tly
 b
y 
cr
ed
it.
M
as
ba
te
 v
illa
ge
:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
. S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Yo
un
ge
r C
hi
ld
re
n
Be
ng
ue
t v
illa
ge
: 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
illa
ge
: 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
El
de
st
 N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
Be
ng
ue
t v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
El
de
st
 N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
illa
ge
: 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
illa
ge
: 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
illa
ge
:
Ex
ce
pt
 fo
r o
ne
, 
al
m
os
t a
ll 
sa
id
 th
ey
 p
ai
d 
in
 c
as
h.
 
Fo
r t
he
 te
ac
he
rs
, t
he
y 
ha
ve
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
co
op
er
at
iv
e.
 T
ho
se
 o
ut
 
of
 c
as
h 
co
ul
d 
ge
t g
oo
ds
 
an
d 
ev
er
y 
pa
yd
ay
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 th
ey
 o
w
e 
is 
de
du
ct
ed
 fr
om
 th
ei
r 
sa
la
rie
s.
 T
he
 c
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e 
w
as
 n
ot
 th
er
e 
ye
t t
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
 I
t w
as
 o
nl
y 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
in
 1
99
2.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
. 
Sa
m
e 
si
tu
at
io
n,
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
Be
ng
ue
t v
illa
ge
:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
ei
gh
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 p
ay
 
ei
th
er
 c
as
h 
or
 c
re
di
t. 
If 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
m
on
ey
, 
th
ey
 
pa
y 
ca
sh
. 
If 
so
m
eb
od
y 
al
lo
w
s 
th
em
 to
 le
nd
, t
he
y 
bo
rro
w
. T
he
 s
itu
at
io
n 
w
as
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
lm
os
t a
ll 
sa
id
 th
ey
 p
ai
d 
in 
ca
sh
 b
ec
au
se
 a
ll 
co
m
m
od
iti
es
 a
re
 s
ol
d 
in 
ca
sh
. 
Sa
m
e 
si
tu
at
io
n,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
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■s
en
t, 
do
 y
ou
 p
os
se
ss
 r
ea
dy
 c
as
h 
up
 to
 5
00
 p
es
os
 o
r 
m
or
e 
at
 h
om
e 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
sl
ac
k 
se
as
on
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o? G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
ix
ed
 a
ns
w
er
s.
 H
al
f s
ai
d 
no
 w
hi
le
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
ha
lf 
sa
id
 y
es
 b
ec
au
se
 th
ey
 
ar
e 
st
ill
 a
bl
e 
to
 w
or
k,
 o
r 
th
ey
 r
ec
ei
ve
 p
en
si
on
 (
fo
r 
re
tir
ee
s)
, 
ho
no
ra
riu
m
 
fro
m
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 c
ou
nc
il 
(fo
r 
vi
lla
ge
 o
ffi
ci
al
s)
, 
or
 
re
m
itt
an
ce
s 
fro
m
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
or
 g
ra
nd
ch
ild
re
n 
ov
er
se
as
. 
Te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o,
 m
os
t o
f t
he
m
 d
id
 n
ot
 
ha
ve
 5
00
 p
es
os
 in
 th
ei
r 
po
ck
et
s.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
si
xt
y 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 
an
sw
er
ed
 n
o.
 S
am
e,
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y-
ni
ne
 
pe
r 
ce
nt
) 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
ye
s.
 
O
ne
 g
ro
up
 p
oi
nt
ed
 o
ut
 
th
at
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
ea
rth
qu
ak
e 
of
 1
99
0 
m
os
t o
f t
he
m
 h
ad
 
no
th
in
g 
in
 t
he
ir 
po
ck
et
s.
 
Th
e 
im
po
rta
nt
 le
ss
on
 
th
ey
 g
ot
 fr
om
 th
at
 
ca
la
m
ity
 is
 t
ha
t t
he
y 
sh
ou
ld
 a
lw
ay
s 
ha
ve
 
so
m
e 
m
on
ey
 fo
r 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
pu
rp
os
es
. 
Te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o,
 o
nl
y 
a 
m
in
or
ity
 h
ad
 5
00
 p
es
os
 in
 
th
ei
r 
po
ck
et
s.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
ni
ne
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
no
. S
om
e 
sa
id
 th
ey
 n
ow
 
ha
ve
 a
 c
ris
is
 s
itu
at
io
n 
be
ca
us
e 
lif
e 
is
 d
iff
ic
ul
t. 
S
am
e,
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
ei
gh
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 
an
sw
er
ed
 n
o.
 T
he
 r
es
t 
w
ho
 a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
 w
er
e 
th
e 
on
ly
 a
ls
o 
on
es
 w
ho
 
ad
m
itt
ed
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
so
m
e 
sa
vi
ng
s 
in
 th
e 
ba
nk
. 
Te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o,
 e
ve
ry
on
e 
di
d 
no
t h
av
e 
th
e 
sa
id
 
am
ou
nt
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
ni
ne
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
) 
an
sw
er
ed
 n
o.
 O
ne
 fa
th
er
 
sa
id
 o
nl
y 
hi
s 
w
ife
 k
no
w
s 
be
ca
us
e 
sh
e 
ke
ep
s 
al
l 
th
e 
m
on
ey
. 
S
am
e,
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
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D
o 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 m
em
be
rs
 w
ho
 tr
av
el
 b
y 
pa
id
 tr
an
sp
or
t m
or
e 
th
an
 tw
ic
e 
a 
ye
ar
 to
 o
ut
si
de
 th
e 
pr
ov
in
ce
 a
t t
he
 p
re
se
nt
 ti
m
e?
 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
bo
ut
 s
ix
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
Th
ey
 s
ai
d 
th
e 
ro
ad
s 
ar
e 
be
tte
r 
no
w
 
an
d 
th
ey
 a
re
 g
et
tin
g 
be
tte
r 
ev
er
y 
m
on
th
. 
M
os
t 
of
 th
em
 tr
av
el
 to
 B
ag
ui
o 
C
ity
 r
at
he
r t
ha
n 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
pr
ov
in
ce
 th
ou
gh
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
E
ig
ht
y 
pe
r c
en
t 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 n
o.
O
nl
y 
on
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
, 
th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 c
ap
ta
in
, 
le
av
es
 
th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 o
fte
n 
to
 a
tte
nd
 
m
ee
tin
gs
 o
r s
em
in
ar
s 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
vi
lla
ge
.
S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 a
go
.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
Fi
fty
-th
re
e 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
, 
pa
rti
cu
la
rly
, 
th
ey
 s
ai
d,
 
du
rin
g 
va
ca
tio
n 
tim
e 
(A
pr
il 
to
 M
ay
). 
Te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o,
 n
ot
 to
o 
m
uc
h.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 
an
sw
er
ed
 n
o.
 T
he
y 
sa
id
 
m
os
t o
f t
he
ir 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
m
em
be
rs
 s
ta
ye
d 
in
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
. 
S
am
e,
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
H
al
f o
f t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 
do
 a
nd
 h
al
f d
on
't.
 T
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o,
 v
er
y 
fe
w
 
pe
op
le
 tr
av
el
le
d 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
pr
ov
in
ce
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
ei
gh
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
) 
an
sw
er
ed
 n
o.
 O
ne
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
 s
ai
d 
hi
s 
fa
th
er
 
an
d 
hi
s 
si
bl
in
gs
 w
ho
 a
re
 
al
l e
ng
ag
ed
 in
 fi
sh
 tr
ad
in
g 
re
gu
la
rly
 tr
av
el
 to
 M
an
ila
, 
S
am
ar
, 
an
d 
to
 S
ib
uy
an
 
Is
la
nd
. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 
ag
o.
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9
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en
t, 
do
 y
ou
 o
cc
as
io
na
lly
 c
on
su
m
e 
gr
ee
n 
ve
ge
ta
bl
es
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
 
be
ca
us
e 
ve
ge
ta
bl
es
 a
re
 
th
ei
r 
pr
od
uc
t. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
ts
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
. 
sa
m
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
ei
gh
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
om
e 
sa
id
 o
nl
y 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
ra
in
y 
se
as
on
. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 
ag
o.
42
0
es
en
t, 
do
 y
ou
 u
se
 m
ilk
/m
ilk
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
re
gu
la
rly
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
O
nl
y 
th
irt
y-
fiv
e 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
Th
ey
 s
ai
d 
th
ey
 d
o 
no
t h
av
e 
m
ilk
 a
nd
 
m
ilk
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
in
 th
ei
r 
vi
lla
ge
. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
Tw
en
ty
 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 t
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o,
 t
he
y 
co
ul
d 
no
t 
af
fo
rd
 to
 p
ur
ch
as
e 
m
ilk
/ 
m
ilk
 p
ro
du
ct
s.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
H
al
f s
ai
d 
ye
s 
an
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
ha
lf 
no
. S
am
e,
 t
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
) 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y-
fiv
e 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 
an
sw
er
ed
 
no
 b
ec
au
se
 th
ey
 s
ai
d 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
po
or
. 
S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
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S
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te
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ye
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 n
ot
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.
M
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ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
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sw
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 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 
te
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ar
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ag
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1
es
en
t, 
do
 y
ou
 c
on
su
m
e 
ric
e 
ev
er
yd
ay
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
sa
id
 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
sa
id
 y
es
. 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l s
ai
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ye
s.
 S
am
e,
 t
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
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ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y-
fiv
e 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
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rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
ye
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S
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e 
sa
id
 o
nl
y 
du
rin
g 
th
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in
y 
se
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on
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D
ur
in
g 
th
e 
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y 
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as
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ec
au
se
 
th
er
e 
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 n
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w
at
er
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 e
at
 
tu
be
rs
 (
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 
sw
ee
t 
po
ta
to
es
) 
in
st
ea
d.
 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 a
go
.
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e 
th
re
e 
(3
) 
m
ea
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 a
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ay
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
ha
rv
es
t s
ea
so
n?
 th
e 
sl
ac
k 
se
as
on
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
sa
id
 y
es
. 
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 a
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w
ee
t 
po
ta
to
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av
a,
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am
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an
d 
ba
na
na
s.
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am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
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ba
te
 v
ill
ag
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A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
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te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
) 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
O
ne
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
sl
ac
k 
se
as
on
 
in
st
ea
d 
of
 a
 fu
ll 
m
ea
l, 
th
ey
 e
at
 p
or
rid
ge
. 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
sa
id
 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y-
fiv
e 
pe
r c
en
t o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
ye
s.
 
S
om
e 
sa
id
 th
at
 
so
m
et
im
es
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
sl
ac
k 
se
as
on
 tw
ic
e 
a 
da
y 
on
ly
. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 
ag
o.
42
3
do
 th
e 
w
om
en
 a
nd
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
in
 y
ou
r 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
w
ea
r s
ho
es
 r
eg
ul
ar
ly
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
. T
he
y 
sa
id
 th
e 
ro
ad
s 
ar
e 
st
ill
 
ba
d 
so
 y
ou
 a
re
 fo
rc
ed
 to
 
w
ea
r s
om
et
hi
ng
 o
n 
yo
ur
 
fe
et
. 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
 W
he
n 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
yo
un
ge
r 
(a
bo
ut
 fi
ve
 to
 s
ix
 
de
ca
de
s 
ag
o)
, 
th
ey
 h
ad
 
no
 s
lip
pe
rs
 a
nd
 s
ho
es
. 
Th
ey
 w
en
t t
o 
th
e 
el
em
en
ta
ry
 s
ch
oo
l 
w
ith
ou
t 
sl
ip
pe
rs
, 
sh
oe
s,
 
or
 u
nd
er
w
ea
r.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
 W
he
n 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
yo
un
ge
r, 
th
ey
 
ei
th
er
 w
al
ke
d 
ba
re
fo
ot
 o
r 
w
or
e 
sl
ip
pe
rs
 to
 s
ch
oo
l.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
ei
gh
ty
-fo
ur
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
) 
an
sw
er
ed
 n
o.
 O
nl
y 
th
os
e 
w
ho
 g
o 
to
 s
ch
oo
l w
ea
r 
sh
oe
s.
 H
ow
ev
er
, 
m
os
t 
of
 
th
ei
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
w
ea
r 
sl
ip
pe
rs
 to
 s
ch
oo
l. 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l s
ai
d 
ye
s.
 S
ho
es
 a
re
 
us
ed
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 g
o 
to
 th
e 
ci
ty
 a
nd
 s
lip
pe
rs
 a
re
 
us
ed
 a
t h
om
e.
 S
am
e,
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 s
ai
d 
no
. T
he
y 
us
e 
sl
ip
pe
rs
 a
nd
 
so
m
et
im
es
 n
on
e.
 O
nl
y 
th
os
e 
w
ho
 g
o 
to
 s
ch
oo
l 
w
ea
r 
sh
oe
s 
or
 s
lip
pe
rs
. 
S
am
e,
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
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4
!h
e 
w
om
en
 in
 y
ou
r 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
pr
ov
id
ed
 m
at
er
ni
ty
 fe
ed
in
g 
up
 to
 a
 m
on
th
 o
r m
or
e?
 H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
Th
ey
 
ha
ve
 a
 m
id
w
ife
 w
ho
 
re
si
de
s 
in
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 
w
ho
m
 th
ey
 m
ay
 c
on
su
lt.
 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
Th
ey
 
sa
id
 th
ei
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
ar
e 
he
al
th
y.
 S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 
ag
o.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t 
N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
Th
ey
 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
ar
e 
he
al
th
y.
 O
ne
 m
ot
he
r 
sa
id
 
he
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
ar
e 
he
al
th
y 
bu
t s
he
 is
 s
ic
kl
y.
 S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
ei
gh
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
om
e 
sa
id
 it
 w
as
 n
ot
 s
uf
fic
ie
nt
 
be
ca
us
e 
so
ur
ce
s 
of
 
in
co
m
e 
ar
e 
ha
rd
 to
 fi
nd
 
so
 th
ey
 e
at
 le
ss
 fo
od
. 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l s
ai
d 
ye
s.
 S
am
e,
 t
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
ei
gh
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
ye
s.
 S
om
e 
sa
id
 th
at
 th
ei
r 
w
iv
es
' m
at
er
ni
ty
 fe
ed
in
g 
is
 n
ot
 e
no
ug
h 
be
ca
us
e 
liv
es
 a
re
 d
iff
ic
ul
t 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
dr
y 
se
as
on
. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 
ag
o.
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5
(1
) 
D
o 
yo
ur
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
ha
ve
 g
at
es
 w
ith
 d
oo
rs
 a
t p
re
se
nt
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 T
he
y 
ha
d 
fe
nc
es
 to
 a
vo
id
 s
tra
y 
an
im
al
s 
fro
m
 d
es
tro
yi
ng
 
th
ei
r 
ba
ck
ya
rd
 g
ar
de
n.
 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
y 
ha
d 
fe
nc
es
. 
Te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o,
 
th
er
e 
w
er
e 
no
 fe
nc
es
.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
ei
gh
ty
-fo
ur
 p
er
 
ce
nt
) 
sa
id
 n
o.
 T
he
y 
sa
id
 
th
at
 a
ny
w
ay
 th
ey
 a
ll 
ha
ve
 
do
gs
 a
s 
a 
pr
ec
au
tio
n.
 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
sa
id
 n
o.
 A
ny
w
ay
, 
th
ey
 
ha
ve
 b
am
bo
o 
fe
nc
es
 to
 
pr
ot
ec
t 
th
ei
r 
ba
ck
ya
rd
 
pl
an
ts
. 
Te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o,
 
th
er
e 
w
er
e 
no
 b
am
bo
o 
fe
nc
es
 a
t 
al
l.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
si
xt
y 
pe
r 
ce
nt
) 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
O
ne
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
 s
ai
d 
he
 d
oe
s 
no
t n
ee
d 
a 
ga
te
 b
ec
au
se
 
th
er
e 
is
 n
ot
hi
ng
 w
or
th
 
st
ea
lin
g 
in
 h
is
 h
ou
se
. T
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o,
 th
er
e 
w
er
e 
no
 
fe
nc
es
 a
t 
al
l.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l s
ai
d 
no
. S
am
e,
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
42
6
:) 
D
o 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
of
 s
ta
y 
fo
r 
hu
m
an
s 
an
d 
an
im
al
s 
at
 p
re
se
nt
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 T
he
y 
sa
id
 th
at
 n
o 
m
at
te
r 
ho
w
 
po
or
 p
eo
pl
e 
ar
e 
th
e 
ho
us
es
 o
f p
ig
s 
an
d 
ch
ic
ke
ns
 a
re
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
fro
m
 th
e 
pe
op
le
. 
S
am
e 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. T
w
o 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 t
he
y 
ha
ve
 a
 c
hi
ck
en
 p
en
 
w
hi
ch
 is
 s
itu
at
ed
 b
el
ow
 
th
ei
r 
ki
tc
he
n.
 T
he
y 
al
lo
w
 
th
e 
ch
ic
ke
ns
 to
 r
oa
m
 
ar
ou
nd
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
an
d 
re
tu
rn
 to
 th
ei
r p
en
s 
in
 
th
e 
ev
en
in
g.
 T
he
y 
sa
id
 
th
ey
 d
o 
no
t t
ak
e 
ca
re
 o
f 
m
an
y 
ch
ic
ke
ns
 b
ec
au
se
 
th
ey
 e
as
ily
 g
et
 lo
st
. 
S
o 
th
ey
 o
nl
y 
ha
ve
 a
 p
ai
r. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 a
go
.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
tld
es
t 
N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, a
ni
m
al
s 
ro
am
 
ar
ou
nd
 t
he
ir 
ba
ck
ya
rd
 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
ne
ig
hb
ou
rs
' 
ba
ck
ya
rd
. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
so
m
e 
of
 th
em
 
al
lo
w
 th
ei
r a
ni
m
al
s 
to
 
ro
am
 a
ro
un
d 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
no
 p
en
s.
 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 a
go
.
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7
i) 
D
o 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 a
 p
riv
at
e 
pl
ac
e 
(s
uc
h 
as
 a
 b
at
hr
oo
m
) 
fo
r w
om
en
 a
t p
re
se
nt
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. T
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o,
 t
he
y 
us
ed
 th
e 
riv
er
 a
nd
 th
e 
br
oo
ks
. T
he
 
up
pe
r p
ar
t o
f t
he
 r
iv
er
 is
 
fo
r m
en
 a
nd
 th
e 
lo
w
er
 
pa
rt 
is
 fo
r w
om
en
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 T
he
y 
ta
ke
 a
 b
at
h 
ne
ar
 th
e 
w
el
l. 
S
am
e,
 t
en
 y
ea
rs
 a
go
.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t 
N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
. T
en
 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o 
m
os
t o
f t
he
m
 
ha
d 
no
 b
at
hr
oo
m
s.
 T
he
y 
ba
th
ed
 o
ut
si
de
 o
r t
he
y 
us
ed
 th
e 
riv
er
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
si
xt
y-
fiv
e 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 
an
sw
er
ed
 n
o.
 T
he
 
ch
ild
re
n 
us
e 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
w
el
l t
o 
ta
ke
 a
 b
at
h.
 
S
am
e,
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
 
W
he
n 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
yo
un
ge
r 
(tw
o 
to
 th
re
e 
de
ca
de
s 
ag
o)
 th
ey
 u
se
d 
th
e 
riv
er
 
to
 ta
ke
 a
 b
at
h.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
. 
S
am
e,
 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y-
th
re
e 
pe
r c
en
t o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
no
. 
S
am
e,
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o.
42
8
■) 
H
ow
 g
oo
d 
do
 y
ou
 th
in
k 
yo
ur
 w
at
er
 s
up
pl
y 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
fo
r w
as
hi
ng
 a
nd
 d
rin
ki
ng
 a
re
? 
H
ow
 a
bo
ut
 te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ag
o?
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Fo
r 
m
ot
he
rs
, 
th
e 
un
de
rl
in
ed
 p
hr
as
e 
w
as
 c
ha
ng
ed
 t
o 
'w
om
en
 i
n 
yo
ur
 n
ei
gh
bo
ur
ho
od
1 w
hi
le
 f
or
 e
ld
es
t 
ne
ve
r 
m
ar
ri
ed
 s
on
s,
 e
ld
es
t 
ne
ve
r 
m
ar
ri
ed
 d
au
gh
te
i 
an
d 
gr
an
dp
ar
en
ts
 t
he
 u
nd
er
lin
ed
 p
hr
as
e 
w
as
 c
ha
ng
ed
 t
o 
'p
eo
pl
e 
in
 y
ou
r 
ne
ig
hb
ou
rh
oo
d'
.
6.
 H
ow
 d
o 
yo
u 
ge
t o
n 
w
itl
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 m
os
t 
pe
op
le
 d
o 
no
t r
el
y 
on
 th
e 
fo
re
st
s 
fo
r 
fu
el
 w
oo
d.
 
M
os
t o
f t
he
m
 u
se
 
liq
ue
fie
d 
pe
tro
le
um
 g
as
 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
ra
in
y 
se
as
on
. 
Th
ey
 
no
tic
ed
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 
ea
tin
g 
an
d 
fo
od
 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n.
 T
he
re
 is
 n
ow
 
m
or
e 
va
rie
ty
 in
 th
e 
fo
od
 
th
at
 th
ey
 e
at
. 
B
ef
or
e,
 
so
m
e 
of
 th
em
 a
te
 r
ic
e 
w
ith
 s
al
t. 
N
ow
, s
om
e 
bu
y 
ca
nn
ed
 g
oo
ds
 a
nd
 
in
st
an
t 
m
ea
ls
 b
ec
au
se
 
th
e 
w
or
ki
ng
 m
ar
rie
d 
w
om
en
 a
re
 b
us
y.
 A
ls
o 
be
fo
re
, 
m
os
t o
f t
he
 
pe
op
le
 o
nl
y 
bo
ile
d 
th
ei
r 
ve
ge
ta
bl
es
. 
N
ow
, 
th
ey
 
us
e 
sp
ic
es
 a
nd
 o
il 
fo
r 
co
ok
in
g.
 A
ls
o,
 s
om
e 
sh
ar
e 
in
 th
e 
re
ar
in
g 
of
 
liv
es
to
ck
. 
O
ne
 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
ta
ke
s 
ca
re
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ot
he
r 
liv
es
to
ck
 a
nd
 
th
e 
of
fs
pr
in
g 
ar
e 
so
ld
 to
 
ne
ig
hb
ou
rs
 fo
r 
re
ar
in
g.
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
m
ut
ua
l s
up
po
rt 
ne
tw
or
ks
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 
du
rin
g 
em
er
ge
nc
ie
s.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
P
eo
pl
e 
in
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 h
el
p 
ea
ch
 o
th
er
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 fo
r 
w
ed
di
ng
 a
nd
 fu
ne
ra
l 
ex
pe
ns
es
. 
Th
ey
 jo
in
 
co
m
m
un
ity
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
. 
Th
ey
 w
or
k 
ha
rd
 a
nd
 
ac
ce
pt
 d
iff
er
en
t 
ki
nd
s 
of
 
jo
bs
. 
Th
ei
r f
oo
d 
is
 fr
es
h 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 p
la
nt
 
ve
ge
ta
bl
es
. 
S
om
e 
of
 th
e 
pe
op
le
 b
uy
 c
an
ne
d 
go
od
s.
 S
om
e 
re
ly
 o
n 
th
e 
fo
re
st
s 
pr
im
ar
ily
 fo
r t
he
ir 
fu
el
 w
oo
d.
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C
on
ti
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io
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M
as
b
at
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vi
lli
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
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as
b
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vi
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ot
 a
sk
ed
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M
as
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vi
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ot
 a
sk
ed
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M
as
b
at
i 
A
ll 
ex
p
e 
in
 t
h
ei
r 
i 
w
ill
 n
o
t 
1 
h
el
p
 e
a<
 
v
il
la
g
e.
S
o
m
e 
of
 t
h
e 
ri
ch
 h
el
p
 t
h
e 
p
o
o
r 
by
 a
sk
in
g
 t
h
em
 t
o 
w
or
k 
in
 t
h
ei
r 
fa
rm
s 
or
 
la
u
n
d
er
 t
h
ei
r 
cl
o
th
es
. 
S
o
m
et
im
es
 t
h
e 
ri
ch
 c
h
ea
t 
th
e 
p
o
o
r 
by
 n
o
t 
p
ay
in
g
 f
or
 
th
ei
r 
la
b
o
u
r 
o
r 
th
ey
 p
ay
 
be
lo
w
 t
h
e 
m
in
im
um
 w
ag
e.
 
T
h
e 
p
o
o
r,
 h
o
w
ev
er
, 
do
 
n
o
t 
g
et
 o
rg
an
is
ed
. 
S
el
f-
 
re
sp
ec
t 
is
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t 
to
 
th
e 
p
o
o
r 
b
u
t 
th
e 
le
ve
l 
is
 
n
o
t 
hi
gh
. 
R
eg
ar
d
in
g
 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 p
ro
b
le
m
s,
 t
h
ey
 
se
e
k
 t
h
e 
h
el
p
 o
f 
n
ei
g
h
b
o
u
rs
, 
si
b
li
n
g
s 
an
d
 
th
o
se
 w
h
o
 a
re
 r
el
at
iv
el
y 
w
el
l-
of
f 
if 
th
ey
 c
an
n
o
t 
h
an
d
le
 i
t. 
T
h
e 
p
eo
p
le
 
st
ic
k
 t
o
g
et
h
er
 a
n
d
 
ev
al
u
at
e 
w
h
at
 t
h
ey
 h
av
e 
to
 d
o.
M
as
b
at
e 
vi
ll
ag
e:
A
ll 
of
 t
h
em
 g
at
h
er
 f
ue
l 
w
o
o
d
 f
or
 c
o
o
k
in
g
. 
M
os
t 
of
 t
h
em
 s
ai
d
 t
h
ei
r 
ea
ti
n
g
 
h
ab
it
s 
an
d
 p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 o
f 
fo
o
d
 h
av
e 
no
t 
ch
an
g
ed
 a
t 
al
l. 
T
h
ey
 d
o
 n
ot
 e
at
 
c
an
n
ed
 f
oo
d.
S
o
m
et
im
es
, 
th
ey
 s
h
ar
e 
re
ar
in
g
 o
f 
li
ve
st
o
ck
. 
T
h
e 
p
eo
p
le
 h
el
p
 e
ac
h
 o
th
er
.
M
as
b
at
e 
vi
ll
ag
e:
T
h
ey
 s
ai
d
 t
h
at
 p
eo
p
le
 
h
el
p
 e
ac
h
 o
th
er
 i
n 
th
e 
fa
rm
 e
sp
ec
ia
ll
y
 i
n 
h
ea
v
y
 
ta
sk
s.
 T
h
ey
 h
el
p
 e
ac
h
 
o
th
er
 o
n
 a
n
 i
nd
iv
id
ua
l 
b
as
is
 b
e
c
a
u
se
 t
h
ey
 d
o
 
n
o
t 
h
av
e 
an
y
 
o
rg
an
is
at
io
n
s.
 T
h
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 c
h
an
g
e
s 
in
 t
h
e 
fo
o
d
 
th
at
 t
h
ey
 e
at
 a
n
d
 i
ts
 
p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
.
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7.
 W
ha
t d
o 
yo
u 
w
an
t m
os
l
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 w
an
t m
os
t t
he
ir 
fa
m
ily
. 
S
om
e 
w
an
t t
o:
 
he
lp
 o
th
er
 p
eo
pl
e;
 f
in
is
h 
th
ei
r 
st
ud
ie
s;
 a
nd
 
be
co
m
e 
pr
of
es
si
on
al
s.
 A
 
gr
ou
p 
of
 fi
ve
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
sa
id
 th
ey
 w
an
t f
oo
d 
m
os
t.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 w
an
t t
o 
be
co
m
e 
fa
rm
er
s,
 f
is
he
rm
en
, 
nu
rs
es
, 
te
ac
he
rs
, 
po
lic
e 
of
fic
er
s,
 o
r 
vi
lla
ge
 
of
fic
ia
ls
. 
Tw
en
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
sa
id
 th
ey
 w
an
t t
o 
fin
is
h 
th
ei
r 
st
ud
ie
s.
 O
ne
 te
n-
 
ye
ar
 o
ld
 c
hi
ld
 w
an
te
d 
m
os
t t
o 
le
ar
n 
ho
w
 to
 
re
ad
.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 w
an
t t
o 
fin
is
h 
th
ei
r 
st
ud
ie
s 
so
 t
ha
t 
th
ey
 
co
ul
d 
lo
ok
 fo
r 
a 
go
od
 jo
b 
or
 s
ta
rt 
th
ei
r 
ow
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
. 
Th
ey
 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
a 
va
rie
ty
 o
f 
oc
cu
pa
tio
ns
 s
uc
h 
as
: 
sc
ie
nt
is
t, 
nu
rs
e,
 t
ea
ch
er
, 
do
ct
or
, 
bu
si
ne
ss
w
om
an
 
an
d 
a 
m
ov
ie
 r
ep
or
te
r.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 w
an
t t
o 
co
nt
in
ue
 o
r 
fin
is
h 
th
ei
r 
st
ud
ie
s 
an
d 
fin
d 
a 
go
od
 jo
b.
 T
he
y 
ei
th
er
 w
an
te
d 
to
 b
e 
a 
te
ac
he
r 
or
 a
 n
ur
se
.
E
ld
es
t 
N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 w
an
t t
o 
fin
is
h 
th
ei
r 
st
ud
ie
s 
an
d 
be
 a
bl
e 
to
 
ha
ve
 a
 g
oo
d 
jo
b.
 O
th
er
s 
w
an
t a
 s
m
al
l b
us
in
es
s.
 
Th
os
e 
w
ho
 a
re
 c
ur
re
nt
ly
 
st
ud
yi
ng
 w
an
t t
o 
be
co
m
e 
pr
of
es
si
on
al
s 
(fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 t
ea
ch
er
s 
an
d 
do
ct
or
s)
 s
om
e 
da
y.
 
Th
os
e 
w
ho
 a
re
 w
or
ki
ng
 in
 
th
e 
fa
rm
 w
an
te
d 
to
 g
et
 
m
ar
rie
d 
an
d 
be
 h
ap
py
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 w
an
t t
o 
fin
is
h 
th
ei
r 
st
ud
ie
s 
an
d 
fin
d 
a 
go
od
 
jo
b.
 S
om
e 
w
an
t t
o 
he
lp
 
th
ei
r 
pa
re
nt
s 
in
 th
e 
fa
rm
 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
ot
he
r m
em
be
rs
 
of
 th
e 
co
m
m
un
ity
.
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 w
an
te
d 
m
os
t t
o 
ha
ve
 th
ei
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
gr
ow
 
up
 w
el
l-e
du
ca
te
d.
 
M
aj
or
ity
 w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 a
 
he
al
th
y 
an
d 
ha
pp
y 
fa
m
ily
. 
O
th
er
 m
ot
he
rs
 
w
an
te
d 
m
os
t t
o 
he
lp
 
ot
he
r 
pe
op
le
 s
uc
h 
as
 
th
os
e 
w
ho
 a
re
 in
 n
ee
d.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l o
f t
he
m
 w
an
t t
o 
m
ak
e 
su
re
 th
at
 th
ei
r f
am
ily
 
su
rv
iv
es
 b
y 
ha
vi
ng
 a
t 
le
as
t t
hr
ee
 m
ea
ls
 a
 d
ay
. 
S
om
e 
of
 th
em
 w
an
t t
o 
ea
rn
 in
co
m
e.
 
Fo
rty
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 m
ot
he
rs
 w
an
t 
th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
to
 fi
ni
sh
 
th
ei
r 
st
ud
ie
s.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 w
an
te
d 
m
os
t t
o 
ha
ve
 th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
fin
is
h 
th
ei
r 
st
ud
ie
s 
ei
th
er
 fo
r 
th
em
 to
 h
av
e 
a 
go
od
 jo
b 
or
 to
 h
el
p 
th
ei
r 
pa
re
nt
s 
in
 
th
e 
fu
tu
re
. 
S
om
e 
fa
th
er
s 
w
an
t f
in
an
ci
al
 s
up
po
rt 
fro
m
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t t
o 
ed
uc
at
e 
th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n,
 
bu
y 
th
ei
r o
w
n 
fa
rm
 la
nd
, 
or
 to
 s
ta
rt 
a 
sm
al
l 
bu
si
ne
ss
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 w
an
t m
os
t t
o 
im
pr
ov
e 
th
ei
r 
liv
es
. 
M
os
t 
of
 th
e 
fa
th
er
s 
do
 n
ot
 
as
pi
re
 to
 b
ec
om
e 
ric
h.
 
Th
ey
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 a
s 
lo
ng
 a
s 
th
ey
 m
ee
t t
he
ir 
da
ily
 
ne
ed
s 
th
en
 th
at
 is
 a
ll 
th
ey
 w
an
t. 
Th
ey
 w
an
t t
o 
w
or
k 
an
d 
no
t b
ec
om
e 
po
or
. T
w
en
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
w
an
t t
he
ir 
ch
ild
re
n 
to
 
fin
is
h 
th
ei
r 
st
ud
ie
s 
w
hi
le
 
te
n 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 
a 
w
at
er
 b
uf
fa
lo
.
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8.
 D
o 
yo
u 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
e 
in
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
? 
If 
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G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
 to
 a
ll 
th
e 
ta
sk
s 
ex
ce
pt
 f
or
: 
w
as
hi
ng
 a
nd
 ir
on
in
g 
cl
ot
he
s,
 g
oi
ng
 to
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t, 
an
d 
ga
th
er
in
g 
fo
dd
er
 - 
se
ve
nt
y-
fiv
e 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 y
es
. 
Th
ey
 s
ai
d 
ch
ild
re
n 
st
ar
t w
as
hi
ng
 
di
sh
es
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 a
re
 fi
ve
 
or
 s
ix
 y
ea
rs
 o
f a
ge
 a
nd
 
cl
ot
he
s 
at
 th
e 
ag
e 
of
 te
n.
B
et
w
ee
n 
th
re
e 
an
d 
fo
ur
 
ye
ar
s 
of
 a
ge
. T
he
ir 
gr
an
dc
hi
ld
re
n 
w
or
k 
be
tw
ee
n 
a 
fe
w
 m
in
ut
es
 to
 
fo
ur
 h
ou
rs
 a
 d
ay
. 
O
ne
 
gr
an
dm
ot
he
r 
sa
id
 th
at
 
w
he
n 
he
r g
ra
nd
ch
ild
 
st
op
pe
d 
st
ud
yi
ng
, 
sh
e 
he
lp
ed
 h
er
 in
 th
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
fo
r 
an
 a
ve
ra
ge
 
of
 fo
ur
 h
ou
rs
 a
 d
ay
.
W
he
n 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
st
ill
 
ch
ild
re
n,
 t
he
y 
w
or
ke
d 
on
 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
ch
or
es
 fo
r 
a 
m
in
im
um
 o
f f
ou
r h
ou
rs
 a
 
da
y 
an
d 
so
m
et
im
es
 th
e 
w
ho
le
 d
ay
.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
 to
 a
ll 
th
e 
ta
sk
s 
as
ke
d 
of
 th
em
 
ex
ce
pt
 f
or
 c
ol
le
ct
in
g 
fu
el
 
w
oo
d 
an
d 
ga
th
er
in
g 
fo
dd
er
 - 
si
xt
y 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 y
es
. 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
 to
 th
e 
ab
ov
e 
ta
sk
s,
 y
ou
ng
er
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
al
so
 s
w
ee
p 
an
d 
sc
ru
b 
th
e 
flo
or
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
w
ip
e 
th
e 
w
in
do
w
s.
B
et
w
ee
n 
th
re
e 
an
d 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
of
 a
ge
.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
 to
 a
ll 
th
e 
ta
sk
s 
ex
ce
pt
 fo
r: 
iro
ni
ng
 c
lo
th
es
, 
go
in
g 
to
 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
t, 
co
lle
ct
in
g 
fu
el
 w
oo
d,
 a
nd
 d
el
iv
er
in
g 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
to
 o
th
er
 
pe
op
le
 - 
on
ly
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 
sa
id
 y
es
; 
an
d 
ca
rin
g 
fo
r 
liv
es
to
ck
, 
le
ad
in
g 
an
im
al
s 
to
 p
as
tu
re
, 
as
 
w
el
l a
s 
ga
th
er
in
g 
fo
dd
er
 - 
be
tw
ee
n 
fif
ty
 a
nd
 s
ix
ty
 
pe
r c
en
t o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 y
es
. 
In
 
ad
di
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
ab
ov
e 
ta
sk
s,
 d
au
gh
te
rs
 a
ls
o 
cl
ea
n 
th
e 
ho
us
e.
B
et
w
ee
n 
fiv
e 
an
d 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ol
d.
 O
ne
 d
au
gh
te
r 
sa
id
 w
he
n 
he
r m
ot
he
r 
di
ed
 s
he
 s
ta
rte
d 
m
an
ag
in
g 
th
ei
r 
ho
us
eh
ol
d.
 A
no
th
er
 
da
ug
ht
er
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 in
 h
er
 
ca
se
 w
he
n 
he
r 
m
ot
he
r 
le
ft 
fo
r 
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
sh
e 
to
ok
 o
ve
r 
si
nc
e 
sh
e 
w
as
 
th
e 
el
de
st
 c
hi
ld
.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
 to
 a
ll 
th
e 
ta
sk
s 
ex
ce
pt
 f
or
: 
de
liv
er
in
g 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
to
 
ot
he
r 
pe
op
le
 - 
se
ve
nt
y-
 
fiv
e 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 y
es
; 
an
d 
iro
ni
ng
 c
lo
th
es
 a
nd
 
go
in
g 
to
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t -
 o
nl
y 
fif
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 y
es
.
Th
ei
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
st
ar
te
d 
he
lp
in
g 
th
em
 b
et
w
ee
n 
si
x 
an
d 
ei
gh
t y
ea
rs
 o
f a
ge
. 
O
n 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e,
 t
he
y 
he
lp
 fr
om
 2
0 
m
in
ut
es
 to
 3
 
ho
ur
s 
a 
da
y.
 E
xc
ep
t f
or
 
th
re
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s,
 a
ll 
sa
id
 th
ey
 d
o 
no
t n
ee
d 
m
or
e 
si
bl
in
gs
 to
 h
el
p 
th
em
 in
 th
ei
r w
or
k.
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
pa
rt 
fro
m
 th
re
e 
m
ot
he
rs
 
w
ho
se
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
w
er
e 
st
ill
 
ba
bi
es
, 
al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 y
es
 
to
 a
ll 
th
e 
ta
sk
s 
ex
ce
pt
 
fo
r: 
ca
rin
g 
fo
r 
liv
es
to
ck
, 
le
ad
in
g 
an
im
al
s 
to
 
pa
st
ur
e,
 
an
d 
ga
th
er
in
g 
fo
dd
er
 - 
on
ly
 s
ix
ty
 s
ev
en
 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 y
es
; 
go
in
g 
to
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t, 
fe
tc
hi
ng
 w
at
er
 a
nd
 
co
lle
ct
in
g 
fu
el
 w
oo
d 
- 
on
ly
 s
ix
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 y
es
; 
an
d 
de
liv
er
in
g 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
to
 o
th
er
 p
eo
pl
e 
- f
or
ty
- 
ei
gh
t p
er
 c
en
t o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 y
es
.
B
et
w
ee
n 
th
re
e 
an
d 
ei
gh
t 
ye
ar
s 
ol
d.
 I
t d
ep
en
ds
 o
n 
th
e 
w
or
k.
 A
n 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 
th
irt
y 
m
in
ut
es
 to
 tw
o 
ho
ur
s 
a 
da
y.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
E
xc
ep
t f
or
 o
ne
 w
ho
se
 
ch
ild
 is
 s
til
l a
 b
ab
y,
 a
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 y
es
 to
 a
ll 
th
e 
ta
sk
s.
Th
ei
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
st
ar
te
d 
to
 
he
lp
 th
em
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 
w
er
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
si
x 
an
d 
te
n 
ye
ar
s 
ol
d.
 T
he
 ti
m
e 
sp
en
t 
on
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 c
ho
re
s 
de
pe
nd
s 
on
 th
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
r 
ta
sk
 th
at
 th
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
ar
e 
w
or
ki
ng
 o
n.
 O
n 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e,
 a
bo
ut
 t
hi
rty
 
m
in
ut
es
. 
Fa
th
er
s 
sa
id
 
th
ey
 d
o 
no
t n
ee
d 
m
or
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
to
 h
el
p 
th
em
 in
 
th
ei
r 
w
or
k.
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D
o 
yo
u 
go
 to
 s
ch
oo
l?
 D
o 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 ti
m
e 
to
 d
o 
yo
ur
 h
om
ew
or
k?
 If
 ‘y
es
’, 
ho
w
 m
an
y 
ho
ur
s 
do
 y
ou
 s
pe
nt
 in
 a
 d
ay
 d
oi
ng
 y
ou
r 
ho
m
ew
oi
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l o
f t
he
m
 g
o 
to
 s
ch
oo
l. 
Th
e 
sm
al
l o
ne
s 
ar
e 
in
 d
ay
 
ca
re
. 
Th
ey
 a
ll 
sa
id
 th
at
 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
tim
e 
to
 d
o 
th
ei
r 
sc
ho
ol
 h
om
ew
or
k.
 T
he
y 
sp
en
t 
be
tw
ee
n 
fif
te
en
 
m
in
ut
es
 to
 tw
o 
ho
ur
s 
on
 
th
ei
r 
ho
m
ew
or
k.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l o
f t
he
m
 g
o 
to
 s
ch
oo
l. 
Th
e 
sm
al
l o
ne
s 
ar
e 
in
 d
ay
 
ca
re
. 
Th
ey
 s
ai
d 
th
ey
 
ha
ve
 ti
m
e 
to
 d
o 
th
ei
r 
ho
m
ew
or
k.
 T
he
y 
sp
en
d 
th
irt
y 
m
in
ut
es
 to
 th
re
e 
ho
ur
s 
in
 d
oi
ng
 th
ei
r 
ho
m
ew
or
k.
 T
he
y 
st
ud
y 
in
 
th
e 
ev
en
in
g 
an
d 
th
ey
 u
se
 
ke
ro
se
ne
 la
m
ps
.
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3e
. W
he
re
 d
o 
yo
u 
liv
e 
no
w
: o
w
n 
ho
m
e,
 c
hi
ld
re
n’
s 
ho
m
e,
 o
r g
ra
nd
ch
ild
re
n’
s 
ho
m
e?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
S
ix
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t l
iv
e 
in
 t
he
ir 
ow
n 
ho
m
e.
 T
he
 r
es
t l
iv
e 
in
 th
ei
r c
hi
ld
re
n’
s’
 h
om
e.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
S
ix
ty
 p
er
 c
en
t l
iv
e 
in
 t
he
ir 
ch
ild
re
n’
s 
ho
m
e.
 T
he
 r
es
t 
liv
e 
in
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
ho
m
e.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l l
iv
ed
 in
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
ho
m
es
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
liv
ed
 in
 th
ei
r 
ow
n 
ho
m
es
.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l l
iv
ed
 in
 th
ei
r 
ow
n 
ho
m
es
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l l
iv
ed
 in
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
ho
m
es
.
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D
o 
yo
u 
re
ce
iv
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 o
r 
m
at
er
ia
l s
up
po
rt 
fro
m
 y
ou
r c
hi
ld
re
n/
gr
an
dc
hi
ld
re
n?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 o
f t
he
 
gr
an
dp
ar
en
ts
 r
ec
ei
ve
 
fin
an
ci
al
 o
r 
m
at
er
ia
l 
su
pp
or
t f
ro
m
 th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
or
 s
om
et
im
es
 
th
ei
r 
gr
an
dc
hi
ld
re
n 
on
ce
 
in
 a
 w
hi
le
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
E
xc
ep
t f
or
 tw
o 
w
ho
 a
re
 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
w
el
l-o
ff,
 a
ll 
gr
an
dp
ar
en
ts
 r
ec
ei
ve
 
fin
an
ci
al
 o
r 
m
at
er
ia
l 
su
pp
or
t f
ro
m
 e
ith
er
 th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
or
 g
ra
nd
ch
ild
re
n 
re
gu
la
rly
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 to
 
bu
y 
m
ed
ic
in
e.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t 
N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
S
om
e 
m
ot
he
rs
 r
ec
ei
ve
 
fin
an
ci
al
 a
nd
 m
at
er
ia
l 
su
pp
or
t f
ro
m
 th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
on
 a
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 
ba
si
s.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 r
ec
ei
ve
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
an
d 
m
at
er
ia
l s
up
po
rt 
fro
m
 
th
ei
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
w
ho
 a
re
 in
 
M
an
ila
.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
S
om
e 
fa
th
er
s 
re
ce
iv
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 a
nd
 m
at
er
ia
l 
su
pp
or
t f
ro
m
 th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
on
ce
 in
 a
 w
hi
le
 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 fr
om
 t
ho
se
 
ab
ro
ad
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 r
ec
ei
ve
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
an
d 
m
at
er
ia
l s
up
po
rt 
fro
m
 
th
ei
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
w
ho
 a
re
 in
 
M
an
ila
.
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C
on
tin
ua
tio
n 
- 4
 W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
go
od
 a
nd
 b
ad
 th
in
gs
 a
bo
ut
 h
av
in
g 
so
ns
? 
da
ug
ht
er
s?
* 
Fo
r e
ld
es
t n
ev
er
 m
ar
rie
d 
so
ns
 a
nd
 d
au
gh
te
rs
, 
th
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 a
sk
ed
 w
er
e.
 D
o 
yo
u 
pr
ef
e 
ha
ve
 m
al
e 
or
 fe
m
al
e 
si
bl
in
gs
? 
W
hy
 d
o 
yo
u 
pr
ef
er
 m
al
e 
si
bl
in
gs
? 
fe
m
al
e 
si
bl
in
gs
?’
 G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s 
w
er
e 
al
so
 a
sk
ed
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
qu
es
tio
ns
: 
‘w
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
go
od
 a
nd
 b
ad
 th
in
gs
 
ab
ou
t 
ha
vi
ng
 g
ra
nd
so
ns
? 
gr
an
dd
au
gh
te
rs
?’
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
S
on
s 
an
d 
gr
an
ds
on
s 
he
lp
 
in
 th
e 
fa
rm
 a
nd
 in
 
ca
rr
yi
ng
 t
hi
ng
s.
 T
he
y 
ca
rr
y 
th
e 
fa
m
ily
 n
am
e.
 
Th
ei
r d
au
gh
te
rs
 a
nd
 
gr
an
d 
da
ug
ht
er
s 
he
lp
 a
t 
ho
m
e.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
al
e 
si
bl
in
gs
 c
ar
ry
 h
ea
vy
 
th
in
gs
 w
hi
le
 fe
m
al
e 
si
bl
in
gs
 c
ar
ry
 li
gh
t 
th
in
gs
. 
M
al
e 
si
bl
in
gs
 h
el
p 
in
 th
e 
fa
rm
 a
nd
 fe
m
al
e 
si
bl
in
gs
 a
t h
om
e.
 T
he
y 
sa
id
 it
 is
 b
ad
 w
he
n 
th
ei
r 
m
al
e 
si
bl
in
gs
 s
pe
nd
 s
o 
m
uc
h 
tim
e 
w
ith
 th
ei
r g
an
g 
m
at
es
.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
al
e 
si
bl
in
gs
 a
re
 g
oo
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
fa
rm
 a
nd
 fe
m
al
e 
si
bl
in
gs
 h
el
p 
at
 h
om
e.
 
Th
ey
 s
ad
 th
at
 th
er
e 
is 
no
th
in
g 
ba
d 
ab
ou
t m
al
e 
or
 fe
m
al
e 
si
bl
in
gs
.
M
ot
he
rs
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
e 
so
ns
 h
el
p 
th
ei
r 
fa
th
er
s 
in
 th
e 
fa
rm
. 
It 
is
 
ba
d 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 g
am
bl
e 
an
d 
ta
ke
 a
lc
oh
ol
ic
 
dr
in
ks
.
D
au
gh
te
rs
 h
el
p 
at
 h
om
e.
 
S
om
e 
of
 th
ei
r 
da
ug
ht
er
s 
ar
e 
in
 M
an
ila
 w
or
ki
ng
 a
s 
do
m
es
tic
 h
el
pe
rs
 o
r 
fa
ct
or
y 
w
or
ke
rs
. 
It 
is
 b
ad
 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 m
ar
ry
 e
ar
ly
.
Fa
th
er
s
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
e 
so
ns
 h
el
p 
in
 th
e 
fa
rm
. 
It 
is
 b
ad
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 
ar
e 
la
zy
.
D
au
gh
te
rs
 h
el
p 
th
ei
r 
m
ot
he
rs
 a
t 
ho
m
e.
 M
os
t o
f 
th
ei
r 
da
ug
ht
er
s 
w
or
k 
in
 
M
an
ila
 a
nd
 s
en
d 
m
on
ey
 
to
 th
em
. 
It 
is
 b
ad
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 a
re
 l
az
y.
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5.
 W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
go
od
 a
nd
 b
ad
 th
in
gs
 a
bo
ut
 y
ou
r 
ne
ig
hb
ou
r’s
 h
av
ii
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
It 
is 
go
od
 if
 th
ey
 a
re
 
ha
pp
y 
an
d 
th
ey
 h
el
p 
th
ei
r 
pa
re
nt
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
ne
ig
hb
ou
rs
. 
It 
is
 b
ad
 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 w
ill
 fi
nd
 it
 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 s
up
po
rt 
th
e 
ne
ed
s 
of
 a
 la
rg
e 
fa
m
ily
 
(s
uc
h 
as
 fo
od
 a
nd
 
ed
uc
at
io
n)
 a
nd
 to
 
im
pr
ov
e 
th
ei
r 
liv
es
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
It 
is
 g
oo
d 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 a
re
 
ha
pp
y 
an
d 
ba
d 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 
ar
e 
no
is
y 
an
d 
th
ey
 fi
gh
t 
ea
ch
 o
th
er
. 
O
ne
 o
ut
 o
f 
th
e 
th
re
e 
gr
ou
ps
 s
ai
d 
it 
is
 
up
 to
 th
ei
r 
ne
ig
hb
ou
r t
o 
de
ci
de
 o
n 
th
is
.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
It 
is
 g
oo
d 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 
he
lp
 y
ou
 a
nd
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
m
an
y 
fri
en
ds
. 
It 
is
 b
ad
 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 a
re
 n
oi
sy
, 
ro
w
dy
 a
nd
 y
ou
 fe
el
 
cr
ow
de
d.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 ( 
si
xt
y 
pe
r c
en
t 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
it 
is
 u
p 
to
 th
ei
r 
ne
ig
hb
ou
rs
 
to
 d
ec
id
e 
on
 w
he
th
er
 to
 
ha
ve
 a
 la
rg
e 
fa
m
ily
 o
r 
no
t. 
O
ne
 g
ro
up
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 
a 
sm
al
l f
am
ily
 is
 le
ss
 
ro
w
dy
. 
O
ne
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t 
sa
id
 h
e 
w
an
ts
 h
is
 
ne
ig
hb
ou
r t
o 
ha
ve
 a
 la
rg
e 
fa
m
ily
 b
ec
au
se
 th
at
 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
fu
n.
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 s
ai
d 
it 
is
 g
oo
d 
if 
th
ey
: 
ca
n 
af
fo
rd
 it
 a
nd
 
th
ey
 c
an
 h
el
p 
yo
u;
 h
av
e 
a 
la
rg
e 
la
nd
 fo
r f
ar
m
in
g;
 
an
d 
he
lp
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r. 
It 
is
 
ba
d 
if:
 t
he
ir 
bu
dg
et
 is
 n
ot
 
en
ou
gh
 a
nd
 th
ey
 d
ep
en
d 
on
 y
ou
; t
he
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
ar
e 
un
di
sc
ip
lin
ed
; 
th
e 
fa
m
ily
 
m
em
be
rs
 fi
gh
t w
ith
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r; 
th
ey
 ta
ke
 t
oo
 
m
uc
h 
sp
ac
e;
 a
nd
 a
re
 
no
is
y.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
si
xt
y 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
it 
is
 
up
 to
 th
ei
r 
ne
ig
hb
ou
r t
o 
de
ci
de
 o
n 
w
he
th
er
 th
ey
 
w
an
t a
 la
rg
e 
or
 a
 s
m
al
l 
fa
m
ily
. 
O
th
er
s 
pr
ef
er
 a
 
sm
al
l f
am
ily
 fo
r t
he
ir 
ne
ig
hb
ou
r 
so
 th
ey
 c
ou
ld
 
ed
uc
at
e 
th
ei
r 
ch
ild
re
n.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 s
ai
d 
it 
is
 g
oo
d 
if 
th
ey
 a
re
 w
el
l-t
ra
in
ed
, 
ea
sy
 to
 g
et
 a
lo
ng
 w
ith
, 
an
d 
ar
e 
ha
pp
y.
 I
t i
s 
ba
d 
be
ca
us
e 
th
er
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
m
or
e 
ex
pe
ns
es
 a
nd
 th
ey
 
ar
e 
no
is
y.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
si
xt
y 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 a
 s
m
al
l f
am
ily
 
co
ns
um
es
 le
ss
 a
nd
 is
 n
ot
 
to
o 
ro
w
dy
. 
O
th
er
s 
th
in
k 
th
at
 it
 is
 u
p 
to
 th
ei
r 
ne
ig
hb
ou
r 
if 
th
ey
 w
an
t a
 
la
rg
e 
fa
m
ily
.
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C.
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
Is
su
e 
.
1.
 H
ow
 is
 th
e 
co
un
try
si
de
 c
ha
ng
in
g?
 G
oo
d 
or
 b
ad
? 
W
ha
t i
s 
its
 e
ffe
ct
 o
n 
yo
u?
 o
n 
yo
ur
 p
ar
en
ts
? 
on
 y
ou
r 
gr
an
dp
ar
en
ts
 (
if 
st
ill
 li
vi
ng
)?
 o
n 
yo
ur
 c
hi
ld
re
n?
 (
as
 a
pp
ln
 
On
 y
ou
r 
gr
an
dc
hi
ld
re
n 
(a
s 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
)?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
It 
is
 g
oo
d 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
co
m
m
un
ity
 is
 c
le
an
er
, 
m
or
e 
pe
ac
ef
ul
 a
nd
 m
or
e 
pe
op
le
 a
re
 h
ap
py
. T
he
re
 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 a
nd
 
co
m
m
un
ity
 a
ss
oc
ia
tio
ns
 
no
w
. 
P
eo
pl
e 
co
nt
in
ue
 to
 
w
or
k 
ha
rd
. 
M
or
e 
vi
lla
ge
rs
 
tra
ve
l 
ov
er
se
as
 to
 w
or
k.
 
W
ha
t 
is
 b
ad
 is
 th
at
 tr
ee
s 
ar
e 
be
in
g 
cu
t a
nd
 n
ot
 r
e­
pl
an
te
d 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
. 
O
ne
 
gr
ou
p 
th
in
ks
 it
 is
 le
ss
 
pe
ac
ef
ul
 n
ow
 in
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
. 
Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
sa
id
 th
ey
 a
re
 e
nj
oy
in
g 
th
e 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
on
e 
gr
ou
p 
sa
id
 th
e 
ai
r 
is 
be
co
m
in
g 
w
ar
m
er
.
H
en
ce
, 
th
ey
 e
xp
ec
t t
he
 
ne
xt
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
to
 
en
co
un
te
r 
di
ffi
cu
lti
es
 d
ue
 
to
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e 
cl
im
at
e.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
It 
is
 g
oo
d 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
su
rr
ou
nd
in
gs
 a
re
 c
le
an
, 
pe
op
le
 p
la
nt
 r
ic
e,
 t
he
re
 
ar
e 
m
an
y 
ho
us
es
 a
nd
 
m
or
e 
pe
op
le
. 
It 
is
 b
ad
 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
fo
re
st
s 
ar
e 
gr
ad
ua
lly
 b
ei
ng
 d
en
ud
ed
, 
m
or
e 
pe
op
le
 b
ec
om
e 
in
to
xi
ca
te
d,
 t
he
 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
cr
im
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
ar
e 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
, 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
di
se
as
es
 a
nd
 th
er
e 
is
 le
ss
 w
at
er
. 
M
aj
or
ity
 
sa
id
 th
e 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 c
rim
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
ca
us
es
 f
ea
r. 
O
ne
 g
ro
up
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 th
e 
ai
r h
as
 b
ec
om
e 
w
ar
m
er
 
no
w
 a
nd
 th
at
 p
eo
pl
e 
ca
nn
ot
 s
le
ep
 w
el
l a
ny
 
m
or
e.
 T
he
y 
al
so
 s
ai
d 
m
or
e 
pe
op
le
 g
et
 s
ic
k 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
di
rty
 a
ir.
 
O
ne
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t v
oi
ce
d 
he
r 
co
nc
er
n 
th
at
 h
er
 
fu
tu
re
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
w
ill
 n
ot
 
se
e 
w
ha
t i
s 
st
ill
 in
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
bo
th
 g
oo
d 
an
d 
ba
d 
ch
an
ge
s.
 O
th
er
 
pl
ac
es
 a
re
 s
til
l c
le
an
 
w
hi
le
 in
 o
th
er
 p
ar
ts
 o
f t
he
 
vi
lla
ge
 th
e 
riv
er
s 
ar
e 
al
re
ad
y 
di
rty
. T
he
re
 is
 to
o 
m
uc
h 
sl
as
h-
an
d-
bu
rn
 
fa
rm
in
g 
an
d 
th
e 
fo
re
st
s 
ar
e 
sl
ow
ly
 b
ei
ng
 
de
nu
de
d.
 O
ne
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t 
th
in
ks
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 p
eo
pl
e’
s 
m
en
ta
lit
y 
w
hi
ch
 is
 m
or
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ta
l i
n 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n.
 H
e 
th
in
ks
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 is
 s
lo
w
ly
 b
ei
ng
 
ur
ba
ni
se
d.
 M
aj
or
ity
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 th
e 
ai
r 
is
 b
ec
om
in
g 
ho
t a
nd
 p
eo
pl
e 
co
ul
d 
ea
si
ly
 g
et
 s
ic
k.
 A
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
 s
ai
d 
th
e 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 le
ve
l o
f 
ur
ba
ni
sa
tio
n 
is
 g
oo
d 
fo
r 
hi
m
 b
ec
au
se
 h
e 
th
in
ks
 
hi
s 
co
lle
ge
 d
eg
re
e 
w
ou
ld
 
be
 o
f u
se
 in
 h
is
 v
ill
ag
e.
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 th
in
k 
th
at
 th
er
e 
w
er
e 
se
ve
ra
l 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 
ro
ad
s,
 h
ou
si
ng
, 
tre
e 
pl
an
tin
g 
an
d 
ar
te
si
an
 w
el
l 
pr
oj
ec
ts
. 
P
eo
pl
e 
ar
e 
bu
sy
. 
Li
ve
s 
th
ey
 s
ai
d 
ar
e 
im
pr
ov
in
g 
an
d 
in
co
m
es
 
ar
e 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
ey
 s
ai
d 
w
ha
t i
s 
ba
d 
is
 
po
llu
tio
n.
 T
he
y 
sa
id
 th
at
 
m
os
t o
f t
he
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 
th
e 
co
un
try
si
de
 h
as
 h
ad
 
a 
go
od
 e
ffe
ct
 o
n 
th
em
. 
O
ne
 g
ro
up
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 if
 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
ro
ad
s 
w
er
e 
as
 
go
od
 a
s 
its
 p
re
se
nt
 
co
nd
iti
on
, 
th
ei
r 
gr
an
dp
ar
en
ts
 m
ig
ht
 n
ot
 
ha
ve
 d
ie
d 
ea
rly
. 
A
ls
o,
 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 b
et
te
r 
ro
ad
s,
 
th
ey
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
to
 
re
nt
 a
 p
la
ce
 in
 th
e 
ci
ty
 fo
r 
th
ei
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
an
y 
m
or
e.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 p
ol
lu
tio
n 
ha
s 
a 
ba
d 
ef
fe
ct
 b
ec
au
se
 
th
ey
 b
re
at
he
 b
ad
 a
ir.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 th
in
k 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
le
ss
 t
yp
ho
on
s 
in
 t
he
ir 
pl
ac
e.
 H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 
m
ou
nt
ai
ns
 h
av
e 
be
en
 
de
nu
de
d,
 w
at
er
 is
 
de
cl
in
in
g,
 a
nd
 b
ec
om
in
g 
po
llu
te
d,
 a
nd
 th
e 
ai
r 
is 
no
t 
so
 fr
es
h.
Th
ey
 th
in
k 
th
at
 th
e 
cl
im
at
e 
ha
s 
ch
an
ge
d 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 fe
el
 th
e 
he
at
 m
or
e.
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C
on
tin
ua
tio
n 
- 
1.
 H
ow
 is
 th
e 
co
un
try
si
de
 c
ha
ng
in
g?
 G
oo
d 
or
 b
ad
? 
W
ha
t i
s 
its
 e
ffe
ct
 o
n 
yo
u?
 o
n 
yo
ur
 p
ar
en
ts
? 
on
 y
ou
r 
gr
an
dp
ar
ei
 
on
 y
ou
r c
hi
ld
re
n?
 (
as
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
) 
On
 y
ou
r 
gr
an
dc
hi
ld
re
n 
(a
s 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
)?
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 th
in
k 
th
at
 th
e 
co
un
try
si
de
 h
as
 c
ha
ng
ed
 
ph
ys
ic
al
ly
 b
ut
 t
he
 
m
en
ta
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
pe
op
le
 
ha
s 
no
t. 
S
om
e 
of
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
rs
 c
on
tin
ue
 to
 
dr
in
k 
w
in
e 
an
d 
ga
m
bl
e 
an
d 
th
is
 in
cl
ud
es
 w
om
en
. 
Th
er
e 
is
 e
le
ct
ric
ity
 n
ow
 
bu
t t
he
 p
eo
pl
e 
ar
e 
so
 
po
or
 th
ey
 c
ou
ld
 n
ot
 
af
fo
rd
 t
o 
ha
ve
 e
le
ct
ric
ity
 
in
 th
ei
r 
ho
us
es
. 
Th
er
e 
is 
no
w
 a
 s
ta
ge
 fo
r v
ill
ag
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 a
nd
 a
 h
ea
lth
 
ce
nt
re
. 
A
 d
ay
 c
ar
e 
ce
nt
re
 
fo
r 
pr
e-
sc
ho
ol
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
is
 
be
in
g 
bu
ilt
. T
he
re
 a
re
 
m
or
e 
pe
op
le
 a
nd
 h
ou
se
s 
no
w
 a
nd
 m
or
e 
pe
op
le
 a
re
 
st
ud
yi
ng
. 
Th
e 
ch
an
ge
s 
ha
ve
 b
ot
h 
go
od
 a
nd
 b
ad
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
on
 t
he
m
.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 n
ot
ic
ed
 th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
pe
op
le
, 
ve
hi
cl
es
, 
an
d 
flo
w
er
in
g 
pl
an
ts
. 
Th
e 
su
rr
ou
nd
in
gs
 
ar
e 
cl
ea
ne
r a
nd
 n
ow
 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 p
la
za
 fo
r v
ill
ag
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
.
Th
ey
 th
in
k 
th
at
 th
e 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 a
re
 g
oo
d 
fo
r t
he
m
 
bu
t d
id
 n
ot
 e
la
bo
ra
te
.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
pa
rt 
fro
m
 th
e 
pl
ac
e 
be
co
m
in
g 
cl
ea
ne
r a
nd
 
ha
vi
ng
 m
or
e 
pe
op
le
, 
ho
us
es
 a
nd
 fl
ow
er
in
g 
pl
an
ts
 a
nd
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t 
of
 a
 v
ill
ag
e 
pl
az
a 
th
er
e 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 
be
en
 m
uc
h 
ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e 
co
un
try
si
de
.
Th
ey
 th
in
k 
th
at
 th
e 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 a
re
 g
oo
d 
fo
r t
he
m
.
M
ot
he
rs
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 n
ot
ic
ed
 th
at
 th
e 
co
un
try
si
de
 h
as
 n
ot
 
ch
an
ge
d 
m
uc
h 
ex
ce
pt
 fo
r 
m
or
e 
pe
op
le
, 
cl
ea
ne
r 
su
rr
ou
nd
in
gs
, 
m
or
e 
or
na
m
en
ta
l p
la
nt
s 
ar
ou
nd
, 
an
d 
so
m
e 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
ro
ad
s,
 a
nd
 th
e 
m
at
er
ia
l o
f 
a 
fe
w
 h
ou
se
s.
 T
he
 g
ro
up
 
sa
id
 s
om
e 
of
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 
pe
op
le
 h
av
e 
no
t c
ha
ng
ed
 
at
 a
ll 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 
co
nt
in
ue
 to
 d
rin
k 
liq
uo
r 
an
d 
ga
m
bl
e.
M
aj
or
ity
 th
in
k 
m
or
e 
be
au
tif
ul
 s
ur
ro
un
di
ng
s 
ar
e 
go
od
 fo
r t
he
m
.
Fa
th
er
s
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y-
th
re
e 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
th
er
e 
is
 
no
t m
uc
h 
ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e 
co
un
try
si
de
. 
S
om
e 
no
tic
ed
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
flo
w
er
in
g 
pl
an
ts
 a
ro
un
d 
an
d 
th
e 
su
rr
ou
nd
in
gs
 a
re
 
m
or
e 
be
au
tif
ul
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
ey
 h
ad
 b
et
te
r 
ha
rv
es
ts
 
be
fo
re
. T
he
y 
al
so
 s
ai
d 
th
e 
cl
im
at
e 
is
 b
ec
om
in
g 
ho
tte
r 
an
d 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
ty
ph
oo
ns
 n
ow
. 
C
le
an
er
 
su
rr
ou
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 
flo
w
er
in
g 
pl
an
ts
 r
ed
uc
e 
po
llu
tio
n.
 H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
e 
ho
t t
em
pe
ra
tu
re
 a
nd
 th
e 
oc
cu
rr
en
ce
 o
f 
na
tu
ra
l 
ca
la
m
iti
es
 h
av
e 
lo
w
er
ed
 
th
e 
vo
lu
m
e 
of
 fa
rm
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n.
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2.
 W
he
re
 is
 th
e 
ne
ar
es
t f
or
es
t?
 W
ha
t d
o 
yo
u 
ge
t
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
Lu
m
be
r, 
ro
ot
 c
ro
ps
, 
w
at
er
, 
irr
ig
at
io
n,
 f
oo
d,
 
an
im
al
s,
 g
ra
ss
, 
fu
el
 
w
oo
d,
 a
nd
 p
ro
du
ce
 (
ric
e 
an
d 
ve
ge
ta
bl
es
) 
fro
m
 
sl
as
h-
an
d-
bu
rn
 fa
rm
in
g.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
Lu
m
be
r, 
fu
el
 w
oo
d 
an
d 
fr
ui
ts
.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Fr
ui
ts
, 
fir
ew
oo
d,
 a
ni
m
al
s,
 
bi
rd
s 
eg
gs
 a
nd
 q
ua
ils
’ 
eg
gs
, 
flo
w
er
s,
 
ve
ge
ta
bl
es
, 
he
rb
al
 
m
ed
ic
in
e,
 w
at
er
 a
nd
 s
oi
l.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
Fi
re
w
oo
d,
 lu
m
be
r f
or
 
bu
ild
in
g 
ho
us
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
sc
ho
ol
, 
w
oo
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
ta
bl
es
 a
nd
 c
ha
irs
, 
an
d 
fr
ui
ts
.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
fo
od
, 
w
oo
d,
 f
ru
its
, 
w
ild
 
an
im
al
s,
 fr
es
h 
ai
r 
an
d 
w
at
er
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
Lu
m
be
r, 
fu
el
 w
oo
d 
an
d 
fr
ui
ts
.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
W
oo
d,
 fr
ui
ts
, 
w
ild
 a
ni
m
al
s 
an
d 
w
at
er
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Lu
m
be
r, 
fu
el
 w
oo
d 
an
d 
w
at
er
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
W
at
er
, 
fre
sh
 a
ir,
 f
ru
its
, 
fir
ew
oo
d 
an
d 
lu
m
be
r.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
W
ild
 a
ni
m
al
s,
 lu
m
be
r a
nd
 
fu
el
 w
oo
d
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Fu
el
 w
oo
d,
 lu
m
be
r, 
w
ild
 
an
im
al
s,
 f
ru
its
, 
flo
w
er
s 
an
d 
w
at
er
.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
W
at
er
, 
fu
el
 w
oo
d,
 l
um
be
r, 
fru
its
 a
nd
 p
la
nt
s.
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:h
e 
si
ze
 o
f t
he
 n
ea
re
st
 fo
re
st
 h
as
 d
ec
lin
ed
 in
 th
e 
la
st
 fi
ve
 y
ea
rs
, 
do
 y
ou
 fi
nd
 y
ou
 n
ee
d 
m
or
e 
la
bo
ur
 (
ch
ild
re
n)
 to
 h
el
p 
w
ith
 m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 (
se
ve
nt
y-
fiv
e 
pe
r c
en
t o
f t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s)
 s
ai
d 
no
t 
an
y 
m
or
e.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
 
(N
ot
 a
sk
ed
)
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o 
or
 h
ad
 
no
 r
es
po
ns
e.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 
O
ne
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t, 
ho
w
ev
er
, 
sa
id
 h
er
 
pa
re
nt
s 
m
ay
 n
ee
d 
m
or
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
to
 p
la
nt
 tr
ee
s.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
M
aj
or
ity
 th
in
k 
th
ei
r 
pa
re
nt
s 
ne
ed
 m
or
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
to
 h
el
p 
in
 
re
fo
re
st
at
io
n.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 O
ne
 
gr
ou
p 
sa
id
 s
in
ce
 th
er
e 
is
 
no
 fo
re
st
 th
er
e 
is
 le
ss
 to
 
ea
t.
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l a
ns
w
er
ed
 n
o.
 O
ne
 
gr
ou
p 
sa
id
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
w
at
er
 a
ny
 m
or
e,
 s
o 
th
er
e 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
le
ss
 c
hi
ld
re
n.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
A
ll 
an
sw
er
ed
 n
o.
 O
ne
 
gr
ou
p 
sa
id
 th
er
e 
is 
no
th
in
g 
to
 e
at
 a
ny
 m
or
e.
 
B
es
id
es
, 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
to
 
w
or
k 
ha
rd
er
 if
 th
ey
 h
ad
 
m
or
e 
ch
ild
re
n.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 th
in
k 
th
ey
 d
o 
no
t 
ne
ed
 m
or
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
to
 
he
lp
 w
ith
 m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d.
M
as
ba
te
 v
ill
ag
e:
Al
l o
f t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 
sa
id
 n
o.
 O
ne
 g
ro
up
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 s
in
ce
 f
or
es
t 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
ha
ve
 d
ec
lin
ed
, 
th
e 
m
or
e 
th
at
 y
ou
 n
ee
d 
fe
w
er
 c
hi
ld
re
n.
 I
f b
ef
or
e 
yo
u 
di
d 
no
t b
uy
 fu
el
 
w
oo
d,
 n
ow
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
to
 
do
 s
o.
46
1
4.
 W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 a
nd
 d
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 o
f p
ro
te
ct
in
g 
th
e 
fo
re
st
s?
 W
ho
 s
ho
ul
d 
pr
ot
ec
t t
he
 fo
re
st
s?
 I
f i
t c
an
no
t b
e 
pr
ot
ec
te
d,
 h
ow
 s
er
io
us
 d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
w
ou
li 
co
nd
iti
on
 o
f t
he
 fo
re
st
s 
be
 in
 th
e 
ne
xt
 fi
ve
 y
ea
rs
 (
20
02
)?
<D
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Fl
oo
ds
 a
nd
 la
nd
sl
id
es
 w
ill
 
oc
cu
r 
be
ca
us
e 
so
ils
 w
ill
 
be
 e
ro
de
d.
 R
ic
e 
fie
ld
s 
w
ill
 
be
 d
es
tro
ye
d.
 T
he
re
 w
ill
 
be
 n
o 
m
or
e 
w
oo
d 
fo
r 
bu
ild
in
g 
ho
us
es
. 
N
o 
m
or
e 
w
at
er
 fo
r 
pe
op
le
 a
nd
 
an
im
al
s 
to
 d
rin
k 
an
d 
pe
op
le
 a
nd
 p
la
nt
s 
w
ill
 d
ie
. 
Th
ey
 s
ai
d 
th
e 
pe
op
le
 in
 
th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 s
ho
ul
d 
pr
ot
ec
t 
th
e 
fo
re
st
s.
Y
ou
ng
er
 C
hi
ld
re
n
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Fr
ui
ts
 w
ill
 b
e 
de
st
ro
ye
d.
 
Fl
oo
ds
 w
ill
 o
cc
ur
 a
nd
 
pe
op
le
 w
ill 
di
e.
 T
he
 
pe
op
le
 s
ho
ul
d 
pr
ot
ec
t t
he
 
fo
re
st
s.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
D
au
gh
te
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
er
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
la
nd
sl
id
es
 a
nd
 fl
oo
ds
. 
N
o 
m
or
e 
fre
sh
 a
ir 
an
d 
w
ild
 
an
im
al
s,
 W
at
er
 s
up
pl
y 
w
ill 
be
 le
ss
. 
P
eo
pl
e 
w
ill 
ge
t s
ic
k.
 T
he
re
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
le
ss
 f
oo
d.
 P
la
nt
s,
 
an
im
al
s,
 a
nd
 p
eo
pl
e 
w
ill 
di
e.
 T
he
y 
be
lie
ve
 p
eo
pl
e 
sh
ou
ld
 ta
ke
 c
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
fo
re
st
s.
 O
ne
 g
ro
up
 a
ls
o 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
th
at
 th
e 
yo
ut
h 
sh
ou
ld
 h
el
p 
in
 p
ro
te
ct
in
g 
th
e 
fo
re
st
s.
E
ld
es
t N
ev
er
 M
ar
rie
d 
S
on
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Fl
oo
ds
 w
ill 
oc
cu
r. 
Th
er
e 
w
on
’t 
be
 fr
es
h 
ai
r. 
Th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 w
ill
 b
e 
lik
e 
a 
de
se
rt 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
ho
t t
em
pe
ra
tu
re
. 
Th
er
e 
w
ill 
be
 n
o 
m
or
e 
w
at
er
. S
oi
l 
er
os
io
n 
an
d 
flo
od
s 
w
ill 
oc
cu
r. 
Th
er
e 
w
ill 
be
 n
o 
m
or
e 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
so
ur
ce
s 
of
 li
ve
lih
oo
d.
 I
nc
om
es
 w
ill 
be
 r
ed
uc
ed
. T
he
 n
ex
t 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
ab
le
 to
 a
pp
re
ci
at
e 
w
ild
lif
e.
 M
aj
or
ity
 s
ai
d 
th
e 
pe
op
le
 s
ho
ul
d 
pr
ot
ec
t t
he
 
fo
re
st
s.
 O
ne
 g
ro
up
 
po
in
te
d 
ou
t t
ha
t t
he
 
yo
ut
h 
sh
ou
ld
 ta
ke
 c
ar
e 
of
 
th
e 
fo
re
st
s.
M
ot
he
rs
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Lu
m
be
r w
ill
 d
ec
lin
e.
 
Th
er
e 
w
on
’t 
be
 fr
es
h 
ai
r. 
It 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
ve
ry
 h
ot
. 
Th
er
e 
w
ill 
be
 a
 fe
w
 fr
ui
ts
 
an
d 
w
ild
 a
ni
m
al
s.
 T
he
re
 
w
ill 
be
 n
o 
m
or
e 
w
at
er
. 
R
iv
er
s 
w
ill 
dr
y 
up
. S
oi
l 
er
os
io
n,
 f
lo
od
s,
 a
nd
 
dr
ou
gh
t w
ill
 o
cc
ur
. 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
w
ill 
be
 
af
fe
ct
ed
. 
P
eo
pl
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
hu
ng
ry
, 
ge
t s
ic
k,
 o
r 
di
e.
 
A
ll 
th
in
k 
th
at
 th
e 
pe
op
le
 
sh
ou
ld
 p
ro
te
ct
 th
e 
fo
re
st
s.
Fa
th
er
s
B
en
gu
et
 v
ill
ag
e:
Th
ey
 b
el
ie
ve
 th
at
 th
e 
fo
re
st
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
ot
ec
te
d.
 O
th
er
w
is
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th
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ils
 w
ill
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ro
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, t
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w
ill
 b
e 
'fl
as
h'
 fl
oo
ds
, 
th
e 
ai
r w
ill
 b
e 
w
ar
m
er
, t
he
re
 
w
ill 
be
 d
ro
ug
ht
, t
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fa
rm
er
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w
ill 
fin
d 
it 
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ffi
cu
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to
 w
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k 
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 th
e 
fie
ld
s,
 a
nd
 th
er
e 
w
ill
 b
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no
 m
or
e 
so
ur
ce
 o
f 
liv
el
ih
oo
d.
 M
aj
or
ity
 th
in
k 
th
at
 th
e 
pe
op
le
 s
ho
ul
d 
pr
ot
ec
t 
th
e 
fo
re
st
s 
an
d 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t s
ho
ul
d 
su
pp
or
t t
he
 p
eo
pl
e.
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Annex 10 
(Chapter 5)
This Annex describes the variables used in the regression models with 
their sources of data placed in parenthesis.
INFMORT
CMORT
FERT
MWB
NMIGj
POVIj
FAMEXPH
MAL
AGEFEM
FLIT
FEMLIT
MALIT
FEMALIT
ILLIT
ACADEG
ELEC
POT
SAN
NAGL
DEPR
HSIZ
URB
LANFO
IRRIG
POPDEN
DIST
ROADEN
PAVRODEN
D
Infant Mortality Rates; the number per 1,000 live births that did 
not reach the age of one (1) in 1991 per province (DOH 1991) 
Child Mortality Rates; the number per 1,000 children that did not 
reach the age of five (5) in 1991 per province (DOH 1991).
Fertility rates in 1990 per province (NSCB 1995a)
Morbidity resulting from water-borne diseases per 100,000 
population in 1991 per province (DOH 1991)
Net Migration Rates; the proportion of net migrants (in-migrants 
less out-migrants) to total population in 1991 per province 
(NSCB 1991)
Poverty incidence in 1991 by province (PCFP 1995)
Average family expenditures on health in 1991 per 
province (NSO 1994b)
Malnutrition rate in 1990 per province (PCFP 1995)
Average age at marriage of female population in 1990 
per province (NSO 1993)
Functional literacy rate in 1989 per province (DECS and NSO 
1989)
Female basic literacy rate in 1991 per province (NSO 1992)
Male basic literacy rate in 1991 per province (NSO 1992) 
Combined female and male basic literacy rate in 1991 per 
province (as computed)
Illiteracy rate in 1990 per province (PCFP 1995)
Proportion of persons 25 years old and over with academic 
degree (NSO 1993)
Proportion of households with electricity in 1990 per province 
(NSO 1993)
Proportion of households with potable water in 1990 per 
province (NSO 1993)
Proportion of households with sanitary toilet facilities in 1990 per 
province (NSO 1993)
Proportion of the labour force in the non- agricultural sector in 
1990 per province (NSO 1993)
The average dependency burden ratio in 1990 per province; the 
number of household members less than or equal to 14 years 
old plus those above 65 years old divided by the number of 
persons in the household (NSO 1993)
Average household size in 1990 per province (NSO 1993) 
Proportion of households living in an urbanised area in 1990 per 
province (NSO 1993);
Proportion of total area of farms in the province in 1991 which 
were fully-owned and operated and not tenanted (NSO 1994a) 
Proportion of arable land in the province in 1991 which is irrigated 
(NSO 1994a)
Population density; population per square kilometre (NSO 1993) 
Dummy variable for distance. The variable takes a value of 0 if the 
province is located in Luzon (except for Mindoro and Palawan 
which takes a value of 1 because of their relatively longer 
distance from MetroManila as compared to the other provinces 
within the Luzon island); 1 if in the Visayas; and 2 if in Mindanao. 
Road density per province (DPWH 1991)
Paved road density per province (DPWH 1991)
Regional delineation from 1 to 13 (NSO 1993)
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Annex 12 
(Chapter 6)
This Annex describes the variables used in the regression models. All 
the data were derived from the survey of households I conducted in 
1997 .
H
FEMED
MALED
FEMALED
AGE
SQAGE
CUBAGE
AGEGAP
NCHLD
GENDER
EGSTOVE
FRIDGE
ELEC
PWF
TIME
NWAGE
IRRIG
LANO
HOUSE
INCOME
PCAPINC
FOC
MOC
D
= height-for-age score for child i; the difference between the actual 
height and the mean height-for age divided by the mean height-for-age 
= number of years of formal schooling of the child’s mother 
= number of years of formal schooling of the child’s father 
= the sum of the number of years of formal schooling of the child’s mother 
and the child’s father 
= age of the child (in months)
= age of the child squared (in months)
= age of the child cubed (in months)
= the difference between the age of the eldest child and the youngest 
child in the child’s family
= number of children in the child’s household between the ages of 1 
month and 60 months
= gender of the child. Dummy variables used: A value of 1 if male and a 
value of 0 if female.
= use of electricity or gas as main source of energy for cooking in the 
child’s household
= use of refrigerator in the child’s household. Dummy variables used: a 
value of 1 yes and a value of 0 if no.
= use of electricity in the child’s household. Dummy variables used: a 
value of 1 if yes and a value of 0 if no.
= use of private washing facilities in the child’s household. Dummy 
variables used: a value of 1 if yes and a value of 0 if no.
= time from the nearest source of potable water to the child’s household 
(in minutes)
= number of working-age members in the child’s household who are 
likewise employed (in agricultural and/or non-agricultural work)
= use of irrigation facilities for farming by the child’s household. Dummy 
variables used: a value of 0 if farmland is not irrigated and a value of 1 if 
irrigated.
= ownership of land used for farming. Dummy variables used: a value of 0 
if household does not own the land being used for farming and a value 
of 1 if household owns the land being used for farming 
= quality of housing floor. Dummy variables used: a value of 1 for a house 
with a cement floor; a house with a wooden floor a value of 2; one with a 
bamboo floor a value of 3; and a house with an earthen floor a value of 4. 
= nominal household income in 1996 
= nominal per capita income in 1996
= father’s occupation. Dummy variables used: a value of 0 for fathers with 
no occupation; a value of 1 for fathers whose main occupation is 
agricultural in nature; and a value of 2 for fathers whose main 
occupation is non-agricultural in nature.
= mother’s occupation. Dummy variables used: a value of 0 for mothers 
with no occupation; a value of 1 for mothers whose main occupation is 
agricultural; and a value of 2 for mothers whose main occupation is non- 
agricultural.
= village. Dummy variables used: a value of 0 for Barangay San Juan and 
a value of 1 for Barangay Nangalisan
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